

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 06823919 7

ZFF

Knapp

Lesungen über d. Christliche Lehre J.
L. C. 2. Aufl. 8d. 1892

LECTURES

ON

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

BY

GEORGE CHRISTIAN KNAPP.

TRANSLATED BY

LEONARD WOODS, JUN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.




NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED BY G. & C. & H. CARVILL,
No. 108, Broadway.

Andover.....Printed at the Codman Press,
BY FLAGG, GOULD, AND NEWMAN.

1833.

57
D 503



"Entered according to the Act of Congress in the year 1833,
by G. & C. & H. Carvill,
In the Clerk's office of the Southern District of New York."

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

BOOK SECOND.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

PART FIRST.

THE STATE INTO WHICH MAN IS BROUGHT BY THE FALL.

ARTICLE NINTH.

OF SIN, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN.

	Page
§ 73. What is meant by sin ; the different words used in the Bible to denote sin, and the meaning of them	11
§ 74. What does reason, without the use of the Bible, teach us respecting the sinful state of man, and the origin of it? And how far do the results of Reason on this subject agree with the Bible?	15
§ 75. Mosaic account of the sin of our first parents	26
§ 76. Of the imputation of the sin of our first parents	42
§ 77. In what the natural depravity of man consists; its appellations in the Bible; when it has its principal seat in man; and how its existence may be proved from the Holy Scriptures	52
§ 78. Of the nature and attributes of this corruption; its propagation, its punishableness; also of the origin of sinful desires among men, and their punishableness	65
§ 79. Of the representations of the ancient Church-fathers respecting human depravity; and the manner in which the ecclesiastical phraseology on this subject, and the various forms of doctrine were gradually developed	75
§ 80. Results of the foregoing discussion respecting the doctrine of natural depravity, and observations on the mode of teaching this doctrine. . . .	84
§ 81. Explanation of the idea which is commonly connected in theology with the expression Actual Sins; and of the different degrees of sin. . . .	93
§ 82. Divisions of sin in respect to the law, to the knowledge and purpose of him who commits it, and to the action itself	98
§ 83. Of some other divisions of sin, and sins of participation	106
§ 84. Of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost,—or the sin against the Holy Ghost	110

§ 85. Of the State into which men are brought by the commission of sin, and the different kinds and names of it	116
§ 86. What punishment is, and what is the object of it; how the divine punishments are named in the Bible, and what we are there taught respecting their nature; also the various divisions of the divine punishments	123
§ 87. Some remarks on positive divine punishments	131

BOOK SECOND.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

PART SECOND.

OF THE STATE INTO WHICH MAN IS BROUGHT BY THE REDEMPTION.

ARTICLE TENTH.

OF JESUS CHRIST.

CHAPTER FIRST.

OF THE DIVINE INSTITUTIONS FOR THE RESTORATION OF MEN, IN A GENERAL VIEW; THE EXPECTATIONS, PREDICTIONS AND TYPES OF THE MESSIAH, AND THEIR FULFILMENT IN JESUS OF NAZARETH.

§ 88. Of the institutions established by God for the moral recovery and the salvation of the human race, in a general view; the scriptural doctrines and representations on this subject; as a general introduction to what follows	140
§ 89. Formation and developement of the idea of Messiah among the ancient and modern Jews; their opinions respecting him; and the proof that Jesus was the Messiah	148
§ 90. Of the principles on which we are to interpret the literal and figurative predictions contained in the Old Testament respecting the Messiah, and the new institute founded by him	156
§ 91. Of the successive degrees of the revelations and predictions contained in the Old Testament respecting the Messiah	164

CHAPTER SECOND.

HISTORY OF JESUS IN HIS TWO STATES OF HUMILIATION AND EXALTATION.

§ 92. The Scriptural representation of the two principal periods in the life of Jesus; the scriptural names of these periods; the proof texts; and some conclusions	171
§ 93. Of the origin, conception, birth and youth of Jesus; his true humanity, and the excellencies of it	177
§ 94. Of the doctrine of Jesus, and his office as teacher	184
§ 95. Of the hardships and sufferings of Jesus	192
§ 96. Of Christ's descent into Hell	198
§ 97. History of Christ considered as a man, in his state of exaltation	204
§ 98. Wherein the heavenly glory or majesty of Christ, as a man consists; and the scriptural idea of this kingdom and dominion of Christ	211

- § 99. Remarks on the form and sense of the Scriptural representation respecting the *kingdom of God* and of *Christ*; and on the signification of the phrase, *to sit on the right-hand of God*, as applied to Christ. 217

CHAPTER THIRD.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

- § 100. The higher nature of Christ, and how it is proved 225
- § 101. Of the connexion between the Deity and humanity of Christ according to what the Bible directly teaches, and the consequences which may be deduced from its instructions 229
- § 102. Historical observations explanatory of the origin and progressive developement of the ecclesiastical system respecting the person and the two natures of Christ, until the eighth century 238
- § 103. Historical observations continued; the ancient terminology respecting this doctrine explained 249
- § 104. A brief exhibition of the ecclesiastical system respecting the person and the two natures of Christ; an explanation of the ecclesiastical phraseology now in use in the doctrine *de communicatione idiomatum*; and a critical judgment upon the same 254

CHAPTER FOURTH.

THE WORK OF CHRIST AND WHAT HAS BEEN EFFECTED BY IT.

- § 105. Scriptural names and descriptions of the works of Christ, and their salutary effects; also, the names of Christ as the Saviour of the world 263
- § 106. What is considered in the Scriptures as properly belonging to the work which Christ performed for the good of men; explanation of the word *redemption*, as used in the Bible; and what is the most convenient and natural order and connexion for exhibiting the doctrine of the entire merits of Christ 267
- § 107. Of the method formerly adopted of considering the work of Christ, as consisting of the prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices 274

PART FIRST OF CHAP. IV.

On redemption from the punishment of sin; or, the Atonement of Christ, and the justification of men before God,—the consequence of the Atonement.

- § 108. Of the various opinions respecting the forgiveness by God, and the conditions on which forgiveness may be granted; and an application of this to the Scriptural doctrine of the Atonement 280
- § 109. Scriptural doctrine respecting the *necessity* of the forgiveness of sin; what is meant by forgiveness, pardon, justification; and the Scriptural terms by which they are designated 291
- § 110. Illustration of the Scriptural statement, that men owe it to Christ alone, that God justifies them, or forgives their sins 298
- § 111. Of the *sufferings* and *death* of Christ; how far we are indebted to them for our justification or pardon; together with observations on some of the principal attributes (affectiones) of the death of Christ 303
- § 112. Of the influence which the resurrection of Christ, and his subsequent exaltation and intercession, have upon our forgiveness or justification 312

§ 113.	The scripture doctrine of pardon or justification through Christ, as an <i>universal</i> and <i>unmerited</i> favor of God	317
§ 114.	Of the various theories respecting the nature and manner of the atonement of Christ; and a notice of some of the most important works on atonement and justification	324
§ 115.	Of the active obedience of Christ	335

PART SECOND OF CHAP. IV.

On redemption from the power or dominion of sin.

§ 116.	Of the importance of this doctrine; its conformity with Scripture, and the manner in which we are freed from sin through Christ.	342
§ 117.	Of the deliverance from the power and dominion of sin, for which we are indebted, under divine assistance, to the instruction and example of Christ	347

PART THIRD OF CHAP. IV.

On the present and future consequences of the work of Christ.

§ 118.	Scriptural titles of salvation procured by Christ for men; its general nature; the doctrine of the New Testament respecting the abolition of the Old Testament dispensation, by Christianity, and the advantages resulting from it to the world	352
§ 119.	The happiness which Christians obtain in this life from Christ	358
§ 120.	The happiness which Christians obtain through Christ in the future life	365

ARTICLE ELEVENTH.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONDITIONS OF SALVATION.

§ 121.	Of the Christian doctrine of <i>Faith</i> , as the only condition of salvation, together with remarks respecting the salvation of the heathen and of infants	370
§ 122.	Of the various significations of the word <i>faith</i> , as used in the Bible; some of the principal passages relating to faith; the parts of which faith is made up; and some of the most important theological divisions of faith	377
§ 123.	Of the different objects of Christian doctrine to which faith refers; and the relation of faith to the same	385
§ 124.	Of the connexion of the parts of which faith is composed; the characteristics and degrees of faith; and the conditions on which it is saving	394
§ 125.	Of the nature of Christian good works or virtues; the relation in which they stand to salvation; and their meritoriousness	403
§ 126.	Explanation of the terms which are used in the Scriptures, to denote both the external profession of Christianity (<i>fides externa</i>), and internal moral improvement and sanctification	411
§ 127.	Statement of the doctrine of moral reformation; its commencement; on putting off repentance, and on late conversions	418
§ 128.	Remarks on the false opinions and perversions concerning the doctrine of repentance, which have been gradually adopted in the Christian Church	423

ARTICLE TWELFTH.

ON THE OPERATIONS OF GRACE ; ON THE DIVINE INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING
REPENTANCE AND FAITH.

- § 129. Explanation of the terms *Grace*, *Operations of grace*, *Means of grace*, and other phrases employed in theology on this subject; and the connexion of this doctrine with the preceding 434
- § 130. What are the operations of divine grace for promoting the repentance and salvation of those who live in Christian lands; and what means does God employ in exerting these influences on their hearts? 437
- § 131. How is the divine origin of these gracious renewing influences proved from the Holy Scriptures? and remarks in explanation of the scriptural phraseology on this subject 445
- § 132. A sketch of some of the principal theories respecting the operations of divine grace, and the freedom (or ability) of man in spiritual things; and the controversies on this subject in the Christian Church 452
- § 133. Exhibition of the modern theory respecting the divinity of the operations of grace, and the power of the word of God 463

APPENDIX.

- OF PRAYER AS A MEANS OF GRACE 473

ARTICLE THIRTEENTH.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY OR CHURCH.

- § 134. What is meant by the Christian Church; its object; its names; and the divisions of the Church, common in Theology 478
- § 135. Attributes of the Christian Church; the ecclesiastical terms commonly employed to designate them, and their signification 483
- § 136. Of the Head of the Christian Church; and of the institutions established to maintain and extend it, especially through the office of public teaching 491

ARTICLE FOURTEENTH.

OF THE TWO SACRAMENTS, BAPTISM AND THE LORD'S SUPPER.

- § 137. Of the Sacraments in general 501

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN BAPTISM.

- § 138. Names, institution, and origin of Christian Baptism; with observations on John the Baptist and the Jewish Baptism of Proselytes 510
- § 139. How and by whom baptism is to be administered; and respecting the optional and unessential things attending the observance of this rite 516
- § 140. Object, uses, and effects of Christian Baptism 522
- § 141. Of the necessity of Baptism, and whether it may be repeated 528
- § 142. Of the Baptism of Infants , 534

CHAPTER SECOND.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

- § 143. Of the names of the Lord's Supper; and the occasion and objects of its institution 540
- § 144. Of the distinction between what is essential and unessential in the celebration of the ordinance of the Supper 550
- § 145. Of the uses and efficacy of the Lord's Supper; and inferences from these 559
- § 146. The various opinions and forms of doctrine respecting the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's supper, historically explained; and also a critique respecting them 567

ARTICLE FIFTEENTH.

ON DEATH, AND THE CONTINUANCE AND DESTINY OF MEN AFTER DEATH; OR THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE LAST THINGS.

- § 147. Of Death 581
- § 148. Of the Christian doctrine of the continuance of the human soul, and its state after death 586
- § 149. Historical illustrations of the various opinions which have prevailed in ancient and modern times respecting the continuance of the soul after death; and the proofs drawn from reason in favor of it. 593
- § 150. Of some of the most important of the various opinions respecting the place of departed souls, and their condition there 602
- § 151. What is understood by the resurrection of the dead; the meaning of the word resurrection; and what is taught respecting it by the Jews 611
- § 152. The Christian doctrine respecting the resurrection of the body 620
- § 153. Doctrine of the New Testament respecting the nature of the body which we shall receive at the resurrection; and the opinions of theologians on this point 627
- § 154. Of the last appearing of Christ before the end of the world; the various opinions on this subject; also respecting the Millennial kingdom, and the universal conversion of Jews and Gentiles 634
- § 155. Of the general judgment, and the end of the present constitution of the world 642
- § 156. Of the punishments of Hell, or eternal condemnation 650
- § 157. Duration of future punishments; reasons for and against their eternal duration 658
- § 158. Result drawn from comparing and examining the different arguments for and against the eternal duration of future punishment; and a sketch of the history of this doctrine 666

ON ETERNAL BLESSEDNESS.

- § 159. Introduction to this doctrine; and explanation of the Scriptural phraseology with regard to it 672
- § 160. What do reason and Scripture teach, and lead us to expect, in a general view, as to the real nature of future blessedness? 678

BOOK SECOND.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

PART FIRST.

THE STATE INTO WHICH MAN IS BROUGHT BY THE FALL.

ON THE PLAN, ORDER, AND SUCCESSION OF TOPICS IN THE SECOND BOOK.

This Book is properly denominated, *theological Anthropology*, because it contains the doctrine respecting man, and his relation to God. In respect to the order and succession in which the various topics belonging to this doctrine, are treated, there is a great diversity in the systems of Theology both ancient and modern. The particular order in which doctrines are treated is, indeed, of no great importance; provided only that those doctrines are placed first, which constitute the basis of those which follow, or which contribute essentially to the illustration of them. To place the doctrine respecting Christ, e.g.—respecting his person,—the redemption effected through him, etc. at the very introduction of the system, (as some have done,) is certainly very preposterous, since a great deal in these doctrines cannot be placed in the proper light, until the Scriptural doctrines of the depravity of man, of sin, and the punishment of sin, have been previously illustrated. The plan adopted by Morus, of placing the latter doctrines first, has, therefore, greatly the advantage over the other. Still, on any method which may be adopted, there will always be found difficulties and imperfections.—Some have made a merit of deviating from the method generally pursued in Systems of Theology, of inventing a method wholly new, and especially of giving new titles to the various divisions of the subject. But no new land is won for the science itself by means of these innovations; and on the contrary, the study of it is rendered very perplexed to beginners, and they are compelled, whenever they take a new system in hand, to begin, as it were anew, and to learn a new language.

We adopt the following order, viz. (a) Man may be considered in his *former or original* condition, *the state of innocence*, and of this an account has already been given in Book First, §§ 53—57. Farther, man may be considered (b) in his *present* state—that in which he is, since the state of innocence has ceased. In this connexion belong the doctrines respecting *Sin*,—its origin,—the various kinds of sin,—and its consequences; Art. IX. §§ 73—87, incl. Finally, man may be considered (c) in that better state to which he is restored. Here the whole doctrine respecting the Redemption of the human race belongs. (1) *De gratia Dei salutari*,—the gracious Institutes which God has established to promote the holiness and happiness of men,—especially those established in and through Christ,—the different states of Christ,—his person,—his work, and the salutary consequences of it to the human race; Art. X. §§ 88—120, incl. (2) On the conditions (Repentance and Faith) on which we can obtain the blessedness promised to Christians by God; Art. XI. §§ 121—128, incl. (3) On the manner in which God aids those who believe in Christ, and enables them to fulfil the prescribed conditions, or, respecting divine influences and the means of grace; Art. XII. §§ 129—133, incl. (4) On the Christian community, or the *Church*; Art. XIII. §§ 134—136. (5) On Baptism and the Lord's Supper, or the *sacraments*; Art. XIV. §§ 137—146. (6) On the passage of man to another world, and his state in it,—of death, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, the Day of Judgment, the End of the world, and future happiness and misery; Art. XV. §§ 147—160.

ARTICLE NINTH.

OF SIN, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN.

§ 73. *What is meant by sin; the different words used in the Bible to denote sin, and the meaning of them.*

I. Definition of Sin.

SIN, understood objectively, and taken in its wider sense, is, *any deviation from the law of God; or, what is not right*, according to the divine law; *what is opposed to the law*. In the language of jurists, a deviation from the law is called, *a crime* (Germ. *Verbrechen, crimen*); in theology, and when the concerns of religion are made the topics of discourse, that is, when men are considered in their relation to God, it is called *sin*; and it is an advantage which the German language [and also the English] possesses, that it is able to designate this particular form of transgression by an appropriate word.—Sin, therefore, properly speaking, is a deviation from the *divine law*, or according to the Scripture phraseology, *what is not κατά τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*.—This word is always used with reference to God, as *Legislator*; and because the Bible, in entire conformity with experience, regards all men in their present condition as transgressors of the divine law, it calls them *sinner*s; Rom. 3: 9, 23, 24.

But would we define *subjectively* that act by which one becomes a sinner or punishable, we might say, *sin is a free act, which is opposed to the divine law*, or which deviates from it. Here it must be remarked,

(a) That in order for an action to be *imputed* to any one as sinful, it must be a *free* action. For whenever a man acts by compul-

sion, and it does not depend upon himself either to perform or omit the action, it cannot be imputed to him as sin; the consideration of which will be resumed in § 81.

(b) Properly speaking, it is the law which makes sin what it is. All morality proceeds from the law; and where there is no divine law, there is no sin. This is taught by Paul, Rom. 4: 15, *οὐ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις (ἔστι)*.—Were there no law given, the actions now denominated *sins* (e. g. licentiousness, theft, murder), while they must still be regarded as foolish and injurious, and be called *evils* (Germ. *Uebel*), could no longer be denominated *sins*. Wild beasts often despoil and destroy other beasts and human beings. This is an evil, and has injurious consequences, even for the beasts themselves,—they are ensnared, and hunted down. But what they do is not *sin*, because they have no law given them; and no reasonable man would call such things in brutes *sins*, or seriously affirm, that a beast had *sinned*. Nor is even the word *crime* applied to their outrages, because they are exempt alike from human and divine laws.

By *law* is meant, *the precept of a ruler, accompanied with comminations*; and by a ruler, is meant one who has the right to prescribe rules of acting to others, and to connect these rules with threatnings. *Commands* and *laws* are two different things. In every law there is a command; but every command is not a law. A command must be *rightful* in order to be a law,—the preceptor must be entitled to give commands, and those to whom they are given must be *bound* to obey;—and on these conditions only does a command become a law. Hence the demand of the robber, to give him our property, with the threat which he annexes, that he will murder us if we refuse, is no law. The laws of God are made known to us partly through nature, and partly by immediate Revelation, through the Holy Scriptures. The latter are designed to renew, impress, confirm, illustrate, and enlarge or complete the law of nature. God has thus, both by the works of nature, and by the doctrines contained in the Holy Scriptures, given us information respecting his designs, as his will respecting men and a rule for them, to which they should continually have regard, and according to which they should regulate their conduct. Morus, p. 106, n. 3, 4.

II. Scriptural terms for Sin.

1. The most common word for sin is the Hebrew \sin , generally rendered by the Grecian Jews $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$. Both of these words are used in various senses.

(a) The Hebrew \sin signifies literally *to deviate from one's way, to slip aside*; a meaning which it has among the Arabians. Hence *to fail of one's end, to see his design frustrated*; Job 5: 24. Prov. 10: 2. In the same way are the words $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$ and $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ employed by the Greeks in reference to those, whose expectation is disappointed, who lose, or are deprived of something, who miss their aim, and come short. Thus, e.g. Xenophon speaks of those $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \beta\omicron\nu\lambda\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, whose counsel was frustrated; and even in Homer we find the phrase $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\omicron}\pi\omega\pi\eta\varsigma$, *to be deprived of sight*. In the Iliad (XXIV. 68) he says with regard to Hector, that he never suffered the gods to want for offerings worthy of their acceptance,

οὐτὲ φίλων ἡμάρτανε δώρων. Hence,

(b) These words are used figuratively, and are transferred to the soul, and denote the faults and defects of the understanding and of the will, and also of the actions,—of the latter more frequently, though sometimes of the former, e.g. John 8: 46, $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\nu\ \pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, *erroris convincere*, and John 16: 8, 9, where $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ signifies, *delusion, blindness of the understanding*. More commonly, however, it is used with reference to the will and the actions, and denotes every deviation from the divine law in willing and acting. *Ἡ ἁμαρτία* therefore often signifies, sometimes every transgression of a grave character, and sometimes, in general, *impiety, profanitas, irreligion*. Thus the heathen were denominated by the Jews $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\omega\lambda\omicron\iota$, \sinners , in opposition to themselves, the *gens sancta*. In Heb. 10: 26 $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$ signifies to apostatize from the Christian faith. In Rom. 7: 9, Paul uses $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ to denote the *propensity to sin* (Germ. *Hang zur Sünde*) which is every where observed in man, and which is natural to him. [Cf. Usteri, *Entwicklung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Zweiter und Dritter Theil. Tr.]

(c) This, and all the words which signify *sin*, are often used by the Hebrews and Hellenists to denote the *punishment of sin*; e.g. Is. LIII. 2 Kings 7: 9, sq.

(d) They also signify a *sin-offering*; e. g. Ps. 40: 7. 2 Cor. 5: 21, *θυσία περὶ ἁμαρτίας*.

2. Besides this word, there are many others by which the idea of *sin* is expressed by the Hebrews and Greeks. Among these are,

(a) In Hebrew, *צָוֶן*, *guilt (reatus)*, *sin*, Ps. 59: 5; frequently rendered in the Septuagint *ἀδίκημα* or *ἀδικία*.—*עָשָׂה*, strictly, *apostasy from the true God* or *rebellion against him*. [The word *כָּרַח* from *כָּוַר* has the same signification. Tr.] Forsaking the worship of Jehovah for that of idols, and every deliberate transgression of the divine law, were justly regarded as rebellion against God, and so called by this name, 2 Kings 8: 10. Jer. 3: 13. *עָשָׂה* is therefore a stronger word than *הִטָּאָה*.—*רָשָׁע* is used to denote the *injustice of judges*, when they lose sight of what is *just* (*צֶדֶק*) and decide unjustly and partially, Job 9: 24. Ezek. 7: 11; hence applied to any *misdeed* or *wickedness*, by which the desert of punishment is incurred, Ps. 5: 5. Hence *רָשָׁע* signifies *one guilty (reus, damnatus,) sensu forensi*. *רָשָׁע* is rendered in the Septuagint by the words *ἀδικία*, *ἀσέβεια*, κ. τ. λ.—*שָׁמַע*, *guilt, guiltiness*.—*שָׁגָה* or *שָׁגָה*, *error, mistake, transgression*, Ps. 19: 13. Sept. *παράπτωμα*. Classical Greek, *πλάνη*.

(b) In the New Testament, the words which denote sin are mostly taken from the Septuagint, where they are used interchangeably the one for the other. Among these are *παρακοή*, Heb. 2: 2;—*παράβασις*, Rom. 4: 15;—*ἀδικία* and *ἀδικημα*, (like *ἁμαρτία* and *ἁμάρτημα*,) Rom. 1: 18. 6: 13;—*ὀφείλημα*, Matt. 6: 12. (The Hebrews often represent sins under the image of *debts*, which must either be remitted or paid.)—*Παράπτωμα*, Matt. 6: 14, also used to signify apostasy from religion, Rom. 11: 12;—*ἀγνόημα*, *a sin committed through ignorance, erratum*, Heb. 9: 7. (So Aquila renders *יָגַע*, Lev. 26: 39, by *ἄγνοια* so also *πλάνη*.)—*Ἀνομία*, *illegality, transgression of the Law*, or *sin*, Matt. 7: 23. It is also sometimes used in the sense of *irreligion, heathenism*; since *νόμος* often signifies the religion revealed by God. Hence the heathen are called *ἄνόμοι*, Rom. 2: 12. 6: 19. Cf. *ἀσέβεια*, *ἀσεβής*. In the text, 1 John 3: 4, *ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, it is not the intention of the writer to give a logical definition of *sin*, but rather to oppose those deceivers, who maintained that a sinful life was allowable. The meaning of the text is as follows: ‘whoever leads a sinful life, acts in opposition to the precepts of the divine law; for every sin is

against the divine law (which commands us to live holy and without sin, vid. v. 3).’

In the discussion here following of the doctrine respecting sin, this order will be observed; viz. (1) *The origin of sin among men, or the sin of our first parents, and the moral corruption of human nature* derived, according to the Scriptures, from them, will be first considered, §§ 74—80. (2) The origin and nature of the *particular sinful actions* of men, which have their ground in that moral depravity, together with the different kinds and divisions of these actions, §§ 81—85. (3) The *punishment* of sin, as learned from reason and revelation, §§ 86, 87.

§ 74. *What does Reason, without the use of the Bible, teach us respecting the sinful state of man, and the origin of it? And how far do the results of Reason on this subject agree with the Bible?*

I. Opinions of heathen philosophers.

The fact, that human nature is imperfect, and has a morally defective constitution, showing itself in the earliest youth, was observed and conceded by most of the ancient heathen philosophers; and the fact is so obvious, and so conformed to experience, that it could hardly have been otherwise. It was formerly observed, as it is now, that man has more inclination to immorality and sin, than to innocence, holiness, and moral purity. A perpetual conflict was seen to exist in man, from his youth up, between reason and sense,—a contest in which man oftener sided with the latter, than with the former, and thus made himself unhappy. It was seen that man, even when enjoying the best moral instruction, and when possessed of a full conviction of the justice of the requisitions of the moral law, still often acted immorally; and this, even when perfectly convinced that in so doing he did wrong; and that he was thus in a state extremely wretched; vid. Morus, p. 109, § 3.—Now, if it was with man as it should be, he would suffer his will to be at once determined by what his understanding perceived to be true and good,

and would regulate his conduct accordingly. That this is not so, experience sufficiently teaches.—It is false therefore to assert, that every thing depends upon instruction, and that if the mind were only enlightened with regard to duty, the will would soon follow. So it should be, but so it is not; and it is the greatest of all moral problems, how to render the will obedient to the dictates of the understanding.

These things having been observed in ancient times, the writings of the Pagan philosophers are full of complaints over the moral corruption of man. Socrates is said by Plato (*De Repub.*) to have complained that all nations, even the most cultivated, and those advanced farthest in intelligence and knowledge, were yet so depraved, that no human discovery or art sufficed to remove the disorder. The writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero are full of expressions of the same kind. Aristotle called this evil *συγγενές*, *Ethic. ad Nicom.* III. 15. Plato says in his *Meno*, that children by nature (*φύσει*) are not good; for in that case, says he ironically, it would only be necessary to shut them up, in order to keep them good. He saw that it was a mistake to suppose, that man is made wicked merely by education, or that he becomes so merely by the imitation of bad examples. Cicero says in his *Tusculan Questions* (III. 1), *Simulac editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, et in summa opinionum perversitate, versamur: ut pæne cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur.* *De Amicit.* (c. 24,) *Multis signis natura declarat quid velit: obsurdescimus tamen nescio quomodo; nec ea quæ ab ea monemur, audimus,*—our will does not follow what our understanding approves as right and good. In this connexion we may cite the common declaration, *Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata*; and that of Ovid, (*Metam.* VII. 18, sqq.)

Si possem, sanior essem.

Sed trahit invitum nova vis; aliudque cupido,
Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

[Very remarkable are the words of Seneca, in his work *De Clementia*, L. I. c. 6. “Quotus quisque ex quæstoribus est, qui non ea ipsa lege teneatur, qua quærit? Quotus quisque accusator, vacat culpa? Et nescio, an nemo ad dandam veniam difficilior sit, quam qui illam petere sæpius meruit. Peccavimus omnes, alii gravia,

alii leviora; alii ex destinato, alii forte impulsī, aut aliena nequitia ablati; alii in bonis consiliis parum fortiter stetimus, et innocentiam invite ac renitentes perdidimus. Nec delinquimus tantum, sed usque ad extremum ævi delinquemus." Compare with this, what he says in his Treatise *De Ira* (II. 8), "Omnia sceleribus ac vitiis plena sunt. Plus committitur quam quod possit coercitione sanari. Certatur ingenti quodam nequitie certamine. Major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est.—Nec furtiva jam scelera sunt; præter oculos eunt; adeoque in publicum missa nequitia est, et in omnium pectoribus evaluit, ut innocentia non rara, sed nulla sit." Cf. also the declaration of Sopater, *σύμφυτον ἀνθρώποις τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν*. For numerous other passages of similar import, the student may consult Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde*, SS. 48, 49, 72, 73; and the works commended by Hahn, *Lehrbuch*. S. 359.—For the opinions of the later Jews, vid. Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, Theil II. S. 80, f.—Tr.]

All this is in perfect accordance with the declarations of the sacred writers, and especially with that of Paul, Rom. 7: 15, "For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that do I."—It is, also, in accordance with the experience of every individual. And yet there have been philosophers, especially in modern times, who have denied the truth of such representations and have attempted to demonstrate the contrary, and who have sought to found new systems of education, upon their peculiar views respecting the character of man.

As to the real *causes* of this depravity which was so universally seen and acknowledged, the opinions were very various.

(1) Men in the earliest times, and among the rude heathen nations, being left to themselves, either neglected all reflection upon this subject, or invented various philosophemes or narrations, in order to facilitate to themselves the understanding of the origin and diffusion of this evil. In all of them, however, it was assumed, that the human race was originally better than afterwards, and that either by slow degrees, or suddenly and at once, it became corrupt. As soon as men begin to reflect upon God and themselves, they exhibit almost universally the feeling, that it is necessary to suppose that mankind was originally in a better condition; nor can this feeling be obliterated by any subtle reasoning; cf. Vol. I. § 56.

(2) The ancient Grecian philosophers adopted in part the fables and narratives which they found already existing; but they also undertook to investigate the first origin of evil more particularly. In doing this, they soon came to the result, (which indeed had been already observed by the authors of those narratives,) that the defective constitution of man consisted in the undue power of *sense* (*Sinnlichkeit*), and that this had its seat in the body. Paul distinguishes in man the νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν (i.e. ἐν σαρκί, v. 18), and the νόμος τοῦ νοός. The former, he says, ἀντιστρατεύεται νόμῳ νοός, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζει με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Rom. 7:23. We have thus a *dictamen sensuum*, and a *dictamen rationis*. So Araspas in Xenophon distinguishes in every man an ἀγαθὴν and a πονηρὰ ψυχὴ, Cyrop. VI. 21; and Plato makes mention of the λογιστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς and of the ἀλογιστικὸν or ἐπιθυμητικὸν.—These Grecian philosophers proceeded on the supposition, that there are two equally eternal and original principles, *God* and *matter*. The former they supposed to be the *rational*, thinking principle, and the origin of all good, physical and moral; the latter, the *irrational* principle, and the cause of all evil; vid. Vol. I. § 46, II. To the former principle, they supposed the rational soul of man belongs; and his body to the second; and as his body consists of matter, so his soul is a part of the divine nature, and a pure effluence from the same.

They were too prone, under the influence of these views, to overlook the advantages which the human soul derives from its connexion with the body,—advantages which could not otherwise exist; and to regard the body too much as a prison, in which the soul is impaled. So taught the Persians, and most of the Oriental philosophers [vid. Neander's account of the Gnostic Systems]; so Pythagoras and Plato, especially in *Timaeus*; so Aristotle, the Stoics, and their followers. In conformity with these views, Socrates and Plato always gave the advice, χωρίζειν ὡς μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν. They believed, however, that after death, the soul would be reunited with God, after having undergone various degrees of cleansing and purification from the matter cleaving to it; respecting which, vid. § 150, II. [This purification was the intent of the Transmigration of souls, (*Metempsychosis*), a doctrine held in all the religions of the east, and in that also of ancient Egypt. The soul, it was supposed, would be purified by the sufferings endured in wandering through uncongenial matter, and be at length

prepared to merge into the pure fountain from which it originally emanated. For some valuable remarks on this, and other religious ideas and observances in the East, vid. Schlegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*. Tr.]

(3) The account which the Holy Scriptures give of the origin of sin, is as follows: 'God made man, not only as to his soul, but his body also; and both pure and without sin; by a daring transgression, however, the nature of man is changed, and from being pure and immortal, has become defective and mortal. This, however, is overruled by God, for our good, by means of Jesus Christ, the Restorer of the human race.'

[Note. The traditions of many of the Oriental nations correspond remarkably with the narrative in Genesis, and confirm its truth. This is the case, especially, with the doctrine of Zoroaster, which so strikingly agrees with that of Moses, as to indicate a common source in the historic fact of an original Temptation and Fall. According to Zoroaster, the first human pair were offered heaven on condition of virtue, and of refraining from homage to the *Devs*,—the demons of the Persian mythology. For some time they complied with these conditions; but at length Ahriman (Satan) caused the thought to be infused into their minds by a Dew, that he was the Creator of the world. They believed this lie, and so became like Ahriman, evil and unhappy. On one occasion they went out upon a hunting excursion, and found a wild goat, and tasted its milk, which was sweet to their taste, and reviving, but injurious to their body. The Dew then offered them fruit, which they ate, and in consequence were still more injured, and stripped of their remaining blessings. Vid. Klenker, *Zend-Avesta*, 3 Thl. S. 84, ff. Cf. Schlegel, *Philos. der Geschichte*, B. I.—Tr.]

II. Results of independent reason and observation.

If, in investigating the origin and causes of this evil, we disregard all authority, even that of the Holy Scriptures, and proceed solely from those considerations to which experience conducts us, we arrive at the following results, which are not indeed entirely satisfactory, but which yet somewhat illustrate this subject, and therefore may be useful to those to whom the instruction of the young is committed.

It may be remarked in general, that the philosopher, as such, can assign no other ground, than that man is a limited being, and consequently can err. The nature of this limitation, and liability to sin, is now to be more closely examined.—Man has a twofold nature,—one part of which is *rational* and *moral*, (*νοῦς*), by means of

which he can act with reference to ends, and possesses understanding and free-will; the other part of which is *sensuous* (*sinnlich*), and consists of desires and appetites (*ψυχῇ*). By the former, he belongs to the world of spirit; by the latter, to that of sense. He is therefore to be regarded, as a being compounded of reason and sense (Germ. *vernunftig-sinnliches Wesen*). In this way, man is distinguished from the brute, which has indeed sense, but no rational or moral nature. This in man should be the *ruling power*,—the other subject to this; and then only is man *free*, when he acts independently of the impulses of his lower nature, and obeys the voice of the moral law, uttered so imperatively within him.—But in man in his present state, we notice a continual conflict between these two natures,—a conflict which cannot be explained away by any subtleties. This conflict rests upon the distinction between these two dissimilar natures in man, and is the immediate result of their connexion in human beings, according to their present constitution.

Beyond this,—the essential nature of man, the mere philosopher cannot go, in his inquiries after the causes of sin; and the fact of a particular corruption of our nature, or of the invisible agency of evil spirits, cannot be resorted to by him, to account for the existing evil. In short, the mere philosopher, who is unacquainted with what the Scriptures have taught on this subject, or who will make no use of their instructions, cannot proceed from *facts*, because these are either unknown to him, or doubtful and uncertain. Hence the truth of what many of the old theologians have said, that the fact of a better state of human nature depends for its proof upon the Holy Scriptures; and that neither that state, nor the Fall which succeeded it, can be demonstrated from mere reason. But we are now exhibiting those results only to which unassisted Reason would arrive.

In noticing the defects and imperfections, which result from the connexion of these two natures in man, the many advantages which also spring from it, ought not to be overlooked. It should be remembered, that man could never have been what he is, if this constitution were different. Man possesses various faculties, which have their ground in this constitution, which may indeed, and actually do, mislead him into many faults and errors, but which are in themselves good, and when rightly cultivated and employed, bring him great advantage. Such are *self-love*, so deeply implanted

in the human breast, (hence the instinct for self-preservation, and for personal improvement,) *the love of honor, the tendency to imitate*, and others, which are in themselves good, and only need to be kept under the control of Reason, and properly directed to the ends for which they were given.

After these remarks, we come now to inquire after the more immediate causes, from which the prevailing power of sense, and the inability of reason to control it, are to be explained. We design in this place, to give only the result of human observation and experience, which will be very inadequate to the full explanation of this subject. We shall afterwards exhibit the doctrine of the Scriptures, and inquire how far it agrees with these results. These causes are to be found partly in the strength of the feelings belonging to human nature, partly in the manner in which the powers of the human soul develop themselves, and partly in the external circumstances in which this developement proceeds.

(1) The feelings of man are much stronger, than those ideas of his mind, which have their foundation in his reason ; and the mere philosopher, who receives no light from Revelation, cannot tell that this has not always been the fact with man. For he cannot conclude with any certainty, from his mere reason, that human nature was originally in a better state, than that in which he now finds it ; he must take man as he finds him, and on the supposition, which he has no means of refuting, that he was always the same. In general, the end of this constitution of our nature would seem to be, to guard against insensibility and inactivity. For the mere motives of reason, would act far too feebly and slowly ; and except for this influence of the feelings, many actions which are useful and necessary for our own good, and that of others, would remain undone. And so it is found, that men of a cold and phlegmatic temperament, who have but little feeling and excitability, though they may have good heads, and benevolent hearts, are generally indolent, irresolute, and inactive, and accomplish very little. It is often the case, indeed, that a man suffers himself to be carried away by his feelings, and resolves and acts without regard to consequences. The advantages of this constitution must, however, be greater than the disadvantages, because it is so established by God. But on this subject much may be said, without leading to any satisfactory con-

clusion. This visible *inordinateness* of one portion of our nature can hardly be made to harmonize with our conceptions of the divine attributes. But beyond this, the philosopher as such cannot go.

(2) In the earlier years of our life, before we can rightly use our reason, we have no other rule for desiring or avoiding any thing, than our feelings. And on this account, that they have no maturity of reason, children and minors cannot be left to themselves, but need to be guided and governed by others. We thus become accustomed from our youth up, to desire those things which excite agreeable sensations in us, and to shun those things, which have an opposite effect. Now the kind of agreeable sensations with which man is earliest acquainted, is that which arises from the gratification of his animal desires. For in the earliest years of his life, man, having not yet attained the full use of his rational faculties, has no taste for the more pure and spiritual joys, which are above sense, and which are attendant only on the knowledge of the truth, and holiness of heart and life. When now, after a long time, and by slow degrees, man has attained to the full use and the maturity of his rational faculties, he has for a long time been habituated, even from his youth, to will and act according to his feelings and the impulses of sense, without duly consulting reason, and carefully weighing every thing by his understanding. This long practice has produced in him a habit, and it is now hard for him to break this habit, and to acquire in place of it, the habit of rational consideration before action. *Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem testæ diu.* Very true, therefore, is the remark of Tacitus (*Vita Agricol. c. III.*), “that human weakness is of such a nature, that the remedies do not act as efficiently, as the disease.”

From these remarks, we draw the following important inference, that we should endeavor, as early as possible, to awaken, cherish, and develop the *moral sense* in the youthful heart. And there is no way for us to do this so successfully, as by means of *religion*; vid. Vol. I. Introduction, § 2. It is therefore one of the most perverse and injurious maxims, to say, that young children should not have religion taught them. The evil effects resulting from this maxim have been deeply felt in our age.

(3) The first knowledge of man is derived from his senses; at first, he can acquire information in no other way, than from sensible objects. The senses must, in all cases, serve as the vehicle of

knowledge ; and they are often misemployed. Since now, from the nature of the case, man must, from his earliest youth, be so familiar with visible and sensible objects, it is not strange that he should be too little affected by the instructions given him respecting objects not cognizable by the senses, and especially respecting God,—the Invisible ; and that he should be so indifferent to the motives to love Him, and from love to obey Him. The remark 1 John 4: 20, “ he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen,” is therefore psychologically true. If we see a man, who has no true love to his neighbor whom he hath seen, we may safely conclude, that he has no love for the invisible God. Hence we may explain the natural coldness of the carnal mind to God, and every thing which belongs to the moral and spiritual world ; and hence too we may derive the duty, of opposing this at the very earliest periods of life ; for the longer a man lives, the more fixed and habitual does it become, and the harder to be removed.

(4) Man brings with him into the world various powers and faculties ; but according to the plan of God, these can be developed and brought to a good end, only by instruction and a wise education. Man does not come into the world with any inborn *habits* of action, or with any thing which answers to the instincts of brutes ; the place of which must be supplied by instruction. But this instruction in religion, morality, and other useful things, which is so necessary to the proper developement of our powers, is enjoyed by very few, and some are wholly destitute of it. And the instruction given on these subjects is often defective and calculated to mislead. It allows men to be satisfied with a merely formal worship, in which the heart remains cold and unimproved ; it is generally above the capacities of the young, and by taxing the memory, more than affecting the heart, it often produces aversion and disgust. The whole moral education, especially in the so called higher circles of life, is often extremely deficient ; so that frequently the rude children of Nature, left to grow up by themselves, are in a better condition, than those who have been reared in the midst of refinement and cultivation. At least they are not so perverted and corrupted ; although they may be wanting in some of the artificial accomplishments which the latter possess.

Evil example, too, has an indescribable effect upon children and

youth, and brings them to an earlier acquaintance with vice than with virtue. It should be remarked, that the out-breakings of many perverse inclinations and dispositions, which are perceived in children, are the signs and the consequences of some endowments of human nature in themselves good. The exhibitions of these dispositions are important hints to the teacher and guardian of the young ; and, if he is wise and skilful, may receive such a direction from him, as will turn them to good account in the ultimate character of those entrusted to his charge. For example, self will and obstinacy indicate firmness of character ; forwardness and inquisitiveness indicate a curious and active mind.

(5) The social life of man, the gradual increase of cultivation, refinement, and luxury, and the propensity to seek for the pleasures of sense, while they are in some respects advantageous, are the cause of great evil and injury ; cf. Rousseau, *Sur l'inégalité des hommes*. The wants of men are greatly multiplied, their sensual appetites are greatly excited, by the constant presentation of new objects, and their true peace and contentment (*αὐταρχία*) are prevented. They thus become continually more passionate, and insatiable, and more withdrawn from invisible and spiritual objects.

Civilized man has, indeed, more means in his power to resist the evils arising from the social state ; but these means are too little regarded and employed. Luxury makes men selfish, proud, and hard-hearted, and paves the way to other vices. And when *Self*, which is so pampered by luxury, once gets firm possession of the heart, morality and virtue are forever banished. The observation of the evils which arise from the connexion of men in social life, and from the progress of cultivation, suggested to many even of the ancient heathen world the thought, that men were formerly in a better condition, than at a later period ; vid. Vol. I. § 56. But Philosophy, uninstructed by Revelation, can never prove *à priori*, that a change has taken place in human nature, and that it is now different from what it was.—At least the philosopher can never attain to perfect certainty on this subject, and will find many things enigmatical and inexplicable.

* Cf. on this subject the works from the different schools. Jerusalem, *Betrachtungen über die Wahrheiten der Religion*, B. II. Th. II. S. 731, f. Junge, *Philosophische und theologische Aufsätze*, Th. II. SS. 297, 367. Steinbart, *System der Glückseligkeitslehre*,

Cap. III. S. 46, f. Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*. Töllner, *Theologische Untersuchungen*, B. I. St. 2. S. 112, f. As however in some of these works, especially in Steinbart, the depravity of man is very inadequately represented, and the present state of man is placed in far too advantageous and favorable a light, in contradiction both to the Bible and to experience, we refer with pleasure to the views of Michaelis on this subject, expressed in his Book, "*Von der Sünde*," §§ 48—54, and in his "*Moral*," Th. I. S. 105—130; also to Kant, "*Ueber das radicale Uebel*," first Essay in his, "*Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft*;" and to Morus, "*Theol. Moral*," and Reinhard's "*Dogmatik*" and "*Moral*."

[Cf. on this subject Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, B. II. S. 17, § 120, *Ursprung der Sünde*. Also Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde*. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, pp. 154—178, especially 158. Neander, *Allg. Kirchengeschichte*, B. I. Abth. II. S. 640. Hahn, S. 342, § 77. Tr.]

III. Could God have prevented sin?

The question here arises, *How can God be justified as the author of this constitution?* Could he not have guarded against moral evil in the world? Might he not have constituted human nature less weak, and less inclined to err and sin? It is not strange, considering how imperfect is our knowledge of the eternal plan and of the universal government of God, that reflecting minds should have always been disturbed by doubts on this subject, and that they should have devised various means of relieving their doubts, and of vindicating God, and that after all they should have been unable, by mere philosophy, to attain to satisfaction. A great portion of the ancient philosophers, endeavoured to relieve themselves of this difficulty by supposing two eternal principles; vid. No. I.

In philosophizing on this subject, we make the following general remarks.

(1) It is an established point, that to God all evil, both physical and moral, as such, must be displeasing; and that he seeks to prevent it, wherever it may be done. But since there is much imperfection, evil, and sin, actually existing in the world, we must conclude, that God has effected and will effect more good by the permission of sin, than could be effected if he had not permitted it. He must have seen, that he would have prevented the good, if he

had not permitted the evil. Vid. Vol. I. § 48, ad finem ; and § 71, I. To show this, was the object of Leibnitz in his "Theodicée."

(2) We must proceed on the same principles in judging of moral evil and corruption, especially among men. Hateful to God as this moral evil must have been, and punishable as it is in itself, God yet must have seen, that by means of this constitution of human nature, a greater amount of good would be accomplished for the human race as a whole, and for the world, than if he had made man more perfect, had secured him against every opportunity to sin, or had hindered his transgression by the *immediate exercise of his power*. The latter could not take place, as God had given to man a moral nature, which is placed under the *law of freedom* alone, and to which compulsion and necessity, which prevail in the material world, where every thing proceeds by mechanical laws, cannot be applied.—But as in every other case, so in this, God knows how to overrule evil in such a way, that higher good shall result from it.—Throughout the world, there is a constant successive developement, and a struggle after an advancement and improvement of condition ; and so it is with man ; vid. Rom. 8: 20—23. Sin itself may serve for the promotion of good, and may contribute to the perfection of man. Through his liability to err, he may indeed pursue a retrograde course with regard to virtue and moral perfection ; but without this liability, he could not make advancement ; and his virtue would cease to have any worth, and would no longer deserve the name, if there were no possibility of wrong. Neither morality nor happiness can be conceived to exist without freedom.—So much may be said on this subject in the way of philosophy ; it is, however, far from being satisfactory.

§ 75. *Mosaic account of the sin of our first parents.*

The moral depravity of the human race is derived everywhere in the New Testament, from the disobedience of our first parents. This universal corruption is denominated by Theologians, *peccatum originatum*, or *originale*, or *originis* ; the first transgression, *peccatum originans*. More frequently, however, is this transgression denominated *lapsus*, *fall*, according to the Hebrew usage, where the

verba cadendi signify to err, to sin, also to become unhappy; as Prov. 24: 16, 17. Rev. 2: 5, ἐκπίπτειν. In the same way is *labi* used in Latin instead of *peccare*, *errare*; and *cadere*, *excidere*, to be miserable, to lose a thing.—Moses in his narrative first gives an account of the divine precept, that Adam and Eve should not eat of the *Tree of knowledge*, etc. Gen. 2: 15—17; (vid. Vol. I. § 52, II. 2;) and then follows the account of the transgression itself, Gen. 3: 1, seq. We must therefore refer back to what has been already remarked in general, respecting the creation of the world and of man, Vol. I. § 49, I.; and § 52, II.—We now proceed to explain this account.

I. Different ways in which this passage has been explained.

The interpreters of this passage were formerly divided into two general classes. Some have regarded it as an *allegory*, and interpret it metaphorically, admitting no real serpent, tree, etc. Others consider it as a *literal narrative* of events which actually occurred in the manner here recorded. To these two classes, a third has been added in modern times, who hold that it is merely a *didactic fable*.—With respect to the History of these various interpretations, cf. Pfaff and Buddeus, in their systems of Theology; also Ode, De Angelis, p. 498; M. J. O. Thiess, Variarum de cap. III. Geneseos recte explicando specimen I., Lubecæ, 1788, 8vo. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 345, f. § 78. Bretschneider, Dogmatik, B. II. S. 58, § 125. Tr.]

(1) *The Allegorical interpretations.* These are very various, and prove by their variety, that no certain results can be attained by allegorical interpretation. All the explanations of this kind are forced and artificial. To suppose an allegory in this passage, which is preceded and followed by plain and simple history, is altogether unnatural, and foreign to the spirit of these ancient monuments. Nor is any hint or key to such an interpretation given us by the writer. This mode of interpreting this passage was resorted to merely for the sake of avoiding certain difficulties, some of which seem to arise from the great simplicity of this narrative, (for to the learned interpreter, this simplicity constitutes an objection,) and others, from the great dissimilarity in the manner of thought and expression of this narrative, from that which is found in this cultivated and refined age. The interpreters of this passage thought it necessary, therefore, to make the writer say something of higher import and

more philosophical, than is contained in the simple words; and proceeded with regard to Moses very much as the later Grecian interpreters did with regard to Homer.

The first attempts at allegorical interpretation are found among the Grecian Jews, and principally in Philo, *De Opificio Mundi*, p. 104, sq. ed. Pfeif. He was followed by Origen in this general principle of interpretation, though the latter gave a different turn to the narrative; and Origen was again followed by Ambrose in his book, "*De Paradiso*," I. Some of their followers understand all the circumstances here mentioned allegorically; others, only some of them, e. g. the serpent, and allow the rest to stand as history. It is said by some, that the whole is intended to teach, by allegory, how unhappy man becomes by the indulgence of violent passions, and the evil consequences resulting from the prevalence of sense over reason. To this view of the subject, Morus is inclined, p. 99, n. 2. He supposes, that by the *serpent* are intended, in general, the external inducements to evil, by which we are surprized and overborne; but that the very things which constituted the original temptation are unknown to us.

(2) *Literal interpretations.* A large proportion of the Church fathers (e. g. Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian, Augustine, and Theodoret), and also most of the older theologians even in the Protestant Church, were united in the opinion, that this passage should not be explained as an Allegory, although they differed among themselves in the interpretation of particular expressions. They agreed however, for the most part, in considering *the serpent*, as something else than a mere *natural* serpent, as it was regarded by Josephus, and other Jewish interpreters. Some affirmed, that the serpent was simply *the Devil*,—an opinion justly controverted by Vitranga, on account of the great difficulties by which it is encompassed. Others, and the greater part of the older Jewish and Christian interpreters, supposed that the serpent here spoken of, was the instrument which was employed by the Evil Spirit to seduce mankind. So it is explained by Augustine, who was followed in this by Luther and Calvin; and this, from their time, was the prevailing opinion of Protestant theologians, until the middle of the eighteenth century. There is, indeed, nothing said in the original text, respecting an Evil Spirit; but as the serpent is here introduced as acting and speaking after the manner of an intelligent,

though evil-disposed being ; it was thought fair to conclude that an evil being actually spoke through the serpent ; and so has it been understood even among modern critics, e. g. by Michaelis and Zachariä.

This exposition respecting the Serpent is indeed ancient ; but still we can find no distinct traces of it in the books of the Old Testament written before the Babylonian exile ; and we are therefore alike unable to prove or disprove, that before that period this passage was so understood. To suppose that the Serpent in this passage was the instrument of an invisible being, is certainly entirely in the spirit of the most ancient people, who imagined that evil and good spirits were every where active in all the evil and good done in the world. After the Babylonian exile, however, we find it expressly said by the Jewish teachers, that in the temptation, an evil being was invisibly active through the serpent. This point may, therefore, be one of those, (of which we find many relating to the doctrine of spirits,) which belong to the later disclosures of the prophets ; vid. Vol. I. § 58.—In the Apocryphal books before Christ, we find it said, that the Devil deceived mankind, and brought sin and death into the world ; e. g. Book of Wisdom, 1: 13, 14 ; and especially 2: 23, 24 (*φθονῷ διαβόλου* &c. &c.) This is conceded on all hands.

It is asserted, however, by many learned men, that this idea does not occur in the New Testament, and they appeal to 2 Cor. 11: 3, where it is said, that the *serpent* deceived Eve, and no mention is made of the Devil ; and also to Rom. 5: 18, where Paul makes no allusion to the Devil, although he is treating of the origin of evil. In answer to this it may be said, (*a*) that considering how prevalent this explanation was at the time of Christ, and that neither he nor his apostles contradicted it, nor said any thing inconsistent with it ; the probability is, that they also assented to it. Morus seems to admit this, although in so doing he cannot be altogether consistent with himself.—But (*b*) it deserves also to be considered, that there are many allusions and references in the New Testament, in which this interpretation is presupposed, and from which it appears, that Christ and his apostles assented to it, and authorized it ; e. g. John 8: 44, *ἄνθρωποκτόνος ἀπ' ὀφθῆς* ; 1 John 3: 8, *ἀπ' ὀφθῆς ὁ διάβολος ἁμαρτάνει* ; also the titles in Revelation, *δράκων μέγας*, *ὁ ὕψις ὁ ὀρχαῖος*, Rev. 12: 9, sq. From these texts we can see, how the text 2 Cor. 11: 3 is to be understood. The

New Testament writers, therefore, assumed it as a fact, that in some way, not farther determined, the Devil was concerned in the Temptation of man. It is not, however, expressly said in any one passage, that the Devil spoke through the serpent.

The principal advocates of the interpretation formerly adopted by Theologians, and in opposition to the Allegorists and to the class of interpreters to be hereafter mentioned, were, among the more ancient, Aug. Pfeiffer, *Dubia vexata*, cap. 6; among the more modern, Joh. Balth. Lüderwald, *Die allegorische Erklärung der drey ersten Capitel Mosis*, u. s. w. in ihrem Ungrund vorgestellt, Helmstädt, 1781, 8vo; also Karl Traugott Eifert, *Untersuchung der Frage, Könnte nicht die Mosaische Erzählung vom Fall buchstäblich wahr, und durch den Fall ein erbliches Verderben auf die Menschen gekommen seyn?* Halle, 1781; especially Storr, *De Protevangelio*, Tübingæ, 1789 (in his *Opuscula*, Tom. II. num 7); and Köppen, *Die Bibel* u. s. w. Th. II. [To this Class the great body of American theologians belongs.]

(3) To the third class, belong those interpreters who consider this narration as a *Mythus*, or a truth invested in a poetic form. According to this idea, this passage has been interpreted in modern times by Eichhorn, in his "Urgeschichte;" in such a way, however, that he allows some things in the account to be historical, and others allegorical. Such, in some respects, is also the interpretation of Rosenmüller, (*Repertor. Th. I. S. 160*,) who supposes that the narrative in Genesis was taken from a *hieroglyphick picture*, i. e. transferred from pictural representation to alphabetic signs. These interpreters have endeavoured to unite the historical, and the mythical or allegorical interpretations. But this is inadmissible. If the mythical interpretation is adopted, the whole narrative, in all its parts, must be considered as a *Mythus*, like what other nations had, in order to represent to themselves, each in its own way, in a distinct and vivid manner, the first sin of man, and its consequences. So Eichhorn, Paulus, Gabler, and many others.—One of two things must be admitted, either this narrative throughout must be considered as a veritable history of events which took place just as here related (and this agrees with the New Testament); or it is wholly a didactic or moral fiction. In both cases, the interpreter must proceed in the interpretation of the particular portions of this account from the same principles.—It is undoubtedly the fact, that Mo-

ses, or the writer from whom he took this account (vid. Vol. I. § 49), understood these expressions just as they stand, according to their literal meaning ; and that these other ideas which are attached to this narrative were ascribed to it at a later period, in order to adapt it more to the tastes and feelings of cultivated and speculative minds.

In confirmation of the internal truth and consistency of this narrative, let the following things be considered ; and they are equally deserving of notice, whether this passage be literally or historically understood. *Conversation* with animals is something, which to man in his natural condition and before the refinements of social life, is perfectly common, and by no means strange and incredible. How often is it the case with children, (even with those too, who are somewhat grown up,) that they address inanimate things, and still more frequently living creatures, imagining what they would answer, and then replying to them in turn ! They will often, too, relate to others the conversations they have had with the animals around them. Hence the fables of *Æsop* were more agreeable, and impressive, and less strange and startling even to mature minds in the ancient world, than now. Hence, too, the supposition which once prevailed even in the heathen world, that in the golden age beasts actually spake.—Again, the author understood the *speaking of God* here mentioned, as real *articulate speech*, perhaps with a voice of thunder. For the idea was very prevalent in the ancient world, that the Deity was, as it were, personally present, and appeared to the men of early times in the most free and familiar intercourse ; somewhat as the gods were supposed by the Greeks to have associated with men in the heroic ages ; vid. Vol. I. § 54, I.

This whole representation, however, whether it be fact or moral fiction, is entirely conformed to the nature of the human soul, and describes, in a manner perfectly true, the history of the temptation and sin of man, as it is witnessed every day, through the impression which sensible objects make upon him.—Here then, by the example of our first parents, two things are shown : the way in which sin commonly arises, and the way in which it actually first entered the world. In this however, there is a difference, that in the case of our first parents, they had come to maturity without having yet sinned. The first sin committed upon earth was one of momentous consequences, for themselves and their posterity.—In looking at this

transaction, we are again impressed with the idea, that the *state of innocence* in which our first parents were placed, was a state of immaturity, of childhood, and infantine simplicity; and that they then had no very extended knowledge or experience. They were deceived in nearly the same way, as an innocent and inexperienced child is now deceived. In this point of view, this narrative has been very justly apprehended even by Morus, p. 99, n. 1.

[Note. There is an interesting Essay on the Mosaic account of the Fall in the Appendix to Tholuck's "Lehre von der Sünde." While he contends for the historic fact of the fall, he at the same time regards the representation here given of this fact as figurative, and finds insuperable objections in the way of the literal, and very plausible arguments in favor of the moral interpretation. He gives the following as the moral import of the passage: "Man who, in accordance with his destination, enjoyed a holy innocence in which he knew no other will than that of God, abandoned this state, became selfish (autonomic), and would no longer acknowledge the divine law of life as the highest." S. 266, of the work above mentioned. The views of the German theologians on this subject are very various; and though often fanciful, sometimes deeply interesting and profound. It will be sufficient to refer to some of the more important of these, which the ardent student of theology, who wishes to overstep the limit of merely traditionary ideas, may consult at his leisure. Cf. Schleiermacher, Christ. Glaub. B. II. S. 59.—Schlegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, B. I. S. 42, 43.—Herder, Geist der Ebra. Poesie, B. I. S. 155.—To these we may add the speculations, ingenious and exciting, even when unfounded and fanciful, of Coleridge. See his "Aids to Reflection," Notes, pp. 324, 325,—also p. 176, 177. Tr.]

II. Particular expressions and representations.

(1) *Respecting the divine law, the transgression of it, and the temptation*; Gen. 2: 17, coll. v. 9, and chap. 3: 1—6. For an account of the name, *Tree of the knowledge of good and evil*, vid. Vol. I. § 52, II. The question is here asked, *what design God had in view in giving this precept*? According to the opinion of many theologians, this command was given by God merely for the sake of putting the virtue of Adam and Eve to the test, there being no injurious quality in the tree itself which should lead him to forbid it; and so they suppose that the punishment of death threatened and inflicted by God, had no natural connexion with the eating of the forbidden fruit; but depended merely upon the divine will. This is supposed by Ernesti, *Vindiciæ arbitrii divini*, in his "Opusc. Theol." p. 231; and among the ancients by Theophilus, *Ad Auto-*

lyc. L. II. c. 35. But against this supposition, there are many reasons, both of an internal and external nature, which have been well exhibited by Michaelis, *Von der Sünde*, S. 559. The fact that this forbidden Tree is set over against the *Tree of Life*, would lead us to think, that it was in itself a *poisonous* tree, and in its own nature destructive to man. And to this opinion even Morus assents, p. 102, § 16. The writer here designs to show, by what natural means the life of man was to have been prolonged, according to the divine appointment, in the state of innocence; and this means is the *Tree of Life*, or life-giving Tree; and afterwards, by what means death came into the world; namely by a poisonous tree. It is against the latter, which bore an alluring, beautiful fruit, that God warns inexperienced man, as a father cautions his child not to taste of a pleasant poison, which may lie in his way. Since man entered his new abode as a stranger, it was natural that he should receive all necessary instructions and cautions from the Being who prepared it for him, and introduced him to it. Tasting of the fruit of this Tree, introduced disorder into the human body, which from that time forward was subject to disease and death. In this way is God justified, as every one can see, from the charge of being the author of human misery; just as a father is acquitted from blame in the misfortune of his children, if he had before cautioned them against the poison. In this way, too, every one can understand why God should require obedience from man. The father requires obedience of his children, because he knows better than they do, what is best for them. For the same reason, should we unconditionally obey God.—Nor is the explanation now given, by which the forbidden fruit is considered in its own nature poisonous, a new explanation; it is mentioned by Chrysostom, although he rejects it.

The propriety and consistency of the account of the Temptation by means of the *Serpent* may be illustrated by the following remarks. The Serpent was used by almost all the ancient nations, as the symbol of prudence, adroitness, and cunning; vid. Matt. 10: 16. 2 Cor. 11: 3. Eve sees a serpent upon this forbidden Tree, and probably eating of its fruits, which to a serpent might not be harmful. And it is very natural, that this should be first observed by the woman, that her interest and curiosity should have been arrested by the sight, and that, with her greater susceptibility to temptation, her desires should have been first kindled, and she first seduced from obedi-

ence. Paul mentions it as worthy of notice, that the woman first sinned, 1 Tim. 2: 14; coll. Sir. 25: 32, ἀπὸ γυναικὸς ἀρχὴ ἁμαρτίας. We may compare with this part of the narrative, the Grecian Mythus of Pandora.—As to what follows, we very naturally understand, that Eve reflected upon what she had seen, and expressed her *thoughts* in *words*: “The Serpent is a very lively and knowing animal, and yet it eats of the fruit which is forbidden us. This fruit cannot therefore be so hurtful, and the prohibition may not have been meant in earnest; etc.”—the same fallacies with which men still deceive themselves, when the objects of sense entice and draw them away. The fact which she observed, that the Serpent ate the fruit of the forbidden Tree without harm, excited the thought, which in vs. 4, 5, are represented as the words of the Serpent, that it was worth while to eat of this fruit. It did not seem to occasion death, and on the other hand, appeared rather to impart health, vigor, and intelligence, as was proved from the example of the Serpent, which remained after eating it well and wise. “Consider me,” the Serpent might have seemed to her to say, “how brisk, sound, and cunning, I am; etc.” Now, as she knows of no being who surpasses man in wisdom, excepting God only, she supposes, in her simplicity, that if she became wiser than she then was, she should be *like God*. Meanwhile, the desire after that which was forbidden became continually more irresistible. She took of the fruit and ate. The man, who, as is common, was weak and pliable enough to yield to the solicitation of his wife, received the fruit from her, and ate with her.

All this may have been as now stated, even on the supposition, so conformed to the spirit of the ancient world, and fully authorized in the New Testament, that the Evil Spirit had an agency in this transaction. This supposition can occasion no alteration in the verbal explanation of this record. Satan can be allowed to be no otherwise concerned in this affair, than as instigator and contriver; somewhat after the manner of a malicious and crafty man, who might secretly injure another, by tempting him, either by words or in any other way, to taste of a poisonous article.—Those to whom the real speaking of the Serpent seems strange and incredible, may understand it as above.

Now it was in this transgression of the divine law, which made strict abstinence from the forbidden Tree binding upon them, that

their *sin* is placed; and it is this which the Apostle calls *παράκοή*, Rom. 5: 19. The rising desires which our first parents felt to eat the fruit, were founded in their nature, and were not imputed to them as sin. Nor is the springing up of involuntary desire in the heart of man ever considered in Scripture as *sin*; but merely the entertaining, cherishing, and accomplishing of this desire; vid. James 1: 14.—The sin of our first parents, then, properly consisted in this, that they were not implicitly obedient to God, as Paul remarks in the passage just cited. This disobedience to God is the greatest wrong, and draws after itself inevitably the most injurious consequences, whether it is shown in greater or smaller instances. Cf. I Sam. 15: 23. They did what God had forbidden, under the impression which men are accustomed to have in such cases, that it was something trifling and of little import.—From this first act, there now arose in their minds, alienation from God, distrust of him, the desire of independence of him, etc. They began to say, ‘that God had not allowed them to be like himself,’ etc.—thoughts from which they should have shrunk with abhorrence, and banished instantly from their hearts.

(2) The *consequences* of this transgression are narrated, vs. 7, sq. The author does not give such a representation, as would lead us to think that all piety, virtue and religion ceased with man, immediately upon his first transgression. For we see in the sequel, that the knowledge and worship of God were perpetuated in the family of Adam. We perceive too, that our first parents felt repentance and shame after the fall, and these feelings are sufficient proof, that morality and rectitude were not wholly obliterated by the Fall. Some theologians maintain, that by the Fall man lost the *Image of God*; but this is denied by others. And both may be true, according as the image of God is understood in a wider or more narrow sense. The whole dispute is more respecting words, than things; vid. Vol. I. § 53, ad finem, and § 54.—The author places the consequences of this transgression in the following particulars; viz.

(a) In the disturbed balance of the powers and inclinations of man, and in the preponderance which the impulses of sense now obtained over reason. For this balance and harmony of powers was that which constituted, according to the account of Moses, the principal advantage of the state of innocence. That this was the

consequence of the first transgression is clearly taught by Moses, in the expression, *and they knew that they were naked*, which may be euphemistically expressed as follows: 'they felt the motions of sense uncommonly strong, which they were no longer able to control as heretofore, but by which they were now governed; whence the feeling of shame arose in their minds;' as is still the case with innocent youth, when it first begins to have such desires. It is possible that this may be considered as also the effect of the harmful fruit which had been eaten by them, by which their nerves were strongly excited. For there are many poisonous plants, by which violent excitement is imparted to the nerves, and by which great disorder is produced both in soul and body,—spasmodic affections, stupefaction, and delirium; such are Belladonna, Opium, Thorn-apple, and Hemlock. This supposition will at least serve to render the subject more intelligible, and to explain how this effect may have been propagated from Adam to his posterity; although it is by no means necessary to understand this effect as a physical one; and at all events, this should not be brought into popular instruction, as it is merely conjectural.*

* The views here expressed respecting the nature of the forbidden fruit, and the consequences of eating it upon our first parents, are the basis of our Author's ideas respecting the natural character of man; they ought therefore to be carefully examined here, where they are first introduced. It is easy to see how Dr. Knapp's love of plainness and simplicity of interpretation, and his aversion to the metaphysical and speculative spirit of his times, should have inclined him to sentiments like those which he has here expressed respecting the narrative in Genesis. Indeed, they may be said to result fairly from adopting and carrying through the principle of Literal interpretation in application to this passage. To the same conclusion substantially were Michaelis and Reinhard brought before him, by reasoning on the same principles. But we ought to hesitate before adopting principles which strip this opening page of human history of its chief moral and religious interest, and substitute transactions so unimportant and even trivial. To teach that the Forbidden Tree was one of physical poison,—that on this account mainly, and not for the purpose of testing their obedience, our first parents were warned against it,—that by seeing a serpent feed on it with impunity, they falsely concluded they might do so,—that having thus by mistake been led to taste of it, their nerves were excited, their passions inflamed, and reason weakened,—and lastly that the propagation of this physical disorder is the cause of the universal predominance of sense over reason, in short of human depravity,—these are propositions so strange, that we must wonder how they could have been soberly propounded by writers of such eminence.

(b) The consequences of the first transgression are seen in still other evils. Physical evils are usually regarded as the consequences of antecedent moral faults; and experience shows this to be correct, though mistakes are easily made in applying this principle to particular cases.—When man was more perfect and lived in a state of innocence, he bore none of those loads which he is now called to sustain; he was under no necessity of tilling the ground with weariness; he lived free from care, needed no clothing, etc.; vid. Vol. I. § 56. All this now ceased; and the evils which began to appear were regarded as the consequences of the Fall, and as punishments inflicted by the Deity. Hence it is related, v. 8, that God sat in solemn judgment upon our first parents, and pronounced their sentence. And this was done in a *Thunder-storm*, which took place בְּרִיבַת הַיּוֹם, i. e. at eventide, when the cool evening wind began to blow at sunset, as it does in the east. This term is used in

To minds of a particular cast, which had been disgusted with the assumptions of philosophy and wearied with travelling through its thorny mazes, so simple and easy a solution of the mysteries of our present condition, might naturally furnish repose. But a just and unperverted critical taste must be offended with an interpretation so flatly and frigidly *ad literam*, as that which is here suggested.

If this narrative is to retain the least doctrinal interest, it must be regarded as exhibiting *the trial of man as to obedience to the divine will*, and the unhappy issue of this trial. And if this meaning be extracted from this history, it is not of so much consequence whether it be by an allegorical or literal interpretation. But to make this the history of the imprudent conduct of Adam and Eve in eating of a fruit of whose fatal qualities they had been forewarned, and thus poisoning themselves, is to empty it of its high interest, as the account of the birth of *Sin*, and to reduce it to a common-place story, unworthy of its place at the head of the history of man. It was well said by Theophilus of Antioch long ago, "that it was not the Tree, but the *Disobedience*, which had death in itself," *Contra Autyl.* Luther, too, who in general followed the literal interpretation, says with regard to this passage, "Adam indeed stuck his teeth into the Apple; but he set them, too, upon a thorn, which was the Law of God and disobedience against him; and this was the proper cause of his misery," *Com. on Gen. 2: 5.*

Some of the remoter consequences of Knapp's view of the transgression of our first parents and its influence on their posterity, are not less singular, than the first appearance of his interpretation. If the result of the Fall to Adam was a physical disorder which we inherit from him, then it would seem that in order that man might be restored, a physical cure ought first to be effected, and the first step towards his recovery should be a medical prescription. But of this more hereafter.—Tr.]

opposition to *הם הִיָּדוּם*, *meridies*, Gen. 18: 1.—Man *hid* himself,—the natural effect of the consciousness of having acted wrong; and then comes the trial. All this is perfectly natural, and like what we see every day in the case of crime, and of an evil conscience. Men, as here, fear the presence of God, and wish to conceal themselves from him; although they well know, that this is impossible. It is hard for them to acknowledge their sins, repent of them and confess them. They seek vain excuses, and throw off the guilt from themselves to others; Eve upon the Serpent, and Adam upon Eve. And indeed in these words, *the woman which THOU GAVEST me*, Adam seems to throw the guilt upon God; as much as to say, ‘hadst not thou given her to me, this evil had not been done.’

But the most distinct punishment for the transgression of the divine Law, was this, that they must die; Gen. 2: 17. coll. 3: 19. In the former of these texts, the phrase is, *מוֹת תָּמוּת* (best rendered by Symmachus, *θνήτὸς ἔσῃ*); in the latter, *thou shalt return to the earth from whence thou wast taken*. In the latter passage, therefore, it can be only *mortality* which is spoken of; and the theological distinction of *spiritual*, *bodily*, and *eternal* death, has no connexion with this passage. Some theologians assert even, that it does not relate to *bodily* death at all, but only to spiritual and eternal. So Calovius, Seb. Schmidt, Fecht, etc.—This mortality now was the consequence of the harmful fruit they had eaten, just as their immortality was described as what would be the consequence of eating of the Tree of Life. And as men were henceforward to be deprived of immortality, they were no more permitted to eat of the Tree of Life, and were therefore removed by God from the Garden; vs. 22—24. In the same way, that their removal from the Garden is represented as an act of God, are we to understand the direction *that they should be clothed with the skins of beasts* (“God made them coats of skins,” as it is said v. 21); viz. as an instruction which they received directly and immediately from God; for it was a common opinion throughout the ancient world, that God had directly communicated to men the knowledge of many useful inventions.

In the words, v. 22, “Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil,” there is something ironical, and they refer to v. 5; as much as to say: ‘we see now how it is; man wished to become wise and like to God; but in breaking the commandment of God, he acted like a fool.’—Others render these words, ‘*he was like one of us*, but now is so no more.’

With respect to the curse pronounced upon the Serpent, v. 14, many difficulties are found. How can the Serpent, which, even supposing it the instrument of the Devil, was an innocent cause of the Temptation, have been punished? This certainly does not seem to agree with our present ideas of punishment and what constitutes capacity for it. But if we notice the conduct of children, and of rude and uncultivated men, we shall find a solution. God deals with men *more humano*, and condescends in his conduct to their limited and infantine comprehensions. When children are injured by an animal, or even by an inanimate thing, they often proceed in the same way, as they would with one like themselves. The sense of the injury which they have experienced, and the displeasure which they naturally feel, leads them to wish for recompense; and they feel a kind of satisfaction, when the cause of the injury done them, even if it be a lifeless object, is in their view repaid. To these conceptions does God here condescend; and designs to impress upon the minds of our first parents by this vivid representation, the idea, that the Tempter in this transaction would not go unrewarded, and that every tempter must expect to receive from him unavoidable and severe punishment. This is the doctrine, which is taught them in this, so to speak, *sensible* manner. The punishment inflicted upon the invisible agent concerned in this temptation could not be made obvious to them; it must therefore be made to fall upon the instrument. Enough for them, that they could derive from the punishment of the Serpent this doctrine, which, in the state in which they then were, could have been in no other way made so obvious and impressive. Hence the fear and dread of the serpent which is felt by man and beast. It is the image of baseness, and cleaves to the ground.—*To eat dust*, is a figurative expression, denoting *to be levelled with the ground, laid in the dust*, Is. 49: 23. So, *to eat ashes*, Ps. 102: 10, and the phrase *humum ore memordit*, used by Virgil with respect to one struck dead to the earth. Cf. Hom. Odyss. XXII. 269.

(3) V. 15, *I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.*—עָרַב in the first case denotes the *posterity of the Serpent*,—the *serpent-race*; in the second case, either collectively, the posterity of Eve, γεννητοὶ γυναικῶν, Matt. 11: 11; or one of

this posterity, a *descendant*, or *son* of Eve; for in this latter sense may זָרַע in the singular be taken, according to the Hebrew idiom; e. g. Gen. 4: 25. Taken in this sense, it is referred to the Messiah, the second Adam, who even by the later Jews was denominated זָרַע, the descendant sometimes of Adam and sometimes of Abraham; vid. Gal. 5: 16, and Wetstein ad. h. l.—These words admit of a threefold construction, neither of which is inconsistent with, or entirely excludes the others; and either of which contains instruction for those to whom these words were first addressed, and to their posterity.

(a) If these words are referred to the serpent here *visible*, the sense is: ‘It is my will, that enmity should exist between thee, and the woman, between thy breed, and her descendants; i. e. there shall be a constant hatred between the human and the serpent race. Men shall aim at thy head, and thou at their heel, i. e. they shall seek thy life, and thou shalt seek to injure them, by thy poisonous bite, whenever thou canst.’ Cf. Zachariä, Bibl. Theol. Th. II. S. 318. and Report. IV. 250, f.

(b) Every thing which took place here was designed to give *moral* instruction to our first parents. In this way, it was intended to teach them respecting the external *occasions* and *excitements* to sin; and by means of the Serpent, this lesson was made plain and obvious to their senses. Hence we have in these words the following maxim: ‘Thou and thy posterity (i. e. all men) will have from henceforward a constant warfare against sin to maintain. The victory of man over the Tempter and his seductions will be difficult and uncertain; they will be in constant contention with each other, and men will not come off uninjured, nor will they remain hereafter un-seduced, and must always feel the injurious consequences of transgression.’

(c) If זָרַע in the second case denotes a single individual among the descendants of Adam, it refers to the Messiah, who has destroyed the power of the Tempter and of Sin, and who has also made it possible for all his followers to overcome them; vid. 1 John 3: 8. Our first parents could not indeed have understood these words as a distinct prophecy respecting the Messiah; for they were not able at that time to comprehend the idea of a Messiah in all its extent; nor is this text ever cited in the New Testament as a prophecy respecting Christ. From these words, however, they could easily de-

duce the idea, that in this contest the human race might and would come off finally victorious. The *head* of the Serpent would be bruised for its entire destruction; and the only revenge it could take, would be to bite the *heel*; it could injure less, than it would itself be injured. Hence it was here, as Paul says respecting the Patriarchs, Heb. 11: 13,—they received the promise from God, but saw that which was promised *πόρρωθεν*. Respecting the manner in which this promise should be fulfilled, and the person through whom it should be performed, more full revelations were gradually given at a later period. So that even although our first parents might not have been able to refer this *נִצָּחַן* to one particular descendant of Adam, they might yet find in these words a consoling promise from God. And for this reason we may justly call this passage, as it has been called by some of the Church fathers, *Protevangelium*, because it contains the first joyful promise ever given to our race. Vid. Storr, *De Protevangelio*, Tubingæ, 1781.—[Hengstenberg, *Christologie*.—Smith, *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*, Vol. I.—Tr.]

Note. In explaining the history of the Fall to the people, the teacher should dwell mostly upon the internal truth and the practical instruction contained in it. In conformity with the remark at the latter part of No. I. of this section, he must show, from the example of the progenitors of our race, not only how sin first entered into the world, but also how it is still accustomed to arise. In doing this he can appeal to James 1: 13—15, and then illustrate the truth by examples, such as daily occur. In this way he may rescue this history from the contempt sometimes thrown upon it, and teach those entrusted to his care, to regard it not as a fable, but seriously to reflect upon it in such a manner as may be profitable to them. He must treat it entirely as *fact* or *history*, in the same manner as it is treated both in the Old and New Testament. Let him by no means initiate his hearers into all the hypotheses and controversies of the learned on this subject; since they are unable to form a judgment respecting them, and will be rather confounded than enlightened by hearing them recited.—And since in the New Testament, the Devil is represented as having an agency in this transaction, he must also be so represented by the Christian teacher, who, however, must not attempt to determine the manner in which this agency was exerted, as on this point the Scripture says nothing.

[On the general subject of this section, cf. the authors before referred to, Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde*, Appendix, S. 264. Schleirmacher, *Glaubenslehre*, B. II. S. 59. Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, S. 345, § 78. Bretschneider, *Handbuch*, B. II. S. 58, § 125. Herder, *Geist der Ebrai. Poesie*, B. I. S. 136, ff.—Tr.]

§ 76. *Of the imputation of the sin of our first parents.*

It is taught in Theology, that the transgression of the progenitors of mankind, had a twofold influence upon their posterity; viz. a *physical* influence, in the propagation of sinful desires and moral imperfection, and also a *moral* influence, which is commonly considered as properly *imputationem peccati Adamitici*. These two do not necessarily belong together, although *imputatio* and *peccatum originale* have been often connected together by Theologians. They may however be distinguished; and one may easily affirm moral corruption while he denies imputation, and the reverse. We shall therefore first treat of imputation, and then show how, according to the Scriptures, the two are united.

Now whatever diversity there may exist in the opinions of Theologians respecting Imputation, when they come to express their own views definitely; they will yet for the most part agree, that the phrase, *God imputes the sin of our progenitors to their posterity*, means, that *for the sin committed by our progenitors, God punishes their descendants*. The term *to impute* is used in different senses. (a) It is said of a *creditor*, who charges something to his debtor as debt; like *הִשָּׁב*, and *λογίζομαι* and *ἐλλογέω*, e. g. Philem. v. 18. (b) It is transferred to human *judgment*, when any one is punished or declared deserving of punishment. *Crime* is regarded as a *debt*, which must be cancelled partly by actual restitution, and partly by punishment. (c) This now is applied to God, who imputes sin, when he pronounces men guilty, and treats them accordingly; i. e. when he actually punishes the sin of men (*הִשָּׁב עֲוֹן*, *λογίζεσθαι ἁμαρτίαν*, Ps. 32: 2). The one punished is called *נִשָּׂא עֲוֹן* in opposition to one to whom *הִשָּׁב לְצַדִּיקָה*, who is *rewarded*, Ps. 106: 31. Rom. 4: 3.

In order to learn what is taught in the theological schools on this subject, we must pursue the historic method, or we shall grope in the dark.

I. Opinions of the Jews.

The imputation of Adam's sin is not called in the Mosaic narrative, or any where in the Old Testament, by the name of *imputation*, al-

though the doctrine of imputation is contained in it, as we shall soon see. But in the writings of the Talmudists and of the Rabbins, and still earlier in the Chaldaic Paraphrases on the Old Testament, we find it asserted in so many words, that the posterity of Adam were punished with bodily death on account of his first sin, although they themselves had never sinned. Cf. the Chaldaic Paraphrase on Ruth 4: 22, "Because Eve ate of the forbidden fruit, all the inhabitants of the earth are subject to death." In this way they accounted to themselves for the death of the greatest saints, who, as they supposed, had never themselves sinned. They taught also, than in the person of Adam, the whole multitude or mass of his posterity had sinned. Vid. the Commentators on Rom. V.; especially Wetstein and Koppe. As early as the time of the Apostles, this doctrine was widely prevalent among the Jews. It is clearly taught by Paul in Rom. 5: 12—14, and is there placed by him in intimate connexion with the more peculiar Christian doctrines. In this passage, he has employed exactly the same expressions which we find among the Rabbins.

How was this doctrine developed and brought to such clearness among the Jews? They proceeded from the scriptural maxim, that man was created immortal, and that the death of Adam was a consequence of his transgression. And since all the posterity of Adam die, although all have not themselves sinned (e. g. children); they concluded, that these too must endure this evil on account of Adam's transgression. Cf. Book of Wisdom 2: 23, 24. Sirach 25: 32, ἀπὸ γυναικὸς ἀρχὴ ἡ ἁμαρτίας, καὶ δι' αὐτήν ἀποθνήσκουσιν πάντες.—Farther than this, which is evidently founded in the Scriptures, they did not go. In order to illustrate this doctrine and render it plain, they probably resorted to some analogies; such, for example, as the fact, that children must often suffer for the crimes of their parents, in which they had no share; and that according to the Law of Moses, the iniquity of parents was visited upon the children of the third and fourth generation.—In what way they probably conceived of imputation, and formed their conclusions about it, may be seen from the remarkable passage, Heb. 7: 9, 10. The patriarch Levi, (who, according to the Mosaic Law, receives the tithes,) paid tithes to Melchisedec in the person of Abraham; i. e. it is to be considered the same as if the Levites paid tithes to Melchisedec, when Abraham paid them, *for Levi was in the loins of his*

father Abraham, when he met Melchisedec, i. e. he already existed in Abraham, although he was not yet born. What Abraham did is to be considered as if it had been done by his descendant; for had he lived at that time, he would have done the same that Abraham then did.

II. Opinions of the New Testament writers.

This doctrine is most clearly taught in Rom. 5: 12—14,—a passage which is very variously explained. It is also briefly exhibited in 1 Cor. 15: 21, 22.—Vid. Töllner, *Theol. Untersuchungen*, Theil I. St. 2. S. 56. Modern philosophers and theologians have found many things here inconsistent with their philosophical systems. And some of them have laboured so hard and long upon this passage, that they have at length extorted a sense from it, in which nothing of imputation could any longer be discerned; and this is the case with Döderlein in his “*Dogmatik*.” They did not consider, however, that Paul here makes use of the same words and phrases which were then common among the Jews on the subject of Imputation, and that he could not therefore have been otherwise understood by his contemporary readers; and that Paul has also reasoned in the same way on another subject, Heb. 7: 9, 10; cf. No. I.

Paul shows, in substance, that all men are regarded and punished by God as sinners, and that the ground of this lies in the act of one man; as, on the contrary, deliverance from punishment depends also upon one man, Jesus Christ. If the words of Paul are not perverted, it must be allowed, that in Rom. 5: 12—14, he thus reasons: ‘the cause of the universal mortality of the human race, lies in Adam’s transgression. He sinned, and so became mortal. Other men are regarded and treated by God as punishable, because they are the posterity of Adam, the first transgressor, and consequently they too are mortal. Should it now be objected, that the men who lived from Adam to Moses might themselves have personally *sinned*, and so have been punished with death on their own account; it might be answered, that those who lived before the time of Moses had no express and positive law, which threatened the punishment of sin, like those who lived after Moses. The positive law of Moses was not as yet given. They could not consequently

be punished on account of their own transgressions, as no law was as yet given to them; v. 14. Still they must die like Adam, who transgressed a positive law. Hence their mortality must have another cause, and this is to be sought in the imputation of Adam's transgression. And in the same way, the ground of the justification of man lies not in himself, but in Christ,—the second Adam.'

Such is the argument of Paul in this passage. But respecting *eternal death*, or the torments of hell, he here says nothing, and is far from implying, that on account of a sin committed by another man long before their birth, God punishes men with eternal hell-torments. On the contrary he here speaks of *bodily death* merely, as the consequence of the sin of Adam. And herein the learned Jews agreed with him. And in the passage 1 Cor. 15: 21, sq., Paul shows that the Resurrection to a blessed immortality will be the best and highest proof of our entire restoration through Jesus Christ, even as bodily death is the first and most striking proof of our degeneracy through Adam. [On this passage, cf. Tholuck, Comm. üb. Rom. V.—Usteri, Entwickel. d. paulin. Lehrbegriffs.—Edwards, Original Sin, Chap. IV. p. 352.—Stuart's Commentary on Rom. V. and Excursus.—Tr.]

III. Hypotheses of Theologians.

The greatest difficulties with respect to this doctrine have arisen from the fact, that many have treated what is said by Paul in the fifth of Romans,—a passage wholly popular, and any thing but formally exact and didactic, in a learned and philosophical manner, and have defined terms used by him in a loose and popular way, by logical and scholastic distinctions. We do not find any where among the ancients, in their popular discourses, an exact and philosophically precise use of terms with respect to the *consequences* and the *punishment* of sin. They frequently use the word *punishment* in a wider sense, in which it is here and elsewhere employed by Paul. He and the Jewish teachers, with whom in this particular he agrees, use *punishment* (*κατάκριμα*), *imputation of sin*, etc. in the same sense in which it is said respecting children, for example, that they are *punished* on account of the crimes of their ancestors, that the crimes of their ancestors are *imputed* to them, etc.; although they, in their own persons, had no share in the guilt, and

could not therefore, in the strictest philosophical and juridical sense, be considered as the subjects of *imputation* and *punishment*. The family of a traitor, whose name is disgraced, and whose goods are confiscated, are thus said to be *punished* on his account. Respecting Louis XVI. who was so unfortunate, and suffered so much in consequence of the errors of his predecessors Louis XIV. and XV., it would be commonly said without hesitation, that he endured *punishment* on their account, and had to *atone for* or *expiate* their crimes. Here, what is merely the *consequence* of the sin of another, is called, from some analogy between them, the *punishment* of one, who has no personal guilt in the matter. Just such is the case here. Mortality was to Adam the *punishment* of his sin, strictly speaking. His posterity are also mortal; since a mortal cannot beget those who are immortal. With them, therefore, mortality is the natural *consequence* of Adam's sin, but not their *punishment*, in the proper juridico-philosophical sense of the word,—because they themselves had no share in the first transgression. *Imputation*, therefore, of the sin of Adam, in the strict sense of the word *imputation*, does not exist with regard to us, his posterity; since we only suffer the baleful *consequences* of the sin of the first man, of which we ourselves were not, however, *guilty*, and for which we cannot therefore be punished. Speaking, however, in a loose and popular way, we may call what we endure, *punishment* and *imputation*.

By this observation, many difficulties in other passages of Scripture are obviated. So when Moses says, “the iniquity of the father shall be visited upon his posterity from generation to generation” (cf. Ezek. 18: 4, 20, coll. Jer. 31: 29, 30), he is to be understood as speaking in a popular way, of the consequences which should befall the posterity of the wicked without any fault of their own. When on the other hand it is said, “the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,” it is to be understood as a maxim of justice, and to be taken in the literal sense. Paul himself says in other passages, that man will be punished solely on his own account, Rom. 2: 6. 1: 18, sq. Gal. 6: 5. 2 Cor. 5: 10. In these he speaks *sensu proprio et forensi*. He also teaches expressly, that reward and punishment do not depend upon natural birth and derivation, Rom. 9: 11; and Jesus rejects the opinion suggested by his disciples, that the misfortune of the one born blind was to be regarded as the imputation of the guilt of his parents, John 9: 2, 3.

But why is language used in such a manner with regard to this subject in the Scriptures? The principal reason why the word *punishment* is used in this connexion, lies in the fact, that there is, in all the mortal descendants of Adam, a preponderance of carnal appetites and passions, and that they are invariably seduced by these into *actual* sin, and so become *punishable*. There is not one upon earth who remains uncorrupted, and consequently all are rendered liable to punishment; vid. Rom. 5: 12. Eph. 2: 3. God would not treat all men as sinners, did they not in this respect resemble Adam.

We find, accordingly, that the passage in Rom. V. was never understood in the ancient Grecian Church, down to the fourth century, to teach *imputation*, in a strictly philosophical and judicial sense; certainly Origen and the writers immediately succeeding him, exhibit nothing of this opinion. They regard *bodily death* as a *consequence* of the sin of Adam, and not as a *punishment*, in the strict and proper sense of this term. Thus Chrysostom says, upon Rom. 5: 12, 'Εκείνου πέσοντος (Ἀδάμ), καὶ οἱ μὴ ἀάγοντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου, γέγονασιν ἐξ ἐκείνου θνητοί. And Cyril (Adv. Anthropol. c. 8) says, οἱ γεγόνοτες ἐξ αὐτοῦ (Ἀδάμ), ὡς ἀπὸ φθαρτοῦ, φθαρτοὶ γέγοναμεν.

The *Latin* church, on the other hand, was the proper seat of the strict doctrine of imputation. There they began to interpret the words of Paul, as if he were a scholastic and logical writer. One cause of their misapprehending so entirely the spirit of this passage, was, that the word *imputare* (a word in common use among civilians and in judicial affairs) had been employed in the Latin Versions in rendering v. 13 of Rom. V.; and that ἐφ' ᾧ (v. 12) had been translated *in quo*, and could refer, as they supposed, to nobody but Adam. This opinion was then associated with some peculiar philosophical ideas then prevalent in the West, and from the whole a doctrine *de Imputatione* was formed, in a sense wholly unknown to the Hebrews, to the New Testament, and to the Grecian Church.—We may hence see the reason of the fact, that the Grecian teachers, e. g. those in Palestine, took sides with Pelagius against the teachers of the African church.

The following are the principal theories which have been adopted in the Western Church, to illustrate the *mode* of imputation, and to vindicate its *justice*.

(1) The oldest hypothesis is that which affirmed, that all the

posterity of Adam were, in the most literal sense, already *in him*, and sinned in him,—in his person; and that Adam's sin is, therefore, justly imputed by God to all his posterity. This hypothesis has its ground in the opinion, that the souls of children have existed either in reality, or at least potentially, in their parents, and this as far back as Adam; and that in this way, the souls of all his posterity participated in the actions done in his person, although they themselves were never after conscious of such action; vid. Vol. I. § 57, II. 3. This was the doctrine of the *Traduciani*, which Tertullian also professed. And it was upon this ground principally, that the strict doctrine of imputation was maintained in the Latin Church; even Ambrosius placed his defence of it upon this basis. But this doctrine was argued with the greatest zeal by Augustine in opposition to Pelagius, and after his time was generally received in the Western Church; although Augustine himself was often doubtful in respect to Traducianism. What Paul had taught in a loose, popular way, respecting the imputation of Adam's sin, was now taken by Augustine and his followers in a strict, philosophical, and legal sense. Ambrosius says, *omnes in primo homine (ἐφ' ᾧ) peccavimus, et culpæ successio ab uno in omnes transfusa est*. Augustine says, *In Adamo omnes peccarunt, in lumbis Adami erat genus humanum*. Also, *Infantes ab eo trahunt peccati reatum, mortisque supplicium*. For a full collection of Texts on this controversy, vid. Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana*. [Vid. Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, § 80, Anmerk. 1, 2.—Tr.] In form, these declarations have an apparent resemblance to the doctrine of Paul; but the resemblance is only apparent. Augustine understands in a strictly philosophical sense, what, as we have seen above, was said by Paul in a popular manner.

In opposition to Augustine, Pelagius taught, that Adam hurt himself alone, and not his posterity by his transgression, and that it would be unjust for God to impute his guilt to his innocent descendants;—a doctrine evidently opposed to that of Paul.

As the theory of Augustine rests upon a baseless hypothesis, it does not need a formal refutation. It was the prevailing theory among the schoolmen, and even throughout the sixteenth century, and until about the middle of the seventeenth, when it was contested by the French Reformed theologians, Joshua Placæus, and Moses Amyraldus; who, however, were violently opposed. In Eng-

land, too, it was contested by Thomas Burnet. The advocates of this theory endeavoured to defend it by means of the theory of *spermatic animalculæ*, which arose about the middle of the eighteenth century. When by means of the magnifying glass, these spermatic animalculæ were observed, the thought occurred, that they were the cause of impregnation. And some then affirmed, that the souls of all men were in Adam, had their seat in these invisible animalculæ, participated in every thing which he did, and consequently sinned with him.—While therefore the biblical theologians of the Protestant church have justly held fast the doctrine of imputation, they have abandoned the theory of Augustine, because this does not accord either with reason or with Scripture, and because it furnishes no adequate vindication for God in this procedure. In place of this theory, our theologians have substituted others, either invented by themselves, or adopted from different authorities.

(2) Many have inferred the justice of imputation from the supposition, that Adam was not only the *natural* or *seminal*, but also the *moral* head of the human race,—or even its *representative* and *federal* head. They suppose accordingly, that the sin of Adam is imputed to us, on the same principle on which the doings of the head of a family, or of the plenipotentiary of a state, are imputed to his family or state, although they had no personal agency in his doings. In the same way, they suppose Christ took the place of all men, and that what he did is *imputed* to them. According to this theory, God entered into a *league* or *covenant* with Adam, and so Adam represented, and took the place of the whole human race. This theory was invented by some schoolmen, and has been adopted by many in the Romish and Protestant Church since the sixteenth century, and was defended even in the eighteenth century by some Lutheran theologians, as Pfaff of Tübingen, some of the followers of Wolf, (e. g. Capzov, in his “*Comm. de Imputatione facti proprii et alieni*,”) and Baumgarten, in his *Dogmatik*, and disputation, “*de imputatione peccati Adamitici*.” But it was more particularly favored by the Reformed theologians, especially by the disciples of Cocceius at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century, e. g. by Witsius in his “*Oeconomia foederum*.” They appeal to Hosea 6: 7, “They transgressed the covenant, like Adam,” i. e. broke the divine *laws*. But where

is it said, that Adam was their federal head, and that his transgression is imputed to them? On this text, Morus justly observes, “*est mera comparatio Judaeorum peccantium cum Adamo peccante.*” Other texts are also cited in behalf of this opinion.

But for various reasons, this theory cannot be correct. And (a), The descendants of Adam never empowered him to be their representative, and to act in their name. (b) It cannot be shown from the Bible, that Adam was informed, that the fate of all his posterity was involved in his own. (c) If the transgression of Adam is imputed, by right of covenant, to all his posterity; then in justice all their transgressions should be again imputed to him, as the guilty cause of all their misery and sin. What a mass of guilt, then, would come upon Adam! But of all this, nothing is said in the Scriptures. (d) The imputation of the righteousness of Christ, cannot be alledged in support of this theory. For this is imputed to men only by their own will and consent.—This hypothesis has been opposed, with good reason, by John Taylor, in his work on original sin, which will be hereafter noticed.

(3) Others endeavour to deduce the doctrine of imputation from the *scientia media* of God, or from his foreknowledge of what is conditionally possible. The sin of Adam, they say, is imputed to us, because God foresaw, that each one of us would have committed it, if he had been in Adam's stead, or placed in his circumstances. Even Augustine says, that the sin of Adam is imputed to us *propter consensionem*, or *consensum præsumptum*. This theory has been advanced, in modern times, by Reusch, in his “*Introductio in Theologiam revelatam*” and in Brunquell's work, “*Die gute Sache Gottes, bey Zurechnung des Falls,*” Jena, 1749. But it is a new sort of justice, which would allow us to be punished for sins which we never committed, or never designed to commit, but only might possibly have committed under certain circumstances. Think a moment, how many sins we all should have committed if God had suffered us to come into circumstances of severe temptation. An innocent man might, by this rule, be punished as a murderer, because had he lived at Paris on St. Bartholomew's Night in 1572, he might, from mistaken zeal, have killed a heretic.

(4) Since none of these hypotheses satisfactorily explain the matter, the greater part of the moderate and biblical theologians of the Protestant church, are content with saying, what is manifestly the

doctrine of the Bible, that the imputation of Adam's sin consists in the prevailing *mortality* of the human race, and that this is not to be regarded as *imputation* in the strict judicial sense, but rather as the consequence of Adam's transgression, perhaps, as is thought by some, the *physical* consequence of eating the forbidden fruit, which may certainly be inferred from Gen. III.—The strict doctrine of *immediate* imputation was by no means universal among the Protestant theologians of the sixteenth century, and, as is justly remarked by Pfaff, Weismann, Burnet, and others, was to many of them unknown, even in name. The common theory, *de capite morali sive foederali* is not to be found in the symbols.

For the purposes of popular instruction let, therefore, the following biblical statement suffice : ' Adam, on account of his transgression of the divine law, was punished with death, and from thenceforward became mortal. And being himself mortal, he could beget only mortal descendants ; vid. 1 Cor. 15: 48—50, coll. Gen. 5: 3. Hence we and all men are mortal ; and the ground of this mortality lies in our progenitors, and this mortality is a consequence of their transgression.' In conformity with these views, let the teacher explain the passage in Rom. V. and abstain from all subtleties and learned hypotheses.

Note. Works on Imputation and Original Sin. (1) In opposition to imputation *sensu strictiori*, and also to the doctrine concerning Original Sin. Of these there have been many among the English theologians of the eighteenth century. Vid. especially, Dan. Whitby, *De imputatione divina peccati Adamitici*, Londini, 1711, translated into German with notes by Semler, 1775.—John Taylor, *Scriptural doctrine of Original Sin*, in 3 parts, also translated into German. At a later period, these doctrines were investigated by the protestant divines and philosophers of Germany, and partly opposed ; e. g. by Töllner, *Theol. Untersuchungen*, St. II., ab. Rom. v. Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*, Th. I. and II.—Steinbart, *System der Glückseligkeitslehre*. Jerusalem, *Betrachtungen*, Th. II.

2. In defence of these doctrines, and in opposition to the works above mentioned. Joh. Andr. Cramer, *Exercitationes de peccato originali adversus Jo. Taylor*, Kopenhagen, 1766–67.—Sixt, *Prüfung des Systems u. s. w.* St. I. (in opposition to Steinbart.) The work entitled, "*Freymüthige Prüfung des Steinbart'shen Christenthums*" (1792) contains also many excellent and just observations.—Seiler, *Von der Erbsünde, oder dem natürlichen Verderben*,—a work directed in general against the ancient and modern objections to this doctrine, especially those of Eberhard and Steinbart.—J. D. Michaelis, *Gedanken über die Lehre der Schrift von der Sünde und Genugthuung*, Göttingen u. Bremen, 1779, 8vo,—one of the most important works in relation to this subject.

He lays the doctrine of the Bible at the foundation, and then endeavors to show its agreement with reason and experience, and to vindicate it against objections. This work contains many very excellent and ingenious observations. There are also valuable remarks on this subject in Storr's work, "Zweck des Todes Jesu," and in his Commentary on the epistle to the Hebrews. Cf. Kant, Vom radikalen Bösen.—In illustration of the History of this doctrine, cf. Walch, *Historia doctrinæ de peccato originis*, Jenæ, 1738. Semler, *Geschichte der Glaubenslehre*, prefixed to Baumgarten's "Polemik."

[The work of President Edwards "On Original Sin" deserves mention among the most celebrated works of European theologians on this subject.—Among the later and more thorough German writers on the subject of imputation are Schleiermacher, Usteri, Tholuck, Nitzsch. The former of these has vindicated some of the highest points of Calvinism by the most profound reasoning. The others follow more or less the general system which he has developed.—Tr.]

§ 77. *In what the natural depravity of man consists ; its appellations in the Bible ; where it has its principal seat in man ; and how its existence may be proved from the Holy Scriptures.*

I. In what natural depravity consists.

The descriptions given of it by theologians are very different as to the words employed. Melancthon describes the *peccatum originis* as an inclination or disposition to all evil, which however does not always manifest itself in the same way, or in the same degree, and which does not appear at once, but gradually, and in all men. Others describe it, as that disposition of the soul by which evil desires have an existence in it, or rather spring up whenever occasion offers ; etc.—But they all agree at last, that the essence of natural depravity, is the disturbed balance of the powers or inclinations of man, or the preponderance of the carnal desires over reason. It lies in the fact, that the lower nature of man, made by God to obey, is not submissive to the reason, as the power which should give law and govern. The following definition may therefore be given of the moral depravity of man, in conformity both with experience and with Scripture : *it is that tendency to sinful passions or unlawful propensities, which is perceived in man, whenever objects of desire are placed before him, and laws are laid upon him ;* Rom. vii. This want of harmony between the two natures being but too clear-

ly perceived, and being justly regarded as an evil fraught with ruinous consequences to man, it was early maintained among the Hebrews and other nations, that it could not have existed in the original state of man. We see every where, that men have felt it necessary to adopt this supposition. It is moreover in accordance with the Bible; vid. § 75, II. 2. We have already considered (vid. § 74) how far unaided reason can go in clearing up this subject; we now come to examine what we are taught respecting it by the Scriptures.

Theologians remark here by way of caution, that we must carefully distinguish between the *essential* and *accidental* deficiencies and imperfections of our nature. *Essential* imperfections would always have been seen in man, owing to the limitation of his nature, even although he had not fallen. But these imperfections would have implied no fault and no depravity. Depravity in any one, presupposes a better state from which he has deteriorated. Hence our *essential* imperfections cannot properly be considered as belonging to our natural depravity. E. g. man cannot be accounted depraved in consequence of the ignorance in which he is born, and the false judgments which spring merely from that ignorance, nor for the pleasure which he takes in objects of sense, when simply considered; but only for the other class of imperfections,—those that are *contingent*. Among these may be placed the violence of the passions, their obvious preponderance over reason, and the hinderances we meet with from this source to the knowledge of the truth, and to our progress in holiness. This is shown by the example of Eve. She was, even before her fall, in many respects ignorant and inexperienced; she judged incorrectly respecting God; she felt too the motions of sense; but as yet she was uncorrupted. But after she fell, she was the subject of those other accidental imperfections, which now constitute human depravity.

II. How depravity is named in the Bible, and where it is located in man.

(1) The word *φθορά* is used in Scripture to designate the entire corrupt constitution of man in a moral respect. According to common usage, it denotes a constitution and state *which is not as it should be*; vid. 2 Pet. 2: 19. Ephes. 4: 22. 1 Tim. 6: 5.

(2) This depravity (*φθορά*) of man exerts a powerful influence

upon his soul,—his understanding and will; vid. Rom. 6: 14—23. Eph. 2: 3. The *body* is, however, plainly the principal seat of the carnal appetites and desires, and hence the origin of this depravity is to be sought chiefly in the body; vid. Rom. 7: 5, 23. 6: 12, sq. And all the ancient heathen philosophers, who considered the preponderance of this lower animal nature as the source of human depravity, made the body the principal seat of this evil, and in doing so were supported by observations familiar to all.

(a) The ancient Grecian philosophers, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics (vid. § 74, I.), considered matter, and the human body as consisting of matter, to be the seat and source of evil. With these writers, the Hellenistic Jews agreed; vid. Book of Wisdom, 9: 15, “The decaying body burdens the soul, and the earthy tabernacle presses down the thinking spirit.” Of the same mind were most of the early Christian fathers, e. g. Justin the Martyr, Origen (although some passages in his works appear to contradict this), Hilarius, and Augustine himself. This doctrine was carried to a great length and very much abused by some heretics who sprang up in the Christian church, particularly in the East. They regarded matter as in itself an evil existence, not deriving its being from God, nor depending upon him. So the Gnostics and the Manicheans.

(b) The doctrine that the body of man is the chief seat of human weaknesses and imperfections, and also the germ of moral evil, was widely diffused among the Eastern nations in the remotest antiquity, and was adopted by the writers of the Old Testament, as may be clearly seen from their use of the word בָּשָׂר (*σάρξ*.) This word signifies originally the human body, then, *men themselves*, but always with the implied idea, that they are frail, imperfect, and mortal, or in a moral respect, that they are inclined to err and sin; vid. Gen. 6: 12. 8: 22. Is. 40: 6; coll. Matt. 26: 41. John 3: 6. On the other hand, the word רוּחַ (*πνεῦμα*) denotes what is spiritual, moral, divine, perfect, holy, etc.

(c) This doctrine, the first traces of which we find in the earlier Jewish books, was gradually developed, and was at last exhibited in the New Testament with the greatest clearness. Paul places *σάρξ* in opposition to *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*, and depicts the controversy between the two, and the hindrances which the *σάρξ* opposes to the *πνεῦμα* in the knowledge of the truth, and holiness of walk; vid. Rom. 7:

18, 23. With him, *φρονεῖν* and *περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα* mean to indulge sinful desires, Rom. 8: 1, 5; and *θέλημα, φρόνημα, νοῦς σαρκός*, signify the corrupt, depraved disposition of human nature, —the propensity to sin, Gal. 6: 13. Ephes. 2: 3. Cf. *ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκικαί*, bodily, sensual desires, 1 Pet. 2: 11; also *ὁ σαρκικός (ἄνθρωπος)*. In Rom. 6: 6, 16, Paul says that the Christian should deprive the *σῶμα ἁμαρτίας* of its power, and not suffer himself to be subject *ἐπιθυμίαις σώματος*; and in Rom. 7: 18—25, still more plainly; he knew, he says, that in him (or rather in his body, *ἐν σαρκί*) the seat of moral good was not to be found (*οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἀγαθόν*). He was not, indeed, wanting in good will to live righteously; but in power to perform his will. He often *could* not accomplish the good, which he heartily approved from his inmost moral feelings; and on the contrary, he often did the evil which he disallowed. And thus he knew, that *sin* (i. e. a disposition to sin, sinful depravity) dwelt in him. His spirit (*νοῦς, ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*) approved the divine law, and acknowledged it good and useful; but in his members (*ἐν μέλεσι*, i. e. *ἐν σώματι*) there was another law, the law of sin (*dictamen sensuum*), which was opposed to the law of God, and which ruled over him. Hence he exclaims, “O miserable man that I am, who shall deliver me from this mortal body (*σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*).” And at last he thanks God, that through Christ he has granted him this deliverance, and that he was no more under the necessity of yielding obedience to his depraved appetites, although they still continued, and often resumed their power.

The word *ψυχικός, ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* is also often used in the Scriptures, denoting that one does not follow his reason, but is wholly under the influence of his bodily appetites and desires, and will give heed only to what he learns through his senses, and so despises the instruction which God has given respecting spiritual things. Thus Jude, v. 19; for *ψᾶς* and *ψυχή* often signify the impulses, desires and propensities of our lower nature; and 1 Cor. 2: 14, where *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* is one who scorns divine instruction, and chooses rather sense, darkness, and delusion; one who has no organ for what is above sense, and no taste for divine instruction,—the same with *σαρκικός*, 1 Cor. 3: 1.—The *inordinate* desires, those which are not as they should be, are often called in Scripture by way of eminence, *ἐπιθυμία, ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκός*, 1 John 2: 16,—commonly rendered in the Vulgate *concupiscentia*; hence this word is adopted in ecclesiastical Latinity. Vid. Morus, p. 107, n. 3, 4.

(*d*) From the passages now cited, and from the known sense in which the words above mentioned were anciently used, it is plain that those writers who make the *soul* the chief seat and original source of corruption very much mistake. Into this error Buddeus has fallen, as appears from his dissertation, “*De anima sede peccati originalis principale*,” Jenæ, 1725 ; and in this error he is followed by Seiler. It is equally certain, however, that this originally bodily disorder has a powerful influence upon the soul, on account of the intimate connexion between these two essential parts of man. It acts (*α*) upon the *Understanding*, since by means of it the objects of knowledge are placed before the mind in an entirely false light, so that the understanding holds that which is false for true, what is evil for good, and the reverse. (*β*) Upon the *will* and the *actions*, so that what has been thus falsely represented by the senses to the Understanding as good and right, is now desired and accomplished. The evil consequences of this are, that man prefers apparent, to real good, that he allows himself to be more governed by his senses than by his understanding, and often does that which he himself disapproves, and so chooses and acts against his own principles, and his better views ; vid. Rom. 7: 8, 19, 23. Gal. 5: 17, “The desire of the flesh is often opposed to the desire of the spirit, so that man is often unable to accomplish his good purposes.” The soul, as Paul teaches, is so far weak, as the animal propensities (*παθήματα σαρκός*) are strong ; and so feeble, that it is the slave of these propensities ; and although it may have a better conviction, is not able to carry it into effect, but is so carried away, that it must do what itself disapproves.—And this is the benefit of Christ (*χάρισμα*), that he saves us from the power of sin, as well as from its punishment.

Note. 1. Care must be taken here, that the doctrine of the injury which we sustain from the body and the inordinate appetites of which it is the seat, be not carried too far, as it has been by Less and other modern theologians. This extreme in the doctrine very naturally leads to dangerous perversions ; and we might expect that it would lead many to resort to *suicide*, in order to free themselves from the burdensome prison of the body. And indeed suicide was justified on this ground by the Stoics, and other ancient philosophers.—On this subject, it is important to bear in mind the great advantages which, as we are taught in the Scriptures, we possess from the connexion of the rational soul with the body in our present state ; vid. § 74. The false idea of the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists, that the body is a prison, where

the soul is incarcerated for its punishment, was held also by many of the Mystics and Platonists among the old Jews and Christians: but it has no foundation in the Scriptures. The sacred writers never require us, as Grecian philosophers and Christian Mystics often do, to *eradicate* our bodily appetites and desires, (which, if it were possible, would destroy the very nature of man); but only to control them, and subject them to reason. Christian Morals therefore insists, not that man should leave off particular sins, or suppress particular outbreakings of unlawful desire, but that a new turn should be given to all the natural desires; and this is the proper tendency of Christian Morals. It designs to bring man from the love of the world, to the love of God, from an improper self-love, to the love of others, from a love to sensible and perishing things, to a love of spiritual and eternal good. Such are the instructions which Christ every where gives; vid. John 3: 3—21.—It is a false assertion, that the inculcation of the doctrine of the natural propensity to evil, has a tendency to discourage men from the pursuit of good; when properly exhibited, this doctrine has exactly the opposite effect, and excites to the vigorous employment of our powers. The great point in this doctrine is, that the man who would fulfil his destination, must depart from evil, and not content with merely cultivating and developing his powers, must experience a radical reformation.

[Note. 2. *Does the depravity of our nature consist in the inordinateness of our BODILY desires?*

From the views exhibited in this section, it appears that our Author adopts the affirmative of this question. He sees in man a conflict between Reason, and those lower principles which have their seat in the body, and thinks of of no ulterior or more radical evil. To such a conception of human depravity he is necessarily brought by his theory respecting the consequences of the Fall, making them to consist chiefly in the disarrangement of our bodily constitution. In behalf of these views he appeals, as the reader has perceived, to the universal doctrine of Pagan philosophy on this subject, to the familiar observation of the actual inordinateness of the bodily appetites and their preponderance over reason, but principally to the Scriptural phraseology employed to designate the native character of man, and which, taken in its first etymological sense, seems to indicate that the *body* is the ultimate cause and principal seat of human depravity.

This part of our Author's system is of such radical importance, and so materially affects the views we must entertain of the other doctrines of Christianity, and especially of the Atonement, that it ought not to pass without examination.

As to the first argument above mentioned,—it will be readily conceded that this view of our natural character and state harmonizes well with Pagan Philosophy. It has a general resemblance even to the Indian and Persian religious systems, as exhibited by the Schlegels and other modern writers on the East. But it corresponds more exactly with the Platonic system, which fully recognizes the conflict between the rational principle (the *λογικόν*) and the irrational, animal principle (the *ἄλογον*). And while it resembles these

systems, it must be said also, that it is liable to the same objection which has often been urged against them, viz. that in some way, by supposing either an eternal intelligent principle of evil, or a blind destiny, or some defective bodily organization, or by some other external necessity, they account for the origin and prevalence of evil, instead of charging it upon the perverted use of the moral powers of men. But to all such conceptions of our moral condition, Christianity stands opposed,—especially in the doctrine of the Atonement, which, by its proffer of forgiveness, presupposes, not misfortune merely, but *guilt*, on the part of man, and which, in its whole bearing, aims at a spiritual, and not a physical evil. It is in this way that Christianity furnishes a new point of view for observing the character of man, and discloses the essential nature and deeper root of evil.

The fact alledged in the second argument, viz. that there is a visible preponderance of sense or of bodily appetites over reason, is also readily conceded. But can we conclude from this fact, that this disorder is to be attributed to the body, and the affections having their seat in it? Would not the just balance between the higher and lower principles of our nature, be equally disturbed by altering the weight in either scale? If in the original constitution of our nature, the lower principles of the animal life on one side, were balanced on the other by the higher principles of our intellectual life, *not by themselves, but in connexion with a communicated divine life* of which they are the organ (as we shall attempt to show); then the mere loss or withdrawal of this divine life would be followed of course by a loss of this original equipoise, and the undue predominance of the lower principles. Thus it can be conceived that the inordinateness of the bodily appetites, in which human depravity might seem at first view to consist, so far from constituting its real essence, may be only the necessary result of an ulterior cause,—the defect of the higher principles. Indeed considering the nature of these higher principles, and their rightful supremacy, how can their being drawn away and enslaved by principles so inferior and subordinate be accounted for, except from some defect in the spiritual part, to say nothing of positively evil inclinations seated there?

The argument derived from the use of the Scriptural terms ἡβη and σάρξ and their synonymes is very plausible; and when Paul calls the νόμος τῆς σαρκός also a νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν, the question might seem to be decided. But if this is difficult on one side, it is not less so on the other, that *pride, envy*, and other feelings, the most remote from the influence of the body, are derived by Paul from σάρξ, as its immediate fruits. Cf. Gal. 5: 19—22. Col. 2: 18.—Other reasons against the meaning assigned by our Author to these Scriptural terms, will appear in the sequel of this Note.

The following developement of the Scriptural doctrine respecting the natural state of man, is offered for consideration, in the belief that it is Augustinian and Edwardsean on the particular points in which these systems differ from the Pelagian and Arminian anthropologies.

In the first place; that principle, state, or disposition of human nature, whatever it may be, by which it designated as corrupt or evil, is more usually denominated σάρξ,—one who is in this state, σαρκικός,—the living and acting in it are described by the formulæ, περιπατεῖν ἐν σαρκί, κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν, φρονεῖν,

κ. τ. λ. The same state is also described, though less commonly, by other terms nearly synonymous with these.

Secondly. The most important clue to the meaning of the term ΣΑΡΞ, upon which so much depends, and which is so difficult of interpretation, is the fact that is placed in constant and direct contrast to the term ΠΝΕΥΜΑ,—so much so, that it seems necessarily to imply a state exactly opposite to that denoted by the latter term. The opposition between these two principles is pointed out in the following passages; viz. Rom. 7: 25. 8: 1, sq. 1 Cor. 3: 4. Gal. 5: 19. sq. Hence it is obvious, that in order to attain distinct and specific conceptions of the meaning of ΣΑΡΞ, we must fully understand the import of the term ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, with which it is contrasted. If ΠΝΕΥΜΑ denotes merely the intelligent, rational principle (the λογικόν), then may ΣΑΡΞ designate merely the irrational, bodily appetites and desires (the ἄλογον). But if ΠΝΕΥΜΑ have a higher import, then to suppose ΣΑΡΞ to be still limited as before to the designation of merely bodily appetites, would be to lose sight of the direct and invariable opposition in which these terms are placed.

Thirdly. It would be a very superficial view of the import of ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, and contrary to the whole scriptural usage, to understand by it, the mere intelligence or Reason of man; on the contrary, it denotes this Reason, considered as the organ of the higher divine life imparted to man, and which is itself more properly the ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, and upon which the SPIRIT, as a natural faculty with which man is endowed, depends absolutely for its exercise. This, it seems to us, is the generic idea of the term ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, although sometimes it denotes more prominently the faculty of the mind, and at others, the divine life itself of which the mind is the recipient; just as Θάνατος is used to denote either the natural or the spiritual part of the whole penalty of the law, of which it is the generic name, according as the one or the other of these is more prominently in the mind of the writer. And so the ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚός is one, who not merely possesses reason and governs his animal appetites by it, but one who partakes of this higher, divine life, who stands in living communion with God, receives the supernatural gifts of his grace, by which the natural principles of Reason are strengthened and enabled to maintain the proper mastery over the lower principles of sense. Accordingly ΣΑΡΞ must indicate that state of man in which he is destitute of this higher life, either having lost it, or never attained to the possession of it,—in which the principles of humanity, both the higher and lower, are left to themselves,—in short, the state in which man is without the Spirit of God,—a state, which, from this its privative character, might be appropriately denominated *unregeneracy* or *ungodliness*. And the ΣΑΡΚΙΚός is one, who not merely has inordinate bodily appetites, and obeys the *dictamen sensuum*, but one who does not receive and enjoy the presence of the Spirit of God. And so Calvin in his Comm. on John 3: 6, explains ΣΑΡΞ to mean the whole natural man, considered as without the new birth, or the divine life; and he well remarks, "*Insulzé theologastri ad partem quam vocant sensualem restringunt.*"

Fourthly. The correctness of the account here given of the import of ΣΑΡΞ is strikingly confirmed by the manner in which its synonymes are used throughout the New Testament. Thus ΨΥΧΙΚός is used (e. g. 1 Cor. 2: 14 and Jude v. 19) to designate one who has not the Spirit, and receives not the things

of the Spirit. And in Eph. 4 : 22, the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*, corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, is opposed to the *being renewed*. And so every where, the destitution of the supernatural grace of God and of his life-giving Spirit is the prominent idea in these and similar terms.

Fifthly. But thus far we attain only a negative conception on this subject. What positive idea then shall we form of the state of man destitute of the Divine Spirit, and estranged from God? An answer to this question will bring us upon the highest dividing points between the Augustinian and Pelagian anthropologies; for it was not in the doctrines which came most into discussion during the Pelagian controversies, that the first and essential differences between these systems lay; but in points farther back, adopted unconsciously by these diverging tendencies, according to their different nature, and of which the doctrines in discussion were only the more remote results.

According to Pelagius, man was originally, and is still, endowed by God with all the powers and faculties requisite to the ends of his being, and it depends only upon himself, in the exercise of his free will, to practise all good and fulfil his destination. In his system, there is therefore no necessity for any supernatural influences of grace, and scarcely any place for them; certainly a destitution of them does not necessarily imply the corruption of nature, since without them man is adequate to holiness.—But according to Augustine it is far otherwise; and man stands in an absolute and constant dependence upon God, as the only source of truth and good,—the faculties of reason and will, with which the Creator has endowed us, are by no means complete in themselves and self-sufficient to the purposes for which they were given, but only organs to receive and reveal the higher life communicated from God, to whom they are related as the eye to the Sun,—and this not merely through the contingency of the Fall, but originally and essentially; so that the loss of this imparted divine life must be followed by the powerlessness of the higher principles of our nature, the predominance of the lower, and so the corruption of the whole man. We have thus a contrast between a state of *grace* and of *nature*, between the *spiritual* and *natural* man,—the former participating in divine life through fellowship with God, and consequently superior to the baser and lower principles;—the latter estranged from this life, and so fallen into entire disorder, inability to good, and moral corruption. Such is the positive idea of *σάρξ*, and this is the being in the *flesh* or being *carnal* so often spoken of in the New Testament.

The views of Edwards, which are exhibited so lucidly and even beautifully in his work on “Original Sin” (p. 330, and especially p. 427, seq. Worces. ed.) correspond entirely with those of Augustine. “The case with man was plainly this: When God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an *inferior* kind, which may be called *natural*, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the *nature of man*, in which his love to his own liberty, honor, and pleasure were exercised: These, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call *flesh*. Besides these, there were *superior* principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love. These principles may, in some

sense, be called *supernatural*, being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, *mere human nature*; and being such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God's Spirit. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart: The other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all things were in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state." Again he says: "The withholding of special divine influence to impart and maintain the good principles, leaving the common natural principles to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart. As light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn, so man is left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption and ruin, nothing but flesh without spirit, when the Holy Ghost, that Heavenly inhabitant, forsakes the house. The inferior principles, given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, *of course* become reigning principles; the immediate consequence of which is, a turning of all things upside down. It were easy to show, if here were room for it, how every depraved disposition would naturally arise from this *privative* original." (Abridged.)

But we may attain to still more definite conceptions respecting the positive nature of *the flesh*, by considering it in opposition to the highest principle and spring of the spiritual state. This latter is ascertained by all just reasoning about the nature of holiness, and by the first precept of the divine Law, to be *supreme love to God*. Hence *selfishness* is to be regarded as constituting the central point of the natural unregenerate life.

It will now be obvious how, in the catalogue of the works of the *flesh*, there should stand such feelings as have no conceivable connexion with the body, and cannot possibly be derived from its influence.

But it may be asked, why then, if it is not intended to exhibit the influence of the body, should the term *σάρξ* and its synonymes be employed to designate the natural unregenerate state of man? To this question various answers might be given. One reason is offered by Edwards, p. 321, of the work cited above. But the reason suggested by Tholuck corresponds best with the view which has been given of the privative nature of the flesh. As the body is dead without the enlivening soul, so the spirit of man is powerless and dead without the higher life derived from the Spirit of God. And thus the mortal part of our animal nature is taken for the designation of our intellectual and moral being, as far as it is dead, powerless, and corrupt, from its being destitute of its higher spiritual life in God.

This view of human depravity, in opposition to that which makes it consist in the inordinateness of bodily appetites, derives its principal interest and importance, from its bearing on the other doctrines of religion, and especially on the doctrine of Atonement. As was hinted in a previous note, if the depravity of man results from any physical disarrangement, then the remedy, in order to meet the exact point of the disease, and to reach its real source, ought to be applied to the physical, instead of the moral, nature of man. It is only

on the supposition, that selfishness is the root of evil, and the central principle of our natural life, and that man is dependent for holiness and happiness upon an imparted life, higher than that of reason, that the provisions of the Atonement have any significance.—Tr.]

III. How native depravity may be proved from the Bible.

(1) In doing this, we should not employ without selection, all those texts which speak of the moral depravity of man in general, or of that of particular men or nations; for in many of these passages, the sins and vices actually committed by men are the subjects of discourse, and not the disposition to sin inherent in mankind. It was the intention of the sacred writers, in some of the examples which they have given us of heinous transgressors, to show to what sin leads, by what terrible consequences it is followed, in order to deter men from committing it; and not to teach that all men are the same, or have actually sunk to the same depth of vileness, although by reason of their inherent depravity, they *might* all sink to the same depth. Among texts of this nature, we may mention Ps. 14: 3, sq., where the declaration, *there is none that doeth good*, etc. relates to the godless persons mentioned v. 1. And so Paul, Rom. 3: 10, proves from this passage, that there were formerly among the Israelites very wicked men. And Job (ch. 14: 4) alludes principally to those actual transgressions, by which men are brought into that state, in which none can be guiltless in the sight of God. In Rom. 3: 9, sq. the Apostle shows, that the Jewish nation had no advantage over others in point of holiness or moral purity, and that there had always been in it corrupt and vicious men. Nor can the text, Ps. 51: 7, be cited in behalf of this doctrine. The mention of natural depravity does not harmonize with the context, and the phrase *to be born in or with sin* (i. e. to bring sin into the world with one) relates, as is evident from John 9: 34, not to native depravity, which all have, but to the fact, that he had not sinned for the first time in the particular crime of which he had then been guilty, but from his youth up had been a great sinner; for such is frequently the meaning of the term מַּחֲטָאִים, cf. Job 31: 18. Ps. 58: 4. It may also be said here, that David does not make an *universal* affirmation, but only speaks of himself, designing to describe himself as a great sinner.

(2) The proof that the doctrine of natural depravity and its propagation is founded in the Holy Scriptures, is rather to be made out from the comparison of many texts taken together, or viewed in their connexion. The doctrine itself is undoubtedly scriptural, although the biblical writers did not always express themselves respecting it with equal clearness and distinctness, and did not adopt all the consequences which have been since drawn from it by many from its connexion with other doctrines. The Bible speaks, as Musæus and Morus justly observe, far more frequently in the *concrete* than in the *abstract*, respecting the sinful corruption of man; and in this respect it should be imitated by preachers in their popular instruction. Men will readily concede the general proposition, *esse perditam naturam humanam*; but they are unwilling that this proposition should be applied to *themselves*; while yet the effect of the personal self-application of this doctrine is most salutary to every individual. The Scriptures teach us how to bring this doctrine home to every heart.

The course of thought on this subject which the Hebrews followed, and which was gradually developed and transmitted to Christians, is as follows: God created every thing, and consequently the *material* from which the sensible world has originated, and from which he formed the human body. All this was good and perfect in its kind, i. e. adapted to the attainment of its end or destination; Gen. I. The body of man was sustained by the *Tree of Life*, and happy and peaceful was his condition in the state of innocence. This Mosaic narrative is at the foundation of the whole. Men ate of the forbidden Tree of poison. Its taste brought sickness and death upon them, weakened their body, and destroyed its harmony. Violent passions now arose within them, and the just balance of the human powers and inclinations was destroyed, and sense obtained predominance over reason; vid. § 75. All this is indeed spoken in Gen. II. and III. only respecting Adam and Eve, and nothing is there expressly said of the propagation of this evil. But their posterity died after the same manner, and experienced the same predominance of sense and inclination to sin, from their youth up. Respecting the race of man sprung from Adam before the flood, the Scripture saith, Gen. 6: 5, *Their wickedness was great, and every imagination of the thoughts of their heart* (כָּל-יִצְרָר מִדְּשִׁבְתָּהֶם לָבוֹא), all the thoughts, desires, resolves arising within them, and carried out into action;—

יִצְרָא, *nature, constitution*, Ps. 103: 14 [rather *frame, whatever is made by an artificer*, and so here, the whole *doing or operation of the heart*]) *was daily nothing but evil*. Nor did any change take place in those who lived after the flood; but men were found to be the same as before, and so God repeated the same declaration respecting them, Gen. 8: 22. And the constant experience of later times confirmed the same truth. It was therefore justly concluded, that this evil is transmitted from generation to generation, and is the common hereditary disease of the human race; especially as this evil was seen to exist very early in all men, even from their youth (מִבְּטֶן), and so could not have arisen merely from defect in education or the influence of bad example. All the imperfections, therefore, which were understood by the Jews under the terms בְּטָר and σάϑξ (viz. mortality, the predominance of sense, the bias to sin, etc.) were universally regarded by them as the melancholy consequences of the Fall of the First Man; vid. No. I. 3. In this, therefore, lay the germ of all the evil and moral corruption among men. It is obviously to these fundamental ideas that all the prophets refer back, when they speak of the sin and corruption so prevalent among men. And it is the same with the later Jewish writers after the Babylonian Exile until the time of Christ; e. g. the writers of the Apocrypha. And so we find many traces of this in the old Jewish translations of the Hebrew Scriptures;—in the Chaldaic Paraphrases, and in the Septuagint Version; e. g. in Job 14: 4, where it is said *none is pure*, the Septuagint adds, *even although he should live but for a single day upon the earth*.

On the same general views do Christ and the Apostles proceed; and Paul especially teaches this doctrine plainly and expressly, and improves it in order to set forth more conspicuously the high worth of Christianity, as that system in which more efficacious and sure remedies against this evil were provided, than the Jewish or any other religion ever possessed. In this way does he humble the pride of man, and describe the disorder of the soul in that celebrated passage before cited, Rom. 7: 14, sq. He calls this innate evil, v. 17, ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία, v. 23, ἕτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι μου, v. 25. νόμος ἁμαρτίας.

In the text Eph. 2: 3, the term φύσις is variously explained. The explanation of Morus, that it denotes the state of one who follows his sensual desires, as all men are naturally prone to do, is just,

on account of the antithesis in vs. 5, 10. *Φύσις* properly signifies (a) *origin, birth*, from *φύω nascōr*; so in Gal. 2: 15, *φύσει Ἰουδαῖος Jews by birth, native Jews*; and so too in the Classics. (b) It is also used both by the Jews and Classics to denote the original, in-born, and peculiar properties, attributes, nature of a thing or person, the *naturalis indoles* or *affectio*; as Rom. 11: 21, 24, where the sense is: ‘even we who are born Jews, are, as to our nature, i. e. that natural disposition which we have exhibited from our youth up, equally deserving of punishment with other men, i. e. native heathen; for all, Jews and Gentiles alike, are born with a dangerous predominance of sense, and deserving of the punishment of all the sons of Adam, viz. *Death*.’

After these texts, the passage John 3: 6 is easily explained: *what is born of the flesh is flesh*, i. e. from men who are weak, erring, and sinful, men of the same character are born. No one attains, therefore, by his mere birth (e. g. as a Jew) to any peculiar privileges from God; these he attains only by being *born again*, by becoming a *regenerate* man, morally changed. On principles like these do the sacred writers always proceed when they teach that all men, without exception, are sinners; John 3: 6. Rom. 3: 9, 19.

§ 78. *Of the nature and attributes of this corruption; its propagation; its punishableness; also of the origin of sinful desires among men, and their punishableness.*

I. Nature of human depravity.

(1) It is *universal*. This implies (a) that no man is wholly exempt from it, however different may be the degrees and modifications in which it may exist. The universality of human depravity is proved, partly from the experience of all men and ages (vid. § 74); partly from the testimony of the Holy Scriptures. Many texts, indeed, treat of the sinful actions and moral corruption of men of mature life; but we are taught by the Bible to look for the first ground even of these in that human depravity or bias to sin, without which sin itself would never have prevailed so universally; § 77, III. ad finem.

The texts commonly referred to on this subject are, Job 14: 4 (who can find a pure man? none is unspotted); Rom. 3: 23, where Paul says, in order to humble the pride of the Jews, that they were no better than the heathen, and were, as well as they, ὅσοι ποῦντες τῆς δόξης θεοῦ also Rom. 5: 12—21. Eph. 2: 3. John 3: 6. No sooner does man begin to exercise his reason, and to distinguish between good and evil, than this bias to sin shows itself in him. While he must acknowledge the law as good and obligatory, he feels within himself a resistance to it,—an inclination to do that which is opposed to it, and forbidden by it. Indeed he is borne away with such power by his lower appetites and passions, that he often does that which he himself knows to be injurious, and neglects that which he knows to be salutary; Rom. 7: 8. Eph. 2: 3. Gal. 5: 17. Thus it is with all men; and each individual must confess, that the Bible truly describes his own history and experience. Hence this evil is universal.

The universality of this corruption implies, (b) that it can never be entirely eradicated, even with the most sincere endeavors of the pious; that although, through divine assistance, an end may be put to the dominion of sin, and its out-breakings may be prevented, yet the root and germ of evil will remain, and cease only with death, or the laying aside of the body, in which this sinful corruption has its principal seat; vid. Rom. 6: 12. 7: 17, 24. Gal. 5: 16, 17. 1 John 1: 8. Even one, therefore, who has been freed from the dominion of sin, has still to contend against this propensity to sin, lest he should again fall under its dominion, Rom. 8: 13. 6: 12, sq. These remnants of depravity which are found even in the best men, make their holiness and virtue very imperfect; and the feeling that they are sinners continually humbles them before God. The truly pious man will never therefore glory in his holiness, or be proud of his virtue, because he well knows that it is imperfect. This is evident from every page of the Scriptures.

(2) It is *natural* and *innate* (naturalis et congenita sive insita vitiositas sive depravatio). The term *natural* is taken from Eph. 2: 3, φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς, vid. § 77, III. 1. Tertullian seems to be the first among the Church fathers who used the term *naturalis*; vid. § 79, No. 4. The use of this term, if it be rightly explained, is unobjectionable. If *natural* be understood in the sense of essential, it conveys a false idea, and is the same as to say, that this depravity is an es-

sential part of man, that man could not exist as man without it. Matt. Flacius of Jena, in the sixteenth century, contended in his controversies with Victor Strigelius about *Synergism*, that *peccatum originale esse non accidens, sed IPSAM SUBSTANTIAM hominis*. But he asserted this merely from ignorance of scholastic phraseology. He meant only to maintain the *entire* corruption of man, and his incapacity to all good. And although the authors of the *Formula of Concord* (Art. I.) nominally oppose Flacianism, they maintain the same doctrine in other words: *peccatum originale cum natura et substantia hominis intime conjunctum esse et commixtum*.

The term *natural* is rather used in this doctrine in opposition to what is *acquired*, or first produced and occasioned by external circumstances and causes. It denotes that for which there is a foundation in man himself, although it may be an *accident*, and may not belong essentially to his nature. In the same sense we say for example, that such a man possesses *natural* sagacity, that a disease is *natural* to another, that he is by *nature* a poet, etc.; because the qualities here spoken of are not the result of diligence, practice, or any external circumstances. In the same way this depravity is called *natural*, because it has its ground in man, and is not in the first place acquired; or still more plainly, because it does not first come to man from without, through instruction or the mere imitation of bad examples.

As the term *natural*, however, is ambiguous and liable to misconception, some prefer the designation *innate* (*congenitum* or *insitum*),—a term which, as well as the other, is scriptural. The word *congenitus* is used by the elder Pliny in the sense of *innate*, and as opposed *acquisito sive aliunde illato*, and is in substance the same as *natural*. So Cicero (Orat. pro domo, c. 5) places *nativum malum* in opposition to that which is *aliunde allato*. And it is with justice that a quality, which has its origin at the same time with man, which is found in him from his earliest youth, and can be wholly eradicated by no effort, is denominated *natural* (נָטוּרָה, applied to the good, Job 31: 18; to the wicked, Ps. 58: 4, denoting any thing which is deep-rooted and shows itself *early* in men). In this sense we speak at the present day of innate or hereditary faults, virtues, excellencies, both in men and beasts; e. g. of cunning, pride, magnanimity, etc. So Kant speaks of RADIKALE Böse; and

Sosipater, according to the testimony of Stobæus, wrote in one of his Letters; ἐννοεῖ δὲ, ὡς σύμμετον τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνθρώποις.

(3) It is *hereditary*. That this evil is transmitted from parents to children, follows partly from its universality, and partly from its entire sameness in all men. As it was in the parents, so it is in the children, although it shows itself in different degrees, according to the difference in the organization, the temperament, and the external circumstances and relations in which they live. In the same way we judge, that certain faults, talents, and virtues are *inherited* by children, when we see a resemblance between them and their parents in these respects. The doctrine, that this depravity is propagated among men from parents to children, and on this very account is universal, is clearly taught in the Holy Scriptures; as Rom. 5: 12, sq. John 3: 6, and other texts; vid. § 77, III. 2.

Note. Human depravity does not, however, consist in *definite* inclinations directed to *particular objects*; but rather in a general disposition to inordinate and violent passions, which shows itself now with regard to one object, and again with regard to another, according to the difference of organization, of temperament, and of external circumstances; but in all cases, whatever may be the object of the passion, in such a way, that reason and conscience avail but little against passion, or far less than they should.

II. The manner in which natural depravity is propagated.

(1) From what has been already said, it is plain that a *physical* propagation of human depravity is affirmed in the Scriptures; and it is in this, that what theologians call *original sin* (Erbsünde) principally consists. This may be proved from the following principles, which are undeniably taught in the Bible: (*a*) that human nature was unquestionably more perfect and better formerly, than it is at present; (*b*) that our progenitors were corrupted, and as it were poisoned by the Fall; (*c*) that the principal seat of this depravity is to be found in the body, § 77, II. Children derive their bodies from their parents, and so back to the first human pair. The attributes which belonged to the bodies of our first parents after the Fall, their excellencies as well as imperfections, belong also to their posterity, and so are inherited by children from their parents. Parents could not beget children better or more perfect, than they themselves were; vid. I Cor. 15: 48, 49. After the Fall, they had

σάρκα, or σῶμα ἁμαρτίας and θανάτου, and consequently their posterity, begotten and born after the Fall, possessed the same. John 3: 6, τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ σαρκὸς σὰρξ (σαρκικὸς) ἐστὶ.

This is illustrated from the analogy of certain diseases of mind and body, which are often propagated through whole generations. It is a matter of experience, that some qualities, intellectual and corporeal, are propagated from parents to their offspring, although it is not the case with all. The propagation of moral depravity is not, therefore, contrary to what is known from experience, but rather in perfect consistency with it; and this is enough.

Closely connected with this, is the New Testament doctrine, that the man Jesus Christ was not produced in the common course of nature, like other men, but in an extraordinary manner, by the immediate agency of God; Luke 1: 34. Matt. 1: 16—20, 25. It was necessary for him to be without sin or depravity (Heb. 4: 15), *vitiositatis expers*, and like the first man in his state of innocence, in order to restore the happiness which was squandered by him; hence he is called ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ, 1 Cor. 15: 45, 47; also ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, the great Son of Adam or of man.

It was on this account, that in the twelfth century, some teachers in France, and Anselmus of Canterbury in England, maintained the *unspotted conception* of the mother of Jesus. To this opinion Scotus acceded; and after him his adherents, the entire body of the Franciscans, and at a later period the Jesuits. But they were opposed by Thomas Aquinas and his followers, and by all the Dominicans. On this point there was a violent dispute in the Romish Church from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and the popes decided nothing respecting it. This doctrine is wholly unsupported by the Holy Scriptures.

When all which has now been said is taken in connexion, it plainly appears, that the doctrine of the physical propagation of depravity fully agrees with the other Scriptural ideas. Any one, therefore, who receives these representations respecting the original and more perfect state of man, respecting the sin and fall of Adam, etc., as true and founded in the Scriptures, proceeds inconsistently, when he denies the consequences which flow from them, as many modern theologians do.

In the times of the Church fathers, during the third and fourth

centuries, this doctrine of the physical propagation of human corruption, was often vindicated and illustrated by the doctrine respecting the propagation of the soul *per traducem*; vid. § 57, II. and § 79, No. 2; but of this there is nothing said in the Bible. The manner in which this disposition is propagated, can be explained neither *psychologically* nor *anatomically*. The psychologist does not know the soul as it is *in itself*, but only a part of its exercises. In like manner, the interior of our corporeal structure is a mystery impenetrable by our senses. Into the inmost secrets of nature, whether corporeal or spiritual, no created spirit can pry. We cannot therefore either understand or describe this disposition which is so injurious to morality, or its propagation, as they are in themselves, but only according to the appearances and effects which they exhibit in the gradual developement of man.

Note. The universality of depravity (*ἀμαρτία*) and of death (*θάνατος*) depends, according to the Bible, upon the derivation of all men from *one progenitor* or *Father*. Hence sin and death are always derived from *Adam*, Rom. 5: 14. 1 Cor. 15: 22; and not from *Eve*, although she, according to Paul himself (1 Tim. 2: 14), first sinned. If *Eve* only had sinned, she would have removed her depravity from the world, when she died; and sin would not through her have come into the world, in such a way, that sin and death through sin, should pass upon all men. Hence Jesus, when it was necessary that he, as a man, should be without sin, was born of a human *mother*, but not begotten by a human *father*; vid. Num. 1.

(2) There is also a *moral* propagation of this depravity. In this are included,

(a) *The imputation* of the sin of Adam, of which we have treated both doctrinally and historically in § 76. By this is understood the universal mortality of man, as a consequence of the sin of our progenitors.

(b) The propagation of depravity through *the imitation of bad examples*. The bias to evil which lies in the human heart, is in no way more excited and strengthened than by *bad examples*, which very soon obtain approbation and are imitated, whether the individual may have seen them himself, or have heard of them from others, or have read respecting them in books. The influence exerted by this cause upon man in the formation of his character is so indescribably great, that many ancient writers regarded it as the only cause of the propagation of human depravity, and either wholly denied, or

at least in a great measure doubted, the doctrine of its physical propagation. They hence supposed, that this evil could be either wholly removed, or at least much diminished by means of a good education, and that the propensity to imitation could receive such a direction, that the good only should be imitated, while the evil should be shunned. So thought Pelagius (vid. § 79, No. 3), and at a later period, the Socinians and many Arminians. This opinion has found advocates also among some modern protestant theologians; e. g. Steinbart, System, S. 105, f. Eberhard, Apologie, II. 339, f. Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, Th. II. B. II. S. 683, f.

That example and education contribute much to the moral improvement or corruption of man, cannot be doubted; but it is equally true, and conformed to experience, that example and education are far from being the only and sufficient cause of the prevailing wickedness, and that with the best education man becomes bad much easier than good, with all the pains taken to make him so. Of this the cause lies in the undue predominance of the animal appetites. This accounts for it, that the bias to evil is so much stronger and more active, than the bias to good. Were it otherwise, it would be unnecessary to contend so strenuously against evil, and to employ so many means to incite man to goodness and to secure him against vice. And among all the thousands who have lived upon the earth, there would have been found some examples of persons who had passed through their whole life free from sin.

As man, therefore, has within himself a natural adaptation to much which is good, he has also a natural disposition and bias to much which is evil (*malum radicale*), which soon strikes root, spreads round, and chokes the good. It is absolutely inexplicable how the preponderance of sense over reason, so visible in all men, *could* be derived from mere imitation. Were this the case, this preponderance ought to cease as soon as man, in the full exercise of his understanding, were taught better. The will, we should expect, would then obey the dictates of reason. It is not found, however, to be so in fact. The dominion of sense still continues, as the experience of every one proves. The ground of this must therefore lie deeper; and both experience and reason confirm the account which Scripture gives of it; vid. § 77.

III. The imputation or punishableness of natural depravity.

This is the *reatus* or *culpa vitiositatis*, and was asserted by Augustine and his followers; vid. Morus, p. 120, § 7, coll. § 79, No. 2. They contended, that all men, even before they had committed any sinful actions, and barely on account of this native depravity, were deserving of temporal and eternal death, or of damnation. Others have endeavored in various ways to mitigate the severity of this opinion. Some modern theologians have taught, in imitation of Augustine, the doctrine that *peccatum originale per se esse damnabile*; but that, for Christ's sake, punishment was not actually inflicted.

But the assertion, that this corruption, in and of itself, involves condemnation, cannot be proved. For (a) it is irreconcilable with the justice and goodness of God, that he should *punish* (in the proper sense of this term) an innocent person for the sins of another. Sin cannot exist, certainly cannot be punished, unless the action is free: otherwise it ceases to be sin; vid. § 76, III. (b) In those texts of the Old and New Testament which are commonly cited in behalf of this opinion, the *death* spoken of, is not *eternal* death, or *condemnation*; but *temporal* death, Gen. 1: 2, 17. Rom. 5: 12. 1 Cor. 15: 22; vid. § 75, II. 2. (c) Even bodily death is represented in the Scriptures as, indeed, the *consequence* of Adam's sin, but not as a punishment, strictly speaking, for any beside himself; for none but himself were guilty of his sin.

In conformity with this view, Rom 5: 12, 14 is to be explained; also Rom. 6: 23, *θάνατος ὁψώνια ἁμαρτίας*, or v. 21, *τέλος (καρπὸς) ἁμαρτίας* so called because it *followed* upon Adam's sin, and as far as he was concerned, was a *punishment* for it; vid. § 76, III. —The doctrine of the Bible on this subject is the following: 'The bias of man to evil, and to do that which is forbidden, is in itself *bad* (Germ. *fehlerhaftes*, *esse in vitio*, *vitiosum*), Rom. 7: 5, 13, 18; but it cannot be imputed to man, or he be regarded as punishable on account of it, unless he yields himself to it, and indulges it; vid. Rom. 6: 12. Gen 4: 7, coll. James 1: 15. This, however, is the case with all men; no one has lived upon the earth who has not been led by this propensity into actual transgression, and so has become deserving of punishment.' Truly, therefore, does the Scripture affirm, that we are all subject to punishment (*τέκνα ὀργῆς*, Eph.

2: 3); not, however, because we are born with this disposition (for this is not any fault of ours), but because we indulge it, give an ear to our unlawful desires, and so suffer ourselves to be led on to the commission of sin.

IV. The source and origin of sinful inclinations, and their punishableness.

From the preponderance of sense now explained, *particular sinful dispositions and passions* take their origin, and so are the result and the proof of the sinful depravity of man. But in order that we may rightly estimate the sinfulness and punishableness of these desires, we must attend to the following considerations.

(1) The desires of man are not *in themselves* and abstractly considered, *sinful*; for they are deep laid in the constitution which God himself has given to human nature; they arise in man involuntarily, and so far cannot certainly be imputed to him. The essential constitution of man makes it necessary, that every thing which makes an agreeable impression on the senses, should inevitably awaken correspondent desires. The poor man, who sees himself surrounded with the treasures of another, feels a natural and involuntary desire to possess them. The mere rising of this desire is no more punishable in him, than it was in Eve, when she saw the tree, and felt an impulse to eat its beautiful fruit, which is never represented in the Bible as her sin.

(2) The desires of man become sinful and deserving of punishment then only, when (a) man, feeling desires after forbidden things, seeks and finds pleasure in them, and delights himself in them, and so (b) carefully cherishes and nourishes them in his heart. (c) When he seeks occasions to awaken the desires after forbidden things, and to entertain himself with them. (d) When he gives audience and approbation to these desires, and justifies, seeks and performs the sins to which he is inclined. This is followed by the two-fold injury, that he not only sins for this once, but that he gives his appetites and passions the power of soliciting him a second time more importunately, of becoming more vehement and irresistible; so that he becomes continually more disposed to sin, acquires a fixed habit of sinning, and at last becomes the *slave of sin*; vid. Michaelis, Ueber die Sünde, S. 365, f.—But if a man repels and suppresses the involuntary desire arising within him, because it is evil, he

cannot certainly be punished merely because, without any fault of his own, he felt this desire. It were unjust to punish any one for being assailed by an enemy, without any provocation on his part.

(3) With this doctrine the Holy Scripture is perfectly accordant. Even in his state of innocence, man felt the rising of desire; nor was this in him accounted sin; Gen. 3: 6. Hence we are never required, either in the Old Testament or the New, to *eradicate* these desires (which, indeed, is a thing impossible, and would cause a destruction of human nature itself); but only to keep them under control, and to suppress those which fix upon forbidden things; vid. § 77. In Rom. 6: 12, we are directed not to let our sinful appetites rule, and *not to obey the body in the lusts thereof*; here, therefore, it is presupposed that these tempting lusts remain. Again in Gal. 5: 24 we are charged, to crucify the flesh, with its affections and lusts. It is to those who contend against their wicked passions, that rewards are promised, and not to those who have never had these solicitations and allurements to evil. The pretended virtue of such men scarcely deserves the name, and is not capable of reward.

Some texts are indeed cited in which the passions, in themselves considered, are forbidden, as Rom. 7: 7, *οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις* Ex. 20: 17, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," etc. Some also in which they are said to be deserving of punishment from God, as Matt. 5: 28. But in these texts, such desires are not spoken of as arise involuntarily within us, and for which we are not therefore culpable, but such as man himself nourishes and entertains, or by his own agency awakens within himself, and which he aims to execute. And so in Matt. V. Christ speaks of the actual intention and design of man to commit adultery, if he could; and not of the passion arising in his heart, which he himself disapproves, and immediately suppresses, because it is contrary to the divine law.

(4) The manner in which man is borne away by his passions to the commission of sin, is described by James (1: 14, 15) in a way that corresponds with the experience of every one; and this text confirms all the preceding remarks. When desires arise within us, we are in *danger* of sinning. Some present enjoyment of sense tempts us. Enticements to sin spring up. These James calls *temptations* (elsewhere called *σκάνδαλα*, Matt. 18: 7, 8, מְכַשֵּׁל, Ezek. 17: 19). For we look upon that which is represented to us by our

senses as charming and desirable, to be a great good, the possession of which would make us happy. This is expressed by ἐξελκόμενος and δελεαζόμενος. The image is here taken from animals which are ensnared by *baits* (δέλεαο) laid before them, in order to take them. To these allurements all men are exposed, although not in the same degree. Thus far there is no sin, i. e. the man is not yet caught in the snare under which the bait lies. But here he must stop, and instead of indulging, must suppress these desires,—must fly from the bait. Otherwise, *lust conceives* (ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα), i. e. these desires and passions are approved in the heart, and the man begins to think, he can satisfy them. This is wrong and sinful. For this is no longer involuntary, but on the contrary the result of man's own will, and he is now deserving of punishment. This is what is called *peccatum actuale internum*. But finally, *desire brings forth sin*,—the evil intent passes into action, and is accomplished. This is *peccatum actuale externum*. Hence flows θάνατος, *misery*, unhappiness of every sort, as the consequence and punishment of sin.

§ 79. *Of the representations of the ancient Church-fathers respecting human depravity; and the manner in which the ecclesiastical phrasology on this subject, and the various forms of doctrine were gradually developed.*

(1) The oldest Christian teachers were mostly agreed in considering death as a consequence of Adam's sin; vid. § 76. [It should be observed, however, that in these early writers, the term *φθορά* stands not only for *mortality*, but also for *depravity*; vid. Neander, B. I. Abth. III. S. 1045.—Tr.] But we shall look in vain through the writings of most of the Greek teachers, to find the full scriptural idea of an *innate depravity*; or at least, it cannot be found exhibited with sufficient distinctness or clearness. As there had been as yet no controversy on this subject, nothing respecting it was determined and settled on ecclesiastical authority. Still they agree for the most part, that the disproportion between sense and reason, or the corruption of human nature, began after the fall of Adam, and has been diffused, as a universal disease, through the whole human race.

That this evil, however, in itself considered, is to be regarded as actual sin, and as such is punished by God, they do not teach; but rather the contrary. So Justin Martyr, Ap. I. 54, sq. Irenæus, Adv. Hæres. IV. 37, sq. Athenagoras, Legat. c. 22. Clemens Alex. Strom. III. (contra Encratitas). "No one," says the writer last mentioned, "is wholly free from sin; but the child, who has never personally trespassed, cannot be subjected to the *curse* of Adam (the punishment of his sin). Yet all who have the use of their reason are led by this their moral depravity to commit actual sin, and so become liable to punishment." The same writer says, in his Pædag. III. 12, *μόνος ἀναμάρτητος ὁ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνειν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον καὶ κοινόν*. Cyril of Alexandria in his Commentary on Isaiah, says *γυσιζὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐκ εἶναι κακόν* and in his work 'Contra Anthropomorph.' c. 8, he says, "Adam's posterity are not *punished* as those who with him had broken the law of God." So also Origen, Præf. ad libros *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, and his followers, Basilus, and Theodorus of Mopsevestia, who, according to the testimony of Photius, wrote a book against those who taught that man sinned *φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ*. There were some, too, of the Greek Fathers who traced the origin of the evil passions and of the actual sins arising from them, to the *mortality* of the body, e. g. Chrysostom and Theodoret. This hypothesis has been revived in later times by Whitby, who has attempted to carry it through; vid. § 76, Note.

(2) The same representation is found in many of the Fathers of the ancient *Latin Church*, even in Africa. They taught that *death* (depravity?) is a consequence of Adam's sin, and yet that it is not, in itself, to be regarded as sin, and punished accordingly. Cyprian (Epist. Synod. Conc. Carthag. III.) says, "A new born child has not itself sinned, *nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus, CONTAGIUM MORTIS contraxit*." In baptism, the sins of the child (which were still not *propria* but *aliena*) were supposed to be washed away. Ambrosius says on Ps. XLVIII., "there is a bias to sin in all, but this is not actual sin, and liability to punishment; God punishes us only for *nostra peccata*, and not for *alienæ (Adami) nequitie flagitia*." Even according to Tertullian (de testim. animæ, c. 3), it is only to *temporal death*, that we are condemned in consequence of the sin of Adam. To this opinion, Hilarius and others acceded. The African fathers before the time of Augustine, and even Tertullian, seem

however to have had less distinct and settled views on this subject, than even the Greeks ; which arose from their misunderstanding the seemingly obscure phraseology of the New Testament, and especially of the Latin Version of it.

[The germs of the controversy which afterwards broke out between Augustine and Pelagius, can be discerned in this earlier period.—The Alexandrine teachers, and among these principally Clement and Origen, took the side of the human will, and its ability to good. They however, by no means carried this so far as was afterwards done by Pelagius, and often expressed themselves strongly respecting the entire depravity of man, and his dependence on the renovating influence of divine grace ; vid. Clement, *Quis dives salv. c. 21*.—The eastern teachers were led to vindicate thus strongly the powers of the human will by their opposition to New Platonism, and the Manichean theosophy, by which sin was attributed either to an eternal principle of Evil, to a blind and resistless destiny, or to some necessity of nature, rather than to the perversion of our own moral powers.

The teachers of the Western Church, on the other hand, and especially those of Africa, having no such philosophy to oppose, recognized more fully the peculiar Christian truths of the corruption and inability of human nature, and the necessity of divine grace. But they, also, were far from representing the grace of God as compulsory and irresistible, as it was afterwards done in the Pelagian controversies.—This tendency in the Western Church is represented by Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrosius.

As yet, however, these opposing tendencies had not come into open conflict, but awaited the causes which brought them into direct collision in the following period.—Tr.]

But Augustine carried the matter much farther. He affirmed the doctrine *de imputatione peccati Adami* in the strictest juridical sense, teaching at the same time the *entire* depravity of man, and his total inability to all good, in such a sense as it is no where taught in the Bible. He may have been led to this, by having formerly belonged to the sect of Manicheans, who hold very strict sentiments on this point ; hence his doctrine *de peccato originali* was called by Pelagius and Julian a *Manichean doctrine*.* He maintained, that

* [We subjoin the following remarks of Neander, with respect to the charge here, and often elsewhere, brought against the system of Augustine. "The anthropology of Augustine," he says, "is unjustly supposed to be derived from the influence of Manicheism. His doctrine respecting the moral depravity of man was a very different thing from the Dualism of Mani, which was derived from the philosophy of nature. The system of Augustine did not, like that of Mani, proceed from his confounding in his conceptions, the *natural* and the *moral*, but from a pure fact of moral consciousness. On the contrary it may be said, that while the hope of finding out, by means of speculation, an

the consequence of Adam's sin was not merely bodily death, but *eternal* (*mors secunda, cujus non est finis*); and that to this all men, even children, who had not themselves thought or done either good or evil, were subjected; though yet the unmerited grace of God delivered some from this punishment (*decretum absolutum*). He exhibits these doctrines in his work, *De civitate Dei*, XIV. 1, and elsewhere. Fulgentius Rusp. (*De Fide*, c. 29) asserts that children who had lived merely in their mother's womb, and yet died without baptism, must suffer eternal punishment in hell. And so taught many of the schoolmen, according to Peter of Lombardy, L. II. Even Augustine attributed a certain kind of physical influence to baptism, and confined the grace of God to those to whom this ordinance was administered. He held this doctrine, however, in common with many of the Latin Fathers before his time; e. g. Cyprian. The adherents of Augustine were accustomed to vindicate their views by the doctrine of the propagation of the soul *per traducem*, though this is not true of all of them. On the contrary, the adherents of Pelagius for the most part denied this doctrine, and were Creationists; vid. Vol. I. § 57, II.

(3) This severe doctrine of Augustine was controverted by Pelagius, and many others who followed him. But Pelagius in his turn went too far on the other side, and maintained various principles which obviously are unscriptural. Here were, therefore, two extremes, between which *scriptural truth* lay in the midst, having both reason and experience on its side. In the system of Augustine, on the one hand, there is much opposed to *reason* and *scripture*; and in that of Pelagius, on the other hand, there is much opposed to *scripture* and *experience*. Pelagius not only denied the imputation of Adam's sin, but also the *physical* propagation of human depravity. He taught, that the moral nature of man is unaltered, and that man is now entirely in the same state in which Adam was

explanation of the irreconcilable opposition between Good and Evil, of which he had become early conscious in the depth of his soul, led him to Manicheism; he was led from it again by coming to apprehend this opposition more and more in a moral light. Again; it was in direct opposition to Manicheism that he adopted the theory, the first germs of which he took from Platonism, that Evil is only a subjective deviation of created being from the law of the supreme and only true Being, and not, as taught by Mani, an independent, self-subsisting existence." Allg. Kirchengesch. B. II. Abth. III. S. 1206.—Tr.]

created. Weakness, imperfection, and death, were in his view, essential to man from the first, and he is punished only for sinful actions. The propagation of human depravity is not physically and by birth; but morally only, from the imitation of bad examples. The declaration, that *in Adam all have sinned*, does not relate, according to his scheme, to any *peccatum nascendi origine contractum*; but to that acquired *propter imitationem exempli*; vid. in Libro de natura, ap. August. ad Rom. V. And Julian said (ap. August. contra Jul. II. 54), *peccatum primum MORIBUS, non SEMINIBUS ad posteros fuisse devectum*. Adam set a bad example before his children, and they again before theirs, and so on. In this sense only did Pelagius allow of a propagation of sin from Adam; vid. § 78, II. 2. The views of Pelagius are very clearly exhibited in the work *De libero arbitrio* (ap. August. de pecc. orig. c. 13): *Omne bonum aut malum, quo vel laudibiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum nascitur, sed agitur a nobis; capaces utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine VIRTUTE, sic SINE VITIO procreamur*.

These views were totally diverse from those of Augustine and other African teachers, and in many points also from the plain doctrine of the Bible. This deviation from the Scriptures, Augustine perceived and opposed. Through the resistance of Pelagius he became more zealous and heated, and in his polemical zeal advanced continually greater lengths in his positions.* The theory of Augustine, or the African theory, was however by no means universal in the fourth century. In the East, and in Palestine especially,

* [This remark respecting the theory of Augustine, though often made, may be shown demonstrably to be incorrect. Augustine had developed his full system concerning the inability of man and the doctrine of predestination resulting from it, as early as the year 397, in a work directed to Simplician, Bishop at Mailand, some time before Pelagius appeared at Rome, and at least ten years before his doctrines had excited attention and controversy. Neander says,—“Opposition to Pelagianism could have had no influence upon Augustine in forming his system. It may rather be said with more truth, that Pelagius was excited and induced to develop his own views, by opposition to the principles of Augustine respecting the natural depravity of man, and grace and predestination not conditioned by the free will.”—B. II. Abth. III. S. 1215. We ought not readily to attribute the opinions of such minds as Augustine’s to external causes. Their own internal impulse, and their effort after perfect consistency, often carry them to extremes, to which others could be driven only by the pressure of controversy. Cf. the Note to the History of Decrees, Vol. I. § 32, p. 252, *Fourthly*.—Tr.]

Pelagius was received into favor and protection with many, who had agreed in many points with Origen, and who therefore saw little reprehensible in Pelagius. Much, indeed, in his theory differed from that then prevailing through the Eastern church. But from the indifference of so many Grecian bishops on this subject, it is obvious, that nothing can have been at that time ecclesiastically determined respecting it, and that the importance of the question by no means appeared to them at first. And even in the Western Church out of Africa, there were many who looked upon the Pelagian theory not unfavourably, and on this account it was at first acquitted of the charges brought against it even by Zosimus, the Roman bishop. Through the efforts of the Africans, however, and their connexion with the Anti-Origenistic party, it was finally brought about, that the doctrines of Pelagius were formally condemned as heretical at the Church Councils, and that the theory of Augustine, after the year 418, became predominant, at least in the Occidental Church.

Various attempts were made to unite the two parties; and many took a middle course between them, from whence originated, at a later period, the so called Semi-pelagian party. Scotus, and his followers among the school-men very much extenuated the natural depravity of man; in which they have been followed by many of the theologians of the Romish Church, e. g. the Jesuits, who have been on this account often accused of Pelagianism or Semi-pelagianism. Among the followers of Augustine many adhered to his opinion, that even mere original sin, in itself considered, is punished with eternal death, even in the case of children who die before baptism, though they themselves have never done any evil; e. g. Gregor. M. L. IX. Moral, c. 16. Others to whom this doctrine seemed too severe, held only, that in consequence of original sin, man is excluded from the *full joys* of the Blessed in Heaven, but not merely on that account cast into the pains of Hell; in short, that he is placed in a middle-state, in which he is neither damned, nor yet perfectly happy. So Damasus: *Pœna originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei*. The same representation respecting children who die before baptism is found also among some Greek writers; e. g. in Gregory of Nazianzen, who says respecting them (Orat. 40) μήτε δοξασθῆναι, μήτε κολασθῆσθαι, κ. τ. λ.

(4) *Some additional, historical illustrations of the Augustinian and African theory respecting natural depravity, and respecting the term, PECCATUM ORIGINIS sive ORIGINALE.*

The depravity of human nature being, according to the Bible, propagated from Adam, and communicated in the way of ordinary generation to children, it was very natural to denominate it *original*; and since, moreover, it is common to all men, and, though not essential to human nature, yet *properly belonging to it* in its present state, it is called *natural*, especially as the term *φύσει* is used in Ephes. 2: 3; vid. § 78, I. 2. Both of these terms are found in the same passage in Tertullian (De anima, c. 41), where he calls depravity *malum animæ ex originis vitio* and *naturale quodammodo*. Upon this passage it is important to observe, that he does not use the term *peccatum*, but *malum* and *vitium*; and again, that this is the first passage in the Latin Fathers in which the term *naturale* is applied to this subject. But because the Latin word *naturale* is ambiguous, and might be understood in the sense of *essentiale* (—a sense in which Tertullian would not use it, and in which even Cyril of Alexandria rejected the expression *φυσικὸν κακόν*, vid. No. I.), Tertullian adds *quodammodo*. The term *naturale*, as used by him, properly means nothing more than *proprium, adhærens, non aliunde contractum*; vid. § 78, I. 2.—Ambrosius too says (Apol. David, c. 11), *Antequam nascimur, maculamur contagio, et ante usuram lucis originis ipsius excipimus injuriam*. Thus none of these fathers use the term *peccatum*, or pretend that natural depravity in the *abstract*, or in itself, is imputed to man as sin, or punished. Augustine is the very first who uses the term *PECCATUM originale, quia originaliter traditur*, as indeed he himself says in ‘Opus imperf. contra Julianum,’ II. After this time, this term, which perhaps may have been used by some Africans before Augustine, was repeated by some Latin teachers, e. g. by Hieronymus, on Ps. L., and was finally authorized by Councils, and adopted into the terminology of the Western Church. It was first publicly employed in the Acts (c. 2) of the Milevitanic Council in the year 416; and those who deny the doctrine *de peccato originali*, and its punishment, which is removed by baptism, were there denounced with an *anathema*.

But how came it to pass, that the word *peccatum* should be employed to designate natural depravity, since this depravity *in abstracto*, and by itself, is to be regarded as a *disease* or a sickly moral disorder of man, and not as *action*; and since man had no guilty agency in bringing it upon himself? It came in this way: In Rom. 7: 9, and elsewhere, Paul uses the term *ἀμαρτία* in reference to the bias

to sin found in all men, or the disposition to do what is forbidden by the divine law ; and this is perfectly conformed to the *usus loquendi*. For the Greek *ἀμαρτία* is employed not only with regard to sinful actions, but any fault, or defective state or nature of a thing ; like the Latin *peccatum* and *peccare* ; vid. § 73, II. In this sense then, they might justly say *peccatum originis*, instead of *vitium* ; meaning simply defect, fault, evil. Tertullian, however, did not use the word *peccatum*, probably on account of this ambiguity. But when Augustine found the term *peccatum* used in the Latin Bible in reference to this natural bias to sin, he supposed that he might, and indeed ought to employ the same. But not distinguishing sufficiently between the different meanings of this word, he contended, that all that must be true respecting this state in itself considered, which is true respecting sinful actions ; on the ground, that the same word is used respecting both in the Bible. He then argued in this way : “ all sin is punished, or it brings men into a state of condemnation before God ; and consequently this natural depravity itself, because it is included under *ἀμαρτία*, and is called *peccatum*.” Thus arose the scheme of Augustine described in No. 2, although in this he was not throughout consistent with himself. Instead of employing this phraseology, it would have been better for him to have said : The tendency to sin is indeed an evil, a moral disorder, i. e. a wrong and defective constitution of our nature in a moral respect, from which particular actual sins result ; it cannot, therefore, be otherwise than displeasing to a perfectly holy God ; nor can he, as the Scriptures expressly teach, be its author ; but neither would God punish men for this, in and of itself. For *punishment* is first inflicted when man suffers himself to be enticed to actual sin, or transgression of the law ; and because none remain unperturbed, so all are sinners, and condemned in the sight of God, although the degree of their guilt, and consequently the degree of their punishment may be different.

After the time of Augustine, various attempts were made to obviate the innumerable mistakes which attended this doctrine *de peccato originali* ; and among others, a distinction was made between *peccatum originale* and *peccata actualia*,—a distinction which is first found in Joh. Cassianus in the fifth century ; vid. Coll. P. P. Sceticor. XIII. 7. There were always, however, among the Catholics, even those of ancient times, not a few who disapproved of the appli-

cation of the term *peccatum* to the corrupt moral condition of man, and wished it to be abolished. And it happened to many, merely because they rejected this word, to be counted among the Pelagians or Semi-pelagians. Many of the schoolmen, too, preferred not to use this term; though it is true, indeed, that among them there were many actually inclined to Pelagianism; vid. No. 3. The schoolmen rather chose to use the term employed by Tertullian, viz. *vitium originale* or *naturale*; or *vitiositas*, or *depravatio congenita*, or *naturalis*.

As to the German word in use on this subject, *Erb-sünde* (hereditary sin), it is still more inconvenient, than the Latin *peccatum originale*. For the latter admits, according to common usage, of a correct interpretation, and so, if it is properly explained, may be still retained. But the German word *Sünde* (sin) is elsewhere always used to denote an *action*, so far as it is contrary to the divine law; but never a *state*. Instead of this word, it would be better to use the word *Erb-fehler* (hereditary defect), or still better, *Erb-übel* (hereditary evil), or more definitely, *das sittliche Erb-übel* (the moral hereditary evil). Many of our Protestant theologians have therefore for a long time preferred to use the term *natural depravity*; vid. § 87, I. 2, 3. Dr Teller proposed to use the word, *Temperaments-sünde* (sin of the constitution or temperament); this, however, is inappropriate, since it bears another sense, viz. some kind of *prevailing* sin, to which a man is especially inclined from his peculiar organization, or his individual *naturel*; cf. § 75.

Note. The term *peccatum originale*, as used in the Symbolic Books of the Lutheran church, comprises the following things. (1) The deficiency in true holiness and piety which is found in all men without exception, accompanied with a deficiency in powers for attaining holiness by their own exertions. This is just and scriptural. For in order to be *morally good and pious*, it is necessary for us to *become* so; we are not born with this character; we do not possess in ourselves the powers requisite to this end, and are dependent on divine assistance. (2) The inordinate passions and appetites which are found in all men; the bias within us to do what is forbidden, and to leave undone what is required;—of the truth of which every one's own experience may convince him, and which is constantly insisted upon in the Scriptures. Thus, by *peccatum originale*, the Symbolic Books understand a *STATE* of man, which morally considered, is not, from the earliest period, what it should be, or what it originally was; and this is certainly just and true, both according to Scripture and experience.

These two things taken together are what the theologians of the Lutheran

and Reformed churches mean, when they say, *man is born with sin* or *in sin*,—an expression which is taken from Ps. 51 : 7. And although this expression is liable to be misunderstood, and indeed in that passage is used in a different sense, yet the thing which they intend by the use of it, is true and conformed to the Bible ; vid. Morus, pp. 117, 118.

It is a common, but very unworthy art of many of the opponents of the doctrine of natural depravity, to make the German word denoting this doctrine, *Erb-sünde* (*hereditary sin*), which is acknowledged on all hands to be inconvenient, the object of ridicule, as if the doctrine of the Protestant church agreed with the untenable positions in Augustine's theory. While they confute this theory only, they assume the air of having overthrown the doctrine of native depravity itself. The scriptural texts which stand in their way, are brought into agreement with the most different modern philosophical schools, by the aid of that artificial exegesis which makes any thing from every thing ; so that the Scriptures must say just that, and that only, which the authors of these philosophical systems require. Vid. Teller's Wörterbuch, art. *Sünde*, and other attempts of the theologians of the Kantian school.

§ 80. *Results of the foregoing discussion respecting the doctrine of natural depravity, and observations on the mode of teaching this doctrine.*

I. Results of the foregoing discussion.

(1) The doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, that the native depravity which discloses itself in the preponderance of sense over reason is to be found in all men without exception, is confirmed by the undeniable experience of all men of all times ; and every individual may be convinced of its truth by his own daily experience, and by observation of those around him. Any one who is in the habit of self-inspection will be compelled to acknowledge, that the confession of Paul, Rom. 7: 18, sq., "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not," is drawn as it were from his own soul. Even the heathen nations, and those of their chief philosophers, who did not employ themselves with empty speculations, but who built their views upon the observation of man and of themselves, recognized the existence of this evil ; vid. § 74.

(2) But although philosophy must recognize the actual existence of this evil, it can give no satisfactory answer with regard to the origin of it ; vid. Kant, Vom radikalen Bösen. All the philosophemes upon this subject from Aristotle down to Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte,

and Schelling, are full of gaps; and in surveying them, we meet with one unanswerable question after another; vid. § 74. Cf. Michaelis, *Moral*, Th. I. S. 127, sq. But there appears in almost all nations, a pressing necessity to believe, that God made the human race in a more perfect state, than that in which it now exists. But they were still unable to solve the riddle. Now this riddle is solved in the Holy Scriptures more satisfactorily than by all the philosophers; vid. § 56, ad fin. §§ 74, 75, etc. And any one who understands the scriptural account of the fall of man as a mere fable, or as any thing beside a narrative of what actually took place, and who is incautious enough to teach these views to the common people and the young, takes away that, for which he can give nothing in return; although he may not design it, he lowers the authority of the Bible in the view of his hearers, and does an injury which he will not be able easily to repair.

There were two theories which were more prominent among the Christian teachers of former times, and which even now have their advocates; viz. the *African* or *Augustinian* and the *Pelagian*; vid. § 79. The latter, which nearly accords with the views of the Stoics, plainly disagrees with the doctrine of the Bible, and moreover has experience against it; vid. § 79, No. 3. But since it wears, on the first view, a more rational aspect, and since especially it is more agreeable to the wishes of men, who had rather view themselves in a favorable than an unfavorable light, it is not to be wondered at, that, in spite of experience, it should have obtained, and still possess, considerable currency.—But in Augustine's theory, there are also incorrect and untenable positions, and he deduces many false conclusions from texts of Scripture wrongly understood. These misinterpretations were in part occasioned, and in part promoted, by the Latin established version, which Augustine followed, and to which he and his fellow teachers were accustomed from their youth. Besides, Augustine's views on the subject of interpretation were deficient. The middle-course between these extremes is accordant with the Bible, with experience, and the system of the Protestant church; vid. §§ 77, 78.

The objection, *that the scriptural doctrine of native depravity is irreconcilable with the justice and goodness of God*, does not lie so much against the scriptural doctrine itself, as against certain false

and unscriptural notions which are sometimes connected with it; e. g. against the Augustinian theory. Let the following things be considered: viz.

(a) It is incorrect to assert, as some do, that if Adam himself had maintained his original innocence, no one of his posterity either would, or *could* have sinned. This is nowhere taught in the Bible. The possibility of erring and sinning would have continued, both with Adam himself and with his posterity, even if he had not at that time fallen. And had it been *impossible* for the posterity of Adam, supposing him to have persevered in holiness, to be otherwise than holy, their goodness would have had no value, and would not be entitled to reward. Man would have been a machine, having no power to move except in one preëstablished and appointed way. It does not, therefore, follow that there would have been no error and no sin, and consequently no punishment of sin, among men, if our progenitor had not fallen. It is indeed true, that both particular individuals, and the race of man at large, would have been by degrees more and more *confirmed* in goodness, if the state of innocence (or the state of the even balance of the human powers) had continued; as is actually the case with good angels; but this confirmation cannot be understood, in reference to men, more than to angels, as removing the *possibility of sinning*.

(b) When now God foresaw, that sin could not be hindered among men, since they are beings endowed indeed with a moral nature, but at the same time possessing appetites and passions limiting the exercise of reason; he provided, that the guilt and ill-desert of sin should be diminished in Adam's posterity, by allowing Adam to fall, and so a general weakness and depravity to pervade the whole race. A stronger and more incorrupt race would, if it sinned, sin far more deeply and unpardonably, than a weaker. Hence we see, that the sin of the *fallen angels* is always described in the Bible, as far more deserving of punishment and more unpardonable, than the sin of the first parents of our race; and their whole moral apostasy is described as far greater, than that of man. Those among Adam's weaker posterity, who resist the inducements to sin, and are diligent in the pursuit of holiness, do, as it were, overcome themselves; and their virtue can therefore have so much more *internal* worth, and be so much the more deserving of reward. Those, on the other hand, who yield to these temptations, and sin, although

they are by no means free from the desert of punishment (since God has made known the means by which sin may be guarded against); may yet, on account of their weakness and inability, hope for pity, forbearance, and a mitigation of punishment. Vid. on this subject, Michaelis, *Von der Sünde*, S. 563. Perhaps God designed by permitting the Fall, to promote many other and unknown ends. Perhaps the example of the Fall of man may be instructive to the higher orders of spiritual beings, who are always described in the Bible, as standing in intimate connexion with man and having knowledge respecting him.

(c) Death was to Adam the proper *punishment* of his sin; to his posterity it is not, properly speaking, *punishment*, but the inevitable consequence of the sin of Adam. For no mortal can beget an immortal; vid. § 78, III. Since now death frees us from this *mortal body*, the principal seat of our sinful depravity; and since the Christian doctrine gives us the comforting assurance, that in the future life we shall possess a more perfect body (1 Cor. xv. etc.); death can no longer be regarded as a punishment, but must rather be considered as a blessing, by all those who fall in with the order appointed by God, and fulfil the conditions on which he has promised happiness after this life.—Now it is a doctrine which we are every where expressly taught in the New Testament, that we are indebted for this good, for this blessed immortality, to Jesus Christ; and the observation of Paul is therefore well founded, that through the institutes which God has established for the recovery of the human race through Christ, through the divine plan of mercy, we have gained far more, than we lost through the sin of Adam and its consequences; Rom. 5: 15, sq.

Note. The disposition to transgress the moral law, from which no man is free, cannot be derived from any deficiency of reason, from error, or want of knowledge. There may be from hence a possibility of sinning either from ignorance or design; but a mere *possibility* of sinning, and an inclination to sin, are very different things. And we feel this disposition even where there is no error or defect of knowledge, yea, even in those cases, in which we see most clearly that obedience to the moral law will conduce to our best advantage, and that by disobedience we shall render ourselves miserable.—Nor can it be a mere fault of education. For then there would be, among all the multiplied and often opposite modes of education, some *one*, which would furnish us with men, who would be free from this disposition.—Nor is it, as has been before observed, the effect merely of the *bad examples* which we witness in others.—This depravity is not exhibited in all men in the same way. One man is either little, or not at all inclined, to those things, for which another has a great pro-

pensity. All, however, are inclined to perform many actions which they themselves acknowledge to be sinful and injurious. There is in men a general *anomaly*, or a general disposition to transgress the moral law, which does not determine to any one particular vice, but which is differently modified in different persons. Since this disposition seeks out so many and so different deviations, it has a different aspect in different individuals; but in all alike, it appears as a strong disinclination to certain duties, and a vehement propensity to certain actions which are morally bad. What is common to this depravity, as it appears in all men, is the preponderance of that which is represented to us as good or evil by our lower appetites, over that which we perceive in the use of reason to be good. From this depravity no age is free; nor can it in this life be ever wholly eradicated. The faults of youth, such as levity and prodigality, do, indeed, often disappear in later periods of life; but their place is supplied by others, such as ambition and jealousy; and many of the excellencies which belong to the period of youth, e. g. innocence, openness, and vivacity, often gradually decay in the years of manhood; and although a more advanced age seems to have the advantage in point of experience and exercise, yet still it cannot be affirmed as a general fact, that this higher age is on the whole morally better than youth. It is therefore a well-known proverb, founded in experience, to say respecting old men who only seem externally to have reformed, that *they have not forsaken sin, but sin has forsaken them*.

II. On teaching this doctrine.

The questions relating to this subject are, *Whether the doctrine of man's native depravity ought to be exhibited in popular instruction?* and if so, *in what way?* On this general subject cf. Knapp's Essay in Ewald's Christlicher Monatsschrift, Jahrg. 2, 1802. Bd. 2. St. 1. S. 3, f.

(1) The doctrine of native depravity, as we are taught it both by Scripture and experience, is very disturbing, depressing, and humbling in its tendency. The light in which man is here taught to regard himself is not at all favorable or pleasant, and is calculated to lead him to tremble for himself. But feelings of this kind, although highly salutary, are yet unpleasant to the natural man (*σαρκινῶ, ψυχικῶ*); and for the very reason that he is of such a character; he is opposed to every thing which awakens feelings of this kind; he prefers to keep this subject out of sight, and is unwilling to hear any thing respecting it. It is with him, as with a sick man, who is unwilling to acknowledge either to himself or others, that he is sick, partly because he is ashamed of his sickness, and partly because he is reluctant to adopt the severe remedies necessary to his cure. Thus it is with the carnal man, who refuses to undertake the radical

cure of the disorders of his soul, because he would feign conceal his sickness from his own view, and dreads to make the bitter sacrifices, which his moral recovery and holiness require. He would rather, therefore, persuade himself and others, that he is good, or at least, that his case is not so bad as might seem. Now if any one does not believe that he is sick, neither does he believe that he is in any need of a remedy, or of a physician; or if he thinks he is only slightly sick, he hopes he shall be able to help himself, or to recover without the aid of medicine. And so any one who thinks in the same way with regard to his moral state, will infallibly be cold and indifferent in the use of all the means which the Christian doctrine prescribes for the sanctification of the heart; he will even scorn them as idle and superfluous, because he sees no necessity for them; yea, he will even feel aversion and hatred towards them, as a sick man is accustomed to do towards a bitter and disagreeable medicine. It is, therefore, very intelligible, and may be psychologically explained, why the opinion, that man is not so depraved as is sometimes represented, and the delusion that the Christian means of cure are inappropriate, superfluous, and may be easily dispensed with, should gain currency in an age and among men, distinguished above others in egotism, self-sufficiency, and the love of worldly enjoyment.

(2) We may hence explain the fact, why the doctrine of human depravity is repugnant to so many in our age, and why it is almost wholly set aside in the instruction of the common people and of the young. The pretext by which the omission of this doctrine is commonly justified, is, that it inspires men with aversion to God, that it makes them irresolute and spiritless in the pursuit of virtue, and that it leads to an unworthy depreciation of one's self, and even to despair, which prevents all improvement. These effects, however, can never be feared, when this doctrine is taught as it is in the Holy Scriptures. Who can bring an example to show, that the scriptural doctrine ever produced such an effect? On the contrary, experience shows, that this doctrine, rightly exhibited, produces just the opposite effects, and animates man in the pursuit of holiness, and leads him to the highest exertions of all his powers for the attainment of it; vid. § 77, II., ad finem.

The true ground why so many forbear to preach this doctrine is, that for the reasons just now suggested, it is displeasing to many of

their hearers, whose favor they would gladly conciliate. It is with them, as with those respecting whom John speaks, ch. 12: 43.—Others have never clearly considered the reasons why they forbear to preach this doctrine, but follow blindly the example set them by some of the eminent and lauded preachers of the day. For the great majority of men, and even of teachers, never think for themselves, but depend upon authority.—Again; there are, alas! many religious teachers, who are themselves unrenewed men, who even while at home were sunk deep in moral corruption, who become still more depraved at the schools and universities, and who, when they assume the sacerdotal robe, alter only their outward deportment, without experiencing a radical change of heart. Such are blind leaders of the blind.

(3) The teachers who adopt the principles just mentioned, are accustomed to descant largely upon the *worth*, the *nobleness*, and the *dignity* of man; since discourse like this is heard with pleasure, and it is far more agreeable to be praised than blamed. In this strain, therefore, preachers of such a character often indulge, and even in their instruction of the young, dwell on nothing but the dignity of man. In this way, many of them suppose they shall elevate man, inspire him with zeal for virtue, and by means of this feeling of honor raise him to nobleness of character. And it is, indeed, right to point man to the noble faculties which he possesses, etc. This is often done in the Bible. This, however, we should do, and not leave the other undone. In the Bible this is always done in connexion with the doctrine of the moral apostasy of man. If this doctrine be not brought into connexion with it, the doctrine of the dignity of man is injurious; it nourishes pride and self-righteousness, and prevents that self-knowledge which is so essential, and thus leads aside from the way of true reformation, such as God will accept. It leads men to think, that they are perfect, and have no need of reformation; that they are in no danger, and at most need only to be ennobled and perfected, and not to be radically renewed. What must be the effect of a doctrine like this in an age in which self-confidence and selfish blindness are the prevailing fault, and have so deeply imbued the minds even of children and youth, that at the age when they are just beginning to learn, they think themselves wiser than their teachers, and from the height to which they suppose themselves to have attained, seem to look down with compassion upon the aged.

(4) From these observations it follows, that it is the duty of a Christian teacher, to exhibit the doctrine of moral depravity, without regard to the fear or the favor of man, after the example which the inspired teachers have set him,—the ancient prophets, Jesus, and the Apostles. The *times* have changed nothing belonging to this doctrine, nor can they. Human nature is the same now, that it has been in every preceding age; and the inculcation of this doctrine is not less important in an enlightened, than in an unenlightened period. It is by this doctrine alone, that the necessity of an entire moral renovation of the human heart can be placed in a strong light; here man learns to understand himself aright, and to think humbly with regard to himself; here he learns to see clearly the difficulties and mighty hindrances which lie in the way of conversion, and attains to the conviction, that he needs help, and that without divine assistance he can do nothing. Truly and beautifully has Seneca said, *Initium est salutis, notitia peccati. Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. Deprehendas te oportet antequam emendes*, Ep. 28. This is the great principle upon which the inspired teachers proceeded in all their instructions. Christ, for example, took this course in his conversation with Nicodemus, however strange the doctrine might have appeared to the latter. And there is no better way,—none which is more capable of vindication on psychological grounds.

(5) But in order that the teaching of this doctrine may attain its end, it is not enough to set forth the mere dogma, and to prove it connectedly from the Holy Scriptures, and then to speak of it in the *abstract*; for in that case, the wholesome and necessary *application* is easily neglected by the hearer. On the contrary, it ought rather to be spoken of in the concrete; at least, the abstract statement should always be applied to particular concrete cases, and especially to *ourselves*. This is the wise mode of teaching exhibited in the Bible; vid. § 77, III. 2. In the popular exhibition of this doctrine, therefore, the teacher should begin with making his hearer observant of himself, and endeavour to convince him of his own depravity, or of the preponderance of appetite over reason in himself, as learned from his own experience. This is the easiest way to bring the contemner of this doctrine to silence. For example, let the teacher in his instructions go over all the points which Paul has cited Rom. 7: 7—23, as proof of the moral corruption of man, without at first remarking that this is taught in the Bible. The

hearer must confess, that he finds it in himself exactly as described,—that he is not what he ought to be, and what his own moral feeling teaches him that he must be, in order to please God. When he is brought to this conviction, than let him be shown, that the doctrine of Scripture corresponds with his own experience. In this way he will acquire regard for the Bible, as he will see that it gives no ideal description of man, but represents him as he actually is. Then he will be constrained to acknowledge : ‘ Yes ! I too am actually so ; it is as if I myself were here described.’ Has any one come to this point, there is hope that he may be inclined to employ the means of recovery prescribed in the Scriptures, and especially in the Christian doctrine ; particularly if he is shown, how and wherefore they have so beneficial an effect ; and if he is made to consider, that our own good intentions, and all the means by which we attempt to help ourselves, are inefficacious. In this way is the feeling of the need of help and of a Redeemer to be excited in man ; and thus does the knowledge of our moral depravity and inability lead to Christ, as to him through whom alone it can be removed.—But all this instruction will be in danger of failing of its effect, unless the hearer perceives, that the teacher himself has a personal interest in the matter, that he speaks from his own internal conviction, and that he has experienced on his own heart the efficacy of the means prescribed, and shows their effect in his life and walk.

(6) None of the profound and learned investigations of philosophers and theologians, respecting the nature of human depravity, the mode of its propagation, etc., should have any place in the practical and popular exhibition of this doctrine. It is enough for the teacher to stop with the simple doctrine of the Bible, and merely teach, (*a*) that all men have been actually so, ever since our first parents transgressed the divine command ; and (*b*) that according to the Bible, the ground why all their posterity are such, lies in our first parents ; but that (*c*) we owe the improvement of our condition, and the restoration of our lost holiness and happiness, to Jesus Christ, since he redeems or frees us from sin and its evil consequences, and turns this evil to our good ; Rom. 7: 25: For more on this point, vid. the article on Christ.

§ 81. *Explanation of the idea which is commonly connected in theology with the expression ACTUAL SINS ; and of the different degrees of sin.*

We have thus far treated of the moral corruption of human nature, and its causes ; we have also given a history of this doctrine ; §§ 74—80. We now proceed to consider *particular sinful actions*, whose source is found in this same moral depravity ; vid. § 73, ad finem. We shall treat this subject under the two following divisions, viz. (1) The *nature* of particular sinful actions, and their different kinds and divisions, § 81—84 ; (2) The different *state* which arises in man on the commission of sin, § 85—87.

I. Additional explanation of the idea of *sin*.

We have before shown under § 73, I., what is meant by the terms *sin* and *law* ; and this will be presupposed in the remarks which follow. Since now we must regard this natural depravity as a *sinful state*, and since we must regard particular sinful actions as the *consequence* and *result* of this state ; theologians, since the time of Cassianus, have adopted the division of sin into *peccatum originale* and *peccatum actuale* ; vid. § 79, No. 4, ad finem, and Morus, p. 118, supra. Morus has, indeed, omitted the special consideration of the doctrine *de peccato actuali* in his *Dogmatik*, and assigned the discussion of it wholly to the department of *Morals*. But the general *theory* of actual sins belongs to the province of *Dogmatical* theology, and is commonly introduced by theologians into this department.

Actual sins are, moreover, commonly denominated *peccata sensu strictiori*. By *actions*, however, theologians do not mean, in treating of this subject, those merely which are *external*, i. e. which are committed by means of the *body* and its *organs* ; but also those which are *internal*, i. e. those which take place merely in the soul, and are performed in thoughts, desires, etc. Hence it has been common to subdivide *actual sins* into *external* and *internal*, of which we shall say more hereafter.—*Actualis* is a term which belongs to the later Latin, and was first used by Macrobius ; it answers to the older term *actuosus*, *active*, *consisting in action* ; or to *activus*, which is sometimes employed in the same sense. Hence Cicero says, *vita actiosa*, *virtus actiosa*, Nat. Deor. I. 40 ; instead of which Macro-

bis writes, *virtutes actuales*. Seneca has, *activa philosophia*, Ep. 95, and Quintilian opposes *activum* (the practical) to *speculativum* (the theoretical).—But sinful actions are denominated *peccata actualia* in opposition to native depravity, because they involve an *actus transitorius*, such as exists in all human actions; they have a beginning and an end. But *original sin* has in this life no end, but continues as long as man remains upon the earth. It is not an *act*, but a *state*. The application of the term *sin* to this state is indeed inconvenient, because according to the definition given of sin, native depravity cannot be literally so called; a more appropriate name would be *hereditary evil*. But since the former term is now common among theologians, and the thing denoted by it is accordant both with reason and Scripture, it must be understood, and its ground must be known.

In explanation of the subjective definition of sin given § 73, I., viz. *a free action which is not conformed to the law of God, or which deviates from this law*, let the following additional remarks be considered. When we would judge respecting any action, internal or external, whether it is sinful or not, our decision must depend upon the three following conditions: viz.

(1) That the man who commits the action had sufficient knowledge of the law (*notitia legis*). And this presupposes (*a*) that the law was actually given to man; (*b*) that it was *known* by this individual, or at least, that it *should* have been known by him, and that so it is his own fault if he remained unacquainted with it; and (*c*) that he understood the sense of the law, or might have understood it. Is any one of these conditions wanting, the act contravening the law is, indeed, an *evil* (foolish, hurtful in its tendency, etc.), but not *sin*; vid. § 73, I. Cf. Rom. 4: 15. 5: 13, ἀμαρτία οὐκ ἐλλογέται μὴ ὅντος νόμου.

(2) That the action does not in fact agree with the law. The determination of this matter has often in particular cases more difficulty, than one would think. The over-anxious and scrupulous man often regards certain actions, both internal and external, as sinful, while they are not forbidden in the divine law; and in this way he needlessly disquiets himself. Another man mistakes on this subject through indifference and carelessness. But a far more common fault is, to allow self-love to pronounce too light and partial a sentence upon our own actions, while on the other hand, we judge the actions of

others too severely ; vid. Matt. 7: 3, 4, 5.—Nor is the obligation of the law the same for all. Some laws are not universally obligatory, but binding only on certain individuals, and in particular cases. The same action may be sin in one man, and not in another. One does it with a conviction that it is not wrong, and so sins not ; the other is doubtful, or convinced in his heart that it is wrong, and yet does it, and sins. This may be applied to the so called *ἀδιάφορα*, *indifferent things*, fastings, amusements, card-playing, dancing, etc. Vid. 1 Cor. viii. and ix. and Rom. 14: 23. The farther discussion of the subject of sin *ex conscientia errante* sive *erronea* belongs to the department of theological *Morals*.

(3) That in the commission of the action, man had the use of his *free-will* (τὸ αὐτεξουσίου, or ἐλευθέρα προαίρεσις). An action which we have been compelled to do against our will, or which we have done without consciousness, cannot be regarded as our own action. This is true not only of evil, but of good actions. In order, now, that the action of a man may be free and so imputable, he must in doing it (*a*) be in a state in which he can exercise his understanding, and determine his will according to that which his understanding approves ; for this is essential to freedom. Therefore no infant, no idiot, no insane person, no sleeper, or dreamer can commit sin, because he has not the use of his understanding. The shameful words and deeds, the blasphemy, etc. which we often see and hear in delirious persons, are not *sins*, because they are not free actions ; and if they are afterwards disposed to trouble themselves on account of what they may have said or done in such a state, they ought to be set at rest.—In order that a man's action may be free, (*b*) his power to act must not be hindered by external circumstances. If, therefore, in any case a man is compelled by some external necessity to act wholly against his will, or if he is barely restrained in acting, so that he cannot proceed wholly according to his own will and intent ; then his action is not free, or at least not perfectly free, and so is not imputable, or is not wholly so. Every thing depends here upon the *intention*. A man designs to do an evil deed, but is prevented from accomplishing his purpose by external circumstances, and so does not sin indeed externally, but he does in his heart ; and in the judgment of God and of his own conscience is deserving of punishment. The case is the same as to the imputation of a good act, the execution of which has been prevented by external circumstances. Vid. Matt. 5: 28, coll. § 82.

II. The different degrees of sin.

In common life, sins are distinguished into *gross* and *great* sins, and *light* and *trifling* sins, and the latter are judged deserving of less punishment than the former. This difference is founded in the nature of the thing itself. For whoever sins, acts against the obligation which rests upon him, to fulfil certain duties; but this obligation has different degrees according to the difference of the powers of the acting subject, and of his motives to action. Hence it follows, that one commits greater sins, who has more power and stronger motives for doing right, than one with whom these powers and motives were weaker. Again; the less the motives and inducements to sin, and the more the reasons which were calculated to deter from the commission of it, so much the worse is the sin, and so much the more deserving of punishment. The motives tending to withhold from sin are to be judged of from the peculiar situation, the circumstances, the mode of thinking, and the knowledge of each individual; also according to the nature of the person or thing with respect to which the sin is committed (e. g. sins against *parents*, to whom we are under greater obligations than to others); and also according to the consequences which flow from the sin. The consideration of this matter, however, properly falls into the department of theological Morals.

In entire conformity with these principles, does the Holy Scripture decide respecting the different degrees of sin, and their desert of punishment; vid. Matt. 5: 22. John 19: 11, *μείζων ἁμαρτία*. Luke 12: 47, 48. Matt. 11: 22—24. 1 Tim. 1: 15. 2 Pet. 2: 20, 21.—But since this difference of degree in sin depends upon so many things, which are not always obvious and cannot be duly estimated by others,—upon the dispositions and intentions concealed in the heart of him who acts, upon his knowledge, his temptations, his powers and capacities; it is often impossible for us in particular cases to form a correct judgment. God only, who knows the heart of man, and the circumstances in which he acts, can judge truly and decisively respecting his actions. To him, therefore, should this decision be left; vid. Rom. 14: 4, *οὐ τις εἰ ὁ κρινὼν ἄλλότριον οἰκέτην*; James 4: 12. Matt. 7: 1, sq. On this account it is our wisdom, as well as our duty, although contrary to the common disposition of men, to judge ourselves with all possible strictness, but the

faults of others with forbearance and toleration. This, too, is according to the direction of Christ, Matt. 7: 1—5, coll. Luke 13: 2—5. Baumgarten has discussed this subject minutely in his “Diss. de gradibus peccatorum,” Halæ, 1744.

Note 1. The philosophers both of ancient and modern times have been almost entirely agreed, that there is a difference of degree in sins; with the exception only of the Stoics, who maintained the paradoxical opinion, *that all sins are alike*; vid. Cicero, Parad. III. Seneca, Ep. 66. Cicero, De finibus bonor. et malor. IV. 27, sq. They assumed, that all virtues were equal; and hence it followed by way of contrast, that all vices were equal; and hence, that all the virtuous and all the vicious were, in their view, on the same level. E. g. one who killed his slave without a cause, committed in their view an equal sin with one who abused his father. In this doctrine, they were opposed chiefly by the Peripatetics. But although they maintained this equality of virtues and of vices, they yet ascribed to them a different extent and limitation, so that some were capable of palliation, others unpardonable; because some deviated more than others from the law; and so with regard to the virtues, which were judged of by them according to their different utility. Hence we see, that in substance they agreed with others, and only differed from them by this striking proposition, which they selected on account of its strangeness. All which they mean to affirm is, that one transgression is as much a transgression as another; and all in respect to their internal nature are alike, because they are all violations of the rule, and so are opposite to the virtues. And the same is taught by the text, James 2: 10, 11. But this *internal nature* of virtues and vices cannot be made the standard by which their greatness is determined; but the consequences which result from them, the purpose and intention of the soul from which they flow, and sometimes even the mere “so it seems good” of the lawgiver. Vid. Tiedemann, System der Stoischen Philosophie, Th. III. S. 151—156.

Note 2. Some theologians have maintained, that sin, or rather the guilt of sin, is *infinite* in the philosophical sense (*culpam sive reatum peccatorum esse infinitum*). They resort to this statement in order to explain more easily the infiniteness of the satisfaction made by Christ, and also the eternity of the punishments of Hell. Whoever, they say, breaks the laws of the Infinite Being, brings upon himself infinite guilt. But this statement, taken in the strict philosophic sense, is incorrect. For (a) it would follow from this, that there was no difference of objects; for the infinite is always like to itself, and cannot be increased or diminished. (b) An action, which is directed against a particular object, does not of necessity partake of the nature of this object. Whether the object is finite or infinite is a matter of indifference with regard to the nature of the action, and makes no alteration in its character. A finite action cannot become infinite, or involve infinite guilt, merely because it relates to an infinite object. If it could, then every good action, agreeing with the divine law, must be infinite, and have an infinite worthiness; and so the knowledge which man

has of God must be infinite, because it relates to an infinite being. (c) This whole opinion rests upon a comparison of divine and human things carried too far, so as to give rise, as in innumerable other cases, to mistake. We look upon the crimes committed against rulers and magistrates as greater, than those committed against others, and we punish them more severely; and this with justice. But the reason of this lies not so much in the personal character or worth of the injured object, as in care for the public welfare or security, which is more endangered by any indignity done to the magistracy, than to a private person. Hence this crime, in order to deter others from committing it, must be punished more severely than others. But this principle cannot be applied in its whole extent to God; although such human representations are often applied to him. For, properly speaking, God cannot be injured by men; they cannot frustrate any of his plans, nor set aside, disturb, or throw effectual hinderances in the way of any of his counsels. Vid. Eberhard, *Apologie des Sokrates*, Th. I. S. 374, f.

§ 82. *Divisions of sin in respect to the law, to the knowledge and purpose of him who commits it, and to the action itself.*

I. In respect to the law.

As the law contains both *precepts* and *prohibitions*, it follows that actions deviating from it may be of two kinds: viz. (a) actions forbidden by the law,—sins of commission (*peccata commissionis*); (b) declining or refusing to perform actions required by the law,—sins of omission (*peccata omissionis*). The latter kind, as well as the former, are mentioned in the Bible, and declared to be equally sins, James 4: 17, “To him that knoweth to do good (i. e. who has power and opportunity to perform it), and doeth it not, it is sin;” or, every omission of good, to perform which we are obliged by the divine law, is sin; cf. Luke 12: 47. Matt. 7: 19. A man, therefore, who guards merely against sins of commission, so that he cannot be charged with any open violation of the divine will, does not deserve the name of an observer of the divine law. To this character he can lay claim, only when he has not to condemn himself for omitting the good which the law required him to perform. Thus not only does he sin, who does what is forbidden by God, but he too who omits to do what God requires. It is, however, a common error of men, to regard sins of omission less than those of commission, because they are less externally visible. Some theologians, too, have

maintained, that sins of omission were less heinous and punishable, than those of commission. But this, as a general proposition, and applied to all cases, is false. To neglect to use the powers and faculties given us, is often as injurious, sometimes more so, than the abuse of them in sins of commission. But because the evil done in sins of commission is often more immediate and obvious than in sins of omission, where the effect is more slow and is often lost in obscurity, we are easily led to regard the latter as less than the former. In the eyes of God, the thief and the murderer may be less vile, than the hardhearted rich man, who refuses to relieve his dying neighbour, and suffers him to perish of hunger; although the former is severely punished by men, while the latter remains unpunished, and even may enjoy the highest repute and honor in the view of men. Christ teaches this, Matt. 25: 41—46, where those who have not fed the hungry and clothed the naked, are consigned by the Judge of the world to the place of torment, as well as other offenders. He applies the term *κακοποιεῖν* to the omission of a good action, Mark 3: 4. Luke 6: 9.

II. In respect to the knowledge and the will of him who sins.

(1) *In respect to knowledge.* In case of an illegal action, one either knows the law or he does not; hence arises the division of sins into those of ignorance, and those of knowledge (*peccata ignorantia*, and *peccata cum scientia recti commissa*). Sin, or transgression of the divine law, always presupposes a knowledge of this law; for without the knowledge of the law, there can be no sin; vid. § 81, I. The sin of ignorance is not found, therefore, in the case of one who is wholly ignorant of the divine law, or who has had no opportunity of becoming acquainted with it, in short, when his ignorance is without any fault on his part. Hence Christ says, John 15: 22, 24, “Had I not told it unto you (that I was a divine teacher), ye would not have sinned (in rejecting me); and had I not done such great miracles (by which they are furnished with the means of judging correctly respecting me), they had not had sin.” An ignorance of this kind, which is wholly without criminality, is called by the school-men, *ignorantia invincibilis*; and however various are the explanations which they give of it, they are agreed in saying, that it must be excused, and cannot be imputed. In particular cases,

however, it is very difficult to judge respecting others, whether the ignorance of any one is, or is not, without any fault on his part. For what seems to one easy to be known, so that he can hardly conceive how it should appear dark or difficult, is attended in the view of another with insuperable difficulties and hinderances. Hence we ought to be very cautious in judging. God only can determine infallibly whether and how far ignorance is attended with criminality. As soon, however, as any one neglects the means within his reach of acquiring knowledge of the law, his ignorance is no longer innocent; he commits actual sin, and is liable to punishment. In order to a *sin of ignorance*, it may therefore be considered as essential, that the person should have been able to know the law, and that his own negligence and forbearing to inquire is the only cause of his ignorance.

Nearly related to these, are sins committed *through error* (*per errorem commissa*); hence they are often classed with sins of ignorance. Sins of error are those which are committed (*a*) when one erroneously supposes that a law exists, when in fact there is none; e. g. when one supposes it is his duty to persecute heretics and errorists; (*b*) when one misunderstands the law, or (*c*) when, through error, he fails in the application of the law to particular cases; or (*d*) when he judges erroneously respecting the obligation under which he is laid by the law. The only question now is, whether such an error is without fault, or not; whether it was in our power to avoid it.—These different kinds of sin are distinguished in the Scriptures, and are always there judged of, according to the principles here laid down; e. g. Luke 23: 34, *Father forgive them* (there was, therefore, sin in this case; for they had had opportunity to become better instructed; and yet there were many things which diminished their guilt; and so Christ adds) *for they know not what they do*. Acts 3: 17, *κατὰ ἄγνοιαν ἐπράξετε* and Paul says respecting himself, 1 Tim. 1: 13, God had forgiven him for persecuting Christians *ὅτι ἄγνοῶν ἐποίησα ἐν ἀπιστίᾳ*. Sins in general are sometimes called *ἄγνοήματα*, Heb. 9: 7; Heb. חַטֹּאתֶיךָ, Lev. 4: 2, 13, where sins of ignorance of every kind are spoken of at length. The farther discussion of this subject belongs to theological morals.

(2) *In respect to the will.* Here again it must be presupposed, that without the free determination of the will no sin can exist.

Such an act does not depend upon me, and is not to be regarded as mine; vid. § 81, I. ad finem. In order to estimate correctly the sinfulness of human actions, and their liability of punishment, regard must be had to the motives and inducements which act on the human will, and the relations of men with regard to them, and the situation in which the offender is placed. According to these circumstances must the degree of the sinfulness of actions be judged and estimated. Sins may be divided, in respect to the intention with which they are committed, into the following classes: viz.

A. INVOLUNTARY SINS,—when one transgresses the law of God, without having formed a proper resolution or purpose of so doing (*si absit consilium peccandi*). Among these are;

(a) *Sins of precipitancy*, “*quæ*,” as Cicero says (*Officiis*, I. 8), “*repentino aliquo motu animi accidunt*,” in opposition to deliberate sins, *prepenſe* and *aforethought*. Sins of this kind are committed, when persons act so precipitately, that they do not once think of the law forbidding the action which they perform, or do not duly consider the reasons which lie against it. They ought to be carefully distinguished from sins which are committed through *levity*. In order that a trespass committed by me should be through mere *precipitancy*, I must not have sought the opportunity to sin; the time between the resolution and the action must have been very short, and the feeling which has carried me away must have been very strong. The sin, too, must be followed by deep repentance, and a firm resolve to avoid the same in future. Such sins of precipitancy ought not, however, to be lightly regarded, because they often plunge us into great calamity, and, if often repeated, cease to be sins of precipitancy. Sins of this nature are mentioned in Gal. 6: 1, where Christians are exhorted to be on their guard against them, and to endeavour in the spirit of meekness, to restore those who have committed them; vid. also Ps. 73: 2, coll. v. 23, sq.

(b) *Sins of weakness* (*peccata infirmitatis*). These, in the strictest sense of the term, can take place only when one knows, that what he does is against the law, but yet is not *physically* able to forbear doing it. They are seen in persons, who are not sufficiently confirmed in goodness, who have not a settled habit of doing right, and whose passions are very violent. Sins, however, cannot be said to be committed from mere weakness, unless he who commits them has used on his part a proper watchfulness,

and has resisted his evil desires, and found after all, that it was impossible for him wholly to exclude them from his mind, or to fulfil his duties and his good intentions. This is the case of which Christ speaks, Matt. 26: 41, "The spirit is willing (πρόθυμον); but the *flesh* (i. e. the body, by which the soul is so much influenced) is *weak* (ἀσθενής);" i. e. as weak men, whose spirit dwelt in a disordered body, they were not able to execute the good purposes for which they had a willingness. The general maxim contained in this passage is the following: men are often hindered by sense and passion from the execution of their best purposes, and yield to the inducements to sin. The Scriptures, therefore, always presuppose in these sins a certain goodness of heart, and the serious purpose of avoiding sin, and deep repentance on account of it, when it has been committed. Men, therefore, who are totally corrupt, and in whom all moral sense is suppressed, cannot commit sins of weakness; though on the other hand, it is not entirely true, according to the common affirmation of some theologians, that the pious only and the truly regenerate can commit sins of weakness and precipitancy, and that, as some will say, all the sins of the unrenewed are to be regarded as sins of design (Germ. *Bosheitssünden*). For, as even the pious man is frequently borne away by the violence of passion to the inconsiderate commission of deeds which are against his own will and purpose; this must certainly be much oftener the case with unrenewed men; and unless they are in a high degree corrupt and vicious, it cannot be affirmed with certainty respecting them, that they always sin from sheer wickedness, and that they never fight against sin, and endeavour to resist it. For a man who is addicted to a particular vice, and who often commits one sin, may yet have in him much which is good, and strive with earnestness and zeal against other sins to which he is tempted. Now little as sin can in any case be approved or exculpated, it is yet true, that many very gross outbreakings of sin, in particular cases and persons, are to be considered as sins of weakness and precipitancy, and that the *Omniscient* being often passes a different judgment with regard to the morality of such actions, from that which men commonly form, or are able to form. This is the case, for example, with theft, suicide, homicide, infanticide, and other similar crimes, which on account of their consequences need to be severely punished by human Courts.

B. VOLUNTARY SINS, *peccata voluntaria*, or *proæretica* (from

προαίρεσις, *propositum, consilium*). These are committed with a determination of breaking the law of God.

(a) When any one knows the law, and before he sins, distinctly recollects it, or might easily recollect it, and yet proceeds to sin; then his sin is *voluntary*;—so also, when he delights himself in the sin which he has committed, approves of it, and wishes for an opportunity to repeat it, notwithstanding he is convinced, or might be, that the act is opposed to the divine law.

(b) A sin does not cease to be *voluntary* and *deliberate*, because he who commits it may have been urged on by the command, the threat, the solicitation, or the contempt of men. For in this case it is in my power to leave the sin undone; and if I commit it, I form the resolution of breaking the law of God, in order to escape an evil threatened me by man; vid. Matt. 10: 28. An exception is, of course, made with regard to proper *physical* compulsion; e. g. if one strikes another with my hand, against my own will, the action in such a case is no more mine.

(c) It is not necessary, that every *voluntary sin* should be a gross one; even the smallest violation of the law which takes place with deliberation, is a voluntary sin; and it may even be, that an action which is not in itself sinful, and which is only regarded as such from an unenlightened conscience, may become a *voluntary sin* by being deliberately performed; for the person, in such a case, forms a resolution to break the law of God. E. g. when one regards card-playing as forbidden, and yet plays; vid. § 81, I. 2.

(d) The highest degree of voluntary sin, is that in which one sins with *willingness, from mere wickedness*, and for the sake of the sin itself (*peccatum frivolum, or ἐχούσιον*). Every such sin is, indeed, voluntary; but every voluntary sin does not spring from pure malice or evil. Such a sin exists only, when one violates the law without being tempted to it by external solicitations or opportunities. There are, therefore, many *voluntary* sins, which do not result from this pure evil, and which are not committed with this perfect cordiality; but which may be even reluctantly performed, through fear of persecution, contempt, or some other cause. In such a case, we have the sin of purpose, not of mere evil. Should one in opposition to his own convictions renounce religion at a time of persecution, or when irreligious opinions were prevalent, he would sin voluntarily;

but for him to do this without the influence of persecution, of danger, or of any solicitation from without, would be to sin cordially and from entire wickedness. Paul names this sinning *ἐκουσίως*, Heb. 10: 26, where he speaks of just such a denial of the faith, and justly declares it to be one of the most heinous and unpardonable of crimes.

(e) When from the frequent repetition of a sin, a habit is formed, this sin thus made habitual is denominated a *vice*; e. g. the vice of drunkenness, etc. The term vice is used in two senses; viz. sometimes to denote the habit itself of acting against the divine law; sometimes to denote the particular actions which originate in such a habit. Thus when it is said, a man is guilty of a great *vice*, the meaning is, that he has committed a sinful action which with him is habitual. Hence every vicious man is a sinner, i. e. a transgressor of the divine law; but every sinner is not of necessity vicious. Cf. Michaelis, Von der Sünde, S. 337, sq. and Toellner, Theologische Untersuchungen, Th. I. B. 2. Num. 7.

NOTE. As the sacred writers always proceed on the principle, that God, as Ruler, has a right to prescribe laws to men, and that men, as his subjects, are always bound to obey; they describe those who knowingly and wilfully transgress his authority, as *enemies*, *rebels*, and *insurgents*, and their crimes, as *rebellion*, *enmity*, etc.; so Ps. 8: 3. Rom. 8: 7. James 4: 4. On the contrary, the virtuous man is described in the Bible, as *obedient* and *submissive* (עֲבָדִים), who willingly and cheerfully bows to the authority of God. *Humility* often stands for *piety*, and *pride* for *wickedness*,—intentional and deliberate sins; and the *proud* are those who commit them; vid. Ps. 119: 21, 51. 25: 9.—Why are the virtuous called *humble* and *obedient*? All virtue should proceed from religious motives,—from thankful love, and a spirit of obedience towards God.

(3) In respect to the *actions* themselves, or the *acting subject*, sins are divided into *internal* and *external*. We act, either with our souls simply, or with them in connexion with the body, of which the soul makes use as its organ. This division is found in the New Testament, Matt. 9: 4. Rom. 3: 13, sq. 2 Cor. 7: 1 (μολυσμός σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος.—*Peccata actualia interna*, are those which are committed merely in heart, or in thought. They are also called *actiones (pravas) animi*, and are comprehended by Paul under the term *ἔργα*, Gal. 5: 19, sq. coll. Rom. 1: 28—31. Among these, however, we are not to include those evil desires, that rise involuntarily and without guilt in the hearts of men; which are rather the disease of the soul, than its guilt. They are committed only, when

the desires after forbidden things rising in the heart are cherished, entertained, delighted in, and executed; in short, when, as James says (ch. 1: 15), sin is *conceived* in the heart. Cf. § 78, IV.

Peccata actualia EXTERNA, are those unlawful actions which one commits with the body and its members. They are divided, according to the different manner in which the disposition of the soul is made known through the body, into *peccata oris* or *linguæ* (Matt. 5: 22. Rom. 3: 14. James 3: 2), *gestuum*, and *operis*. The external or bodily actions of men are, however, only so far sinful and liable to punishment, as they depend on the soul or the will, Matt. 15: 18—20. Otherwise they cannot be denominated sins; vid. No. II. 2, of this section. Hence Christ calls the heart of man the *treasury* (θησαυρός) of good and evil, where good and evil actions lie concealed, and are prepared, before they are externally exhibited; Matt. 12: 34, 35, coll. Mark 7: 21. The body is merely the instrument or subject, which obeys the commands of the soul. Hence it is plain, that it is false to consider *internal* sins as less heinous and deserving of punishment, than external sins, as is commonly done. This mistake results from the fact, that internal sins are concealed from the view of men, and cannot therefore be punished by them. We deceive ourselves here also, by conceiving of the relation between men and God as about the same, as that which subsists between man and his fellow man, especially like that between subjects and a human ruler, where thoughts are not liable to punishment, so long as they remain mere thoughts, and are unknown to other men. But to God, the mere thoughts of men are as much known, as their outward actions; vid. 1 Cor. 4: 5, and Vol. I. § 22; and he can therefore bring them into judgment for the one, as well as for the other. Hence in the Bible, the very significant epithet, *καρδιογενώστης* (לִבְהֶקֶר) is applied to God. It is also obvious, that in very many cases, internal sins are in the sight of God more heinous and ill-deserving, than external. For example; one man occupies his fancy with shameless and unchaste images. He commits internal sin, although no other man can reproach him for it, or punish him, because it is done merely in heart. Another man, ordinarily chaste, is borne away by passion at one time, actually to commit fornication or adultery, and thus brings upon himself shame or punishment from man, while the other goes free. Both have sinned. But which of the two sins is in the sight of God of the dark-

est character, and the most deserving of punishment, the internal or the external? The decision in this case is not difficult; and if we, like the omniscient God, knew the heart, we should all decide in the same manner with regard to offences of this nature. Hence Christ says, Matt. 5: 28, whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. Cato pronounced justly a similar judgment; *furtum sine ulla quoque attrectatione fieri posse, sola MENTE atque ANIMO, ut furtum fiat*, ADNITENTE; Gellius, XI. 18, ad fin.

§ 83. *Of some other divisions of sin, and sins of participation.*

I. Some minor divisions of sins.

Besides the divisions of sin already mentioned, § 82, there are also many others, which are either wanting in exactness and philosophic correctness, or are of less consequence, as they cast but little light upon the doctrine itself, and only furnish some contingent characteristics of particular kinds of sin. Some of them are also liable to great abuse. Still, as they are frequently found in the writings of the schoolmen and of modern theologians, it is necessary to understand them as matters of history.

(1) The division of sins in respect to the object of the law against which the sin is committed, into those which are committed against *God*, against one's *neighbour*, and against *one's self*, is a very common division, but far from being accurate and just. For the object of every sin, if the *formale* of it is considered, is God. The obligation to obey the law issues from him, as the supreme Ruler and Lawgiver.—Again; every one who commits a sin, of whatever kind it may be, sins in each case against himself. For in the commission of it he most injures himself.

Note. We may here notice the division of sins which is found among the schoolmen, into *peccata philosophica* (those committed against the laws of nature), and *peccata theologica* (those committed against the revealed will of God). But no characteristics can be given by which these two kinds of sinning can be distinguished from each other; and the guilt and ill desert of both must be necessarily equal, since God is no less the author of the laws of nature, than of those of Revelation. We may learn something of the great

abuse of this division of which some of the Jesuits since the close of the seventeenth century have been chargeable, from Church History and theological Ethics.

(2) Sins have been divided, in respect to their greater or less guilt and desert of punishment, into *mortalia* or *non-venalia* (unpardonable), and *venalia* (pardonable);—*sins unto death*, and *venial sins*. The phrase *sin unto death* is taken from 1 John 5: 16, where however it has an entirely different meaning from that which is given to it in this connexion; viz. punishment with death at a human tribunal, *a crime worthy of death, a capital crime*. But this phrase, as used by theologians, is taken in the Hebrew sense, and denotes sins which draw after them death, i. e. divine punishment; e. g. John 8: 21, 24, ἀποθανεῖσθε ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὑμῶν. The term *peccatum veniale* is found even in Augustine. Very different opinions, however, are entertained by theologians as to the meaning of this division; and there has been much controversy about it, especially between the theologians of the Roman and the Protestant Church. In order that this term may be understood in a sense conformed to the Bible, it must be explained in the following way; every sin, as such, deserves punishment (θάνατον ἀπονέμει, James 1: 15), nor do the least remain unpunished. The pious man, therefore, either does not sin at all, or if he sins, deserves punishment (death). But if any one has sinned through ignorance, heedlessness, human weakness or precipitancy, he may hope for the pardon (*veniam*) of his sin, since he did not commit it with deliberate purpose; vid. § 82. Heinous sins remain always deserving of punishment; but those who repent of their sins and with all their hearts turn from them, receive, according to the doctrine of the Scriptures, pardon from God through faith in Jesus Christ; and the Christian knows, that through his faith his sins are truly forgiven him. Vid. Rom. 8: 1, οὐδὲν κατάκριμα. 1 John 1: 9, coll. 2: 1. Ps. 103: 8—18.

(3) As the phrase *to cry to Heaven* is used in the Bible with reference to particular sins, some have thence taken occasion to introduce the division of sins, into *clamantia* and *non-clamantia*. The texts are Gen. 4: 10. 18: 20. Ex. 3: 7. James 5: 4, coll. Is. 22: 14. The sins mentioned in these passages have been comprized in the following distich;

“Clamitat ad cælum vox sanguinis et Sodomorum,
Vox oppressorum, merces detenta laborum.”

But this *crying to Heaven* is not given in the Bible as the definite mark of any particular sins, and it may be spoken of many others besides those to which it is actually applied. It depends merely upon the circumstances. It is *prosopopæia*, and is used to denote great and aggravated offences, which have terrible consequences, but which are not punished in this world, either because they remain undiscovered, or because, on account of great public corruption, they are not regarded as sins. Respecting such sins, the Hebrew says, *they cry to God*, or they call to God for revenge, i. e. they are punished by God with peculiar severity, although overlooked by men. Among sins of this nature, e. g. is *perjury*, respecting which it is expressly said, Ex. 20: 7, that God will not forbear to punish it; although the phrase *crying to Heaven* is never used with respect to it in the Bible. On the contrary, it is said respecting the blood of Christ, Heb. 12: 24, that it *speaks better things than the blood of Abel*; it calls upon God for favor and the forgiveness of sins, or it results in this, that God does pardon; while Abel's blood called on God to punish, or was followed by this consequence, that God punished the murderer. In connexion with these texts, vid. Sir. 35: 18, "The tears of the widow cry over themselves (to heaven) against him who extorts them."

II. Participation in the sins of others.

In 1 Tim. 5: 22, Paul makes use of the language, *κοινωνεῖν ἁμαρτίαις ἄλλοτρίαις*. A *sin of participation* is committed by any one, when the unlawful action, though not performed immediately by him, is yet done *mediately* through him, or, which is the same thing, is occasioned, aided and abetted by him. Every thing, therefore, by which I give to my fellow man opportunity, inducement, or occasion to sin, is a sin of participation. The guilt which rests upon me is greater or less, in proportion as I could have foreseen, or did actually foresee and approve the sins which my fellow man has committed in consequence of these opportunities and inducements which I placed in his way. In a great variety of ways can one give to another occasion to sin;—by command, by bad advice and counsel (John 18: 14. 2 Sam. 16: 21), by praising wicked deeds, by concealment, by omitting to place all possible resistance in the way of the sin, or by failing to give needful admonition, warn-

ing, or correction (1 Sam. 3: 13). The mere participator, however, has not always equal guilt with the one who himself directly commits the sin. The guilt of the one may be greater or less than that of the other, or that of both may be equal; and this will be according to the circumstances in each particular case. The more full discussion of the whole subject belongs properly to the department of Morals.

There is one class of sins of participation which deserves more particular notice here, although the consideration of it at large belongs to theological Morals; viz. *scandals* so called. We subjoin only a few remarks. Σκάνδαλον (שִׁבְלֵי) is literally any thing by which one is made *to fall*; it then signifies any thing by which one is injured, e. g. snares, plots; finally, in a moral sense, it denotes not only every deliberate and designed solicitation of another to evil, but also every thing by which one gives to another occasion to sin, even in a more indirect way, and if he had no intention of so doing; e. g. the bad example which one sets before another. This term is sometimes used in the discourses of Jesus, to signify temptation to apostasy from Christianity, e. g. Matt. 18: 6. John 16: 1; but it is also used by Christ in a wider sense, e. g. Matt. 17: 27, where it denotes the inducement to disobey magistrates, which one offers to another by his conduct; and in general σκανδαλίζειν is with him *to give occasion to sin, to tempt*, Matt. 5: 29, 30. Such an offence or scandal may be committed either in word or in external deed. Actions and words may in themselves be right and innocent; but if one can foresee that by them another may be led into sin, it is his duty to refrain from them. On these principles, Paul judges respecting the eating of meats regarded as unlawful, and of flesh offered to idols, in presence of persons who had conscientious scruples respecting it, Rom. 14: 20—25. 1 Cor. 8: 10—13. The maxims which Paul lays down in these places are very important and worthy of being laid to heart, because they are applicable to all similar cases. The accountability and ill-desert of a person guilty of such an offence is different, in proportion to the deed itself and its consequences. The easier it is to avoid the seductive action, the more important the office and station of the one who does it, the more unlawful the action is in itself, and the greater the evil done by it; so much the greater and more deserving of punishment is the offence.

Scandals or offences are sometimes divided, in respect to the *subject*, into those *given*, and those *received*;—a division, however, which is in many respects inconvenient; it is farther treated of in theological Morals. Scandals *given* are those actions of an injurious tendency, to the omission of which one is obligated, either from the nature of the actions themselves, or from the particular circumstances of the case. To commit an action in such a case is *σκανδαλίζειν τίνα* (activé), Matt. 18: 6. Scandals *received*, are such actions as may prove temptations to some one, but which are either in themselves good and according to duty, or at least indifferent in their moral character. In the first case, one may give offence or occasion sin without being accessory to it, and so without sin on his part. In the second case, it is a duty to abstain from the action according to the advice of Paul, as we have seen above. This *scandalum acceptum* is *σκανδαλισθῆναι ἐν τίνι*, Matt. 11: 6. 13: 57 (the first case); Rom. 14: 21 (the second case).

In judging of sins of participation and of scandals, moralists often mistake by carrying the matter too far in theory, and thus weakening the effect of their rule; as, on the other hand, men in common life are apt to judge too lightly and indulgently respecting such sins. In order to guard against this latter fault, which is often very injurious, it is well to reverse the case, and see how we should judge respecting participation in good, virtuous, and noble actions, and how careful we should be to make out our title to reward in consequence of this participation. In this way many incautious decisions respecting these sins would be prevented.

§ 84. *Of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, or the sin against the Holy Ghost.*

The latter phrase (the sin against the Holy Ghost), which is introduced into theology, is both unscriptural and very inconvenient, on account of its indefiniteness and vagueness. For there are many sins against the Holy Ghost which are not yet *blasphemy* against him; vid. Acts 7: 51. 1 Thess. 4: 8. The blasphemy of the Holy Ghost (*βλασφημία*, or *λόγος εἰς πνεῦμα ἅγιον*) is the sin which is intended in this discussion; and this, too, is the scriptural mode of

expressing it. The proof-texts properly relating to this subject are, Matt. 12: 31, 32. Mark 3: 28—30. Luke 12: 10; with which many compare the texts Heb. 6: 4—6. 10: 29. 1 Pet. 4: 14. John 15: 22—24, etc., although their reference to this subject is disputed by others.

I. Historical observations.

Even among the ancients the explanations given of this subject were very diverse, and often very indefinite and unsettled. Athanasius wrote a whole dissertation on this subject; Ep. 4, ad Serapion. In this he states among other things, the opinion of Origen, that "all the sins committed after baptism were sins against the Holy Ghost." But in the writings of Origen now extant, he places the sin against the Holy Ghost in the denial of the divinity of Jesus Christ, by means of which he performed miracles (works of the Holy Spirit). So Theognostus of Alexandria, Hilarius and Ambrosius, although the latter in one place explains himself differently. In the *Pastor of Hermas* this sin is explained to be blasphemy in general.

Since the fourth century, two explanations have, however, found the most approbation; and although they are both very differently modified, yet the most diverse representations can be arranged under the one or the other of these general classes. (1) The explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. 42, in Matt.), to which Hieronymus also assents (Comm. in Matt. 12). According to them, one commits the sin against the Holy Ghost, who asserts that the miracles performed by Christ through the aid of the Holy Ghost, were done by the agency of an evil Spirit. (2) The other is the opinion of Augustine. He is not indeed always consistent with himself in his views respecting the kind of sin which should be regarded as the sin against the Holy Ghost. But he makes the principal character of this sin to be, the obstinate impenitence of the sinner till the close of his life; and from this circumstance he explains it, that this sin is *not forgiven*.

To one or the other of these explanations, most of the theologians of the Western Church have attached themselves, at least in general. The Reformers of the sixteenth century came out of the school of Augustine, and generally adopted his views on this subject. Hence the following description of this sin was the most common among the Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and a part of the eighteenth centuries: viz. it is committed when any

one recognizes the Christian doctrine as divine, and inwardly approves it, but yet denies it against his own convictions, opposes and blasphemes it, and perseveres in this deliberate contempt of all the means of grace, through which the Holy Spirit acts upon his heart, even till the close of life.

Against this view, however, many difficulties have been urged. (a) It is said that in the texts of Scripture above cited, the ordinary operations of the Spirit of God are not intended, but the extraordinary. (b) That every sin, persevered in until death, is followed by condemnation; and that this cannot therefore be a distinguishing characteristic of the sin against the Holy Ghost. For these reasons, other theologians prefer the opinion of Chrysostom and Hieronymus; e. g. most of the Arminian theologians, and after them, Stackhouse, Tillotson, and other English divines. These again were followed by most of the German Lutheran theologians of the eighteenth century, after Pfaff, Schubert, Baumgarten, and others, had assented to this view. For the opinions of the theologians of the Romish Church on this point, vid. Mart. Gerbert, *De peccato in Sp. S., S. Blasii*, 1760; and Hirt, *De logomachiis circa Doctrinam de Spiritu Sancto obviis*, where the opinions of the Lutheran theologians are carefully collected. Vid. Næsselt's, "Bücherkenntniss" for an account of an almost innumerable multitude of other works on this subject; e. g. those of Feuerborn, Musæus, Schubert, Zellner, Hauber, Flatt (a prize-essay, 1770), Buchwitz, Semler (1768), etc.

II. Scriptural Representation.

The Pharisees and Scribes attributed the miracles which Jesus wrought to confirm and establish his divine mission, to the Devil; with the malicious purpose of rendering Jesus suspected in the view of the people, upon whom his miracles had produced a great impression, as being a magician, standing in alliance with the Devil. It was this wicked calumny which led Jesus to make the declaration respecting the unpardonableness of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, according to the express information of Mark, chap. 3: 30. The following remarks may serve to explain this declaration of Jesus.

(a) *Βλασφημία* is any slander or calumny which aims to disgrace or dishonor any one, whether it be God, or created beings,

—angels and men, 2 Pet. 2: 10, 11, Mark 7: 22. In this passage it is used in the widest sense, and so includes both. (It is inaccurately rendered by Luther, in Mark 3: 28, *blasphemy against God*.) Therefore Christ says, “all other sins, and even blasphemies (against God and men) may be forgiven to men (if they seek forgiveness in the appointed way); but for that sin alone, which is committed by blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is no forgiveness to be expected. It is the most heinous of all sins.

(b) The phrase *Son of man* is sometimes applied to the Messiah considered in his whole character (*θεάνθρωπος*); it is however borrowed from his inferior nature, and relates chiefly to his *humanity*. The contemporaries of Jesus were especially offended by the humiliation of the Son of man, which was so contradictory to their expectations respecting the Messiah; Matt. 11: 6. 1 Cor. 1: 23. Blasphemy directed against the Messiah was, indeed, in all cases a great offence; but in the ignorant and misguided multitude it was by no means so great a sin, as in those who led them astray; and hence in their case, there was hope of pardon. They were among those, who knew not what they did, Luke 23: 34.

(c) The case was very different with the Pharisees; they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, since they knew that the Holy Ghost acted through Christ, but yet denied it, and cast contempt upon his agency. The support and guidance of the Son of man is constantly ascribed by Christ and the Apostles to the Holy Spirit; vid. Matt. 3: 16. John 3: 34. Acts 10: 38.—It is not, however, the *personal* dignity of the Holy Ghost, as God, which is here spoken of; nor does Christ design to say, that a sin against one divine person is greater than against another,—for which no reason can be supposed; nor would he intimate, that the Holy Ghost was superior to himself and the Father; for, according to his instructions, they are equal in dignity; but he speaks only of the *operations* of the Holy Spirit, and of his *manifestation*, which was so plainly exhibited in Christ. For the *work of God* and the *work of the Devil* are here opposed to each other, and in Mark 3: 29, 30 πνεῦμα ἅγιον and πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον and instead of the phrase *to cast out Devils by the Spirit of God*, which is found Matt. 12: 28, we find the phrase *by the finger of God* used in Luke 11: 20.—The sin here described is therefore called *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost*, because it is committed against those divine operations, which are especially as-

cribed to the Holy Ghost, as his œconomic work. But it does not follow, that the personal dignity of the Holy Ghost is greater than that of the Father or the Son. The Pharisees, therefore, committed the sin against the Holy Ghost, not only by obstinately denying, against their own convictions, the miracles which Jesus performed in proof of his divine mission, and which they knew in their hearts to be performed through divine agency, but by giving them out as imposture and the effect of an evil Spirit, with whom Jesus stood in alliance, in order thus to render his doctrine suspicious. This, considering the circumstances in which the Pharisees were, showed a high degree of wickedness, and was actual blasphemy against God, —a designed and deliberate blasphemy too, which they were by no means disposed to repent of, or to retract. Here two questions arise ; viz.

(1) *Can the sin against the Holy Ghost be still committed at the present time ?* Those who adopt the opinion of Augustine commonly affirm, that it can. But among those theologians who have explained these texts after the manner of Chrysostom and Hieronymus, the opinions on this subject vary. (a) Some of them maintain the affirmative. They think that whoever denies the miracles of Christ, casts contempt upon them, or gives them out as deception, imposture, or magic, still commits this sin, although (as they sometimes cautiously add) no one can undertake to decide, whether it has been committed by another. (b) But the other side was taken long ago by some Arminian theologians (e.g. by Limborch). They maintained, that only *eye-witnesses* of Christ's miracles, as the Pharisees were, could be guilty of this sin, because no others had equal advantages for attaining to a full and undoubting conviction of their certainty. Those in our times who pursue the general course of the Pharisees, deny and ridicule events respecting the historic truth and credibility of which they are in doubt, or which they suppose never to have taken place. Hence it is concluded, that this sin can no more be committed, because miracles are no longer performed. So Pfaff reasoned, and after him many Protestant theologians. (c) There is still, however, one case, in which the same sin which was committed by the Pharisees may be still committed ; viz. where one is fully convinced of the historic truth of the miracles of Jesus, and that they were done through the divine power, and yet, in total opposition to his own convictions, and with the same malicious

purpose which the Pharisees had, pronounces them to be imposture and deception, the effect of magic or other wicked arts. This would in reality be the same case with that of the Pharisees. For the circumstance of *having seen the miracles one's self* is of no special consequence, and it is enough if one be convinced of their truth. When the conviction of the truth of the miracles is equally strong in one who has not seen them, and in one who has, the same degree of guilt would seem to be necessarily involved in denying them. Such a case indeed will seldom occur, but the possibility of it must be admitted.

(2) *Why does Christ affirm, that this sin cannot be forgiven? and what does he mean by this declaration?* The theologians who adopt Augustine's hypothesis, understand here a real *impossibility*, in the proper and philosophical sense, and derive it from the nature of the sin itself, as being continued to the end of life; respecting which vid. supra. Those who follow the other hypothesis, have different opinions on this subject. Some understand a real impossibility, but do not enter upon the question, *why* it is impossible. Others take the ground, that this language means only, that this sin is forgiven with great difficulty. So most of the theologians of the Romish Church who adopt this hypothesis; also many of the Arminian theologians and Commentators; likewise Heumann, Pfaff, and other Protestants. These again are divided in their opinions, since some suppose that Christ spoke conditionally, meaning that this sin could not be forgiven, *if it were not repented of*; and others, that Christ here uses the language of feeling, which is accordingly to be understood hyperbolically, and not literally. Vid. Koppe, Quo sensu peccato in Spiritum Sanctum venia a Christo negata fuerit, Gott., 1781.

On this question we will give our own judgment. The words of Jesus are, οὐκ ἀφθίσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,—οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι (i. e. according to the *usus loquendi* of the Jews, neither *here* nor *hereafter*); ἐνοχός ἐστιν αἰωνίου κρίσεως, or according to another reading ἀμαρτίας (he incurs the guilt of a sin never to be pardoned, and for which he must endure the pains of hell). The meaning cannot be, that God *cannot* forgive such a sin. For one who has sinned in a manner ever so aggravated, may yet repent and reform, and then he surely receives forgiveness; and this is truly said respecting blasphemy against God of any other

kind. It is obvious, that Christ here speaks with feeling and righteous indignation; this is proved by all his words; and on this account it is unwarrantable in us to give these terms an *universal* sense, and to apply them to every similar case. This Koppe has well shown in the Essay before mentioned. But although Christ spoke with feeling, it does not follow that he went too far, or affirmed any thing which is not in strict accordance with truth. For the feeling which Christ exhibits is never accompanied either by error or sin. The case properly stands thus: (a) all experience shows, that a man who has arrived at such a point of wickedness seldom comes to a knowledge of the truth or to repentance; hence Paul says with regard to such sinners, ἀδύνατον γὰρ κ. τ. λ. Heb. 6: 4—6. Vid. other texts cited at the beginning of this section. (b) But Christ, as one who knows the heart, was most firmly convinced, that those whom he addressed would never repent of that deliberate blasphemy, but would persevere in it to the end. The reason why he spoke so decidedly was, *that he knew what was in man*, and did not need that any one should teach him; John 2: 25. 16: 30. In this way, the theories of Augustine and of Chrysostom somewhat agree on this point; and we have also a plain reason, why Christ speaks so decidedly in this case, while yet we cannot do so in similar cases.

§ 85. *Of the state into which men are brought by the commission of sin, and the different kinds and names of it.*

I. The state of sinners in respect to their conduct and disposition.

Those in whose hearts evil desires no more prevail, but rather virtuous feelings and a disposition inclined to moral good, are called *upright, virtuous (probos, honestos)*; but those who are thus, out of regard to God, i. e. from obedience to the known will and command of God, and from thankful love to him, are called *pious (pios), religious*; although this distinction is not always observed in common discourse. The latter is the state which we are required to possess by the precepts of Christianity. A short summary of Christian doctrine on this point is contained in the first epistle of

John. The Bible recognizes no other virtue or holiness, than that which springs from religious motives; *religious* virtue, we are there taught, is the only virtue which has true worth in the sight of God; and this we are taught even in the Old Testament. Those who possess this religious virtue are there called חֲסִידִים, עֲבָדִים, צַדִּיקִים, רְשָׁעִים, δίκαιοι, ἅγιοι, πράξεις, εὐσεβείας, δοῦλοι θεοῦ, &c. &c. &c.; one of the opposite character is called ἀσεβής, ἄδικος, &c. &c. &c. But one who acts according to his corrupt desires, and does so habitually, is called in Scripture the *servant* or *slave* of sin; it is said of him, that *he lives to sin, he serves it, he obeys it, he is sold under sin, and it rules over him*; vid. Ps. 19: 14. Rom. 6: 1, 2, 6, 12, 16, 20. 7: 14, 24. 14: 24. John 8: 34, sq. 2 Pet. 2: 19.—He only who is placed in a state in which he can govern his desires, and subject his appetites to reason enlightened by divine instruction, is a *free man* (John 8: 34); whoever cannot do this, is a slave of sin.

The state of all who are devoted to sin is not however alike. Every vicious man is, in his own way, a servant of sin; but all are not so in the same way. Three principal classes may be in general here distinguished. (a) Some adopt the appearance of virtue and piety; they give a saintly appearance even to their crimes, in order to obtain the advantages connected with goodness. These are *hypocrites*, and their fault is called ὑπόκρισις, שָׁרָב, מְרִמָּה, מְרִמָּה; opposite to which are אֱמֶת, אֱמֶת, ἀλήθεια, *truth, sincerity*. This is one of the most shameful, aggravated, and dangerous crimes,—the hatefulness and destructiveness of which, are more fully considered in the department of Morals. Cf. Matt. vi. and xxiii. Luke 11: 37—54. 2 Tim. 3: 5. (b) Others have no hesitation in acting out before the world the ungodly desires and purposes of their hearts. Such are called, *ungodly, improbi*, ἄδικοι, ἀσεβείς, רְשָׁעִים, because they do not fear or regard God or his law; opposite to these are those *who fear God*, i. e. act with reverential regard to his commands. (c) Those sinful and godless men, who by long custom in sinning have established a fixed habit of it, are called *vicious, wicked, sceleratos*. Cf. § 82, II. ad finem.

II. The state of sinners in respect to the consequences which sin involves.

The different kinds of sinners noticed above are all unhappy, and in the judgment of God, deserving of punishment. The feeling of their danger and misery is not, however, alike with them all;

and some live even in entire insensibility. In this observation we have the ground of the divisions of the various *states*, which have been commonly made by theologians, and which are founded in experience; though the passage from one to the other of these states is very easy.

(1) Some men very plainly see the unlawfulness of their actions, and the evil consequences springing from them; they often form the purpose of renouncing sin, and living better; but the power of the evil inclinations which have obtained the mastery over them is so strong, that they allow themselves to be continually hurried away into sin. Such are in constant restlessness, fear, and anguish, on account of their sins; and their state is denominated by theologians, in conformity with scriptural phraseology, *conditionem sive statum servilem* or *servitutis*, *a state of slavery*; and this is taken from John 8: 34. Rom. 6: 20, and chap. vii. Men in this state are like slaves, who at least sometimes, if not always, wish to be free, and make attempts for their own deliverance, and yet always remain slaves.

(2) Others lead a sinful life, without having an earnest desire to free themselves from the dominion of sin. They pay no regard to their unlawful actions, and have no scruples about them, either from ignorance or levity, or because they hope to remain unpunished, and from many other reasons, often those which are in the highest degree foolish. This is called the *state of security*, i. e. freedom from care, like the Latin *securus*;—*status securitatis* or *libertatis carnalis*, because those who are in it feel free to follow their sinful appetites (σάοξ). This state is far more dangerous than the preceding one; and with such sinners reformation is far more difficult. Cf. Matt. 24: 38. Eph. 4: 17—19. Jude v. 4, sq. The state of such is therefore compared with that of the *sleeping* or of the *dead*, Eph. 5: 14. They live for sin; but are dead to goodness; while it ought to be the reverse.

Note. Theologians distinguish between this state, and that of *spiritual liberty* or *security*. They give the latter name to the state of the pious, the whole disposition of whose heart is so renovated, as to be conformed to the precepts of Christianity, who by divine assistance control their evil desires, and are sure of the pardon of their sins; vid. John 8: 36. Rom. 5: 1. 6: 18. For true spiritual freedom consists in being free from the power and dominion of sin, and also from its punishment; and we owe both to Christ. These are the *blessed godly ones* (*Gottseligen*, in the proper sense of the term), i. e. those who are blessed in the conviction which they feel of the forgiveness of God,

who internally and from the heart enjoy a happiness, in which they cannot be disturbed even by outward calamities. *Happy* and *unhappy* (*selig* and *unselig*), are terms which apply properly to the internal state,—the well or ill-being of the soul; *fortunate* and *unfortunate* (*glücklich* and *unglücklich*) more to the external state.

(3) Others still come into a state of *hardness* or *obduracy*. This state exists, when any one remains insensible and indifferent under the most powerful motives to repentance, so that they cease to make any impression on him. It springs (*a*) from the frequent repetition of sin, and from the settled habit of sinning. This produces a gradual diminution of the power of the motives to abandon sin, and at length an entire cessation of their efficacy. (*b*) But those are in peculiar danger of coming into this state, who have had placed before them the most urgent and moving inducements to religion and virtue, but have yet neglected and despised them all. It is in the very nature of the human soul, that these motives, at each repetition of sin, lose something of their energy, and that at length an entire indifference must ensue, rendering the conversion of one who has brought himself into such a state, *morally impossible*. This state is called by theologians, *statum indurationis perfectum*. It is described by Paul, Heb. 6: 4—6, and Is. 6: 10, ‘who have eyes, but see not; ears, but hear not,’ i. e. who are deaf and insensible to all the motives to holiness which are held before them and which they clearly understand, and who therefore cannot be *healed*, i. e. renovated and made happy. Cf. John 12: 40. Acts 28: 26, 27. 2 Cor. 4: 4. 3: 14; also Ex. 7: 13.

The words and phrases used in the Bible to denote this state are, (1) כָּבֵד, βαρύνεσθαι, βαρὺς. These words are *literally* employed to signify *what is heavy* and *inactive*; they are then used with reference to the members of the body and the organs of sense, as *heavy tongues*, *hands*, *ears*, denoting their inactivity, and the difficulty of their use; Zech. 7: 11. Gen. 48: 10. Matt. 26: 43; lastly, they are applied to the *soul*, indicating stupidity of the understanding, and slowness of belief; 1 Sam. 6: 6. 2 Chron. 25: 19; sometimes also the qualities of the will, and sometimes those of the understanding and will both,—an inertness of soul, and an incapacity to the right use of its essential powers. (2) חֲזָק, literally *hard*; Hiphil, חֲזָקָה, σκληρύνειν, σκληρύνεσθαι; hence the term σκληροκαρδία, from which *obduratio* is taken. The state of mind now

under consideration is often indicated by this *σκληρύνεσθαι*, as Heb. 3: 8, 15, sq. Rom. 2: 5; and by *חִמְּךָ* in the Old Testament; Ex. 7: 3. Ezek. 3: 7. (3) The words which originally signify *fat*, denote also this state of insensibility and unfeelingness; e. g. *חִמְּךָ*, *pingue fieri*, *παχύνεσθαι*, Is. 6: 10, and Matt. 13: 15; as likewise the Latin *pinguis* is synonymous with *hebes*, *stupidus*, *tardus*; e. g. *ingenium pingue* is the same as dull and obtuse. The fat of the body of animals is without sensation: and this observation was much more familiar to nations offering sacrifices, and so having much to do with the slaughter of animals, than to us; and hence this phraseology was so current among them. (4) The words which indicate *deep sleep*, in which all external sensation ceases; *κατάνυξις*, Rom. 11: 8, answering in the LXX to the Hebrew *חִמְּךָ*. (5) One of the most common words used in the New Testament on this subject is *πώρωσις*, and *πωρόω*, *πωροῦσθαι*, e. g. Rom. 11: 7, 25. 2 Cor. 3: 15. Mark 6: 52, *καρδία πεπωρωμένη*. This word is properly taken from *πῶρος*, which means having a *hard, indurated skin* (as in the hands of workmen); *callous*, without feeling; and so *πώρωσις* figuratively denotes, according to Hesychius, the same as *ἡ ἀναισθησία*, and is synonymous with *σκληροκαρδία*. All these words which signify *hardheartedness*, are sometimes used in reference to the understanding (called *בִּינָה*), sometimes in reference to the will, and often with reference to both. A *soft heart* is accordingly *susceptibility* for reasons and conviction, *the open ear of the soul*. A *hard heart* is the opposite, and indicates a want of knowledge and capacity,—the remiss use of them, inactivity.

With regard to this *status indurationis* there has been a great difficulty, which may be stated as follows. From what has been already said, it appears, that when a man comes into this state, he alone is to blame, and has all the guilt of it resting upon himself. This is taught in the Scriptures in many of the passages already cited. Still there are other texts of Scripture in which God seems to be made the author of this obduracy of men, and of sin in general, and its consequences; e. g. Ex. 4: 21, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart;" 14: 17, sq. Is. 63: 17. Deut. 2: 30. Josh. 11: 20. Ez. 20: 25; and in the New Testament, John 12: 40, *τετύφλωκεν ὁφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ πεπώρωκε καρδίαν*. Rom. 9: 18, also 1: 24. These and similar texts were explained by the severe *particularists* of the Reformed Church, also by the Jansenists and many of the

stricter Thomists of the Romish Church, to mean, that God is the efficient cause of these effects; that from such men he withdraws or withholds, for some reason to us inscrutable, a certain supernatural or irresistible grace, without which they cannot become holy or happy; and that he does this by his unconditional decree. This interpretation resulted from ignorance of the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers. Let the student consider the following particulars; viz.

(a) Even in modern languages we often use expressions, by which we ascribe to an individual the remote consequences of his actions, even when he did not design to produce these consequences, and perhaps employed all the means in his power to guard against them. E. g. after I have often exhorted some one to repent, and all without effect, except that, in direct opposition to my intentions, he becomes, through my repeated warnings, only the more unfeeling, I then say, *I have preached him deaf, I have made him harder and more wicked by my efforts.* Thus Is. 6: 10, "Make hard this people (by preaching), and let their ears be deaf;" vid. Michaelis' note on Ex. 4: 21. We speak in the same way, when our good purposes have miscarried. But,

(b) In the ancient, and especially the Oriental languages, this mode of speech is far more current, than in modern languages. It is altogether appropriate to the whole manner of thinking and speaking in the ancient world; but it has by degrees become foreign to the scientific dialect of the modern world, although it has not wholly fallen into disuse in common life. Hence it often has a strange appearance to the learned; while to the unlearned it sounds more natural. The simplicity of that early age of the world often ascribes every thing which takes place under the inspection and special guidance of Providence, whether it be good or evil, directly to God himself, and regards him as the author and efficient cause of every event and of its consequences, because nothing takes place without his permission and foreknowledge; vid. § 58, II. 1., and especially § 70, Note, ad finem. Thus, God performs miracles in order to induce Pharaoh to let Israel go; Pharaoh does not comply; and the oftener the miracles are repeated, the more hard-hearted does he become. Now it is said, that God hardened Pharaoh, rendered him unfeeling, and even by those very means which should have rendered him feeling; *and at the same time, the calamity which*

now befalls him, is regarded as a punishment which God inflicts upon him. This last opinion plainly shows, that it was not the belief that God acted irresistibly upon Pharaoh; for in that case, how could he be punished? This language is then to be understood in a manner perfectly consistent with the personal guilt of Pharaoh. Cf. Rom. 1: 26. 9: 17. 2 Thess. 2: 11.—In the same way, the *good actions* of men are ascribed to God; and from the misunderstanding of the texts in which this is done, originated the doctrine respecting *supernatural* and *irresistible grace*; as from the misunderstanding of the other, the doctrine of *judicial hardness*. The mode of thinking and speaking now referred to, is found also among the Greeks, and indeed in all ancient writings; it occurs in Homer as well as in the Bible, and also in the Arabic writers. In Homer it is said, that the deity infuses *good* and *evil* into the heart (*ἐμβάλλει καρδίῃ*); that he inspires *wisdom* and *folly* (Odys. XXIII. 11, sq.); that he infatuates and deceives men, deprives them of their reason, so that they may act foolishly, deludes their senses (*Ζεὺς φρένας εἵλετο*, Il. IX. 377. XIX. 137); tempts them to evil (Odys. XXIII. 222); and is the cause of the wickedness of men. *For he does every thing*. Il. XIX. 87, 90, sq. Odys. XVI. 280, 297, 298. Il. IX. 632, sq.

. . . " Ἀλληκτόν τε κακόν τε
Θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι θεοὶ θέσαν. . . .

—Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it? Amos 3: 6.

Note. The text, Rom. 9: 18, *ὃν θέλει ἔλεει, ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει* means, according to many, *he treats hardly*, like Job 39: 16 (*ἀποσκληρύνει τέκνα*); and the principal reason for this is, the contrast of *ἐλεειν*. This interpretation, however, does not agree with v. 19; and the whole passage alludes too plainly to the passage in Exodus respecting Pharaoh, to admit of this interpretation. This language is therefore to be understood here also in the common sense, and the verse may be thus explained; viz. 'The good and the evil which befall men depend alike upon the divine will. Some (who are pleasing to him, as his children) he causes to prosper; others he *hardens*, i. e. he suffers them to feel the consequences of their obstinacy, insensibility, and indifference to his oft repeated commands; as in the case of Pharaoh, v. 17.' The same thing which is called *σκληρύνειν* here, is called *ἐνδείξασθαι ὀργήν*, v. 22. Vid. Rahn, ad loc. Rom. IX. 17—23, Halæ, 1789.

§ 86. *What punishment is, and what is the object of it; how the divine punishments are named in the Bible, and what we are there taught respecting their nature; also the various divisions of the divine punishments.*

In our treatment of this whole subject, we must proceed on the ground of what has been already said on the divine laws and punishments, in the discussion of the subject of divine *justice*, Vol. I. §§ 30, 31. Supposing the student already acquainted with these, we proceed to make some additional observations, and a more immediate application of what has been already said.

I. What is punishment, and what is its object?

“*Punishment* is an evil (suffering, something awakening unpleasant sensations) which the superior inflicts upon those placed under him, on account of some trespass (the theologian calls it *sin*); and this, for the sake of maintaining the authority of his laws for the good of his subjects, or to promote their improvement and welfare.” This is the general notion of punishment, which is also to be applied to the divine judgments, though with a careful separation of every human imperfection. The following points need to be carefully considered.

(1) The one who punishes another must in all cases be the *supreme magistrate*, whether it be God or man. For no one has the right to punish, who has not the right to give laws, and this is the peculiar province of the supreme magistrate; vid. § 73, I. All punishments therefore depend upon the law, and one can inflict punishment only upon those over whom he possesses the power of legislation. Consequently the right of punishment belongs to *God*.

(2) In order to be punished, one must be subject to a law, and have broken it, and in such a way too, that his transgression can be imputed to him. And this may be, when he has either committed unlawful actions himself, or contributed to those of others. But it is only when the trespass can thus be imputed to a person, that punishment can be inflicted upon him.

(3) The objects of punishment are *all unlawful actions*. In human judicatories the *external* actions only are the objects of punishment; because the knowledge of men extends no farther than

these; but at the bar of God, not only these, but also *internal* actions, evil thoughts, designs and desires are liable to punishment; vid. § 82, ad finem.

(4) The *guilt* of a person has, therefore, its ground in his relation to the law transgressed by him, and to its author. On account of this relation, he deserves the punishment which is threatened against transgressors, i. e. he must take upon himself the evil connected with the transgression of the law. The guilty person (*qui culpam sustinet*) is called in the Scriptures *ὁφειλέτης, ὁ ἔχων ἁμαρτίαν, ἔνοχος νόμου, ὑπόδικος θεῷ, τέκνον ὀργῆς*, one who must give account, etc. vid. Morus, p. 110, § 4, n. 1. All men are described in the Bible as being such; and the sacred writers insist upon it with great earnestness, that men should look upon themselves as subject to the penalty of the law, as the only way for them to become disposed to accept of the means of improvement offered to them, and to comply with the prescribed conditions; vid. § 80.

(5) *The last end of punishments.* This in general may be best stated as follows: they aim at the welfare and reformation of the subject; or, it is their object to support the authority of the law for the welfare and improvement of those placed under it. This subject is treated more at large in Vol. I. § 31, II. 2; where the opinion of Michaelis, that the only object of punishment is *to deter men from sin*, is farther considered. The imperfections which cleave to human punishments, must necessarily be separated from divine; nor should human punishments ever be made the standard by which divine punishments are to be judged of.

NOTE. Some modern philosophers have asserted, that God cannot punish, and that *divine punishments* ought never to be spoken of; because what are so called are to be regarded as benefits, and have benevolent ends and results. But merely because punishments tend to promote the good of men, and are designed to secure the most benevolent results, they do not cease to be evils, and become the same with what are ordinarily denominated benefits. The pain which is felt in sickness is beneficial; it makes one mindful in time of danger, leads to caution, and so is often the means of preserving life; still it is an evil which we endeavour to avoid, and the approach of which we fear. Thus it is with punishments. And it is in the highest degree injurious to undertake to obliterate from the minds of the great multitude of unconverted men, the fear of divine punishment. Too great caution cannot be used against that miscalled philosophy which does this; for wherever it has found entrance, either in ancient or modern times, it has always destroyed religion, morality, and civil order; vid. § 156.

II. Scriptural names of divine punishments, and the nature of these punishments.

(1) Many of these names bear the impress of the simplicity of the popular phraseology of the earliest times. They are sometimes derived from injured and irritated rulers, who give free scope to their anger, and take revenge for the injury done them; sometimes from judges who hold judgment over the guilty, pronounce sentence upon them, and execute it. It would be a great mistake, however, for any one to charge the scriptural writers with entertaining gross anthropomorphic ideas on this subject, merely because they sometimes use expressions of this nature. They only retained the common terms in use among men, while they always understood them in a refined and elevated sense. It is not with them, as in Homer, where even the gods fear, that Jupiter, when he is enraged, will punish the innocent and guilty alike, *Il. XV. 137*. Nothing like this is taught in the Scriptures. That the sacred writers connected ideas worthy of God with those popular expressions which they made use of, is evident from the New Testament, in which, notwithstanding the most just conceptions of the divine nature are unquestionably contained, still the terms in common use with regard to the divine being, such as *the revenge, the oath, the curse of God*, often appear. The same is true in the Old Testament, in the books of Moses and in the Psalms.

Expressions like these, it may also be said, make a far stronger impression upon the uncultivated mass of mankind, depending as they do upon their senses, than terms more abstract; they take firmer hold upon them, and sink deeper and more easily into their hearts, than terms which represent the thing less plainly to the senses. For this reason, terms of this nature are employed by the sacred writers, especially when they have to do with men of the character now described; they alternate, however, such expressions with others; and in this we ought to imitate them.

The following are among the names which they employ; viz. אָפָה, חֲרוֹן, חֶמֶד, סֹגְרָה, θυμός, *Ps. 7: 12. Rom. 5: 9, coll. § 31, ad init.*; שָׂנְאָה, *Deut. 1: 27*; נָקָם, ἐκδίκησις, *Is. 63. 4. Luke 21: 22*. The opposites of these, are the *love, the favor, the friendship* of God, חֶסֶד, חֵן, ἀγάπη, ἔλεος, χάρις, &c. &c.—With reference to announcing or threatening the divine punishments, the sacred writers frequently employ words which literally mean, *to rebuke, increpare*, which the irritated man commonly does; especially, גָּעַר, גְּעָרָה,

ἐπιτιμᾶω, ἐπιτιμία, Jude 9, sq. Again; the words which signify *cursing, imprecation*, are used to denote the same thing; as קָלַלָהּ, κατάρσα, מָאַרָהּ, etc., Deut. 9: 26, sq. Gal. 3: 20. Opposite to this is בָּרַךְהָ, εὐλογία, εὐλογεῖν, Deut. 28: 15. Gal. 3: 13.—As *vocabula media* (used with reference either to benefits or punishments) all the *nomina judicii* and *verba judicandi* are often employed; more frequently, however, with reference to divine punishments, as מִשְׁפָּט, דִּין, רֹשׁ, κρίσις, κρίμα, κατάκριμα, Gal. 5: 10. Rom. 2: 3. The words, too, which designate a judicial declaration, are often employed to denote threatenings and punishments; so even דָּבָר, λόγος, ῥῆμα θεοῦ.—Among the *vocabula media* belong also all the *verba intuendi* and *aspiciendi*, such as רָאָה, ἐπείδειν, and especially פָּקַד, to which the word ἐπισκέπτεσθαι answers in the New Testament, and in the Vulgate, *visitare*; in the good sense, *to behold any one with a cheerful face* is, to shew him kindness or favor, e. g. Ps. 8: 5. Luke 1: 68, 78; in the bad sense, *to behold any one with an angry face*, is to punish him; hence פָּקַדְתָּהּ and ἐπισκοπή signify often *punishment*; e. g. Is. 10: 3. 1 Pet. 2: 12. In the Old and New Testament the terms מוֹסֵר, נָסַר, παιδεύειν, *castigare* and παιδεία, are used to denote the *fatherly discipline* and *chastisement of God*, which is the proper idea to be entertained of the *divine punishments*, and the ends for which they are inflicted; cf. §31, 2.—Finally, all the Hebrew words, which properly signify *sin* and *guilt* are often used to denote *punishment*; e. g. צָוֹן, הַטָּאָה, רֹשׁ, vid. § 73, II. 2, ad finem; exactly as in Homer, Ἄτη signifies *crime*, and also its *guilt* and *punishment*, Il. XIX. 91; cf. 136, 137.

Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄτην ἣν πάντας ἄτται.

—*Ate, the daughter of Jupiter, who brings every one into guilt.* Cf. Il. IX. 50, sq. and Vol. I. §§ 30, 31.

Note. Some modern philosophers and theologians object to the phrase, *the anger of God*; and many young religious teachers carefully avoid it, and pronounce their older brethren who still employ it, very unenlightened. But they do this without any good reason. Anger, in general, is the expression of strong disapprobation. In this men indeed are liable to err; they may express their disapprobation with regard to things, which do not deserve it; or more strongly, than is proper; and often quite unjustifiably; their anger therefore may be, and often is, wrong and sinful. But it is by no means necessary, that anger should be so; there may be a *righteous anger*, as is often said in common life, when one expresses his deep and lively displeasure in such a way as to be perfectly conformable to the subject, the end, and the circumstances. Nor can a good moral being exist, or even be conceived to exist, without

such anger. God, as the most perfect and holy moral being, has certainly the greatest displeasure against sin; and as he is the supreme moral Governor of the world, he expresses it in a very impressive manner. He, therefore, is said to *burn* with anger; but his anger is always *just*.

(2) The divine judgments are inflicted, according to the Bible, (a) *in the present life*; (b) *by death* (although this was strictly a punishment for sin only in the case of the first man, and with regard to all others is only a consequence of the sin of Adam; vid. § 76, III. and § 80, ad finem); (c) *after death*. All these punishments, according to the Bible, stand connected with the sin of our first parents. For from that arose the moral corruption which is communicated to all mankind. This is the source of actual sins, and these bring punishment in their train; vid. § 76, sq. From this evil, the second Head of our race has freed us.

That the representations given in the Bible respecting the divine *punishments* and their end, agree perfectly with what sound reason recognizes on this subject, is very evident from the description it contains of the nature of these punishments. They are (α) always *just* and *proper*; vid. the texts quoted Vol. I. § 31; moreover Rom. 2: 2, *κρίμα θεοῦ ἔστι κατ' ἀλήθειαν*; vid. also those texts which speak of the *ἀποσωποληψία θεοῦ*. (β) They have *the welfare of men for their object*. This is the last end for which they are inflicted; vid. the texts cited; and if this object is not attained with any particular offender, he himself is alone in fault; and his punishment then serves for the good of others, who learn wisdom from his example. (γ) They are *certain*, and will be *inevitably* inflicted; they are not mere empty threats; no one will be able to escape; vid. Rom. 2: 3, coll. Heb. 12: 25, and especially Heb. 4: 12, 13. This follows from the divine *veracity*; these punishments must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the divine Being, and to prevent an universal carelessness and indifference about sin. (δ) The divine punishments are also described as *terrible*; as in these expressions, *our God is a consuming fire, it is a terrible thing to fall into his hands*, etc.; Heb. 10: 30, 31. 12: 29. For in order that these punishments may attain their end, they must be sufficiently severe to terrify the transgressor, and must meet him in the point where he can be most strongly affected.

III. Divisions of Punishments.

(1) A very ancient division of punishments is into *pœnam damni* and *sensus*, in reference to the evil itself which is inflicted on any one by punishment. (a) By punishment, a certain good is *withdrawn*. The judgments of men respecting their true welfare and their real interests are very diverse; and consequently the withdrawal of their supposed advantages is variously estimated and felt. To one person, riches appear a great advantage; to another, not; and so while the former will regard the loss of them as the greatest evil, the latter will not suffer in the least from their loss. It is not here, then, of so much consequence, whether the advantages are real or only apparent, as in what estimation they are held by him from whom they are withdrawn. This withdrawment now is called *pœna damni*, or sometimes *pœna negativa*. (b) When in addition to this, positively unpleasant feelings are caused and pains inflicted, this is called *pœna sensus*. These two parts of punishment are commonly connected. These unpleasant sensations have their proper seat either in the body, and are communicated through the senses to the soul; or they are confined to the soul, and have their origin there. The latter are felt the most keenly, and are the most dreadful.

(2) In respect to the connexion of punishment with crime, punishments are divided into *natural*, and *positive* or *arbitrary*. The former are such as result from the internal nature of morally bad actions themselves; the latter are such as stand in no natural and necessary connexion with wicked actions, but which are connected with them merely by the good pleasure (*arbitrium*) of the Lawgiver. These two kinds of punishment have been already explained, Vol. I. § 31, as well as the doctrine respecting the natural and positive laws of God, Vol. I. § 30.

In this place we shall add a few remarks respecting the *natural* punishments inflicted by God upon men, especially *in this life*; in the following section, we shall farther discuss the subject of *positive* punishments.

There has been some dispute among philosophers, (into which we do not mean to enter fully now,) whether the natural evil consequences of sin ought to be called punishments; and the propriety of this is by some denied.—Judging from the common conceptions on this subject, and the common phraseology founded on these, there

can be no doubt, but that we may and ought to consider the evil consequences resulting from the transgression of the divine commandments, as punishment. So we say, for example, with respect to a liar, in whom at length no one places any confidence, or with respect to the voluptuary or drunkard, who brings infamy and disease upon himself, and in all such cases, that sin *punishes* itself.—Again, if the *leges naturales* are properly called laws, (and whatever is true of law in any case is true of them,) how can it be doubted whether the consequences resulting from the transgression of these laws are properly denominated *punishments*?

But these natural punishments may be distinguished into two kinds.

(a) Such as are the *necessary* and *inevitable* evil consequences of the actions themselves, and which would result equally from these actions, were they not forbidden, and were the actions, therefore, not *sins*. They are called *physical* punishments. Among these are all the sicknesses and pains which arise from intemperance of every kind; the poverty which comes from idleness; the grief, sorrow and shame, which are the results of a dissipated life; etc. It is in order to guard against the necessary evil consequences of sin, and so to diminish them, that the divine law is given; and in this way it is, that what were before mere *evils*, now become *sins*; vid. § 73, I.

(b) Punishments which result *from the relation of human actions to the law*, or which have respect to the moral character of men. These are called *moral* punishments. These moral consequences of sin fall principally and most heavily upon the soul. Hence they are also called *spiritual* punishments. Among these are e. g. the reproaches of conscience, telling us that we have violated the law of God, rendered ourselves unworthy of his favor, and disqualified for his blessings; also restlessness of soul, and fear of punishment, from the consciousness of guilt or ill-desert,—the fear of God, Rom. 3: 19, 23. 1 John 1: 8, sq. 3: 14, sq. These are the most fearful and terrible of all punishments.

This distinction between the different kinds of natural punishment is very important, especially in the doctrine of the *atonement of Christ*; vid. § 111, II. From thence it appears,

(a) That the natural and physical evil consequences of certain wicked actions cannot wholly cease, even after pardon has been

bestowed upon men, and they have repented, or after they have appropriated the merits of Christ. For we have no right to suppose, that God will remove, in a miraculous manner, the necessary physical consequences of sinful actions. From experience we see, that God does not do this in the present life. E. g. if any one has brought upon himself, by his excesses, prolonged sickness or poverty, he will not become at once well in body and estate merely by reforming his courses ; but he must continue to feel the necessary consequences of his errors and crimes ; just as the consequences of the sin of Adam—death and other temporal calamities, continue to be felt by all his posterity, even by those who are renewed and pardoned ; vid. Rom. 8: 10, 18—23. Nor does the Bible any where teach us, that in some miraculous way, God will, even *in the future life*, remove all the natural and lasting consequences of actions ; it is therefore highly probable, that some portion of these consequences will continue even hereafter. But these naturally evil consequences, (as well those which are temporal, as those which continue in the future life,) from which we are not entirely freed by the death of Christ, are yet mitigated, and lose the terror of punishment, to those who are pardoned and sanctified. This experience in the present life teaches us, and the Holy Scriptures assure us of the same ; vid. Rom. 8: 1, and 5: 1, 3—10. But the *pænæ naturales spirituales* cease entirely with the renewed. Hence,

(b) The principal evils from which man is freed in this and the future life, when he is pardoned and renewed, are the *moral* consequences of sin ; and it is because the believer is freed from these, that even the natural consequences of sin are mitigated to him, and lose the terror of punishment. The renewed man will never indeed forget the sins which he has once committed ; he will condemn them, and mourn over them ; but, as he is sure of pardon, his disquiet respecting them, his fear of God as a judge, and the reproaches of his conscience, will either at once or by slow degrees entirely cease ; peace of soul will be restored, together with a lively and joyful feeling of his present happy state, in comparison with his former unhappy condition. This is what the Scriptures mean by the *peace of God* in the heart of the man whose sins are forgiven ; vid. the texts before cited from Rom. v. and viii.

§ 87. *Some remarks on POSITIVE divine punishments.*

In addition to what we have already said on this subject, in stating the doctrine of divine justice, Vol. I. § 31; we add here the following remarks.

(1) The term *arbitrary* punishments (*pænæ arbitrariæ*) seems to be somewhat inconvenient, and to be liable to be misunderstood; it is for this reason objected to, by very many modern writers; e. g. Steinbart, Syst. S. 130. Eberhard, Apologie d. Sokr. Th. I., and the author of the "Apologie der Vernunft." And if the term *arbitrary* must be understood to denote a blind caprice, in which no regard is paid to rectitude and propriety and to the nature of the offence, it could never, without blasphemy, be predicated of the punishments inflicted by God. But no advocate of the *arbitrariness* of God in the punishments he inflicts, has ever understood it in this sense; for it cannot be supposed that even a man of common understanding and goodness would punish in such a manner. These evils, which are called positive punishments, are not, indeed, founded in the internal nature of the forbidden actions themselves; they are not the immediate natural consequences of these actions; but they are added to, and conjoined with, the natural consequences of sin, by the special appointment of the legislator; and it is for this reason that they are called *arbitrariæ*. They are *mala ex arbitrio*, i. e. *libero Dei (judicis ac domini) consilio sive instituto extrinsecus immis- sa*. But they are always determined by the rules of supreme wisdom and goodness, and have all the qualities of the other divine operations. They are moreover resorted to by God, in cases where his object cannot be attained by merely natural punishments. We should not, then, be over-scrupulous about the use of this term; for when we hear it said, that God, the All-wise and just, inflicts arbitrary punishments, the associated idea of blind caprice, acting without cause or reason, falls away at once and of itself. The same is true of this term, as of the expression *the anger of God*, vid. § 86. The *arbitrium* of God is always wise, and never a blind caprice, as it often is with men, especially with passionate rulers and magistrates. In case this term were rejected, we might substitute the phrase *free punishments*.

(2) That there are positive divine punishments, especially in the

future world, the Bible teaches with sufficient clearness. And indeed, from the scriptural doctrines, *that God forgives sins*, (i. e. removes their consequences), and that Christ, the innocent, *endured punishment for us*, it seems to follow, that the sacred writers believed in positive punishments and their remission. A philosophic argument in behalf of positive punishments is derived from the nature and efficacy of natural punishments, which are not sufficiently great to deter the sinner from crime, or lead him to repentance; so that positive punishments in addition to these are necessary, in order to produce this effect. It was a great object with Michaelis to establish this point. The arguments brought in opposition to it by Steinbart, Eberhard, and others, together with the arguments in its favor, were briefly stated Vol. I. § 31.

But since this subject is attended with various difficulties which can never be entirely removed by human philosophy, owing to the limitation of our minds; the question arises, *What course shall the religious teacher pursue on this subject, and what instruction shall he give respecting positive divine punishments?* In order to come to a right decision on this question, and to be able to answer it for ourselves, we must not proceed upon empty speculations or ideal conceptions; but from the following results of *experience*. The history of all ages teaches, that the prevailing notion among men always has been and still is, that God inflicts, not only natural, but also positive and arbitrary punishments; or, that moral evil has not only natural evil for its consequent, but also such punishments as depend entirely upon the choice of the Lawgiver. Hence sicknesses and other calamities, which stand in no natural connexion with crime, were yet often regarded as the punishments of it; e. g. the pestilence in the camp of the Greeks before Troy was so regarded in Homer; cf. Iliad XVI. 384, sq. Now in what way did this idea obtain so wide a prevalence among men, and so strong a hold upon them? If we make history and experience our teachers, we shall come to the following conclusions.

(a) Human legislators can threaten only positive punishments, because they are able to inflict no other. For they are neither the authors, nor the rulers of nature; but are themselves, as well as those over whom they rule, subject to that constitution which God has given to nature. Since, now, men are apt to reason from the human to the divine, they were disposed to transfer to God and his

government, those procedures and institutions common in human families and states. From hence it is obvious, how even heathen nations should have come so generally to this notion. They reasoned thus : as men have the right to enact arbitrary laws, and impose arbitrary punishments ; this right must belong in a far higher degree to the supreme legislative power, which knows of no limitation. It was by such arguments that they arrived at this idea ; though by such alone, the reflecting mind is not satisfied. But,

(b) The true cause of this universal belief lies much deeper. There is on this subject a certain feeling of need in human nature, which cannot be reasoned away, and which often exercises its power even over the speculative philosopher, although he has long suppressed it by his speculation. It is but too clearly proved by daily experience, that fear of the merely natural consequences of sin is too inefficacious to restrain men from committing it. For these natural punishments man has but little regard, and he thinks he can find means to avoid them, or to secure himself against them. The end, therefore, can be more surely answered by positive punishments. This result built upon experience, although men were only obscurely conscious of it, awakened in them a feeling, which made it necessary for them to believe, that there are positive divine judgments. Hence many even of the ancient heathen lawgivers took means to give to *natural* laws and penalties, the authority of positive ; and for this purpose they intimately associated the civil and religious institutions of their country.

(c) If there are positive *rewards* in the future world, as all concede ; it is hard to see how positive *punishments* can be denied ; vid. Vol. I. § 31.

(d) To any one who makes the Holy Scriptures the source of his knowledge, this subject cannot be doubtful. For the Scriptures clearly teach, that there are positive punishments, and presuppose them in many of the most important doctrines.

But if any one remains unconvinced by philosophical arguments and by the authority of the Bible, that God actually appoints positive punishments, he must be referred to the fact and observation above mentioned, that this belief cannot be taken away from a people without endangering its morality. Even if a religious teacher should himself entertain doubts on this subject, it would be foolish and wrong in him to communicate these doubts to the people, and

thus deprive them of a belief for which he can substitute nothing equally firm and salutary. The history of all ages teaches, that nothing has so injurious an effect upon the morality of people, as the persuasion, that there are no positive punishments which they have to fear from the hand of God. When such punishments have been expected, the fear of them has always proved a mighty barrier against all the gross outbreaks of sin. For a confirmation of these remarks, let the student consult history; cf. also § 156, II. Note.

But on the other hand, it is equally the duty of the religious teacher, to rectify, by scriptural views, the false opinions which people are apt to form respecting the nature of these positive punishments, and to prevent as far as possible, their injurious influence. In discharging this duty he may be aided by the following scriptural observations. From the prevailing false ideas respecting positive punishments, occasion is sometimes taken to condemn others, and to pronounce upon them uncharitable censures; as, on the other hand, from the bestowment of positive rewards, many are disposed to extol and to imitate those upon whom they are conferred, supposing them to be the favorites of heaven. This results from the mistake, that prosperity and adversity in this life are proofs of the pleasure or displeasure of God with the conduct of men; something as it is with those who stand in favor or disfavor with human rulers. But all such opinions have a most unfavorable influence upon morality, and upon the dispositions of men. The teacher must therefore take pains to show,

(α) That external prosperity and adversity *in this life*, are not distributed by God, as reward and punishment for the *moral* conduct of men; vid. § 71, II.; and that it is, therefore, judging hastily, to pronounce positively and decidedly, that the calamities which befall particular countries or individuals, from natural and not moral causes are judgments from God; although they may be so overruled by the Providence of God, and should be so improved, as to contribute to the promotion of moral good, and to the diminution of moral evil.

(β) That even although positive divine rewards and punishments should take place in the present life (which we are not entitled to deny *in thesi*); yet men are not in a situation, nor in any way qualified, to decide that they are so in particular cases; because

they have no sure and infallible marks by which they can distinguish these, from advantages and calamities which result from other causes, and have no connexion with the good or ill-desert of men. Hence Christ himself warns against such precipitate judgments ; vid. Vol. I. § 31, coll. Ps. 73: 2, seq.

(*γ*) The Old Testament is often appealed to, where much is indeed said respecting positive rewards and punishments even in the present life ; and by the unguarded application of such texts, much injury may be done, even by sincere and well-disposed religious teachers. On this point instruction should be given to the people with due discretion, in conformity with what was said on this point, Vol. I. § 31, ad finem, in the Note. It must be shown, that the same is not true now, as was true in that early period of the world, and under the peculiar constitution of the Jewish religion. This matter can be made very plain to any one, by remarking, that then there were *prophets*, who, as the divine ambassadors, expressly declared, that this and that physical evil was a positive punishment from God ; but that, as we have no prophets now, we are unable in particular cases to pronounce a definite decision, whether this and that evil is, or is not to be regarded as a positive punishment.

(3) Still another chief objection which is often urged against the existence of positive rewards and punishments in the future world, is this : God would have named the positive punishments which he meant to inflict, and would have settled the manner of their infliction in his laws. This is done, it is said, by every humane and just legislator among men ; and it is regarded by us as tyranny and despotism for a ruler to inflict punishment which he has not previously threatened. But this comparison of human rulers and magistrates with God, and of their punishments with his, will not hold. For, (*a*) with human judges and magistrates, this regulation is necessary, in order to prevent the Judge from acting unjustly or rashly, or from inflicting too light or too severe a punishment under the influence of momentary feeling. But we are secure from any such danger, when the punishments to be inflicted are left to the disposal of an omniscient, all-wise, and benevolent Ruler. There is not therefore the same reason for this, that there is in the case of men. (*b*) Human criminal codes, even those which are most complete, contain only a few species of crimes ; nor can they have any respect, in the appointment of the punishment, to the motives, the state of

mind, and innumerable other circumstances, which make the crime greater or less. But to all these circumstances, God, who is perfectly wise and just, must have respect. How impossible now must it be, to give a catalogue of all sins and their punishments, according to their endlessly diversified degrees and modifications? Who would read, understand, or regard such a catalogue? Would it not make many for the first time, and to their great injury, acquainted with sins, of which they otherwise would have known nothing? (c) As the future world lies entirely beyond the circle of our ideas, it might not be even possible fully to describe to us, in our present state, every kind of positive reward and punishment. (d) The fear of a positive punishment at present unknown, makes a stronger impression upon the sinner, and is more efficacious in deterring him from sin, than that of a punishment definitely described; for in the former case, the sinner will always fear the worst, and expect that the punishment will strike where he is most susceptible.

Note. The Holy Scriptures, and particularly Jesus and his apostles, make it a great object to unfold all the consequences of sin; and to show how we can be freed from them. Those who are teachers of the Gospel, should follow their example in this respect. They insist particularly upon the *misery of the soul* arising from sin, and upon the punishments of the *future world*. This entire misery, or the unhappy state of both soul and body, as produced by sin, is called in the Scriptures by various names, e. g. ὄλεθρος, ἀπώλεια, θάνατος, σκότος, &c. &c.; vid. Morus, p. 111, prope ad finem. Of the external evil consequences of sin, which befall men in the present life, the sacred writers, speak less frequently; partly because these are not by any means so great and terrible as the other, and partly because they are perfectly obvious, and fall under the notice of every one.

BOOK SECOND.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

PART SECOND.

**OF THE STATE INTO WHICH MAN IS BROUGHT BY THE
REDEMPTION.**

ARTICLE TENTH.

OF JESUS CHRIST.

This important article has been treated in a great variety of ways, from the earliest times. The teachers of religion and the interpreters of the Bible, have, for various reasons, been dissatisfied with the simple scriptural representation, and have often predetermined, by the principles of some school of philosophy, or by religious opinions current at their own time, what could be believed concerning the person, offices and merits of Jesus Christ. Any declarations of the Bible in opposition to their views, have been either overlooked, as if they could not be found, or, by the help of that artificial exegesis which makes any thing out of every thing, have been so explained as to agree with their preconceived opinions. In this manner has this Article especially been treated of late in the Protestant church, particularly in the Lutheran church in Germany. And so common has it become to pervert this doctrine in the universities, schools, and in popular discourses and writings, that the teacher who turns aside from the beaten path, must possess no small degree of unprejudiced piety. My design is, to exhibit, according to my honest conviction, *the pure, unfalsified doctrine of the Bible*, with its proof; and carefully to distinguish it from ecclesiastical distinctions, and from other additions and alterations.

The latter I shall consider by themselves, and endeavour to illustrate them from history, and to pronounce judgment upon them according to their true merits.

CHAPTER FIRST.

OF THE DIVINE INSTITUTIONS FOR THE RESTORATION OF MEN, IN A GENERAL VIEW; THE EXPECTATIONS, PREDICTIONS AND TYPES OF THE MESSIAH, AND THEIR FULFILMENT IN JESUS OF NAZARETH.

§ 88. *Of the institutions established by God for the moral recovery and the salvation of the human race, in a general view; and the scriptural doctrines and representations on this subject; as a general introduction to what follows.*

I. What is requisite for the moral recovery of man.

The Bible every where teaches, that man is debarred from the enjoyment of that happiness which God intended for him, by the want of holiness,—by sin, and deserved punishment; vid. Art. IX. Holiness gives the only right of citizenship in the moral kingdom of God (βασίλεια θεοῦ). Now because sin is universal among men, all have need of *forgiveness* and *reformation*—the remission of sins, and regeneration (ἄφεσις, μετάνοια, ἀναγέννησις). And since we never attain to perfect holiness in this life, whatever advances we may make, [and hence must be disquieted with regard to our acceptance with God,] it is equally essential, that we should have some *quieting assurance* respecting what awaits us, in order to the exercise of true religion, as that we should reform. These then are the principal objects at which Christianity aims. If men are to be redeemed, these hindrances to their happiness must be removed, they must be reformed, and must be forgiven, and a comforting assurance that they are so must be imparted. This is done in two ways.

(1) By one method, the power of *sinful affections* is weakened; so that reason will again attain to its dominion over them; by

which man will be placed in a situation to lead a holy and pious life (*δικαιῶς καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζῆν, κ. τ. λ.*). This means, however, must be of such a nature as to leave human freedom entirely unimpaired. Reformation in a moral being is effected by bringing the desires and inclinations, from which actions spring, under the control of the intelligent mind. It is for this reason, that in Christianity a *doctrine* is revealed to men, to be received and believed by them, intended to enlighten their minds, to teach them how to avoid and overcome the temptations to sin, and how to live agreeably to the will of God and their own destination. This doctrine must exhibit the motives for the avoidance of sin and the practice of virtue and holiness in a manner universally intelligible and convincing, equally designed to illuminate the reason and affect the heart. But it must also show in what way man can attain power to enable him to be holy. For any mere *doctrine of virtue*, or code of moral precepts, does not confer upon man the power of becoming actually virtuous. This, as Paul says, is *τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου*. The moral law, with all its precepts, threatenings, and promises, could not by itself make us holy and acceptable. The fault however does not lie in the law, but in that weakness and imperfection, which results from our depravity (*Sinnlichkeit*). *Ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ σαρκός*. Now in Christianity, as we are taught by the sacred writers, the most perfect instruction of this nature is given to men.

(2) But the Bible teaches us, that the recovery of man to happiness requires something more than this instruction. This other means is, the forgiveness of sins, or freedom from the punishment of sin. Nor was it enough that men should be merely forgiven; their tranquillity and happiness require, that they should be able to attain to an *assurance* and certain conviction of the fact. This can be done through the atonement of Christ. Many ancient and modern philosophers and religious teachers have, indeed, maintained, that no such atonement is necessary, since God forgives the sins of men whenever they reform. But the whole history of the human race, in ancient and modern times, proves, that an universal apprehension arising from a universal feeling of need, has prevailed among men, that besides inward reformation, some other means of propitiating the Deity, and averting the deserved punishment of sin, are necessary, and do actually exist.

The following reasons may be given for this feeling: viz. (a) Al-

though one should be guilty of no new transgressions, he cannot feel a comforting assurance that the sins which he has *previously* committed will be forgiven on the ground of his subsequent reformation. Indeed he can find no reason to believe this, while he has reason enough to fear the contrary. For how can that which is once done, be undone; or the consequences of it be prevented? (b) Every man, whatever his advances in sanctification, must still confess, that his holiness is very imperfect, and that he frequently sins. How, then, can he hope to deserve the mercy of God, by a holiness which is so imperfect and mingled with sin?—It is the voice of conscience, then, which has produced, and spread so widely among men, this feeling of the necessity of an expiation. There is not a nation upon the globe, as Plutarch has observed, which has not certain appointments for this purpose; such as offerings, cleansings, and other religious rites. Cf. Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen*, S. 123, f.

Now it will be in vain to endeavour to take away this feeling from man, considering how universal and deeply rooted it is, and that it is founded upon the voice of conscience, and corresponds with the most natural and familiar notions which men form respecting God, and his manner of feeling and acting. The religious teacher who withholds from his people the doctrine of *pardon through Christ*,—who represents it as uncertain and doubtful, or entirely rejects it, acts very inconsiderately and unadvisedly. He cannot substitute any thing better, or more consoling. And when the consciences of men awake, he will be unable to give other grounds which can prove so entirely sufficient for their consolation.

II. The different institutions which God has appointed for the restoration and moral perfection of the human race, in a general view.

(1) The means which God employs for this purpose are very *various* and *manifold*. They are designed partly to weaken the power and dominion of sin; partly to instruct men, and to shew them the true way to happiness, and give them power to pursue it. These objects are promoted even by the original constitution which God has given to nature, the movements of conscience, the unhappy feelings which follow upon sinful actions, etc;—also by the common and extraordinary instruction which God has given to men, in one way and another (*πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*, Heb. 1:1);—by the

opportunity afforded us of becoming acquainted with the nature of virtue and vice,—the happiness of the good, and the wretchedness of the bad, by observing the example and profiting by the experience of others ;—in short, by *history*, which is one of the best teachers of the human race.

The history of every nation is useful in this respect ; but that of the Jewish nation possesses uncommon interest. Jesus and his apostles allude to it constantly in their discourses. It is indeed highly instructive, and exhibited in such a way, as to make the deepest impression upon the most numerous class of men. It always represents God not simply as a *metaphysical* being, but as conversant with men, and acting after the manner of men. It presents clearly before our eyes the attributes of God, the course of his providence, and the salutary discipline he exercises over men. Those religious teachers who entirely reject the use of the Old Testament in the instruction of the common people and of the young, and who would gladly see the Book itself cast aside, know not what they do. They deprive themselves and their charge of great advantages. It is, indeed, abused in various ways, as it was at the time of Christ ; but this does not prevent its proper use. Respecting the use of the *history* of the Old Testament, vid. 1 Cor. 10: 6, 11. Rom. 15: 4, and Köppen's excellent work : "Die Bibel, ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit ;" and J. G. Müller, Von dem christlichen Religionsunterrichte, Winterthur, 1809, 8vo.

But the greatest blessing which God has bestowed upon men, as the Bible every where teaches, is the appearance of Christ in the world, his instructions, and his entire work for the human race ; Rom. 11: 33, 36. Still, we ought not to undervalue or exclude the other benevolent institutions by which God has benefited and does still benefit, not only Christians, but mankind at large. All these means should be considered as inseparably connected, as they really are, and as the Scriptures represent them. Cf. Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, Th. II. Hess, Vom Reiche Gottes ; Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, Berlin, 1780.

(2) These means are *universal* ; vid. Morus, p. 126, § 6. God has not, indeed, bestowed them at all times, and upon all nations ; since all men in all ages have not been capable of receiving them. But he has selected the most proper in every age and nation ; so that the knowledge and worship of God, piety and virtue, have nev-

er been wholly lost from the earth. We should not confine our attention to the Jewish nation ; but should search out, and thankfully admire the traces of divine care over nations called heathen. Even in the midst of their imperfect knowledge of God, and of their polytheism, we often find true religiousness and piety, which, notwithstanding their erroneous views, are certainly acceptable in the sight of God. The ancient writers are full of such instances. The gracious care and providence of God is as clearly seen in raising up good legislators, practical sages, teachers of the people, promoters of science and morality, among the Greeks, Romans, and other people of the earth, for their improvement and moral good, as in the institutions which he established among the Jewish people, for the same purposes. These natural means which God employs, redound as much to his glory, as the supernatural.

Paul therefore says expressly, that God has given the heathen opportunity of knowing him ; that he has not left himself without a witness among them ; and that they, too, will be inexcusable if they leave unimproved that knowledge of God imparted to them through nature, Acts 17: 27. Rom. 1: 18, sq. Accordingly the virtue and piety which the heathen practise, after the measure of their imperfect knowledge, is represented in the Bible as agreeable to God. The case of the centurion Cornelius is an example, Acts x. God accounted him worthy to be intrusted with more knowledge, because he proved himself faithful in the use of that lesser degree which he possessed.

The national pride of the Jews led them into the mistake, that God had a special regard for *them*, that they were more agreeable to him than other nations, that they exclusively were his children, and that the Messiah was designed only for them. These mistakes are frequently opposed in the New Testament ; there is *εἰς θεὸν καὶ πατὴρ πάντων*, Ephes. 4: 5, 6. 1 Tim. 2: 5, seq. God has no partiality (*προσωποληψία*), Rom. 10: 12. Acts 10: 34 ; all have equal right to the divine blessings, especially to those conferred by Christianity, John 10: 16. Ephes. 1: 10. 2: 14, 18. Rom. 5: 18, seq. ; and the texts cited by Morus p. 126, § 6, nn. 1, 3. This universality of the divine favors is expressly asserted even in the Old Testament. The prophets frequently affirm, that the knowledge of the true God will become universal among the heathen, and that they by no means shall be excluded from it ; Deut. 32: 31. Is. 11.

and LXVI. Indeed the Old Testament contains promises of far better times in future for the heathen, than for the Jews.

(3) They are appointed by God with great wisdom in reference to the nature of man and the circumstances of particular *times*. Such means are selected, as allow the freedom of man, and leave him at liberty to choose or reject. It is the internal force of truth which is made to influence man, and not external compulsory means. Moreover God, like a wise father and teacher, proceeds according to the time and age of the human race in general, and of nations and individuals in particular. He regulates his instruction according to their capacity. He does not overload their infancy with such laws and precepts as they cannot understand; but saves the higher instruction for the maturer age of a more advanced generation.

This greater or less capability of some generations and nations in comparison with others, should be considered as one reason, why God did not earlier disclose certain truths which are peculiar to Christianity, and why he still withholds them from certain nations and countries. For such nations however he provides in another way, and leads them to that degree of happiness of which they are capable. He is not confined to one method, as is shown in the Introduction. Nor is the education of the human race confined to this life. Provision will doubtless be made, to enable those who are *innocently* deficient here, to make up their loss hereafter.

Note. In the New Testament, the terms χάρις, χάρις θεοῦ, δωρεὰ θεοῦ, are used to denote *the whole compass of means* employed by God to bring men to happiness, as well as any particular means; vid. Morus, pp. 122, 125. The term χάρις is used in various senses; and as unscriptural ideas are often attached to it, we shall here briefly explain the scriptural significations. It corresponds to the Hebrew חַנּוּן, and sometimes to חַסֵּד, and similar words. It signifies (1) in general, the unmerited love and benevolence which God, as the supreme Governour, bears for all his creatures and subjects, and especially for men; and so is synonymous with ἀγάπη, χρηστότης, φιλανθρωπία, Tit. 3: 4; and (2) the consequences and proofs of this gracious regard; in short, all undeserved divine favors; John 1: 16, χάρις ἀντὶ χάριτος. These are elsewhere called χάρισμα, δωρεά, &c. Cf. Rom. 5: 15. Inasmuch as they are undeserved, they are contrasted with ὀφείλημα, Rom. 4: 4.

Hence arise various other significations, by which certain great favors are called χάριτες, by way of eminence: as, (a) the Christian doctrine and institute in general, and particularly that principal doctrine of Christianity, the gracious forgiveness of sin on account of Christ. Χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια, John 1:

7; λόγος χάριτος, the benevolent doctrine, Acts 14: 3; χάρις θεοῦ, Tit. 2: 11, χάρις Χριστοῦ, and χάρις simply, Acts 18: 27, seq. (b) Certain employments, businesses, and offices in the Christian church, and the talents, abilities, and gifts bestowed by God upon particular persons in reference to these offices. Thus Rom. 1: 5, χάρις καὶ ἀποστολή; also 12: 3. In other texts χάρισμα is used, with which χάρις is interchanged as synonymous in 1 Pet. 4: 10, and in the epistles to the Corinthians. From these and similar texts is derived (c) the ecclesiastical usage, in which *gratia* denotes, by way of eminence, the operations of God upon the hearts of men for their improvement and conversion. These operations were called *actiones gratiæ*; and the condition of a converted man *statum gratiæ*. The Latin church, especially since the time of Augustine, has used this word in this sense. Vid. *infra*, § 129.

From what has been said, it appears, that the *grace* of God is only his *goodness*, considered in a particular relation. Grace is the goodness of a superior to a *subordinate* person. The ruler, properly speaking, is gracious only to the subject, and the lord to the slave. The Bible conforms to this usage. God then is *gracious* in the highest sense of this word, because he is the supremo and necessary ruler and governour of men. Every thing consequently, which God does for men, relating to the body or soul, is an operation of his grace, *actus gratiæ divinæ*. And this grace is *free*, because no one can compel it. And the very idea of *grace* excludes all *merit*; Rom. 4: 4.

III. The particular purpose of God to restore the human race by Christ.

The New Testament teaches, that God has determined to bestow his favors upon men through Christ; and to lead them to holiness and happiness by him. Hence Christ is called ἀρχηγὸς ζωῆς, Acts 3: 15, coll. v. 26. This term is explained by αἴτιος σωτηρίας, Heb. 5: 9, coll. Acts 17: 30, 31. The gracious decree of God to pardon, sanctify, and bless mankind, and the institutions he has established for this purpose, are called χάρις σωτηρίας, Tit. 2: 11. 3: 4. The following particulars are implied, viz. God designs to free men from the unhappiness occasioned by sin (σωξείν); and also to bestow upon them unmerited favors (χαριτοῦν, χάρις, κ. τ. λ.). These favors are pardon, sanctification, and eternal blessedness, also information communicated by God respecting this blessedness, instruction as to the manner how we may attain to it, and strength imparted to us for this end. This grace of God is called ἡ χάρις θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ δοθεῖσα, 1 Cor. 1: 4. It is always represented in the New Testament as bestowed upon us through Christ, and on his account. By him God teaches us, and renews us; pardons us on account of his death; and bestows upon us eternal blessedness through him and for his sake. Every thing proceeds from him, and

is referred to him. This purpose of God is also described in the Bible by the words *θέλημα θεοῦ, πρόθεσις πρόγνωσης* and *προορίζειν*, Ephes. 1: 4, 11. 3: 11. The Bible says, too, that God made this decree *from eternity* (*πρὸ αἰώνων* or *καταβολῆς κόσμου*). All the divine decrees are of this peculiar nature, as is implied in the particle *πρό*. The passage 1 Pet. 1: 20 is very clear upon this subject. From the Old Testament, the passage Ps. 40: 7, sq. belongs in this connexion. This decree is always described as the *free* determination of God. Thus in the passages cited it is called, *εὐδοκία θελήματος*. Not that it would have been consistent for God to desert the human race, and leave it to perish;—the divine goodness forbids such a supposition. The simple meaning is, that no external necessity compelled him to it, and that it is his free grace, without any desert or worthiness on the part of men. Paul too, in Rom. ix.—xi. speaks of the free grace of God in respect to the new institute which he established upon earth by Christ.

The following result may be deduced from what has been said: Christianity is founded upon the principles, (*a*) that all men are considered as sinners in the sight of God; to which the conscience of every one bears testimony (vid. No. I. ad finem); and that therefore, (*b*) they are subject to the punishment of sin; as experience proves. The distinguishing trait of Christianity is this, that it promises to men DELIVERANCE FROM SIN, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN, before it requires of them perfect holiness, acceptable to God. It thus comes to the relief of ignorant, desponding, and feeble man; inspires him with confidence in God, and with love to him; acquaints him with his destination to true holiness and unalterable happiness, and shows the only way by which he can attain it. Any philosophy or system of religion, which reverses this order, and demands holiness of men before it gives the power to attain it; which represents holiness as the procuring cause of forgiveness; fails of its object, and asserts and requires an impossibility. The great point in this pardon or amnesty which Christianity promises, is the doctrine that Jesus Christ came into the world to bless sinful men, to free them from sin and death; 1 Tim. 1: 15; coll. 2 Tim. 1: 10. John 3: 16, 17. This pardon, however, reaches men, only when under divine guidance and assistance, they act according to the conditions and precepts laid down. Hence forgiveness and eternal life are inseparably connected in Christianity with the requisition of

repentance and *faith*, made active by love. These doctrines are always connected in the Scriptures; so Tit. 2: 11—14.

§ 89. *Formation and developement of the idea of MESSIAH among the ancient and modern Jews; their various opinions respecting him; and the proof that Jesus was the Messiah.*

I. The gradual developement of the idea of a Messiah among the Israelites.

(1) The idea of a former happy condition in the earliest ages of the world is universal among men; and is found too among the Israelites; vid. § 56. But it is quite as natural to the human mind, to console itself in the midst of troubles, sufferings, and the feeling of physical and moral imperfection, with the hope of better times to come, and of a future happy condition, either in this life or the life to come, or in both together. Hence arose the fables of the heathen respecting the return of a golden age, the expected dwelling of the gods upon earth, and pictures of a similar nature, in which their wishes and expectations were embodied. These ideas, like those concerning the original golden age, are held by every nation, and are founded, like those, in a feeling of necessity which is deep laid in the human soul. These ideas, expectations, and wishes are found in every nation, differently modified, however, according to their particular situation, and mode of thinking and representation. One people is more bold and confident in its expectations; another is more moderate, hoping and wishing, rather than determining and deciding.

(2) The Jewish nation, too, expected such a return of the golden age to the earth; and they were justified in this by the declarations and promises of their oldest prophets. But this expectation of the Jews was peculiar, and distinguished from that of others in this respect, that this period was placed by them in the times when the Messiah should appear. These happy times were called עֵינֵי מָשִׁיחַ.

(3) But the question here arises; is the doctrine respecting the Messiah, the Saviour of the world, a doctrine really revealed by God to men; or is it merely a human opinion, originating among the Jews from their accidental circumstances,—in short, a Jewish *fable*, employed by Christ and the Apostles for benevolent moral purposes?

FIRST. The last supposition is maintained in general by those who deny or question all direct revelation; by all, indeed, who deny the

reality of *miracles* ; for *predictions* belong to the class of miraculous occurrences ; and the objections made to one may be made to the other, vid. § 7, III., § 72, II. These writers endeavour by various hypotheses to explain the natural origin of this idea. Cf. Stephani, Gedanken über die Entstehung und Ausbildung der Idee von einem Messias, Nürnberg, 1787, 8vo. Eckerman, Theologische Beyträge, B. II. St. 1, Altona, 1791, 8vo. Ziegler, Entwicklung des wahrscheinlichen Ursprungs der Idee vom Messias, in Henke's Mag. für Religionsphilosophie, B. I. St. 1, Abhandl. 2. Ammon, Versuch einer Christologie des alten Testaments, Erlangen, 1794, 8vo. Their principal opinions may be compressed in the following statement : viz.,

Many brave heroes and deliverers (σωτήρες, מוֹשִׁיעִים) had appeared among the Jews from the earliest period of their history, and had contributed to the public weal. Such were the *prophets* and *great kings*. But the advantages which had been hoped for, both in respect to religious and moral improvement, and also in respect to civil and social welfare, had not as yet been realized, and were still expected in future time. By degrees, all wishes, hopes and expectations centered in *one* person, who would accomplish all which was desired. This idea did not become general, or rather did not take its origin, among the Jews, until after the Babylonish captivity. This person was expected to be the deliverer and helper of the *Jewish* nation, and principally a temporal deliverer, who would establish an earthly kingdom. This idea prevailed widely among the Jews at the time of Christ, and, by the aid of the allegorical interpretation then current, was carried into the more ancient of their sacred books. Now Jesus, it is said, found this idea, and connected it, such as he found it, with his doctrine ; not considering it himself (as many say) to be really true. He modified this idea and gave himself out for a *spiritual* deliverer of mankind, by his *instruction*. Eckermann, therefore, affirms distinctly, that in the whole Old Testament there are no proper predictions of Christ ; Beytr. St. 1.

Remarks on this explanation.

(a) All accounts of the origin of this idea, which are exclusive of direct divine revelation, if not otherwise objectionable, are merely conjectural and hypothetical, and cannot be historically proved.

This is the reason why they are so various and contradictory ; there is no sure historical ground and basis upon which they can be established and built ; they are mere plays of the imagination, mere conjectures as to the manner in which the thing may possibly have been. And, indeed, many cases may be imagined *possible*, no one of which can be proved to be historically true, and most of which have historical evidence against them. This discrepancy of views among writers on this subject, therefore, never will or can cease, as long as they proceed in this way.

(b) The assertion of Eckerman and others, that the Old Testament descriptions of the Messiah are not descriptions of *Jesus*, but of an *earthly king*, is unfounded. For although the Messiah is often compared to a king, as even God is, he is also named and described as a *prophet* and *priest*. And to free men from sin, to instruct them, and promote their moral improvement, are ascribed to him, as the principal part and proper object of his advent ; Pss. xxii. xl. cx. Is. ii. xi. liii.

(c) The predictions of the prophets represent the Messiah not as the king and ruler of a single nation, as the Jewish kings were ; but as the king and benefactor of all who should be friendly to him. In the predictions of the Jewish prophets he is promised quite as much, and even more, to the heathen than to the Jews themselves. Vid. the passages before cited. The promises given to Abraham, Gen. 12: 3. 22: 18, are certainly free from any Jewish exclusiveness, and are as comprehensive as possible.

(d) The assertion that the idea of Messiah originated during the Babylonish captivity or afterwards, and that the earlier Jews differently understood the so named messianic passages in Moses and the prophets, is contrary to history. For the idea respecting a Messiah was universal among the Samaritans at the time of Christ, and much earlier. And indeed it was held by the Samaritans more purely, than by the greater part of the Jews ; as the Messiah was represented by them as the great *prophet* and *saviour* ; John 4: 25, 42, sq. Therefore this idea must have existed among the Jews before the religious separation between them and the Samaritans ; and consequently before the Babylonian exile. For the Samaritans would not certainly have received it from the Jews after the separation. Whence then did they derive it ? They admitted only the five books of Moses from the whole Old Testament. Accordingly

they must have grounded their expectation upon the testimony of Moses, and the interpretation of this testimony given them by the Israelitish teachers sent to them from Assyria, 2 Kings 17: 27, sq. The Israelites, therefore, must have had the idea of a Messiah long before the Babylonian exile, and must have found it, too, in the books of Moses.

SECONDLY. The whole opinion, that the idea of Messiah does not depend upon divine revelation, and that it is not contained in the oldest sacred records of the Hebrews, stands in the most palpable contradiction to the clearest declarations of Christ and his apostles. For (a) the writings of the prophets are acknowledged by them to be of divine authority, and the doctrines and predictions contained in them are not treated as fictions and fables, but as truly revealed by God.—And (b) it is no less certain, that they teach that there are in Moses and the prophets, predictions respecting the Messiah, or benefactor of the world, and that these were fulfilled in Jesus. Jesus himself frequently asserts this in the most impressive and solemn manner; Luke 18: 31—33. 22: 37. 24: 27. Matt. 20: 18, 19. 26: 54. Mark 9: 12. John 5: 39, 46. And in this his apostles exactly follow his example, Acts 2: 16, 25. 3: 18. 10: 34. 13: 23, 32. 26: 22, 23. 1 Pet. 1: 11. 2 Pet. 1: 19, and the Pauline epistles. The apostles themselves therefore believed this.

Now if Jesus and his apostles were merely human teachers, they may *possibly* have erred in this matter; as also many of the Jewish teachers of that time, who interpreted these passages in the same way, may have done. But if they were divinely commissioned, what they say on this subject must be believed. For I am not at liberty to proceed optionally in believing the declarations of a man, whom I acknowledge to be divinely commissioned. I am not at liberty to make selection of what I will admit, and what reject, at my good pleasure. I must rather yield unconditional faith to each and every thing which he, as a divine messenger, teaches and declares. Consistency, then, requires us to go on this principle in this subject. Vid. Herder, Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend, Br. 18, 21, particularly S. 303, f. 349—352, Th. II. Cf. Herder's Work, "Vom Erlöser der Menschen, nach unsern drey ersten Evangelisten," Riga, 1796, 8vo. [Cf. especially Hengstenberg, "Christologie," where this whole subject is more ably discussed than any where else. Tr.]

II. Various opinions of the Jews at and after the time of Christ respecting the Messiah, and the nature of his kingdom.

(1) At the time of Christ and previously, the current opinion of the people in Palestine, and indeed of most of the Pharisees and lawyers, was, that he would be a temporal deliverer and a king of the Jews, and indeed a universal monarch, who would reign over all nations. Thus they interpreted the passages, Ps. 2: 2, 6, 8. Jerem. 23: 5, 6. Zech. 9: 4, seq. Hence those, who during the life time of Jesus acknowledged him to be the Messiah, wished to proclaim him king; John 6: 15, coll. Matt. 21: 8, 9. The apostles themselves held this opinion until after the resurrection of Christ, Matt. 20: 20, 21. Luke 24: 21. Acts 1: 6. And Jesus himself, during his life upon earth, proceeded very guardedly, in order to lead them gradually from this deep rooted prejudice, and not to take it away at once. Josephus says, that the enthusiasm of the Jews in the war against the Romans was very much increased by this belief of an universal monarchy; vid. Bell. Jud. VI. 5. Suetonius (Vesp. c. 4) and Tacitus (Hist. V. 13) speak of this expectation spread throughout all the east by the Jews. It was expected that he would institute new religious rites, John 1: 25; that he would perform uncommonly great miracles, John 7: 31; that he would be born at Bethlehem, of the line of David, and yet from obscure parents, John 7: 42; and that he would never die, John 12: 34.

(2) Some, but by far the smallest number, had purer ideas respecting the Messiah; and did not so much expect an earthly kingdom, as forgiveness of sin, instruction, diffusion of truth, and in short spiritual blessings. Simeon had this correct view, Luke 2: 30, sq; the malefactor on the cross, Luke 23: 43; and a few other Jews at the time of Christ. Many pious Jews too, out of Palestine, may be supposed to have had the same correct views. For even the common people of Samaria had opinions on this subject comparatively pure; vid. John 4: 25, seq. Jesus approved these opinions, as just and scriptural, and always acted in conformity with them; vid. Luke 17: 20, 21. John 18: 36—38. It is, then, very unjust to charge him with the intention of establishing an earthly kingdom, as is done in the work "*Vom Zweck Jesu*," Braunschweig, 1778. Vid. Koppe "*Progr. de sententia Judaeorum de Messia et futuro ejus regno*," Gott. 1779.

(3) Many united both of these opinions, and considered the Messiah as a teacher and earthly king at the same time,—as the supreme head of Church and state. This appears to have been the opinion of the apostles, and most of the disciples of Christ, while he lived upon the earth. A multitude of Christians of the Judaizing party, during the first and second centuries, believed that Christ would return to the earth to establish a temporal kingdom for a thousand years;—an opinion which has been indulged by many Christians in every age down to the present time.

(4) Some of the Jews at the time of Christ, and previously, were free thinkers, and appear to have rejected the whole notion of a Messiah, as a popular superstition, a fabulous and groundless expectation. Especially was this the case after the destruction of the Jewish state by the Romans. Many of the Jews out of Palestine, especially the learned Grecian Jews, appear to have been of this way of thinking. Accordingly there is no mention of this idea, even in the Book of Wisdom, or in all the writings of Philo. And even Josephus, in his desire to please the Greeks and Romans, appears to have been ashamed of this faith of his fathers; and so always avoids the subject. They were satisfied with mere morality, and connected the Grecian philosophy with the doctrines of the Jewish religion and theology. This silence is the more remarkable, especially in Philo, considering how much he was given to the allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament.

(5) We find all these different opinions repeated in the writings of the Jews who lived after the time of Christ and the destruction of the temple;—in the Chaldaic paraphrases, in the book Sohar, in the Talmud, and in the Rabbins, where so many of the ancient traditions are exhibited.

(a) The opinions of the more modern Jews were very various respecting the importance of the doctrine itself. Some considered it to be the most important doctrine of their faith, and expected that a complete restoration of religion, morality, and happiness, would be effected by the Messiah. In their view he was to accomplish, as it were, a new political and moral creation; so Maimonides. Others considered it as a doctrine of less importance, and seldom mentioned it. Many of them appear, in reality, to have rejected it altogether, or to have been ashamed of it.

(b) In respect to the institutions of the Messiah, and the object

of his mission, they exhibited the same diversity as prevailed at an earlier period. Most adhered to the gross opinion of the establishment of an earthly kingdom, and the subjection of the גִּזְרִים. Others made his most prominent object to be the improvement of doctrine, the restoration of morals, and spiritual blessedness. But these were comparatively few.

(c) Some of the Jews who could not understand how the Messiah should be described by the prophets sometimes as king (Ps. 11. cx. Is. 41.), and sometimes as inferior, lowly and despised (Ps. 22. Is. 53.); invented the doctrine of a *twofold Messiah*, in order to reconcile these accounts;—one, the inferior, despised Messiah, Joseph's son, in whom Christians believe; the other David's son, who is yet to come, and establish his kingdom.

(d) Many of the Jews endeavoured to account for the long delay of the Messiah, by the sinfulness of which their nation is guilty. The promise, they say, was made conditionally. But this hypothesis derives no support from the Messianic oracles in the Old Testament.

III. The method of proving that Jesus of Nazareth is the true Messiah.

(1) This is proved from the marks and descriptions which the Old Testament gives of the Messiah; all of which meet in Jesus in the most remarkable manner. This proof, that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, may be made extremely convincing. Christians however do not, as Collins supposes, by any means rely solely on the predictions of the Old Testament, for the Messianic authority of Jesus; nor does Christ himself; vid. John 5: 34, sq. For these predictions, though ever so valuable and important in themselves, are always, like all predictions, in a certain degree obscure. The Old Testament is indeed very instructive and useful, when rightly employed; but it is not the only ground on which the confidence of Christians rests. It affords important proof even for Christians; but not the only proof; vid. Vol. I. § 12, II.

This method of proof from the Old Testament is especially useful in convincing the Jews, and in refuting their objections. Thus Christ applies it, John 5: 39—47. All the marks which the Jews consider characteristic of the Messiah, according to their sacred books, agree exactly in Jesus. And all those traits, and minute circumstances, which are exhibited in passages of the Old Testament,

acknowledged by the Jews themselves to relate to the Messiah, meet in him, as they do not in any other person known in history. He was born at Bethlehem, of the family of David, of which the Jews have now for a long time had no continued genealogical tables. He had a precursor. He confirmed his doctrine by the most striking miracles. He died, was honorably buried, and rose again. His garments were divided. Vinegar was given him to drink. And many other circumstances of the same nature, greater and smaller, which were predicted concerning the Messiah, were fulfilled in Jesus. Such passages are therefore very frequently urged by the apostles against the Jews, in order to convince them.

(2) Christians, who acknowledge the divine authority of the New Testament, and the credibility of Jesus and the apostles, have an additional and principal ground of their belief of this truth, in the testimony and information contained in the books of the New Testament. Throughout these books, Jesus is represented as the greatest divine messenger, Lord over all, the Saviour of the world (σωτήρ, ὡς τοῦ κόσμου, ὁ κύριος). In short he is described as the same person whom the Jews call *Messiah*. If divine wisdom had seen proper to raise him up in another country, and under other circumstances, his name and the form of his doctrine might, indeed, have been different, while the substance itself would have continued the same.

According to the constant representation of the New Testament, God himself confirmed the truth, that Jesus was the Messiah. He did this by John the Baptist, John 1: 19—41; by voices from heaven at the baptism of Christ, and on other occasions; by angels, Luke 1: 30—38; by Jesus himself, who confirmed the truth of his declarations by miracles, John 4: 25, 26. Matt. 26: 62, 63; and by the apostles commissioned to be his messengers, Acts 2: 22—38. 1 John 1 and 2: 1; etc.

Thus in all the passages of the New Testament where it is said that Jesus is the Messiah, or that the Messiah has come in the person of Jesus, the idea is always implied, that Jesus is the promised *Lord* and *Redeemer*, the *Benefactor* and *Saviour*. In short, the word *Messiah*, which grammatically signifies *king*, becomes a doctrinal word, synonymous with κύριος and σωτήρ. And in this way the erroneous views of the Jews respecting the Messiah, were corrected. If we would consider the subject in this light, and be satisfied with the representations which the New Testament gives of it;

we should easily avoid the difficulties with which many have been perplexed regarding this doctrine. Vid. Eckermann, Theol. Beytr. St. 1. We should not then declare with this writer and others, that the doctrine that *Jesus is the Messiah*, belongs only to the Jews and is not an essential doctrine of pure Christianity. The Hebrew name מָשִׁיחַ was Jewish or Israelitish, but the thing denoted by it was intended for *all*, and is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity.

NOTE. Works on some of the subjects treated in this section. For information respecting the Jewish opinions of the Messiah, vid. Maii 'Synopsis Theol. Judaicae,' Giess, 1698, 4to; Glassner, De gemino Judaeorum Messia, Helmst. 1739, 4to; Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum; Keil (Prof. Lips.), Hist. Dogm. de regno Messiae, Jesu et app. ætate, Lipsiae, 1781. On the point, that Jesus is the Messiah, vid. the ancient works of Olearius and Schöttgen, in "Hor. Hebr." T. II. The most complete work after these, is that of Bishop Kidder, "Convincing proof, that Jesus is the Messiah;" translated from the English by Rambach, Rostock, 1757, 4to. [For a fuller account of the literature of this subject, cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 444, Anmerk. Vid. especially the late work of Hengstenberg, Christologie des A. T.—Tr.]

§ 90. *Of the principles on which we are to interpret the literal and figurative predictions contained in the Old Testament respecting the Messiah, and the new institute founded by him.*

I. Brief History of the manner in which Christians have interpreted the Messianic predictions.

The allegorical method of interpretation prevailed among the early Christian fathers, especially the Egyptian fathers; e. g. Justin the Martyr, Pantaenus, Clement of Alexandria, Tatian; and still more after the age of Origen. They considered the Bible, as Philo and other learned Grecian Jews had done before them, to be a repository of every kind of useful information, and especially of all religious truth. Any truth of this kind which they did not find clearly exhibited in it, they introduced, by means of their allegorical interpretation; exactly in the same way as the Stoics, and many other learned Grecians, had proceeded with Homer, and some other of their sacred books. On this principle it was, that many of these fathers endeavoured to find all the perfection of Christian knowledge

in the Old Testament, and carried back into it the entire Christian system. But in this they deviated widely from the mind of the apostles, who expressly say, that the patriarchs saw the promised blessings only from afar off, Heb. 11: 13; and that there was much *obscurity* in the predictions concerning Christ, 2 Pet. 1: 19—21. 1 Pet. 1: 10—12.

But this extreme was objected to by many of the learned fathers; e. g. Eusebius the Emesene, Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodorus of Mopsuestia. Some of these fell into the opposite extreme, and allow few or no passages in the Old Testament to refer to the Messiah. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, took a middle course between these two parties. This difference of opinion has continued down through all ages of the Christian church. Some have seen the Messiah rarely or nowhere; others, every where, in the Old Testament; while others still have pursued a middle course. Vid. Ernesti, "Narratio critica de interpret. prophetiarum Mess. in eccl." in Opusc. Theol.

II. Examination of the principles of the theory of *accommodation* applied to the interpretation of the Messianic predictions.

Since the time of Semler, about the middle of the eighteenth century, an opinion has prevailed widely in the Protestant church, that the Old Testament contains very few passages or none at all, which treat literally and properly of Jesus Christ; and that all or most of the passages cited in the New Testament, are used in the way of *accommodation*. The following reasons have been offered in support of this theory. The Jews at the time of Christ, were very much given to the allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Ever after the time of the exile, when the expectation of a Messiah had become universal among them, they had eagerly searched the Old Testament for every thing which in the least favored this expectation; and had succeeded, by the help of their allegorical interpretation, in making their Scriptures seem to contain predictions respecting a Messiah. Jesus and the apostles were therefore compelled to pursue the same method, and to use it as a means of gradually bringing the Jews to a better knowledge of religion. Their pursuing this course does not prove that they themselves considered these passages as actual predictions. That they did not so consider them, appears from the fact, that they pursued a different course

when teaching Gentiles, and did not in that case appeal to the Old Testament.

But in this statement we must carefully distinguish between what is true, and what is erroneous and exaggerated.

(1) The allegorical interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures cannot be historically proved to have prevailed among the Jews from the time of the exile, or to have been common with the Jews of Palestine at the time of Christ and his apostles. Although the Sanhedrim and the hearers of Jesus often appealed to the Old Testament, according to the testimony of the New Testament writers, they give no indication of the allegorical interpretation. Even Josephus has nothing of it. The Platonic Jews of Egypt began, in the first century, in imitation of the heathen Greeks, to interpret the Old Testament allegorically. Philo was distinguished among those in that place, who practised this method; and he defends it as something new, and before unheard of, and for that reason opposed by the other Jews; *De confus. lingu.* p. 347, sq. Jesus was not, therefore, in a situation where he was compelled to comply with a *prevailing custom* of allegorical interpretation; for this method did not prevail at that time among the Jews; certainly not in Palestine, where Jesus taught.

(2) The writers of the New Testament themselves make a clear distinction between the allegorical and literal interpretation of the Old Testament. When they use the allegorical method, they either say expressly, *here is allegory*, Gal. 4: 24; or they show it by the context, or by prefixing some particle of comparison, e. g. *ὡσπερ*, *καθώς*, Heb. vii. John 3: 14. Matt. 12: 40. But they express themselves very differently in texts which they quote as literal prophecy, for the purpose of proof.

(3) If the Apostles did not allude to the Old Testament in the instructions which they gave to Gentiles, it does not follow either that they believed the Old Testament to be of no use to them, or that they did not seriously consider the passages which they cited as predictions in their instructions to the Jews, to be really such. The reason why the Apostles omitted these allusions in the commencement of the instruction which they gave to the heathen, is the same, as leads the wise missionary at the present day to omit them in the same circumstances. Their Gentile hearers and readers knew nothing of the Bible; and could not, of course, be convinced from an un-

known book. The apostles, however, gradually instructed their Gentile converts in the contents of this Book, and then appealed to it as frequently before them, as before Jews or converts from Judaism. This is proved by the Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles. Thus Peter says to the *heathen* centurion, Cornelius, after the latter had become acquainted with the prophets, "Of this Jesus testify all the prophets," etc. Acts 10: 43, coll. Acts 8: 26—35, and the epistles of Paul.

(4) It cannot be shown in general that Jesus and his Apostles, in compliance with the current prejudices of their contemporaries, ever taught any thing, or seemingly affirmed any thing to be true, which they themselves considered as false. No more can it be shown, in particular, that they adopted and authorized any explanations of the Old Testament, which they themselves considered as invalid, merely because they were common among their contemporaries. Such compliance is entirely contrary to their usual course of action; vid. Matt. 5: 19, 23; nor can it be at all justified on pure moral principles, as even modern theologians are beginning more and more to allow. When Christ, therefore, says distinctly, Matt. 22: 43, that *David, by divine revelation, called the Messiah, Lord* (Ps. cx.); he must have believed exactly as he said; and so have admitted a divine prediction respecting the Messiah in this Psalm. The same when he says, John 5: 46, "that Moses wrote concerning him." Hence it follows, that whenever Jesus and the apostles expressly assent to the Jewish explanations of the Old Testament, or build proofs upon them, they themselves must have considered these explanations as *just*.

Here every thing depends upon the doctrine above stated: if Christ and his apostles were mere human teachers, they may have erred; but if they spake as divine messengers, they must be believed, on their simple authority.

III. The principles of interpretation on which *Christ and his apostles* proceed in quoting from the Old Testament, especially the Messianic passages.

Undoubtedly many of the same principles often appear in Jewish writings; as well as the same formula of quotation, 'thus is fulfilled,' etc. Vid. Wähner, *Antiqq. Heb. T. II.*; Surenhus, *Ἡ βίβλος καταλλαγῆς*. Wetstein ad Matt. 1: 22, and Schöttgen in § 89 of his book last cited. Now if Christ, by his own example, authorizes the

principles which were embraced by the Jews, he himself must have considered them to be true. Whether *we* must on this account consider them as true, must be determined by the alternative above stated. The principles of interpreting the Old Testament which many modern commentators have adopted, differ altogether from those which Christ and his apostles followed; still these modern principles must not be ascribed to Christ and his apostles, but we must inquire historically, *What were the principles on which Christ and his apostles proceeded?* These need not necessarily be the same, as those which modern interpreters adopt.

(1) God determined *from eternity* (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου) to send a benefactor and Saviour (σωτήρ, Messiah) to bless the world made wretched by sin. This purpose was revealed very early; and was from time to time repeated and rendered more plain. Thus Christ and the apostles declare, with the Jews, "that Moses, the Psalms, and the prophets spake concerning him;" vid. § 89.

(2) God saw best to communicate his will to the patriarchs of the Jewish nation, and to transmit this revelation to their posterity, by means of extraordinary men, messengers (מַלְאָכִים); thus making the Israelites, as it were, the depositories of the divine revelations for the salvation of men, during the earlier ages of the world. In this respect, too, Christ and the Jews were agreed; and in this also, that God had reference in all his instructions and ordinances given by the prophets, to his great plan respecting the Messiah.

(3) Consequently, according to the doctrine of Christ, the writings of the prophets, from Moses downwards, contain *literal* predictions respecting this Saviour of the world, and the new institute to be founded by him; though all these predictions are not of equal clearness.

(4) But to these prophets themselves every thing which they predicted was not perfectly plain and intelligible. God saw best to reserve the more clear explanation of the sense of many of his earlier oracles to be communicated by prophets at a later period. Thus many of the predictions respecting Christ and his apostles, could be more distinctly and justly interpreted in after times, than by the prophets themselves who originally uttered them. This maxim often appears in the writings of the Jews, and is expressly mentioned in the New Testament. 1 Pet. 1: 10—12, and 2 Pet. 1: 19; vid. Progr. ad h. l. [Vid. the discussion of this point in the Bib. Repos-

itory, No. I. Art. 4. also No. IV. Art. 4. Cf. Woods on Inspiration, Lect. I. p. 33. Tr.]

(5) The duties and offices of the Messiah very much resemble the duties and offices of the Old Testament *prophets, priests* and *kings*. These names are therefore frequently applied to him. As a king of the house of David, he inherited, as it were, all the rights, privileges and titles of the kings (e. g. of David or Solomon); as a *prophet*, those of the Jewish prophets (e. g. of Moses and others); and as a *priest*, those of the priests (e. g. of Melchisedec and Aaron). The character which they possessed, and the actions which they performed imperfectly, and on a small scale, he possessed and performed perfectly, and on a large scale. This canon of interpretation is held by the Rabbins, and is not in any way objectionable. The case is very much the same as when the rights of an emperor are proved by showing from the history of the empire, that his predecessors possessed them; or when the official rights of a person are established from the ancient privileges of the office, and from the history of his predecessors in it. Cf. Ps. 89: 27, 31—34.

This principle casts light upon the passages of the New Testament, where texts are cited from the Old, which appear at first sight to treat of different persons and objects. All the texts in which the rights, offices, and dignities of the Israelitish prophets, priests, and kings, are the subjects of consideration, relate to the Messiah, the greatest of their successors, and are directly applicable to him. He possesses all the greatness, distinction, and preeminence ascribed to them, only in a far higher degree. So it is in the writings of the Jews, and in the New Testament, Heb. I. and II. and other places.

(6) The Jews generally, though not uniformly, asserted the pre-existence of the Messiah before his visible appearance upon the earth; although the doctrine of his miraculous birth was not as yet entirely clear to them. This is seen in the Chaldaic paraphrases and in the writings of the Rabbins. Christ himself affirms his preexistence in the clearest manner, John v. 8: 58. ch. xvii. seq. The writers just mentioned ascribe every thing which was done in the Old Testament for the salvation of men, and particularly of the Jews, to the Messiah, as the efficient or concurrent cause. He led them from Egypt, defended them in their journey through the desert, and spake to them by the prophets. They explained many passages of the Old

Testament in which the appearance of God, or of the angel of the Lord, is mentioned, as applying directly to the Messiah. This principle, too, is authorized and adopted in the New Testament. According to 1 Pet. 1: 11, it was the *Spirit of Christ* which inspired the prophets of the Old Testament, and communicated revelations through them. According to 1 Cor. 10: 4, the *rock* (a common appellation of God) which accompanied the Israelites in the desert, was Christ. When they tempted God by disobedience, they tempted Christ (v. 9). Isaiah, who saw God in his glory (Is. vi.), is said to have seen the glory of the Messiah, John 12: 41.

Thus we see why texts of the Old Testament, which treat of God in general, and of his works among men, especially among his own people, are applied in the New Testament directly to the Messiah.

(7) Instruction by means of allegories, symbols, and symbolical actions is very suitable to men; especially during the childhood both of individuals and nations. Such instruction is exactly in the spirit of the Hebrews, and of other oriental nations. This being so, it would have been a subject of wonder, if instruction of this kind had not been given respecting so important an object as the new dispensation to be instituted by the Messiah. That such instruction was given, the Jews have always maintained; and it is clearly contained in many passages of the Old Testament: e. g. Ps. 40: 7, sq. The writers of the New Testament distinctly teach, that some of the ordinances appointed by Moses and the other prophets by divine command, were designed by God to prepare the way for the future Saviour of the world, to point to him, and to be types of him and his blessings. Sacrifice, expiation, and other ordinances of the Old Testament, were not appointed on their own account; but were intended as images of the more perfect ordinances to be expected in future time. Many of the expressions and images in the discourses of John the Baptist and of Christ respecting sacrifices, and the sacrificial lamb, lead to this conclusion; and the correctness of it is distinctly declared by the apostles; vid. Col. 2: 17. Rom. 3: 21. the Epistle to the Galatians, and Heb. viii. ix. x. John 19: 36.

But we are very liable to go too far in the illustration and development of these allegorical predictions; and this study frequently degenerates into an idle amusement. The charge of extravagance in this respect may be justly made against many of the ec-

clesiastical fathers, and many Protestant theologians of later times ; especially against Cocceius and his followers, at the close of the seventeenth century. The best way to avoid such mistakes, is to admit of no allegorical predictions except such as are mentioned in the New Testament ; and to extend the resemblance no farther, than it is carried there.

But we must not suppose, because some have made this subject ridiculous by their extravagance, that the New Testament does not authorize the belief of allegorical predictions. Such a supposition is most obviously untrue ; and the only reason why any have supported it, is, that they would *prefer* that an idea so inconsistent, as it seemed to them, with the spirit and ideas of our own age, should not be found in the New Testament. That the design of God relating to the future was not always made known immediately on the establishment of the ordinances of the former dispensation, does not prove that God, in founding those ordinances, had no such design. It was sufficient that he made it known, as soon as men were capable of understanding it ; vid. *supra* No. 4.

These allegorical or symbolical predictions and indications, are commonly called *types*. So they were called by the fathers, who took this term from Heb. 8: 5. Rom. 6: 7. 1 Cor. 10: 6, 11. They were divided into *typos personales*, certain persons (rulers, prophets, priests), who were the representatives of the Messiah ; and *typos reales*, to which the Levitical ritual, sacrifices, and other ordinances of Moses belong. Vid. Michaelis, *Typische Gottesgelahrtheit* ; Dr. Rau, *Freymüthige Untersuchung über die Typologie*, Erlangen, 1784, 8vo ; and most of all, Storr, *Commentar über den Brief an die Hebraer*, particularly SS. 199—203.

Note. In the instruction of the common people, the following view of this subject may be most scripturally and safely presented : by means of various religious ordinances and remarkable persons among the Israelites, God represented and pointed out the Messiah ; to these Jesus and his apostles often allude, in order to show that the present dispensation was of old designed and decreed by God, and in order to excite a due estimation of these benefits in us, who have, not the *shadow* simply, but the full enjoyment and possession of them ; Col. 2: 17.

Those who deny any direct revelation of the divine will during the Old Testament dispensation, declare themselves against allegorical predictions with great zeal. And so they must, in order to be consistent. But this shows, that their doctrine is not agreeable to the Scriptures, which affirm that both the Old and New Testaments contain direct divine revelations.

(8) Finally, all these observations are perfectly consistent with the principle, that many texts of the Old Testament are cited merely on account of some accidental resemblance in subject or expression; in the same way as quotations are made in works of every kind; conveying the idea, that *what was true in the passage cited in one sense, is true here in another sense*. Thus the text, Is. 53: 4, 5, "he removed our sicknesses," denoting *spiritual* sicknesses, is applied, Matt. 8: 17, to *bodily* infirmities. The discourse of Christ, John 18: 9, coll. c. 17: 12, affords a similar example. Cf. on this subject, Köppen, *Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*, Th. I. S. 235; Michaelis, *Dogmatik*, §§ 122—128; Scrip. Var. Arg. p. 609, sq. respecting *πληρωθῆναι, κ. τ. λ*; Kleuker, *Tractat. de nexu prophetico inter utrumque constitutionis divinæ fœdus*. [Vid. also Woods on Inspiration, Lect. II.—Tr.]

§ 91. *Of the successive degrees of the revelations and predictions contained in the Old Testament respecting the Messiah.*

Divine providence frequently makes a long and secret preparation for great and important events, before they are actually accomplished. Commonly it gives at first only intimations, and distant allusions; but gradually unfolds its designs more clearly. We might expect, then, with much probability, that the divine revelations respecting the Messiah would, at first, be comparatively scanty and obscure; and would gradually become more clear and evident. And such we find to be the fact. Besides, the early childhood of the world, and of the Jewish nation, was not prepared to receive full information upon this subject. Theologians observe very justly, that God has most exactly adapted the instruction given respecting the Messiah to the necessities of men, and the circumstances of particular times. The Messiah, accordingly, is sometimes represented under the image of a king, sometimes under that of a prophet, again under that of a priest; etc. § 90.

Four periods are commonly distinguished.

(1) *The first period* extends from the commencement of scriptural history to the time of David. In this period there is, by general confession, the most obscurity. From the remotest ages, however,

there was a general belief, that a time would come, in a distant futurity, in which God would show signal favor to men, and especially to *pious* men, in some extraordinary manner, by means of his prophets, and particularly *one* of them. This belief was sufficient; 'They saw the promised blessings from a distance;' Heb. 11: 13.

The first text of this kind occurs Gen. 3: 15. Vid. § 75, ad finem. [Also Hengstenberg's *Christologie*, S. 26, ff.] It was during the life of Abraham, and the times immediately following, if we judge from the Bible, that the general truth was made known, that his family would be the medium of communicating this great blessing to a future age. Here belongs the promise, Gen. 12: 3, that 'in Abraham all nations should be blessed.' This cannot mean that they should prosper if they received him and his posterity with kindness, and treated them as friends, and be unfortunate, if they did the contrary; but that this happiness should be diffused over all *through* Abraham, and his posterity; he should be the *instrument* or agent in the hand of divine providence. Farther, Gen. 22: 8, 'In (or through) thy *seed* shall all nations be blessed.' This cannot mean that Abraham's posterity, as well as he himself, should be remarkably favored by God; and all nations friendly to them, and who wished them well, should be prospered on their account. But here again is the idea conveyed, that *the great happiness of the nations* should proceed from Abraham and his posterity, the Israelites. The former passage is explained by this. The word זָרַע may be used collectively here, as Paul uses it, Rom. 4: 13. But in Gal. 3: 11, he refers this זָרַע more especially to the Messiah, and remarks, that it may be translated in the singular. Christ says expressly, that Abraham rejoiced in view of the birth and appearance of the Messiah upon the earth, John 8: 56; and all the writers of the New Testament agree in referring these texts to the Messiah.

Another text is found in the song of Jacob, Gen. 49: 10. This is not, indeed, cited in the New Testament as a Messianic prediction; but it is so understood by the Chaldaic paraphrast, the Talmud, and many of the Rabbins, among the Jews; and by Justin the Martyr, in the second century; and afterwards by Augustine and others, among the Christian fathers. The word שִׁילֹה, which Luther renders *Held* (hero) has been explained in a great variety of ways. But in whatever way this word is understood, the rest of this text applies very well to the Messiah. And if Abraham expect-

ed such a deliverer, and waited for the day of the Messiah, according to the declaration of Christ above quoted; the same certainly may be true, in the view of Christ, respecting his grandson, who had the same promises and indulged the same hopes as Abraham. This text declares, that "*the sceptre shall not depart from Judah,*" (i. e. the preeminence of this tribe over the others shall continue, although Judah was not the first-born; that tribe furnished the nation with the greatest kings and warriors, long before the time of the Messiah,) "*until at last the בְּיָדָא (to be descended from it) should come, and to him should other nations gather;*" i. e. many other nations, besides the Jewish, should be subjected to him, and dependent upon him. The best translation of בְּיָדָא is *proles ejus, filius ejus*, especially *his great descendant*. After Schultens, Stange has explained this word in the best manner, in his work, "*Symmikta,*" Th. II. S. 224, f., Halle, 1802; though I cannot consent to refer the whole passage to Solomon, as he does.

The last text is Deut. 18: 18, "*a prophet like me, will Jehovah raise up,*" etc. This text is referred to Christ in the discourses of Peter and Stephen, Acts 3: 22 and 7: 37; and is probably alluded to in John 1: 45. Moses is giving the distinguishing mark of true and false prophets, and wishes to assure the Israelites, that they would not be destitute of direct messengers from God after his death. By itself, therefore, it might be taken *collectively*, meaning 'prophets like me' etc. But if at the time of Moses, there was a belief in a general reformation of religion and morals, which should be effected in some future time in a special manner, by a prophet sent from God; (the opposite of which cannot be proved;) this word may be used *especially*, to denote this future reformer; and Jesus expressly says, 'Moses wrote concerning me,' John 5: 46.

Besides these, the origin of many of the symbolical predictions respecting the Messiah may be traced to this period; respecting them, vid. § 90.

(2) *The second period* comprises the reign of David. A considerable number of texts are found in the Psalms of David which may be referred to Christ, more easily and naturally than to any other person. Some of them make mention of very minute circumstances, which had their accomplishment in Jesus. These Psalms are actually referred to Christ in the New Testament. The most important of them are Ps. II. XVI. XXII. XL. CX. Now many of the

Psalms from which passages are cited in the New Testament, as referring to the Messiah, may, indeed, be understood to refer in their primary and literal sense to another king, from whose history they may be explained. But this is no objection to considering them, as the New Testament does, to be predictions of the Messiah, according to the principle contained in § 90. III. No. 5. E. g. Ps. XLV. LXVIII. LXIX. LXXII.

Sometimes, in these Psalms, the Messiah is represented as a king and priest, in short, in his exaltation. The wide extension of his kingdom is described; and the spiritual nature of his mission, is denoted with sufficient clearness. Thus Ps. II. and parts of Psalms XVI. XL. CX. *Again*, he is represented in suffering and humiliation. Thus Ps. XXII. and part of Psalms XVI. and XL. The piercing of his hands and feet, and the parting of his garments by lot, are mentioned in Ps. 22: 7, 14, sq. His death and resurrection are mentioned in Ps. 16: 10, 11, and also in Ps. 22: 25.

It was during this period that the appellation מָשִׁיחַ (*χριστός*) i. e. *king*, by way of eminence, became common; because the Messiah was described, as a ruler appointed by God, as the representative of the Deity upon earth. At this time, too, it was distinctly predicted, that he should be born of the line of David; vid. 2 Sam. 7: 12, sq. Ps. II. and LXXXIX. Acts 2: 30. 13: 34.

(3) *The third period* extends from the reign of David to the Babylonish captivity, and a little later. The writings of the prophets during this period contain many passages which treat of the future restoration of the Jewish state, and of the church, then fallen into great degeneracy; and which encourage the hope, that a distinguished reformer and deliverer, commissioned by God, would appear; and that with him the golden age would return to the earth. These blessings are not promised, however, to the Jews only, but also to the heathen, and to all who should desire to share in them. Indeed far better promises are given in these prophets to the heathen, than to the Jews: e. g. Is. II. and LXVI.,—promises which have been confirmed by the result. In this period, as in the second, the Messiah is described as a *king* and *ruler*, born from the line of David; as a prophet, and a reformer of religion and morals: as Is. 11: 1. sq. ch. XL.—LXVI.

But the passage, Is. LIII. is particularly applicable to the Messiah. It describes his humiliation, rejection, death, exaltation, the diffusion

of his doctrine, etc. No other person has been found in history, to whom this passage can apply ; although some have referred it to Hezekiah, others to the Jewish people, and others to Jeremiah ; vid. Döderlein, ' Uebersetzung des Isaías,' (Edit. 3d), where he endeavours to apply this passage to the Jewish people. Dr. Eckermann (Theol. Beytr. St. I. S. 192) endeavours to show, that the new Israelitish state is here meant by the *servant of Jehovah*. Stäudlin understands it of Isaiah, explaining it from the Jewish story, that king Manasseh persecuted Isaiah, and at last caused him to be sawn asunder. But this interpretation is *forced* ; and the story itself a modern *fable*. Paulus refers the passage to the better part of the Jewish nation, which was called עֲבֵרֵי יְהוָה. The New Testament always refers this passage to Christ and to none else ; and all other explanations must be allowed to be difficult and forced. There is no person in history to whom it applies, as well as it does to Christ. If we were not sure that it was written long before the birth of Christ, we might be tempted to believe, that it was an imitation of the evangelical history, and was an extract from it, clothed in poetical language.

The passage of Micah, (who was a contemporary of Isaiah) ch. 5: 1, was considered by the Jewish Sanhedrim as giving indubitable indication of the birth place of the Messiah, Matt. 2: 4, sq. In Zech. 12: 12, 13, we have the lineage of the family of David, from which the Messiah should be born (vid. Dathe in loc.) ; and in Hag. 2: 7—9, an exact indication of the time in which he should appear, viz. the time of the second temple. This passage treats, indeed, more particularly of the gifts, presents, and offerings, which foreigners would bring to the second temple. Still it exhibits those cheerful prospects for the future which were first realized at the time of the Messiah. The passages Mal. 3: 1. 4: 5, 6, respecting the Messiah and his precursor Elias, are more clear.

The passage Dan. 9: 24, sq. respecting *the seventy weeks* has been commonly considered very important, and as calculated to carry conviction even to the Jews. But the passage is so obscure, and is encompassed with such numerous difficulties, that it is not so useful as many believe, for the purpose of convincing the Jews, that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah. Some modern interpreters have even doubted whether the Messiah is the subject of the passage. By מְשִׁיחַ some have understood Cyrus, others, a king. Modern commentators have labored with the greatest zeal to throw light

upon this subject. Clauswitz, Michaelis, Hassenkamp, Dathe, Blayney, Gerdes, Velthusen, Less, Døderlein, and Berthold, have written upon it; but much yet remains uncertain. Still it cannot be referred to any but the Messiah, without doing violence to the words. And so much is clear from this passage, that the advent of the Messiah is fixed to a time, which has now been past for upwards of a thousand years. The Jews then may be convinced from this passage, that the Messiah has long since come; and then from other passages, that Jesus is the person in whom all the characteristics of the Messiah are found. [Cf. the late Commentary of Hengstenberg on Daniel.—Tr.]

(4) *Fourth period.* We have already shown in § 89, from the New Testament and other writers, how general the expectation of the Messiah was about the time when Jesus appeared, and shortly after, especially after the Jews became subject to the Romans; and how this idea was modified by the great multitude, and intermingled with various unscriptural views. A few, however, entertained right conceptions. If we had more Jewish writers of this latter period, especially more from the Jews of Palestine, who had written upon the religious opinions of their nation; we should certainly obtain more accurate and distinct knowledge upon this point. Still in what we do know with certainty, we have enough for our thorough conviction. Farther; one age was distinguished above another in the earnest expectation of the Messiah to come; just as among Christians, one age is distinguished above another in its belief on the Messiah already come. Even in the Christian church, some one doctrine has, at one particular time, been made more prominent than others. And so it was in the Jewish church.

Thus far the first Chapter, as introductory. We have now to consider the doctrine respecting Jesus Christ himself; what he was according to the description of the New Testament; and what he performed for the salvation of men. The New Testament proposes Christ himself as the foundation of the Christian faith, John 17: 3. We shall treat first of the history of Jesus, or of the doctrine of the *states* of Jesus; in Chap. II. Then of the *person* of Jesus Christ, in Chap. III., it being inconvenient to treat of this subject first, as is done in many systems. Finally, the doctrine respecting what Christ has done for the good of man, or respecting the *work* and office of

Christ (*de munere Christi*); in Chap. IV. Morus discusses all these subjects, pp. 134—196; and has interspersed many excellent exegetical, doctrinal, and practical observations; but he treats them in a very broken and disconnected way; and in an entirely different order from what is common in the systems; and, in short, in a manner not very much calculated to facilitate the subject to the student just commencing his theological studies.

CHAPTER SECOND.

HISTORY OF JESUS IN HIS TWO STATES OF HUMILIATION AND OF EXALTATION.

§ 92. *The scriptural representation of the two principal periods in the life of Jesus ; the scriptural names of these periods ; the proof-texts ; and some conclusions.*

Before the man Jesus was raised by God to that illustrious dignity (δόξα), which, according to the testimony of the New Testament, he now enjoys even in his human nature ; he lived upon the earth in greater depression and indigence, more despised and neglected, than the greater part of mankind. This gave occasion to the division of the whole life of Christ, into two parts, or conditions ; —the state of *humiliation* and the state of *exaltation* ; or better, *status humilitatis et gloriæ*. These conditions might be called, with equal scriptural authority, the states of subjection and of dominion, of poverty and splendor, of lowliness and majesty, etc.

1. Scriptural names of both conditions.

(1) Ταπεινός, ταπείνωσις, and ὕψος, ὑψοθῆναι. These, which are the more common theological terms, are taken from Phil. 2: 8 (ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν), and v. 9 (θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε). Ταπεινός denotes, in general, *misery, inferiority, indigence* ; and ὕψος, *elevation, greatness, majesty* ; James 1: 9, 10. Matt. 23: 12.

Note. The word ἵψοῦν is applied by Christ himself, in a different sense, to his crucifixion, John 3: 13, 14. 8: 28. 12: 32—34. For the *verba exaltandi* signify also among the Hebrews, *to hang up, publicly to execute a malefactor*. Vid. Gen. 40: 13, 19.

(2) Σάοξ, and the opposite πνεῦμα. Σάοξ and רַפּוּז do not denote simple *humanity* and *human nature* ; but frequently *weak*,

mortal, suffering humanity; and the depressed condition in which man lives. They are nearly synonymous with *mortalis*, *conditio mortalis*. The opposite πνεῦμα denotes *what is perfect, a perfect condition*. Thus Paul, 1 Cor. 15: 50, calls the mortal body of man σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, which he afterwards calls ἐπίγειον, and σῶμα ταπεινώσεως. The heavenly body he calls πνευματικόν, and the heavenly condition of Christ πνεῦμα. Accordingly, the humble life of Christ upon the earth is called ἡμέραι τῆς σαρκός, Heb. 5: 7; and βίος ἐν σαρκί, 1 Pet. 4: 2. The same explanation must be given to the following terms: viz. Χριστὸς ἐλήλυθεν, ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, 1 John 4: 2. 1 Tim. 3: 15, 16; σὰρξ ἐγένετο, John 1: 14; σπέρμα Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, Rom. 9: 5. 1: 3, 4; and 1 Pet. 3: 18. Vid. Döderlein, in Repert. II. S. I. f.

(3) The term παθήματα is applied to the state of humiliation, 1 Pet. 1: 11; and the phrase αἰ μετὰ ταῦτα δόξαι to the opposite state. For in fact, the sufferings and calamities of Christ were by no means confined to the last period of his life, but were extended through the whole of his state of humiliation; cf. Luke 24: 26, where παθεῖν stands contrasted with εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν. The phrase δόξα καὶ τιμή is used in the same way in Heb. 2: 9 (Ps. viii.), and δοξασθῆναι very frequently in John; as in chap. xvii.

(4) The words τελειωθῆναι and τελείωσις are applied to the state of exaltation, Heb. 2: 10. 5: 9. The phrase, διὰ παθημάτων (τελειῶσαι), added in Heb. 2: 10, signifies, *AFTER the sufferings endured*. These words are literally used to denote the reward of victors in mock contests, when they receive the prize (βραβεῖον); in which sense Philo uses them. Cf. XII. 23.

II. Most important proof-texts.

These are, on the general subject, 1 Pet. 1: 11. Heb. 1: 3, 4. 5: 7—9. 12: 2, 3, sq. The first of these has been already explained, No. I.; the second will be, when we come to speak *de statu exaltationis*. But the two passages, Phil. 2: 6—11 and Heb. 2: 9—11, may be considered as the most full. A brief explanation of these two passages is here subjoined.

(1) Phil. 2: 6, sq. Paul exhorts Christians to imitate, in respect to their feeling towards others, the example of Jesus, who renounced and sacrificed all his own advantages for their good. The passage

relates to Jesus, considered as the Messiah. *Μορφη θεοῦ* stands in opposition to *μορφη δούλου*, v. 7; and so denotes *divine authority* and *majesty*. *Μορφή* is the same as *σχημα*, v. 7. The same sentiment is expressed more strongly by the phrase *εἶναι ἰσα θεῶ*, *equal to God, the image of God*. Homer applies the epithets *θεοεικελος*, *ἀντίθεος*, *divine, equal to God*, to Ulysses and Achilles. The antithesis is *ὁμοίωμα ἀνθρώπων*, v. 7, which signifies not merely *similar to*, but the *same as*, men. ('He that sees me, sees the Father,' John 14: 9.) Christ is the image of God upon earth, Col. 1: 15. Heb. 1: 3.

Οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο i. e. he did not wear his divinity for the sake of ostentation, nor did he make a vain display of it; the antithesis of which is in v. 3.—*Ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν*, v. 7, is synonymous with *ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν*, v. 8. *Κενός* corresponds to the Hebrew *רָיק*; and *רֵיק* is rendered *poor, needy* in the LXX, and in Luke 1: 54, where *κενός* and *πλουτοῦντας* are contrasted. This phrase then is synonymous with the one used in 2 Cor. 8: 9, *ἐπτόχευσε δι' ὑμᾶς*, *se ipsum demisit ad statum tenuem*, he let himself down, he freely sacrificed the riches, privileges, and all the divine majesty and glory, which he might still have possessed.

Ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, *after he appeared as man*, he assumed the form of a servant. Indeed (v. 8), he went so far in his obedience to the divine will, that from love to his Father, and to us, his brethren, he submitted to death, and even to a disgraceful crucifixion.

"Therefore" (in reward for his sacrifice and obedience) "has God highly exalted him," (this is explained by what follows,) "and raised him to supreme dignity" (*ὄνομα*, Heb. 1: 4). The reference is to the name *Lord*, v. 11, which denotes his *dominion over every thing* in his state of exaltation; according to vs. 10, 11. Heb. 1: 4. "That before Jesus," (or at the name of Jesus, the name *κύριος*;—*audito nomine Jesu*, i. e. before Jesus as their Lord,) "the inhabitants of heaven, earth, and the under-world, should bow the knee;" i. e. *universal* reverence and adoration should be rendered to him (as to *kings*, Is. 45: 23); "and that all, with one mouth, should confess, that Jesus, the Christ, is Lord (*κύριον*) or universal ruler (v. 10)."—*Εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πατρός*, "this contributes to the honor and glorification of the Father," John 17: 4, 6. Whoever does this, honors the Father; for it is his will that all should honor

the Son, John 5: 23 ; inasmuch as Christ, even now, since his return to God, provides for the extension of the kingdom of God upon earth, and promotes morality and happiness.

(2) Heb. 2: 9—11. Paul shows that man, at some future time, will pass into a happy life, and into a perfect condition, although, while upon earth, he is imperfect and mortal. This he illustrates from the example of Christ, who in this is similar to us.

“We see that Jesus, who [like other men] was inferior in dignity to the angels, (vid. Ps. 8: 5,) was crowned with glory and honor, after he had endured sufferings.” (He was thus depressed, in order to suffer death for the good of us all, according to the gracious purpose of God.) “*For it became God, from whom all things proceed, and to whose glory every thing contributes,—it became him* (i. e. nothing else could be expected from his justice and goodness,) *to bestow upon Jesus the highest blessedness, after he had endured sufferings, and had led so many children* (worshippers of God) *to glory* (the enjoyment of eternal blessedness); *and had thus become the author of their salvation* (ἀρχηγὸς σωτηρίας). *For he that sanctifies* (ὁ ἁγιάζων, Jesus) *and they who are sanctified* (ἁγιαζόμενοι) *are of one race* (or common human origin, ἐξ ἐνὸς sc. πατρὸς sive αἵματος, Acts 17: 26. He is man, as well as we). *Hence he is not ashamed to call us brethren* (relatives).” Here we see clearly on what analogy the Apostle argues.

III. Results from these and other texts ; and general observations on the doctrine of the conditions of Christ.

(1) The states of humiliation and exaltation concern the human nature only, and not the divine nature of Christ. These texts refer only to the man Jesus, or to Christ as man. For as God, he is always the same (ὁ αὐτός), and can neither be humbled nor exalted. But the ancient writers frequently express themselves incautiously and loosely upon this subject. Origen says, ‘the divine nature let itself down from its majesty, and became man.’ De prin. II. 6. Gregory of Nyssa says, ‘*κενοῦται ἡ θεότης ἵνα χωρητὴ γένηται τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει.*’ Such language indeed admits of explanation, and was understood by them in a right sense ; but it is hard and inconvenient, and not according to the example of the Holy Scriptures.

(2) Two things, as we may learn from these passages, are impli-

ed in the humiliation of Christ. (a) The abdication, surrender, or renunciation which he made, for the good of man, of the exalted privileges which he could have enjoyed (*carentia sive abdicatio usus majestatis suæ*). This is commonly called *κένωσις*, from Phil. II., *ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν*, which Luther renders, “*Er äusserte, or entäusserte sich selbst.*” The idea, however, is founded rather upon the whole subject of this passage and of other passages, such as 2 Cor. 8: 9, than on this particular word. It is also implied in the idea of his *elevation*. For he *then* entered upon the possession and enjoyment of all his rights and privileges. (b) His submission to great misery and to many sufferings. Although innocent himself, as the Bible represents him, yet for our good he *freely* submitted to all that distress and wretchedness, which are the inevitable consequences of our sins; vid. Phil. II. and the other texts cited.

Note 1. Theologians have disputed, whether Christ *laid aside* the use of his divine attributes, or continued in the actual possession of them, only veiling them from the eyes of men. There were various opinions upon this subject in the Lutheran church, even as early as the sixteenth century. But in 1616, a controversy commenced between the theologians of Giessen and Tübingen, and other theologians of Württemberg. Those of Giessen maintained, that Christ frequently *renounced* the use of his divine attributes, and alleged the word *ἐκένωσε*. But the theologians of Tübingen maintained, that the *κτῆσις idiomatum divinorum*, existed in Christ even *in statu exanitionis*, although he never used them; so that it was a mere *κρίψις*. This controversy was in a good measure logomachy. The theologians of Saxony rather favored the views of the theologians of Giessen than of Tübingen. So much, however, is certain, that if the person of Christ, even during his life upon earth, was the person of the Son of God, (as he himself clearly affirms,) it was *possible* for him to exercise his divine attributes. But, on account of the work which he had to perform upon earth, he forbore the full use of them; which is just what the theologians of Tübingen would say; vid. the works cited by Morus, p. 173. n. 3. Cf. p. 192. n. 3. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 470.—Tr.]

Note 2. Theologians generally allow some use of these attributes on different occasions. Others object that this is not consistent with the *constant* humiliation of Christ while upon the earth, and is not clearly supported by the New Testament. He himself frequently says, especially in the gospel of John, that he performed the miracles which he wrought as man, through a miraculous divine power, and as the messenger of the Father. The case was the same as to his instruction. Neither Jesus himself, nor the apostles, ever alluded to his proper divinity in such a way as to imply that it qualified him, as a man upon earth, to instruct and work miracles. He had resigned his divine prerogatives, and his qualifications are always considered as derived from the Father; vid. § 102. But this free renunciation of the privileges which belong-

ed to him as God, did not exclude the use of them, when occasion should require. Christ himself said, that he performed his work in common with his Father, John 5: 17, sq. and c. X.; he that saw *him*, saw the Father, John 14: 9; his *glory* which the apostles had *seen*, was a glory which belonged exclusively to the only begotten Son, John 1: 14.

(3) Although Jesus lived upon earth in humiliation and indigence, *his whole life upon earth* cannot be called, as it is by many, a *state of humiliation*. The passage Phil. II. is often appealed to in behalf of this opinion. But Paul evidently mentions the *ταπεινωσις, κένωσις*, and *μορφή δούλου* (2: 8, 9) as constituting only a part of this life. The *incarnation* is never mentioned in Scripture, as belonging to the *state of humiliation*. It is so considered, however, by many of the ecclesiastical fathers; as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa; and by many of the Latins; as Leo the Great, in his epistles. They are consequently compelled to assert that God, or the divine nature of Christ, lowered itself, by becoming man. Neither are the forty days which Christ lived upon earth after the resurrection, to be enumerated among the days of his humiliation (*ἡμέραι σαρκός*).

(4) The state of humiliation is commonly divided into five *gradus*, degrees, periods; and the state of exaltation, into the same number. Some, however, suppose more, and others fewer. The *common* division and arrangement is taken from the so named *apostolical creed*. But the object of this creed was not to make a systematic and logical division, and to determine the limits of the two conditions; but to oppose certain doctrines condemned by the orthodox church as erroneous. The *conception* is made to stand first; but this does not belong to the state of humiliation, because the divine nature cannot be lowered; nor could the human nature, before it existed. [Vid. Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 471.—Tr.]

We proceed now to treat of Christ considered as *man*, or of the man Jesus, in the state of his humiliation upon earth, §§ 93—96; and then in the state of his exaltation and glory, § 97—99, incl.

§ 93. *Of the origin, conception, birth and youth of Jesus; his true humanity, and the excellencies of it.*

Jesus was the son of Mary, conceived by her in a miraculous manner (*διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου*), Matt. 1: 18. Luke 1: 35; of the posterity of Abraham, Rom. 9: 5, and the royal line of David. The register of his descent is inserted both in Matt. 1: 1, sq. and in Luke 3: 23, sq. They both agree in making him the descendant of David, however they may apparently differ in tracing his descent. Ancient writers did not agree upon the method of reconciling the two tables. The most correct solution is this; that Matthew gives the genealogy of Joseph, of whom Jesus was the adopted son; and Luke that of Mary. Both descended from David; Joseph, through Solomon, and Mary, through Nathan, who also was David's son. Jesus was born in the reign of Augustus, Luke 2: 1; probably earlier by some four or five years, than the common Dionysian mode of reckoning, which we follow; accordingly in the thirtieth year of the reign of Augustus, 749 (according to Dionysius, 754) from the building of Rome. We subjoin the following doctrinal observations.

I. Miraculous conception of Christ.

The scriptural view of the events of the world is altogether different and higher than the common view. The Bible derives every thing which takes place in the material world directly from the will and agency of the Supreme Being, and refers every thing back to him. But it teaches, at the same time, in what way, by what means and appointments, God arranges and accomplishes all things which take place around us. With regard to all important events especially, we are taught by scriptural principles, that they have their deeper origin in the invisible world, and that the way is prepared for them by God, and that they are finally brought forward into maturity and accomplishment, chiefly through the ministry of superior spirits. Such, then, for a higher reason, was the fact respecting that most important of all events, the appearance of the Saviour of the world, and of his precursor. It was required, not only by the Jewish nation, but by the whole ancient world, that great and extraordinary persons, employed by God as instruments for the accomplishment of his designs, should receive some extraordinary and miraculous at-

testation of their mission, and proofs of their authority. Such attestation was expected at and before their birth, during their life, and at and after their death. Vid. Wetstein on Matt. 1: 20. Now though God is represented in the Bible, as a Being high and exalted over all, he is still described as willingly complying with the necessities of men, as condescending to them, and in his intercourse with men acting after the manner of men; especially whenever, by so doing, he can attain his great objects, their sanctification and salvation. Accordingly those extraordinary men, by whom God intended to promote these objects, received his seal to their testimony in that extraordinary manner, which was calculated to convince mankind, and to satisfy their expectations. In this manner, the Bible informs us, was the testimony of Moses and all the prophets, down to John, of Jesus also and his apostles, confirmed by God.

It deserves to be mentioned, in this connexion, that the Jews called the Messiah *the second Adam*, (as Paul did,) and that they imagined he would be born as guiltless and pure, as Adam was when he first came from the hands of God, and was therefore called *τοῦ θεοῦ (υἱος)*, Luke 3: 38. In common generation, as Scripture and experience teach us, the depravity of man is propagated. But Christ is described in the New Testament, as similar indeed to us, but without sin.

Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, Luke 1: 35, signifies *miraculous divine power*, and is synonymous with *δύναμις ὑψίστου*, vid. Acts 1: 5, 8. Every extraordinary and supernatural event takes place through the influence of the Holy Spirit, and the performing of all miracles is referred to him. The phrases *to come upon one* (*ἐπελεύσεται*), and *overshadow one* (*ἐπισκιάσει*), amount to the same thing: ‘thou shalt experience a miraculous divine power exerted upon thee; thou shalt become pregnant by this divine miraculous power, in an extraordinary way.’ In Matt. 1: 20, it is briefly said, “that which is born of her ἐκ Πνεύματος ἁγίου ἐστὶν ἄγιον.”

The phrase, *conceived from the Holy Ghost*, which occurs in the ancient creeds (e. g. in the apostolic creed), is derived from this passage (Matt. 1: 20). (This phrase was introduced as antithetic to the declarations of such as considered Jesus to be a natural son of Joseph and Mary. For he was so considered by many of the Jews at the time of Christ, (cf. Luke 3: 23,) and by some Christian sects; as the Ebionites; vid. Iren. Hæres. V. c. I. This same opin-

ion has been advocated lately in a work entitled, 'Versuch eines schriftmässigen Beweises, dass Joseph der wahre Vater Christi sey,' Berlin and Stralsund, 1792, 8vo. The author of this work does palpable violence to the sacred writers, and has not considered this narrative in the spirit of the age in which it was written. His explanation goes upon the supposition, that the two first chapters of Matthew are spurious, and that Luke, in his narratives, followed a report which had circulated only among a few Christians, respecting the conception of Christ.) From the New Testament it is certain, that before the conception of Jesus, Mary was a virgin; cf. Matt. 1: 23, and Luke 1. The extraordinary manner of her conception has led many to say, that the name of *παρθένης* belongs to her, even since the birth of Christ. This name, however, is not given to her in the New Testament after this event; on the contrary Christ is said to be *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός*, Gal. 4: 4. When the monastic life became popular, and the unmarried state was regarded as the most holy and pleasing to God, the opinion prevailed, that after the birth of Christ, Mary lived, even in the married state, in entire continence, like a nun, and had no children by Joseph. Hence she was called *ἀειπαρθένης*. In the fourth century, this opinion was almost universal; and Epiphanius and Hieronymus pronounced Apollinaris, Helvidius, Jovinian and others who disputed it, to be heretics. But Basilus the Great considered it as a question of minor importance.

II. True humanity of Christ.

From the New Testament it is evident, that Christ was a real man, both as to body and soul. He had feelings, senses, and organs of sense, as we have. He hungered, thirsted, shed his blood, and died. He exhibits, too, all the properties of the soul. He attained gradually to the knowledge and understanding which he possessed as a man, Luke 2: 52. He displayed human feelings, joy, sorrow, indignation, etc. Luke 22: 42, 44. 23: 46. Paul calls him expressly, *ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς*, 1 Tim. 2: 5. Men are called his *brethren*, Heb. 2: 11—14. He frequently calls himself, *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, the more proper meaning of which phrase is, *the son of Adam, the great son of Adam*, *ὁ δευτερός Ἀδάμ*, as Paul says. But in whatever way this phrase is understood, it clearly denotes the true humanity of Christ. The phrases: *he came or appeared in the flesh, he became flesh*, denote the same thing, John 1: 14. 1 John 4: 3. Rom. 8: 4, sq.

But certain popular prejudices, and incorrect philosophical principles, led some to doubt, and others to deny this clear truth. Hence the *true humanity* of Christ was expressly mentioned in the ancient creeds.

(1) Some taught, that Christ did not possess a *true human body*, but only a bodily phantom and shade; that he appeared ἐν δολήσει or φαντάσματι, for such aerial bodies were then ascribed to departed spirits, and even to divinities. These were the persons who believed that *matter* was the origin of all evil, and did not proceed from God, but from an evil and malicious being. Hence according to their view, the pure divine spirit of Christ, one of the highest æons, could not have dwelt in a material body. Those who held these opinions were called *Docetæ* and *Phantasiasts*; they comprized most of the Gnostics, as Marcion and others; also the Manicheans and their followers.

(2) After the fourth century, others denied the existence of the *human soul of Christ*, believing that it was unnecessary, inasmuch as the Logos supplied its place. We find, indeed, that the oldest fathers had no particular and distinct conception of the human soul of Christ. They did not deny its existence; but they made no distinct and express mention of it in their writings, presupposing it, as understood of course. Origen in the third century, taught, for the first time, the exact doctrine of the human soul of Christ, and showed its importance. It was a considerable time, however, before this doctrine was introduced into theology, as a specific article. It did not become universal among the Catholics until after the middle of the fourth century; when Apollinaris the younger appeared, and boldly denied that Christ had a human soul. Afterwards he determined more exactly, that Christ indeed possessed the ψυχήν (animal soul), which was the organ by which the Logos operated upon the human body of Jesus; but that he was destitute of the πνεῦμα, νοῦς (the rational soul), the place of which was supplied by the Logos. Attention was now excited, for the first time, to this doctrine; it was introduced into the Christian creed; scriptural refutation of the error of Apollinaris was sought; decrees of councils were made, and laws were enacted against it. [Vid. Hahn, Lehrb. §95, S. 456. Neander, Kirchengesch. B. I. Abth. III. S. 1060, ff. and B. II. Abth. II. S. 904—Abth. III. S. 1170.—Tr.]

III. Excellencies of the humanity of Jesus.

A. In respect to his *body*.

(1) The beauty of his appearance. Many of the fathers imagined him to be the ideal of manly beauty; and the painters of succeeding ages have endeavoured to express this in their pictures of him. The New Testament itself gives us no means of determining either for or against such a supposition. Only we must be careful, if we adopt this opinion, not to consider it essential; and must remember the declaration of Christ, *ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ὠφέλει οὐδέν*, John 6: 63; and what Paul says, that *γινώσκειν Χριστὸν κατὰ σάρκα* is not the thing required, 2 Cor. 5: 16. Vid. Carpov, Progr. 'de forma oris et corporis Christi,' Helmstädt, 1777.

(2) The immortality of his body. We reason thus: immortality belonged to Christ because he was without sin; for death is the consequence of sin, Rom. 6: 23. He was not subjected to the necessity of dying; although he actually died, in obedience to God, and from love to us, and for our advantage. This took place, however, not against his will, but with his consent, John 10: 18. Hence Paul mentions it as the express design of the incarnation of Jesus, that he *might* suffer death.

B. In respect to his *soul*. Among these are,

(1) His extraordinary human understanding, sagacity, and knowledge. His whole history proves, that even as a man, he was not of the common and ordinary class, but one of those great and extraordinary persons, of whom the world has seen but few. But he was like other men in this respect, that his talents and intellectual faculties did not unfold themselves at once, but gradually; and were capable of progressive improvement. Hence Luke records (2: 52), that he *προέκοπτε σοφία*. Hence too, he *learned* and *practised* obedience to the divine command, and submission to the divine will, Heb. 5: 8; he *prepared* himself for his office; etc.

(2) His perfect moral purity, and the blamelessness of his life. Theologians call this, the *sinlessness* (*ἀναμαρτησία*) of Jesus. The greatest honesty, virtue, and piety shone forth in all the doctrines and discourses,—in the whole life and conduct of Jesus. Hence most of the enemies of Christianity admit this excellence, of the moral doctrine and of the person of Christ, and consider him as an example of piety and virtue. Cf. Hess, Geschichte der drey letzten

Lebensjahre Jesu.' [Also the remarkable passage in Rousseau's Conf. du Vic. Sav. in his Emilius.] The most important passages which treat of the sinlessness of Jesus are : 2 Cor. 5: 21, *μη γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν*, i. e. *peccati expertem esse* (Is. 59: 8) ; 1 John 3: 3, 5, *ἄγνός ἐστι*, and *ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἔστι ἐν αὐτῷ*. Heb. 4: 15, ' he was like us, but *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*' 1 Pet. 1: 19, *ἀνοῦ ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου*. The texts also in which it is said, that he was obedient to the will and command of God, belong in this connexion : as Heb. 5: 8 (which is called *obedientiam activam*), and many passages in John.

Jesus being free from sin, was free from the punishment of sin, and from all that evil which men bring upon themselves by their own sins. He suffered, what he did suffer, undeservedly and voluntarily. Vid. Heb. 7: 27. 1 Pet. 1: 19. The sinlessness of Jesus is to be regarded as a consequence of the fact, that he was born without moral pollution ; cf. § 92.

But this subject is frequently represented, as if it would have been impossible for the man Jesus to sin ; and as if his virtue and holiness were absolutely *necessary*. Cf. Baumgarten, Diss. de *ἀναγκαιότητι* Christi, Halle, 1753. But,

(a) The Scripture nowhere teaches that the *possibility* of sinning would have ceased in Adam and his posterity, if Adam had not fallen. The possibility of erring and transgressing, would belong to man, even if he had no natural depravity. Otherwise, Adam could not have fallen ; for before the fall, he was without original sin. The case must have been the same, therefore, with the man Jesus, although he was without natural depravity ; vid. § 80, II. 2.

(b) If it should be *impossible* for a man to live otherwise than virtuously, or if his virtue should be necessary, it would have no value and no merit. All freedom, in that case, would vanish, and man would become a mere machine ; according to the remarks made in the place just referred to. The virtue of Christ, then, in resisting stedfastly all the temptations to sin, acquires a real value and merit, only on admission, that he could have sinned. It was in this sense doubtless, that Scotus made that affirmation, which was alleged against him, *humanam naturam Christi non fuisse ἀναμάρτητον*.

(c) This opinion is, in fact, scriptural. For (α) we are frequently exhorted to imitate the example of Jesus, in his virtue, his conquest of sinful desires, etc. But how could this be done, if

he had none of those inducements to sin which we have, and if it had been impossible for him to commit it, (β) Improvement in knowledge and in perfections of every kind is ascribed in Scripture to Christ; and Paul says, “that through sufferings he constantly improved in obedience (ἐμαθεν ὑπακοήν),” Heb. 5: 8. (γ) We read expressly, that Christ was *tried*, i. e. tempted to sin; but that he overcame the temptation, Matt. 4: 1, sq. This temptation took place shortly before his entrance upon his public office, and tended to prepare him for it. It was intended to exercise and confirm him in virtue, and in obedience to God. But what object could there have been in this temptation, if it had been impossible for Jesus to yield to it? And what *merit* would there have been in his resistance? No difference is made in the thing itself, and in its consequences, by considering it, with Farmer and others, as a vision and parable, and not as a real occurrence. If it was impossible that Christ, as a man, should sin, it would be hard to find what the Bible means, when it speaks of his being tempted, and commends him for overcoming temptation.

IV. Early history of Jesus.

As the gospels contain but little important information respecting the events of the *childhood* of Christ, the apostles themselves could not have been acquainted with many credible circumstances relating to it. The Apocryphal gospels contain a multitude of stories and fables upon this subject, especially the Gospel “*infantiæ Christi*.” Vid. Fabricii Codex apocr. N. T. T. I. It cannot be proved, that Jesus performed miracles before his entrance on his public office, to which he was consecrated by John the Baptist. The supposition is, in fact, contradictory to the clear declaration of John, who calls the miracle in Cana of Galilee, ἀρχὴν σημείων, 2: 11.

Joseph was a mechanic. Hence Jesus is called ὁ τέκτονος υἱός, Matt. 13: 55. All the ancient stories agree, that he followed the employment of his father; which is very probable, since he himself is called ὁ τέκτων, Mark 6: 3. Besides, it was not uncommon for the Jewish literati to learn and practise some handicraft. So Paul did, Acts 18: 3. It appears from the united testimony of the ancient fathers, that Jesus was *faber lignarius*, τέκτων ξύλων. Even in Hebrew, שֵׁנִי denotes a *carpenter*, by way of eminence, 2 Kings 22: 6.

But Jesus was also learned in the Jewish law and all Jewish literature ; although he had not studied at the common Jewish schools, nor with the lawyers ; vid. John 7: 15, *πῶς οὗτος γράμματα οἶδε, μὴ μεμαθηκώς* ; cf. Matt. 13: 54. Probably divine providence made use, in part, of natural means, in furnishing Jesus with this human knowledge. Mary was a relative of Elizabeth, the pious mother of John the Baptist, and a guest at her house, Luke 1: 36, 40. We may imagine, then, that Jesus received good instruction in his youth from some one of this pious, sacerdotal family. We see from the first chapters of Luke, that Joseph and Mary belonged to a large circle of pious male and female friends, in whose profitable society Jesus passed his youth, and who contributed much to his education as a man ; especially as they expected something great from him, from his very birth ; as appears from Simeon. Respecting the early history of Jesus, vid. Casauboni 'Exercitt. in Annales Baronii.' Hess, in the appendix, to his 'Geschichte der drey letzten Lebensjahre Jesu ;' and Heilmann, 'Opusc.' Tom. II. p. 501, sq.

§ 94. *Of the doctrine of Jesus, and his office as teacher.*

The work committed to Christ by God, was twofold : (a) to teach by oral instruction and example ; (b) to suffer and die for the good of men. Both together compose what is called the *ἔργον* of Christ, John ch. xvii. And it was that he might execute *both* of these offices, that, according to the Bible, he became man. We treat here, in the first place, *of his office as teacher.*

I. Commencement and continuance of his office as teacher ; also the names and importance of this office.

(1) Jesus entered upon his office as teacher, according to the custom of Jewish teachers, when he was about thirty years of age, Luke 3: 23. Respecting the continuance of his office, the opinions of the learned have differed from the earliest times. The opinions most wide from the truth, are, on one side, that of Irenæus, that it was sixteen years ; and, on the other, that it was only one year. Origen supposed, that it was *three years and a half* ; which has be-

come the common opinion, and is founded upon Luke 13: 7, 33, and upon the computation of the passover, especially according to John. Cf. Morus p. 149, § 3.

(2) The New Testament every where teaches, that Christ, considered as a man, was qualified by God for his office as teacher, by extraordinary intellectual endowments; like the prophets of old, and his own apostles in after times; only in a far higher degree than they. John 3: 34, God gave to him *οὐκ ἐκ μέτρου τὸ πνεῦμα*. The prophets had these endowments, but in a less degree; he, as the highest messenger of God, had them *without measure*. Acts 10: 38, *ἔχρισεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ δυνάμει*. Jesus received these higher gifts of the Spirit when John baptized him; for he himself submitted, of his own accord, to this baptism, by which the Jews were to be initiated into the kingdom of the Messiah. John himself was convinced by a confessedly miraculous occurrence at his baptism, that Jesus was the Son of God, and heard a heavenly voice which expressly declared him such, Matt. 3: 13—17. John 3: 31—33, coll. Luke 4: 1, 14. Whatever, therefore, the man Jesus either did or taught after his baptism, he did and taught as the messenger of God,—as an inspired man, under direct divine command, and special divine assistance; *ἐν πνεύματι*, as the New Testament expresses it. Vid. Morus p. 149, not.

The name of a *prophet* (נָבִיא), which denotes in general an immediate messenger, and authorized ambassador of God (vid. § 9, No. 2), was given to Christ, because, as above remarked, he taught by divine inspiration, and proved to his contemporaries the truth of his doctrine and of his divine mission by miracles, John 14: 10. The Jews expected this of the Messiah, whom they hence called נְבִיא ה', ὁ προφήτης, by way of eminence; vid. John 6: 14. Matt. 21: 11. Luke 24: 19. Acts 3: 22, and other texts.

Christ commonly called his office as teacher, and indeed his whole office, *ἔργον*, his *work, business*; (cf. John 17: 4;) also *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πατρὸς* (John 4: 34, sq.), in order to show, that the Father himself had commissioned him; according to what he elsewhere declares, that his doctrine was not his own (discovered by himself as a man), but revealed and entrusted to him (the man Jesus) by God, John 12: 49. 14: 10.

The name *σωτήρ* (benefactor of men) is given to Christ, partly because he died for our good, and partly because he is our teach-

er by precept and example. Both of these belong to the great work of Jesus ; and one ought not to be separated from the other. He himself says (John 18: 37), that he was born and had come into the world to proclaim the true doctrine (*ἀλήθεια*) ; and that his kingdom (*βασιλεία*) was the kingdom of truth. But we owe it to his death alone that we become citizens of this kingdom, John 3: 6. His death is always described as the procuring cause of our salvation ; and our sins are not forgiven us on account of our own reformation and holiness, but on account of the death of Christ.

II. Christ's method and manner in his ministry ; and the chief contents of his doctrine.

(1) The instruction which Christ gave was partly *public*, (John 18: 20,) and partly *confidential* or private. And accordingly the manner and nature of his discourse were different. Like all the ancient teachers, he had two classes of hearers and disciples ; the *exoteric*, those who were publicly instructed, and the *esoteric*, the disciples of the inner school, to whom he gave private instruction. The Jews of Palestine, at the time of Christ, were very ignorant, misguided and prejudiced. Christ was, therefore, compelled to condescend to their level ; and was unable fully to instruct them in many truths, for which they had no relish, and which they could not understand. He could carry them no farther, than the first elements of his doctrine ; and had first of all to endeavour, to excite them to attention and inquiry ; vid. Matt. 13: 11, sq. Luke 10: 1, 10, *ὑμῖν (esotericis) δέδοται γνῶναι μυστήρια βασιλείας ; ἑκείνοις (exotericis) οὐ δέδοται*. His disciples were not, however, to keep any secret doctrines (*disciplina arcani*) for themselves ; but as soon as their hearers were prepared for it, to give them still farther instruction, and declare to them the whole ; vid. Matt. 10: 26, 27. Luke 8: 17.

But although the instruction of Jesus was so variously modified as to manner and subject, according to the wants of his hearers ; his doctrine itself was always the same. He had no twofold scheme of salvation ; one for the refined and the noble, the other for the mean and uncultivated ; but one and the same for all. "Repent and believe the gospel" was his direction, as it was of John the Baptist. This was the great point which he brought to view in all his discourses before rich and poor, enlightened and ignorant. We do

not find, that Jesus ever withheld or omitted any of his doctrines, or even proposed them less frequently, because they might be offensive, or unpleasant to his hearers, or opposed to their inclinations. On the contrary, he exhibited these very hated truths with the most frequency and urgency; because they were the most important, salutary, and indispensable to his hearers. He disregarded their persecution and contempt. The doctrines of his death and its consequences, of the necessity of regeneration and of holiness, are examples of this kind; John III. VI. VIII. X. His early disciples followed his example in this respect; as appears from Acts and the epistles. And his disciples in all ages are sacredly bound to do the same; and if they do not, they are *unworthy of him*.

Moreover, his public religious instruction was in a high degree intelligible, throughout practical, and adapted to the necessities of his hearers. It was without fear or favor of man, Matt. 22: 16, 46. He was eloquent and impressive, and skilfully availed himself of the present occasion, place, and circumstances, John 4: 14, 34, sq. The populace, accordingly, found his instructions far more excellent, impressive, and sincere, than those of the Pharisees or lawyers. With all this, however, he was, as a teacher, in a high degree modest and unpretending, vid. Matt. 11: 29. John 7: 16—18.

Considering the imperfect knowledge of his hearers, Jesus endeavoured to represent the truth as palpably and obviously to their senses as possible, and frequently spoke in figures. He frequently availed himself of the sayings and proverbs current among his contemporaries. Following the example of the ancient, and especially of the oriental moralists, he frequently taught moral principles in apothegms, as in the Sermon on the Mount. But he made the most use of *parables*, which were very commonly employed by Jewish teachers in their instructions. Vid. Vitringa, De Synag. Vet. L. 3. Storr, De parabolis Christi, in his Opusc. Academ. Tom. I.

He gave most of his instructions in the *religious dialect* common with the Jews. And many of his expressions, e. g. in the Sermon on the Mount, in his address to Nicodemus, etc., cannot be clearly understood without a knowledge of this dialect. It is the same, for the most part, as we find in the Talmud and in the writings of the Rabbins. But much of the ancient Jewish phraseology, had been frequently misunderstood and perverted. These abuses Christ corrected, and gave a different, more just and important

meaning to this ancient phraseology ; as wise teachers of religion have always done. But the superior impression which the scriptural language, and the phraseology of the Old Testament made, led Christ to use them, in preference to any other, even where another might have answered his purpose.

We observe in all the discourses of Jesus a wise forbearance and indulgence of such prejudices (e. g. respecting the kingdom of the Messiah, § 89), as could not have been at once removed, or were not necessarily of injurious practical tendency. This is called *συγκατάβασις*, *œconomia*, *accomodatio*. But we find no case in which Jesus ever taught any thing which he considered as false or erroneous, merely because it might be pleasing to his hearers, or agreeable to prevailing prejudices. Such a course would be contrary to his own maxims and his whole mode of procedure, and could not be justified on correct moral principles ; vid. §§ 64, 65. This, it seems, is more and more conceded by modern theologians. Many who do not consider Jesus as a divine teacher in the strict sense, prefer saying that he *mistook* in this or that particular, to allowing that he declared or taught any thing which he himself considered erroneous. They perceive, that the latter supposition is entirely irreconcilable with the moral purity which is every where exhibited in the character of Jesus. Others however, who are not willing to allow that Jesus taught any thing inconsistent with their own opinions, affirm that Christ did not actually believe, in such cases, what he said, but accommodated his doctrine to Jewish opinions, in which he himself had no belief. But they cannot prove the fact ; and they do not consider in what a suspicious light they place his character. One that allows Christ to be a divine teacher, if he would be consistent, must admit his declarations and doctrines without exception, and will not venture to select from them, at pleasure, what he will believe, or to prefer his own views to those of Christ, or to affirm that Christ could not have taught such a thing, because it appears differently to him, or because it is contrary to the prevailing opinions of his age. See Heringa, Ueber die Lehrart Jesu und seiner Apostel in Hinsicht auf die Religionsbegriffe ihrer Zeitgenossen ; a prize-essay, Offenbach, 1792, 8vo ; Storr, Erläuterung des Briefs an die Hebräer, Th. II. S. 536, f. and Opusc. Theol. Iste Abhandl.

(2) The contents of the *public* instruction of Jesus. On this

subject and on the plan of Christ in general, cf. Dr. Reinhard, Ueber den Plan des Stifters der Christ. Relig.

(a) He instructed his disciples in the doctrine respecting God, and his attributes; especially respecting his impartial and universal love to sinful men; and his desire for the welfare of all; respecting providence, and reward and punishment after death. This last doctrine he made eminently practical.

(b) He taught them, with still more particularity, the destination of man, and the duties of the true worshipper of God; especially the love of God and of our neighbour, in opposition to Jewish exclusiveness. He placed before them the motives for the fulfilment of these duties; and refuted many practical prejudices, which were common to the Jews, and other nations. He always opposed the arrogance, self-righteousness, and self-confidence of 'men'; and endeavoured to show them, that their virtue was very imperfect, and that they deserved nothing on account of it, and received every favor from the grace of God; Luke 17: 9. 18: 9. Matt. 20: 1, sq.

(c) He endeavoured to give them juster views respecting the Messiah, and the benevolent design of God in his mission, and the new order which he was to bring about; in short, respecting the *kingdom of God*. He proved to them that he was the Messiah, and predicted the wide extension of his religion. He endeavoured to awaken in his hearers a feeling of the necessity of a Saviour.

(d) He instructed them in the exalted, heavenly dignity of his person, John v. viii. x.; respecting his death, its causes and happy consequences. He assured them that he was the person, *through* whom, and *on whose account*, men would be saved; that he was the Saviour of men, through whom they obtained freedom from sin and from the punishment of sin; and all this, through the influence of his doctrine and instruction, and especially of his death; John iii. vi. viii. x. He announced the entire abolition of the Old Testament dispensation and the Mosaic institute, and the near approach of the time when a spiritual and perfect worship should be established universally. Instructions of this kind are mostly found in John. Still they were only the first indications. For Christ had reserved the more perfect instruction to be given by his disciples after his death and ascension. He only went before them, and prepared his hearers for the instruction which they would afterwards give. He sowed; but it was for them and their successors to reap the full harvest; John iv.

We find, as a general thing, that Jesus, in his *public* instructions, aimed principally at the improvement and correction of the *Jewish doctrine*; in order to prepare and qualify the great multitude for the reception of his religion: while in his *private* instructions, on the other hand, he discoursed more particularly on his own institutions; vid. Matt. 22: 29. John 3: 1, sq. 4: 7, sq. In his public discourses, he frequently treats of general moral truths; not however in the common unprofitable way, in which men are told what they ought to do, without being told how to do it. He shows how the law of Moses should be interpreted, and warns against the false explanations commonly given to it, and the additions made to it by men; and against the falsification of the divine commands; Matt. v. sq.

He was accustomed, like many of the Jewish teachers in his age, to travel about with his disciples; and to teach in the synagogues, on the high ways, in the market places, the field, and the temple; vid. John 18: 20.

(3) The *private* instruction of Christ.

He had destined his *intimate friends* (esoteric disciples) to be the future teachers, through whom his great plan should be carried into execution. To these he gave more minute explanation and instruction respecting the doctrines mentioned in No. 2. He solved for them any difficulties or obscurities which remained in his public discourses; vid. Mark 4: 10, 11, 34. But even this instruction was in a great measure only elementary, and preparatory to their future destination. Hence he frequently endures their weakness and their prejudices with wise forbearance; John 16: 12—15, 25, sq. Acts 1: 7, sq. He tells them expressly, that they could not understand or endure at that time, many things which it was important for them to know. And he promises to instruct them more perfectly after his departure by means of the Paracletus, and to make known to them the whole extent of whatever it should be necessary for them to know and to teach, for their own good or the good of others, John 14: 26. 16: 12—14; etc.

NOTE. Although Jesus frequently declares, that his doctrine is of divine origin, and revealed to him by God himself (since he was the greatest of the divine messengers), we are not to suppose from this, that every particular doctrine which Christ taught was given out by him as entirely *new*, and as imparted to him by direct inspiration of God. Many of his theoretical and practical doctrines were known to the Jews of his age, from the writings of the

Old Testament, as Christ himself says, Matt. 5: 17; or by some other means, e. g. the unwritten instructions of the prophets, who lived at and after the time of Babylonian captivity. But Christ completed and amended these doctrines, made additions to them, and placed them in relations and connexions, which were entirely new and peculiar, thus giving them new weight and interest. This was the case with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, regeneration, prayer, etc. It may, therefore, be said with truth, that a great part of all the doctrinal and moral instruction which is found in the discourses of Jesus, actually existed among the Jews of his own age. We find many of his maxims, parables, etc., in the Talmud and the Rabbins. Vid. Lightfoot, Schöttgen and Wetstein on the N. T.

But while we willingly concede this, we may also truly maintain, that Jesus founded a new religious system. He himself says distinctly, that the religious teacher must make use of both new and old doctrines. "A Christian teacher must be like a householder, who brings out of his treasure things new and old," Matt. 13: 52. But Christ did more than any other religious teacher before or since his time, by teaching not simply what men have to do; but by providing and pointing out the means, by which they can perform their duties; vid. John 1: 17. Tit. 2: 11, sq.

The question disputed by Theologians, Whether Christ can be called a new law-giver, may be decided by these considerations. *Civil* laws and institutions are here out of the question; *such* Christ did not intend to establish, since his kingdom is not of this world. *Law* must be understood as synonymous with *religion, religious doctrine*; according to the use of the Hebrew *הִלְכוֹת*, and the Greek *νόμος*. The question would then be, more correctly, whether he was a *new religious teacher*. The remarks above made, show that Christ is entitled to this name; and in a far higher sense than Moses was. He himself calls his religion, and the ordinances and institutions to be connected with it, *καινήν διαθήκην*, in opposition to the ancient Mosaic dispensation, Matt. 26: 28. And Paul calls Christ the *author* and *founder* of the new dispensation (*μεσίτης καινῆς διαθήκης*), Heb. 9: 15. 12: 24. His religion, according to Paul, succeeds to the Mosaic, and puts an end to the Mosaic dispensation as such. The term, *novus legislator*, has been rendered suspicious in the view of some theologians from the use which Socinians make of it, designating by it the whole office and merit of Christ.

Note 2. Jesus always appeals to his miracles, and proves by them that his doctrine is divine, John 7: 11. His apostles do the same, Acts 2: 22. But this proof is altogether rejected by many at the present day; or, at least, very little regarded. This is the case among those, principally, who labor for the abolition of all positive religion, and the introduction of the religion of reason. For the *positive* divine authority of the religion of Jesus stands or falls with his miracles. The truths of reason which Jesus taught would, indeed, remain valid, although confirmed by no miracles. But in that case, his declarations would not continue to possess divine authority. We should no longer be compelled to believe in any of his doctrines *because he taught them*; as he always requires us to do, John IV. Our belief on the contrary would be entirely in-

dependent of him and of his declarations. His declarations and doctrines would be subjected to the revision of human reason, like the declarations and doctrines of any merely human teacher. The authority of Jesus would not be more binding than that of Socrates, of Confucius, Zoroaster, and other wise men of antiquity. Whoever, then, denies the miracles of Jesus, removes all that is positive in the Christian religion; the sure consequence of which is, that every man may believe as much of the Christian doctrine as he pleases, and is by no means bound to admit the truth of whatever Jesus says; because he is of opinion that the doctrine of Jesus is subjected to the revision of his reason. To such an one, the writings of the New Testament may possess an historical, but not a *doctrinal* value. Cf. Rühl, *Werth der Behauptungen Jesu und seiner Apostel*, Leipzig, 1792, 8vo; especially the first treatise.

§ 95. *Of the hardships and sufferings of Jesus.*

I. During his whole life upon the earth.

Although it is true, that Jesus suffered a great deal while he was upon the earth, we should avoid all unscriptural exaggeration of this subject; and not maintain, that his whole earthly existence was mere, uninterrupted suffering. We find scenes in the life of Jesus, which caused him many happy and cheerful hours, Luke 10: 21. Matt. 17: 1, sq. Jesus, as a man, possessed very tender feelings and warm affections, John xi. Both pain and pleasure, therefore, made a strong and deep impression upon his heart. The evangelical history exhibits him, as at one time in deep distress, and at another in great joy.

His external trials and hardships consisted principally in his great poverty and indigence, Matt. 8: 20. Luke 9: 58. 2 Cor. 8: 9.; the many difficulties and hinderances in the way of the accomplishment of his office as teacher; contempt, persecution, danger; and the suffering which the disobedience and obstinacy of his contemporaries occasioned him. The sufferings which he endured at the end of his life will be considered in No. II. The following remarks will serve to the better understanding of the doctrine respecting the sufferings and adversities of Jesus.

(1) Human infirmities and calamities are of two kinds: viz. (*a*) *Natural*; which are founded in the laws and constitution of human nature, and are therefore common to all men. Jesus too, we find, was subject to these, § 93; but in common with all others;

and when he became a true man, he of course subjected himself to them. (b) *Contingent* (accessoriæ;) which do not happen to all, but only to a few. Such are lowliness, poverty, contempt, etc. Jesus, as a man, was not necessitated to endure these; and the very opposite of them was expected in the Messiah. He submitted to them, because the divine plan for the good of men required it; Heb. 12: 2. Phil. 2: 6, 7.

(2) Many things which are commonly accounted hardships and trials, are not so in the eyes of the true sage, who is superior to the prejudices of the multitude. And on the other hand, many things which are commonly admired as the best fortune, do not appear to him either good fortune, or real welfare. We should be careful, therefore, not to enumerate among the sufferings and afflictions of Jesus, such things as would be so accounted only by the voluptuary and libertine, and not by the wise man. Such things are his frequent journeys, his being born in a stable, laid in a manger, etc. These circumstances in themselves considered, were no hardships to a man who disregarded convenience and worldly honor.

Religious teachers must exercise great caution on this subject. There is a double disadvantage in enumerating such circumstances among the *sufferings* of Jesus; one is, that the common people will be confirmed in the error, which is very prevalent, of considering the goods of fortune, rank, birth, splendor, and other external advantages as of great value: the other is, that they will be encouraged in effeminacy and false sensitiveness. The example of Jesus in his humiliation ought, on the contrary, to be employed to show, that a man of true piety and magnanimity needs none of those external advantages, which are commonly so highly esteemed, in order to be happy and contented; that a man, even in poverty and humiliation, may be highly useful to others; etc. The sufferings of Jesus, considered in this light, are very encouraging and cheering to despised or neglected worth. And the New Testament makes this very use of the doctrine of the sufferings and humiliation of Jesus. E. g. Heb. 12: 2, *αἰσχύνῃς καταθρόνῃσας*, i. e. he was so superior to his enemies in greatness and strength of spirit that he disregarded their insults, and their foolish judgments respecting him.

The sufferings of Jesus are eminently calculated to impress our

minds with a view of his great love to men. He became poor for our sakes, that we might become rich. The proper effect of this view is to lead us to gratitude and cheerful obedience.

(3) Some are accustomed to particularize the sins for which Jesus atoned by particular hardships and sufferings; and also the virtues, for the performance of which he at such times procured us the power. But we ought not to go beyond the New Testament, and to make arbitrary distinctions, which have no scriptural ground. The Bible does not represent Christ as enduring, in the highest possible degree, every imaginable distress of mind and body. The greatness of the merits of his sufferings depends neither upon their continuance, nor upon their magnitude and variety. The sufferings of Christ would still possess their whole adequate value, even if he did not endure every imaginable distress.

II. Sufferings of Christ at the end of his life; commonly called his passion.

(1) The sorrowful feelings of his *soul*, or his *mental* suffering, his anguish of heart, exhibited most strikingly on the Mount of Olives in Gethsemane, Matt. 26: 37—44. Luke 22: 41—44. This anguish is described by Luke as great to an extraordinary degree. He felt it shortly before his enemies commenced their abuse. In view of this distress many difficulties have arisen. The martyrs of religion have frequently exhibited under greater sufferings than these, and tortures which they have actually solicited, a joy and firmness, which we have been accustomed to admire. Besides, Jesus exhibited, throughout all the rest of his life and his after sufferings, an unexampled magnanimity and power. He foresaw his sufferings with cheerful courage, and undertook them of his own accord. But Jesus did not exhibit, either in the last moments of his life or at any other period, that ill-timed enthusiasm which was so much admired in the Christian martyrs of the second and third centuries. Nor, on the other hand, did he shew any cold insensibility to suffering. Both enthusiasts and philosophers are therefore displeased with his allowing himself to feel this fear and timidity; and many interpreters have exerted their skill upon these passages, to pervert their true meaning. Why such despondency and anguish just at this time? We remark upon this subject,

(a) There is nothing in the conduct of Jesus at this time, which

is inconsistent with a great man. He was far from that apathy and stoicism, which the martyrs exhibited either from affectation, enthusiasm, or insensibility. He actually endured therefore, for a considerable time, the pains of death which are natural to men; as appears from Matt. 26: 39—44, and John 12: 27; and Paul says distinctly, Heb. 5: 7, 8, that Christ wished to resemble us, his brethren, in respect to the painful accompaniments of death, in order to qualify himself better to become a compassionate high-priest. 'He prayed to God who could deliver him from death, with loud crying and tears.' A forced, stoical apathy is entirely opposed to the spirit of Christ and his religion. Christianity pronounces against every thing which is forced, artificial, and unsuited to the nature which God has given us. It is the duty of men to improve and to increase in holiness; but they should still continue to be men; and not be ashamed of human feelings, and of the natural and innocent expressions of them. The example of Christ is instructive in this respect. But the most important consideration is the following: viz.

(b) These sufferings, as Jesus and his apostles always taught, were endured for our sakes, and were the punishment of our sins. This being the case, it was necessary for Christ to feel that he suffered. He could not, and should not remain insensible. We must see by his example, what we deserved to suffer. Some hours before his death, Jesus assigned this as the true object of his sufferings—'he would shed his blood for the remission of the sins of men,' and he instituted the Lord's Supper in memory of this great event, Matt. 26: 28. This suffering, therefore, arose principally from a view and a lively feeling of the great multitude of sins, their criminality and liability to punishment. Cf. Harwood, Ueber die Ursachen der Seelenangst Christi, 4 Abhandl. Berlin, 1774. The history of the sufferings and death of Christ is considered in this light throughout the gospel and epistles. He suffered and died for us, and on our account; and we thus learn, what we deserve. This history was not intended to produce a short and transient emotion, or mere compassionate sympathy. And the preacher who employs it for these purposes only, neglects its proper object. This is a great fault of many Passion and Good Friday discourses!

(2) The great *bodily* sufferings and tortures which he firmly endured; with which is connected,

(3) His condemnation to a violent death on the cross, and his undergoing of this sentence. His life of humiliation on the earth *ἡμέραι σαρκός* closed with his death. For the time which he lived upon the earth after his resurrection did not belong to it. Crucifixion, which was designed for *slaves* and *insurgents*, was a very disgraceful punishment; vid. Gal. 3: 13, coll. Deut. 21: 23. Paul therefore considers it as the lowest point of the humiliation of Jesus, and calls it *ταπείνωσις* in distinction, Phil. 2: 5—8. cf. Heb. 12: 2. Every thing was ordered by God in such a way as to convince the world beyond a question, that his death had actually taken place; vid. the circumstances, John 19: 30, sq. In that age, no one doubted the fact. Jesus was laid in the tomb as plainly dead. He remained in the tomb until the third day, that the fact of his death might be the more certain. His burial was honorable. The passage Is. 53: 9, may well be referred to this event: "he was destined to a grave among transgressors; but was buried with the rich." The New Testament does not, however, expressly cite it as applicable to this event.

The question has sometimes been asked, Whether the *burial* of Jesus belonged to his state of humiliation or exaltation. It is sufficient to answer, neither to one nor the other. The burial concerned only the lifeless body, separated from the soul. But according to the common way of thinking and feeling among men, the circumstances of the burial were honorable to Jesus, and should therefore be rather connected with his exaltation, than his humiliation.

Note. At the time of the apostles no one doubted the actual death of Jesus. All, Christians, Jews, and Gentiles, as appears from the New Testament, were firmly convinced of it, as an undeniable fact. Some, however, appeared in the second century, who either doubted or denied the actual death of Christ; or who gave such a turn to the affair, as to remove from his death and crucifixion whatever was offensive to the Jews and heathen. The death of Jesus was not however disputed on historical grounds, for there were none; but merely for *doctrinal* reasons. The doctrine of Christ's death was inconsistent with some of their philosophical hypotheses. Most of the Gnostics and Manicheans, who maintained that Christ had a seeming or shadowy body, contended that he did not actually suffer tortures and death; but only *ἐν δοκίσει* (seemingly, in his seeming body); vid. § 93, II. The Basilidians maintained, that Jesus was not crucified, but Simon of Cyrene in his stead. Cerinthus taught, that one of the highest æons, Christ or the *λόγος*, united himself with the man Jesus, the son of Joseph and Mary, at his baptism; that Christ deserted

the man Jesus during his sufferings, and returned to heaven; and that thus the man Jesus alone suffered and died. In accordance with this opinion he and his followers explained the exclamation of Christ upon the cross, "My God! why hast thou forsaken me?" Matt. 27: 46.

This desertion (*derelictio a Deo*) has been very differently understood, even in modern times. The words which Christ uses are taken from Ps. 22: 1;—a psalm which he frequently cites as referring to himself. It is the language of a deeply distressed sufferer, who looks forward with anxious longing to the termination of his sufferings, and to whom the assistance of God, comfort, and consolation seem to disappear altogether, or to delay too long. The phrase *to be deserted by God*, is frequently used without implying a prevailing doubt in the actual providence of God: as Ps. 71: 11. Is. 49: 14. Notwithstanding, this anxious feeling was one of the greatest and most piercing of the mental sufferings of Jesus. At the same time it is very consoling and quieting to one who comes into similar circumstances, especially at the close of his life; since he can count upon being heard in the same way. Thus Jesus was enabled shortly before his death, when he saw his approaching end, joyfully to exclaim, *τετέλεσται*, i. e. now every thing, which I had to do or to suffer according to the will of God, is accomplished and perfected; John 19: 30. coll. v. 38. This term refers especially, as *πληροῦν* does in other cases, to the fulfilment of what was predicted concerning him as the decree of God; vid. Luke 18: 31. 22: 37. Acts 13: 29.

III. Attributes and motives of the sufferings of Christ.

Jesus underwent all these sufferings and death itself (1) *innocently*, Luke 23: 14, 15 and the parallel texts, 2 Cor. 5: 21. 1 Pet. 2: 22, 3: 18; (2) *freely*, Matt. 16: 21—24. John 10: 11, 17, 18. 13: 1, 21—33. 18: 1—8; (3) with the greatest *patience* and *firmness*, 1 Pet. 2: 23; (4) *from unexampled and magnanimous love* to us; also from *obedience* to God, he herein subjected himself to the will and decree of God, vid. § 88; John 15: 13. Rom. 5: 6—8.

Theologians call this obedience which Jesus exhibited in suffering *passive obedience*, from Phil. 2: 8, "obedient unto the death of the cross." The active obedience of Christ, his doing every thing which was suitable to the divine will and command, was considered § 93, III. They are one and the same obedience in reality. The origin and advantage of this distinction will be farther considered in the Article on justification. The various *objects* and uses of the sufferings of Christ will also be considered more fully in the same Article, § 115. Cf. Morus pp. 160, 161, § 7.

§ 96. *Of Christ's descent into Hell.*

I. Meaning of the phraseology, *to descend into hell*, (כַּדְּרֵי שְׁאֵל, καταβαίνειν εἰς ᾗδην,) and an explanation of the texts relating to this subject.

(1) The ancients believed universally, not excluding the Orientalists and the Hebrews, that there was a place in the invisible world, conceived to be deep under the earth, into which the disembodied souls of men, good and bad, went immediately after death. The name of this place was שְׁאֵל, ᾗδης, *orcus*, *the under-world*, *the kingdom of the dead*. This word never denotes *the place of the damned*, either in the Scriptures or in the Fathers of the three first centuries. Accordingly the phrase *descendere in orcum*, always denotes in the Bible, *the separation of the soul from the body*, and *the condition of the disembodied spirit after death*; Num. 16: 30, 33. Job 7: 9. Ps. 55: 16. Is. 14: 15; and frequently in the apocryphal books of the Old Testament. When the heroes of Homer are slain, their souls are said to descend to Hades.

This phrase may then be explained, in this sense, to refer to the *death* of Christ; and so it is a tropical or figurative representation of his death, and the separation of his soul from his body. When he died, he descended into Hades, and continued there, as to his soul, as long as his body continued in the grave. We find the continuance of Christ in Hades actually mentioned in this sense in the New Testament. Peter, in his speech (Acts 2: 27), cites the passage, Ps. 16: 10, οὐκ ἐγκαταλείψεις τὴν ψυχὴν μου εἰς ᾗδου, which is always referred to Christ's death and continuance in the grave. The phrase καταβαίνειν εἰς ᾗδην, does not indeed occur in that passage; but the omission is merely accidental. It was certainly used by the first Christians respecting Christ as *deceased*, in the same way as respecting other dead.

(2) But the chief dependence is placed upon two other texts of the New Testament; in which the descent of Christ to hell is expressly mentioned, and in one of which his employment in Hades is thought to be determined.

(a) Ephes. 4: 9. But the context shows, that the descent of Christ to hell, is not the subject in this text; but his descent from heaven down to the earth; and his subsequent return into heaven.

(b) The principal passage is, 1 Pet. 3: 18—20. Various explanations are given of this passage. In the earliest times, it was universally considered as denoting the continuance of Christ in Hades; and this meaning is undoubtedly the most natural, and best suited to the words, the context, and all the ideas of antiquity. But as this meaning does not accord with modern ideas, various other explanations have been attempted. But the context shows that the continuance of Jesus in Hades is the subject of this passage; i. e. that it treats of the condition and employment of the soul of Christ after death. The Apostle is showing, from the example of Jesus, that suffering for the good of others, is honorable and will be rewarded. Christ laid men under great obligations to him, by suffering and dying for them, v. 18; by what he did too, after death, while his spirit was in Hades, v. 19; (v. 20, is parenthetical;) by his resurrection, v. 21; his return to God, and his elevated situation in heaven, v. 22. The sense then is: the *body* of Christ died; but his *soul* was preserved. (Peter always uses *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα* in this sense; as 4: 1, 6.) While his body was lying in the grave, his soul (*ἐν ᾧ*, sc. *πνεύματι*) wandered down to the kingdom of the dead, and there preached to the disembodied spirits. It was the belief of the ancients that the Manes still continued, in the under-world, to prosecute their former employments; vid. Is. 14: 9. The same belief is seen in the fables of the Grecian kings and judges. Tiresias still continued to prophecy. Vid. Is. 14: 9. Christ, by his instructions and exhortations to reformation, deserved well of men while he was upon earth. He continued this employment in Hades. He preached to the greatest sinners; and Noah's contemporaries are particularized as distinguished examples of ancient sinners, v. 20. Now that Peter really supposed, that Christ descended to Hades, appears from Acts 2: 31.

II. A sketch of the history of this doctrine.

For the various opinions of commentators respecting the descent of Christ to hell, cf. Dietelmaier, *Historia dogmatis de descensu Christi ad inferos*, ed. 2. Altorf. 1762, 8vo; Semler, in *Programm. Acad.* p. 371 sq; Pott, *Epistola Catholica perpetua annotatione illustr.* Vol. II., Göttingen, 1790, Excurs. III. (ad 1 Pet. 3); and Dr. Hacker, (court-preacher in Dresden,) *Diss. de descensu Christi*

ad inferos, ad provinciam Messiae demandatam referendo, Dresden, 1802. [Cf. Hahn, S. 472.]

The passage Acts 11, coll. Ps. 16: 10, was the foundation upon which this doctrine was built. Its simple meaning is, that Christ really *died*, like other men, and that, while his lifeless body lay in the grave, his soul was in the same place and state with the souls of all the dead. So the early Christians undoubtedly understood it. The question now arose, was the soul of one, who while on earth had been so active for the good of men, idle and unemployed in Hades? No. Hence a third question, What was his employment while there? The same as on earth;—*he instructed*,—was the natural conclusion, which was confirmed by the word ἐκῆρυξε, 1 Pet. 3: 19.—But since in later times, Hades was understood to signify only *the place of the damned*; and since *φυλακή* and *sinner*s are mentioned by Peter in this passage; it was *thither*,—to the place of the damned,—that Christ was supposed to have gone, to preach repentance (κηρύσσειν), to show himself as a victor in triumph, etc.

Such is the course which the investigation of this question naturally took. Now the historical sketch itself.

(1) The ecclesiastical fathers of the three first centuries, were agreed in the opinion, that during the three days in which the body of Christ lay in the grave, his soul was in the kingdom of the dead. This opinion they derived correctly from 1 Peter 11. and Acts 11. By this representation, they supposed, in substance, the condition of Christ, as to his soul, during his death, to be described. Thus Irenæus says, ‘Christ in this way fulfilled the law of the dead,’ V. 31. Clement of Alexandria expresses himself in the same way. Origen says, *γυμνὴ σώματος γενομένη ψυχὴ*, Contra Celsum II. Tertullian says, ‘Christus forma humanæ mortis apud inferos (est) functus;’ etc.

They differed in opinion respecting his employment there. Most supposed, that he preached the gospel to the ancient believers who expected his advent,—to the patriarchs, etc. Vid. Iren. (IV. 45, 50). Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen and others. But Origen and some others seem to have believed, that Christ rescued the damned who believed on him in Hades, and transported them to the abode of the blessed. Still, the *descent to hell* is nowhere expressly mentioned in the ancient creeds of the three first centuries, either in the eastern or western Church. No one, in

this period, held it to be the interment of Christ. Nor did any one assert that he went *exclusively* to the place of the damned.

(2) This doctrine was gradually regarded as fixed after the fourth century, and was adopted into the *creeds*. The phrase, *καταβήθοντα εἰς τὰ καταχθόνια*, was established at the Arian Council at Sirmium in the year 357, and at many orthodox and Arian Councils after that time. It was now inserted in the more ancient creeds, to which it had not previously belonged; e. g. into the Apostolical creed; particularly, as it seems, on account of the controversies with Apollinaris. But all the churches had not admitted it into this creed before the sixth century. Ruffin says (*Expos. S. Ap.*), that the Romish church did not admit this doctrine into the Apostolical creed, '*nec in Orientis ecclesiis habetur*,' and adds, that the word BURIED which is there used, conveys the same sense. The reason why this doctrine was so much insisted on, and admitted into the creeds, especially after the middle of the fourth century, is, that it afforded a weighty argument against the followers of Apollinaris, who denied the existence of a human soul in Christ. *Vid.* § 93, II. ad finem. It may be added, that the fathers of the fourth century, and of the one succeeding, adhered for the most part to the opinions found among the earlier fathers; No. 1.

(3) The opinions of the earlier fathers were gradually set aside in after ages, especially in the *Western church*. The opinion, that the separation of the soul from the body was all that was intended by the representation of Christ's descent to hell, was by degrees entirely laid aside. The *infernus* was considered by many as the appropriate designation of the place of the damned, and the passage in 1 Pet. III. as the only proof-text; and so the *descent to hell*, became equivalent to the descent of Christ to the place of the damned. Such were the views of many of the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas adopted the opinion of Hieronymus and Gregory, that Christ rescued the souls of the pious fathers who lived before Christ from the *limbus patrum* (a kind of entrance to hell, *status medius*). So also the Council at Trent.

They now began to dispute, whether the soul only of Christ was in hell, or his body also; whether he was there during the whole time in which his body was in the grave, or only on the third day, shortly before the resurrection, etc. Durandus and other schoolmen, understood the matter figuratively. According to them, Je-

sus was not in hell *quoad realem præsentiam* (as to his substance), but only *quoad effectum*. This opinion had many advocates.

The Protestant theologians since the Reformation have been divided in opinion upon this subject.

(a) Luther spoke very doubtfully upon the subject, and was unwilling to determine any thing decidedly. He agreed at first with Hieronymus and Gregory, in supposing a *limbus patrum* whither Christ went. But whenever he mentioned the subject, especially after 1533, he was accustomed to remark, that Christ destroyed the power of the Devil and of hell, whither he went with soul and body. This induced the theologians, who adhered strictly to every particular doctrine of Luther, to represent the *descent of Christ to hell* as his victory over the Devil; as was done in the *Formula Concordiæ*, Art. ix. M. Flaccius had represented the descent to hell as belonging to the state of humiliation. But they represented it as belonging to the state of exaltation, and declared that on the moment of the resurrection, Christ repaired to hell, with soul and body, and in both natures,—showed himself to Satan and hell as victor, and then appeared alive upon the earth at day-break. They are not so unreasonable, however, as to demand a belief in all their distinctions respecting this doctrine. Hutter, Baier, Winkler, Carpzov, and others held these views. But there is no foundation for them in the Bible. Some of the ancient creeds say, *the gates of hell* (kingdom of the dead) *trembled at his approach*; e. g. the Sirmian creed, 357.

(b) Beza and other Reformers understood the *descent of Christ to hell* to mean his *burial*. Russ and Rambach among the Lutherans assented to this opinion. It is false, however; for descent to hell, in the sense of the ancients, does not refer to the body but to the soul; vid. *supra*.

(c) Others affirmed, that Christ preached the gospel in Hades; some say, to the believers who lived before his advent; others, to the wicked also, and that such as submitted to him, were delivered from the place of the damned; almost like the opinion of many of the ancients. Even Seiler thinks this opinion very probable. He supposes, with others, that both the body and soul of Christ were in Hades. But Flaccius, Brentius, Dreyer, and others agree with the ancients, that only the soul of Christ was there, while his body lay in the grave. But these differ again on the question,

whether the descent to hell belongs to the state of humiliation or exaltation.

(d) Some supposed, as Durandus did, that the whole subject should be understood figuratively.

(e) Zeltner, Baumgarten, Oeder, and others returned to the ancient opinion, and understood ᾗδης to denote in general, *the place and condition of departed spirits*. So most of the English and Arminian theologians.

(f) John Aepinus, (a Lutheran theologian at Hamburg, of the sixteenth century,) affirmed that Jesus endured in hell the pains of the damned, and therefore accounted his descent thither as belonging to the state of humiliation. He had many followers; though he was not the first who advanced this opinion. Cardinal Nicolaus of Casa had before asserted the same thing, in the fifteenth century; and also many Reformed and Lutheran theologians since the sixteenth century; as John Agricola, Hunnius, Brentius, Cocceius, and Witsius.

We omit the mention of the peculiar hypotheses of some other theologians.

II. Critical observations, and a result from what has been said.

Theologians at the present day are agreed, for the most part, that this question is one of minor importance. Some have often affirmed, that the passage, 1 Pet. iii. did not relate to this subject. But all the other explanations given are forced and unnatural; and the idea, after all, is scriptural; for the passage Acts ii. cannot be explained away. According to the passage, 1 Pet. iii. the soul of Christ actually went to the *place of the damned* (φυλακή, carcer cæcum) in Hades, and there *preached* to the disembodied spirits. Until the last Judgment the souls of all the deceased are in Hades, (i. e. they are *manes*, disembodied,) but in different regions, distant from each other (i. e. *in vario statu*); Luke 16: 19—31. Christ, then, during his continuance there, did what he was accustomed to do while yet on the earth for the good of men; he *instructed* those who needed instruction, and *exhorted*. The object and use of this preaching, which is mentioned in the passage in Peter, we cannot see; since those who are in Hades are always represented by Jesus, the apostles and Peter himself, as fixed in their destiny, and reserved to the day of Judgment; cf. Luke xvi.

It will be sufficient for the teacher of religion to say, that the phrase, *Christ descended to hell*, teaches (1) that during the time in which the body of Christ lay in the grave, he was really dead; and (2) that the human soul of Christ was in the same unknown condition and place, to which the souls of all the deceased go, and where they continue till the day of Judgment; (3) that, in this respect also, as in others, he was like men, his brethren, and that (4) he had a true human soul, Acts II. (5) Peter assures us that Christ did this for the good of men,—*he preached to the departed spirits*. The nature of this preaching, its particular *object* and *consequences*, what he intended to effect, and did actually effect by it,—are entirely unknown to us, as many other things which pertain to the invisible kingdom of spirits. When we ourselves shall belong to that invisible kingdom, and probably not till then, we shall receive more perfect information respecting this subject, if it can be useful for us to have it.

§ 97. *History of Christ considered as a man, in his state of exaltation or perfection.* §§ 97—99, incl.

I. Of the resurrection of Christ.

(1) The vivification and resurrection of the man Jesus is not, strictly speaking, *pars status exaltationis*, but *terminus a quo*, as some theologians have justly remarked. So his conception was the *terminus a quo* of the state of humiliation. The *state of exaltation*, strictly speaking, commences with the ascension of Christ. The events which preceded were merely preparatory.

(2) The resurrection of Jesus is frequently ascribed in Scripture to the Father, Acts 2: 24, 32. 3: 15. Vid. other texts, Morus p. 174, § 1, not. Jesus, however, frequently ascribes it to himself, as the Son of God, John 10: 18, coll. 2: 19, “I have power (*ἐξουσίαν*) to take my life again.” He had this power, inasmuch as he acted in common with the Father, and, as Messiah, had received power from the Father adequate to this purpose.

(3) The *proof* of the resurrection of Christ on the third day, is to be deduced entirely from the accounts given of it in the New Testament. The *genuineness* of these histories, and the entire

credibility of the accounts contained in them, are here presupposed. On these grounds we may be satisfied of the truth of this fact even if no inspiration is admitted; vid. §§ 6, 8. The following circumstances deserve notice: viz.,

(a) The disciples of Jesus had always expected that he would establish a visible kingdom upon earth. They had never understood and always perverted, what he frequently said to them respecting his death and resurrection. When, therefore, his death took place, they did not believe that he would actually rise again; vid. John 20: 9, coll. vs. 24, 25. Accordingly, they were so incredulous on this subject, that they regarded the first information of the fact which they received, as fabulous and unworthy of credit, Luke 24: 11, coll. vs. 22—24. Gregory the Great remarks justly and happily: *dubitatum est ab illis, ne dubitaretur a nobis*.

(b) After this event Jesus appeared frequently to his apostles and his other disciples. Ten different appearances have been noticed by some writers in the Evangelists. At these times, he conversed with his disciples, and gave them such palpable demonstrations of his resurrection, that none of them could longer doubt respecting the fact; vid. the last chapters of the gospels, and particularly John 20: 21, and Acts 1: 2, 3. 10: 41. Some, at first, regarded his appearance, to be that of a dead man with a *shadowy body*, such as was believed by the Jews, Greeks, and Romans; very much the same as in Homer and Virgil. So Thomas, in John 20: 25, sq. For this reason, Jesus ate with them, and allowed them to handle him, John XXI.

(c) Thenceforward, they were so convinced of the truth of his resurrection, that they never were, or could be persuaded to doubt respecting it. They spake of it, after the final departure of Christ from the earth, as an established fact, which was universally admitted. They proclaimed it publicly at Jerusalem, where Jesus was condemned, before the Sanhedrim, and other tribunals; nor could any one convince them of the contrary. Acts 2: 24, 32. 4: 8—13. III. x. XIII. 1 Cor. 15: 5, sq. 1 Pet. 1: 21.

(d) No solid *historical* objection has been ever brought against this event; nor has any ground been alleged sufficient to convict the apostles of imposture; because the *data* for such proof are wanting. The event must, therefore, be regarded as true, until the contrary can be proved by *historical reasons*, or until the witnesses

can be convicted of untruth. The enemies of Christianity have often been challenged to produce a single example of a history so well attested as that of the resurrection of Jesus, and followed too by such important consequences both among cultivated and ruder nations, which has turned out in the end to be false and fictitious. But such an example, they have never been able to produce. It is worthy of notice, that we do not find in the whole history of the apostles, that any of the most enlightened enemies of Christianity, even the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, undertook to say, that Christ had not risen; although they hated the apostles so much as to abuse and condemn them. *At that time*, no one ventured seriously to question this fact. The grave was watched; the frightened guards brought the news of what had happened to the Sanhedrim, and were bribed to give out, that the disciples of Jesus had stolen his corpse, Matt. 28: 11—13. Incredible as this story was, still many of the Jews at first believed it, as Matthew declares, v. 15, of the same Chapter.

To this latter supposition, the *Wolfenb. Ungenannte* has entirely assented, in his work, *Vom Zweck Jesu*, and in the fragment, 'Ueber die Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu,' which Lessing published in his "Beytragen zur Geschichte und Literatur," B. 4, 1777. He looks up all possible discrepancies in the narrative which the Evangelists have given of minute circumstances; although they would not be sufficient, even if well grounded, to render the fact *historically* suspicious. Vid. Dæderlein, *Fragmente und Antifragmente*, 2 Thle. Nürnberg, 1781; Semler's 'Beantwortung,' 2d ed. 1780; Michælis, *Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu*, Halle, 1783. Among the ancient writers, see Ditten, *Wahrheit der christlichen Religion auf der Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu*, u. s. w; and Sherlock, *Gerichtliches Verhör der Zeugen für u. s. w.*

Some have endeavoured to render this history suspicious, from the fact, that Jesus did not *publicly* shew himself after his resurrection, and did not appear to his enemies. Some reply, that it does not follow from the silence of the evangelists that he did not. But Peter says expressly, that he appeared *οὐ παντὶ τῷ λαῷ, ἀλλ'—ἡμῖν* (the disciples), Acts 10: 40, 41. What object, now, would have been answered by this public appearance? Those who had not before received him as Messiah, would have rejected him anew; and even although they should effect nothing by it, they would still have given out the whole thing as an imposition. And suppose the whole

populace had believed; they might have commenced dangerous innovations, and made arrangements to establish Christ as an earthly king. Cf. John 6: 15. Those who had no taste or capacity for the spiritual kingdom of Christ, would no more have believed in him, or firmly and faithfully adhered to him, after he had appeared to them, raised from the dead, and had himself preached to them, than before, when he also preached to them in person, and wrought the greatest miracles before them; so that he himself would have found the truth of what is said, Luke 16: 31.

Persons have not been wanting who have considered the account of the resurrection of Christ as allegorical. Semler supposed that Christ did not *physically* rise from the dead, and that the life which is ascribed to him is spiritual life, in heaven and in the hearts of men. Others suppose that he did not actually die upon the cross, but that he lived in private among his friends, for a considerable time after his crucifixion, and then disappeared. They suppose that when his side was pierced, he fell into a swoon, from which he was revived by the evaporation of the spices in the tomb;—without thinking, that even if he had survived the crucifixion, this evaporation in a confined cave would necessarily have suffocated him. Spinoza says somewhere, that the resurrection and ascension were not events which took place in the *material* world, but in the *moral* world, i. e. they are fictions,—ancient Christian fables,—which however had great moral consequences. Many modern writers, and even some theologians have adopted this opinion. Dr. Paulus rather inclines to it, in his Comments on the Evangelists.

(4) The *necessity* and *importance* of this doctrine. It is one of the most important of the positive and peculiar doctrines of Christianity; and is so regarded by Christ, and in the whole New Testament. Morus p. 175, sq. § 3.

(a) The apostles always represent this as a fundamental truth of the Christian faith. The ὡφθῆ ἀγγέλοις, *he showed himself alive to his messengers*, i. e. disciples, is mentioned as a fundamental truth, 1 Tim. 3: 16, coll. Rom. 10: 9. The apostles were called μαρτυροὶ ἀναστάσεως Χριστοῦ, Acts 1: 22. Paul therefore says, that if Christ be not risen, we can have no hope of resurrection, and our whole faith in him is unfounded, 1 Cor. 15: 14, 17, coll. vs. 5—7. For the instructions of Christ are attested and confirmed as certain and divine, only by the resurrection; cf. 1 Pet. 1: 3, and Morus p. 176, n. 5.

(b) All the apostles agree, that Christ, by his resurrection received the seal and sanction of God, as the great prophet and Saviour, constituted by him. He himself had claimed to be the Messiah; but his death seemed to frustrate every hope; vid. Luke 24: 20, 21. His resurrection, however, rendered this belief more sure and unwavering. His disciples now saw, that he was the person whom he claimed to be. They were compelled to conclude that God would not, by such a distinguished miracle, authorize and support an impostor, who merely pretended to be a divine messenger. Added to this is the fact, that he himself had prophesied, that he should rise in three days, Luke 18: 33. John 10: 17. The accomplishment of this prophecy proves that Christ did not teach in his own name, but as the messenger of God; as he often said, John VIII.—X. The following are the most important texts relating to this point: viz. Rom. 1: 4. Acts 17: 31. 1 Tim. 3: 16. The passage Ps. 2: 7, “thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee,” is often referred in the New Testament directly to the resurrection. “I have declared thee (by raising thee to life) on this day (the day of the resurrection) to be the Messiah.” Acts 13: 33, 34.

II. The ascension of Christ.

(1) Jesus spent forty days on earth after his resurrection, in order to render his disciples more sure of the fact, to teach them many important things, and to prepare them for the discharge of their public office; vid. the last chapters of the Evangelists, and Acts 1. Afterwards, he was removed to the abodes of the blessed. These abodes are situated in regions invisible to men, at a distance from the earth, and inaccessible to us, while we continue here. They cannot be better described, than by the word *heaven*, which almost all people and languages have, and which the sacred writers frequently employ. As they use it, it denotes the place of the highest sanctuary of God, i. e. the place where the Omnipresent Being reveals himself with peculiar glory; cf. John 14: 2, 3.

Jesus was taken up from earth in view of his apostles, and borne hence (*ἐπὶ ῥοθῆ, ἀνελήφθη εἰς οὐρανόν*), Acts 1: 9—11. 1 Pet. 3: 22. Heb. 9: 10, 11, 24. He ascended from Bethany on the Mt. of Olives, Luke 24: 51. He predicted his ascension to his disciples; John 6: 62. 14: 2, 3. This doctrine, like that of the resurrection, is enumerated among the fundamental truths of Christianity, 1 Tim. 3:

16 (ἀνελήφθη ἐν δόξῃ), 1 Pet. 3: 22. He taught his disciples to find in all these events, confirmation of his declarations, and joy and consolation. As he had risen, the first that arose from the dead, and had been translated to heaven; they too should one day arise, and be glorified, if they reposed faith and confidence in him. They should be with him, where he was, at home, in the house of his father; etc.

Note. Some modern writers have endeavoured to awaken suspicion respecting the doctrine of the ascension of Christ, from the fact, that Matthew, Luke, and John do not expressly narrate this history of the ascension in their gospels, as Mark does in his, and as Luke does in the Acts. But they could not have been ignorant or doubtful respecting this event, any more than the other writers of the New Testament; since Jesus had mentioned it in his early instructions, according to John 6: 62, and had frequently alluded to it afterwards. The writings of Paul, Peter, and the Acts of the apostles written by Luke, show how universal was the belief of this event among the first Christian teachers. And how could these two have been exceptions? Vid. the Essays, "Warum haben nicht alle Evangelisten die Himmelfahrt Christi ausdrücklich miterzählt?" in Flatt's Magazin, Stück 8, Tübingen, 1802, Num. 2.

(2) According to the clear declarations of the New Testament, Christ lives in the abodes of the blessed, as a *true man*; cf. Acts 1: 11. 17: 31. Heb. 9: 10, sq. Vid. his appearances in the Acts. But the saints in heaven do not have a gross, feeble, perishable body, like the human body which we possess upon the earth; but a more perfect, imperishable, glorified body; very much like that of the gods of Homer and the Grecians; 1 Cor. xv. coll. § 152. Now Jesus received such a body in heaven, as we shall one day receive; Phil. 3: 21;—σῶμα δόξης (i. e. ἔνδοξον) αὐτοῦ, which our present earthly body (σῶμα ταπεινώσεως) will in future resemble. The same doctrine is carried out, 1 Cor. 15: 42—53. As inhabitants of earth, men have a mortal body, like Adam; as inhabitants of heaven, a refined and immortal body, like Christ, *the second Adam*. Christ, however, did not receive this body immediately on his resurrection; but when he became an inhabitant of heaven. During the forty days which succeeded his resurrection, he ate and drank with his disciples;—actions which cannot be predicated of heavenly bodies. He bore, too, on his body the scars and marks of the crucifixion. Some few have supposed, that he then possessed a spiritual body, from a misunderstanding of the words, θυρῶν κεκλεισμένων, John 20: 19, 26. The declaration in the epistle to the Hebrews, that he

offers to God, as High-priest, his own blood, in the Holy of holies, shows that the same Jesus, who according to the divine decree died on the earth for our good, now lives in Heaven; and that we may always rejoice in the happy consequences of his sacrifice; Heb. 9: 14, 24, sq.

Note. The dispute relative to the Lord's Supper has occasioned much controversy since the sixteenth century, respecting the *Omnipresence of the body* of Christ, which was asserted by many Lutheran theologians. But the doctrine *de omnipresentia* or *ubiquitate* of the *human body* of Christ, is a mere hypothesis of some theologians, without any sure scriptural support. Indeed, those divine attributes, which, from the nature of the case, cannot be predicated of Body in general, cannot be ascribed to the body of Christ, although it be glorified. Besides, we are expressly assured, that we shall in future receive a body of the same kind, as the heavenly body of Christ, Phil. 3: 21. 1 Cor. 15: 49. Finally, this doctrine is not necessary for the defence of the Lutheran doctrine respecting the Lord's Supper; vid. *infra*, respecting this doctrine.

(3) There has always been a great diversity of opinions on the question, How long Christ, as a man, will continue in heaven, and when, according to his promise, he will return and visibly reappear on the earth. Christ himself has promised no other *visible* return, than that at the end of the world, as the Judge of men. For his *παρουσία* to destroy Jerusalem, and punish his enemies, is a figurative mode of speech, like the *adventus Dei* so often spoken of by the prophets. But many of the early Christians, who were inclined to Judaism, and expected the establishment of an earthly kingdom, explained many texts in accordance with such an opinion, although there is not one passage in all the writings of the apostles distinctly in favor of it. The apostles always supposed, that Christ would remain in heaven until the end of the world, (during the whole time of the New Testament dispensation,) and not visibly return until that time; although they did not undertake to determine how long this period would continue; vid. Acts 1: 11. 1 Thess. 1: 10, coll. 2 Thess. 11. sq.

Here belongs that remarkable passage in the speech of Peter, Acts 3: 20, 21, which has been so often misunderstood and referred to the restoration of all things. "God has caused the joyful times of the New Testament to appear (*καιροί ἀναψύξεως*, cf. 2 Cor. 6: 2), and has sent Jesus Christ, whom now the heaven hath again received, or still retains, *as long as this happy period of the New Testament* (the new dispensation upon the earth) *shall continue.*" Here,

then, is no promise that Christ will return to found an earthly kingdom.—*Δέξασθαι*, when spoken of a place, always means, according to a Greek idiom, that the place *receives* or *retains* any one. So all the ancient interpreters, and Beza, who denied the omnipresence of the body of Christ from this passage. For this reason the Lutheran theologians have preferred to refer *δέξασθαι* to Christ.—The *χρόνοι ἀποκαταστάσεως* are *the times of the New Testament* like *χρόνοι διορθώσεως*, Heb. 9: 10; vid. v. 20.—And *ἄχρι* signifies not *until*, but *dum*, *while*, *during*; *ἄχρις σήμερον καλεῖται*, Heb. 3: 13. Vid. Ernesti, Program. ad h. l. in Opusc. Theol. p. 483, sq.

Note. It was intended to teach men by this event, to regard Christ, even in his human nature, as henceforth standing in the closest connexion with God,—as in the possession and enjoyment of supreme felicity and power, and as the Ruler and Lord, whose agency and influence were unlimited. The description of God, as dwelling in heaven, suggests the idea of his supremacy over all the inhabitants and events of the world, his controlling providence, boundless reign, and perfect enjoyment. Morus p. 177. not. extr.

§ 98. *Wherein the heavenly glory or majesty of Christ, as a man, consists; and the scriptural idea of the kingdom and dominion of Christ.*

I. Scriptural designation of the glory of Christ.

The imperfection and inferiority, which Christ had voluntarily assumed during his life upon earth, ceased immediately on his ascension. He now became, even as a man, immortal and blessed; Rom. 6: 9, 10. Heb. 7: 16, 25. Even in his human nature he was raised by God to a very illustrious dignity; John 17: 5 (*δόξα, δοξασθῆναι*), Acts 2: 33—36. Eph. 1: 20, sq. Col. 1: 17. "*Ὄνομα ὑπὲρ πάντων ὄνομα*", Phil. 2: 9, 10. He is entitled to honor from every being, even from the higher intelligences, Heb. 1: 6. Phil. 2: 9, 10; since he is henceforth raised in glory and majesty above all, 1 Pet. 3: 22. Hence a kingdom is ascribed to him, over which he reigns in heaven. He is called *King*, and divinely appointed *Lord*; *ὁ Κύριος*, Acts 2: 36; and *Κύριος δόξης*, especially by Paul, 1 Cor. 2: 8 (i. e.

the glorious, adorable Lord, מֶלֶךְ הַכְּבוֹד, Ps. 24: 7, 8). In Heb. 1: 9, Paul applies to Christ the passage, Ps. 45: 8, "God hath anointed thee with the oil of joy above thy fellows," i. e. God honors thee more, and gives thee more privileges, than all the partners of thy dignity,—the other kings, or sons of God.

Note. Various other appellations are applied in the New Testament to Christ, descriptive partly of his supremacy, and partly of his care for the Church, as its head. Among these are the following; viz. *Κεφαλή*, the Christian church being often compared with a *body*, Eph. 1: 22, 23. 5: 23; *ἀνὴρ, maritus*, 2 Cor. 11: 2; and *νομικός*, John 3: 29. Also the appellation of a *shepherd*, and the comparisons taken from it, John 10: 12. So Christ is called, by Paul, *ποιμένα τὸν μέγαν*, Heb. 13: 20, and *ἀρχιποιμὸν*, 1 Pet. 5: 4. This is a very honorable appellation, since *kings* were called *shepherds* by the Hebrews, Ps. 80: 2, sq; like the *ποιμένες λαῶν* of Homer. We must understand, however, by this appellation a *pastoral prince*, such perhaps as Abraham was, and the orientlists frequently were;—the proprietor and owner of the herds, who had servants in his employment, as under shepherds.

II. The Nature and extent of the kingdom of Christ, the administration of his reign which he carries on from heaven.

Cf. Næsselt, Diss. "de Christo homine regnante," Opusc. Tom. II., Halle, 1773; and the programm, "De Christo ad dextram Dei sedente," p. 10, sq. Halle, 1787. There are some good remarks, together with many very unfounded ones, in Dr. Eckermann's Essay, Ueber die Begriffe vom Reiche und der Wiederkunft Christi, in his Theologischen Beyträgen, B. II. St. 1. Altona, 1791, 8vo. Morus treats this subject admirably, p. 178, sq.

(1) The terms which signify *rule*, are sometimes used figuratively, and denote a *joyful situation, happy and honorable in an uncommon degree,—freedom, independence, authority*, in short, every kind of distinguished happiness and welfare. Thus the Stoic paradox: "*omnem sapientem regnare, sive esse regem*;" and Cicero: "*olim cum regnare existimabamur*." In this sense, Christians are called *kings*, 1 Pet. 2: 9. Rev. 1: 6. They are said *συμβασιλεύειν τῷ Χριστῷ*, to share with Christ the royal privileges, 2 Tim. 2: 12. In the parallel passage, Rom. 8: 17, they are said *συνδοξασθῆναι*. They are said, also, *κληρονομεῖν βασιλείαν*, Matt. 25: 34; and *βασιλεύειν ἐν ζωῇ*, Rom. 5: 17. Accordingly, when Christ is said to reign, his life in heaven may be intended. But this phrase applied to him, is not confined to this meaning; it signifies something far

more great and elevated than all this ; as will appear from the following remarks.

(2) The kingdom of Christ, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, is of very wide extent.

A. It extends over every thing in all the universe. "All power, in heaven and on earth is given to me," Matt. 28: 18. Ὁ πατήρ πάντα δέδωκεν εἰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. John 13: 3. God exalted him, even as a man, above every thing which is great and powerful in the material and spiritual world, in order that he might rule over them ; and subjected to him even the different orders and classes of good and bad spirits. Christ reigns over them as Lord, Phil. 2 9—11. Eph. 1: 20, 21. Col. 1: 15—17. Heb. 1: 4—14. 1 Pet. 3: 22. The ground and object of such an extensive rule is this : There are many things both in the material and spiritual world which operate to the advantage or disadvantage of men. Now if men are to be peculiarly the subjects over whom Christ is to reign, as king ; if to promote their welfare and to shield them from all harm ; if to punish his own enemies, and the enemies of his kingdom, and to bless and reward his followers, are to be his peculiar concern ;—he must be able to control all *these other objects*. For,

B. The reign or government of Jesus, as Christ or Messiah, has a principal respect to the *human race*. He exerts his authority on account of men, and for their advantage. This kingdom is two-fold : viz.

(a) *Regnum sensu latiori*. Since the time when Christ was received into heaven (Eph. 1: 20), he has reigned over *all* men, whether they know and honor him, or not ; i. e. he provides for them all that spiritual welfare, and true happiness of which they are capable. He received from the Father right and power over the human race, John 17: 2. Matt. 28: 18. Eph. 1: 10. 2 Pet. 2: 1.

(b) *Regnum sensu strictiori sive angustiori*, extends over his worshippers, who know and love him ; over the whole society (ἐκκλησία, עֵקְלֵסְיָה) of those who are united not by external power and compulsion, but by the power of truth and by instruction. This community is therefore called, in the discourses of Jesus, βασιλεία θεοῦ sive οὐρανοῦ, Eph. 5: 5. Col. 1: 13. Over this community, he exercises the most special watchfulness and care. Its members, when faithfully devoted and obedient to him, are his πρόβατα ἴδια. The foundation was laid and the beginning made in this commu-

nity, during the life of Christ on earth. From the time of John it suffered violence, Matt. 11: 12. But the beginning was small, and, in comparison with what afterwards took place, unobserved by the great multitude; οὐκ ἔρχεται μετὰ παρατηρήσεως, Luke 17: 20. This kingdom was not extended and widened till after the ascension.

(3) The *manner* in which Christ governs or rules his kingdom. He reigns as σωτήρ, Eph. 5: 23—29.

A. *Now*, during the continuance of the present state of the world,

(a) By *instruction in the truth*, John 18: 37. At his departure from the world, he committed this instruction to his disciples, and especially to his apostles as his ambassadors, that they might communicate it every where, without regard to nation or kindred, Matt. 28: 18—20. It was to be more extensively diffused and widely propagated by means of other teachers, appointed by the apostles under the guidance and authority of Christ, Eph. 4: 11, 15, 16. Accordingly in the passages mentioned, Paul derives the qualifications and the ministry (χάρις, χαρίσματα) of teachers from Christ himself; as Christ also himself does, John 10: 1, sq.

(b) By that *support*, help, and assistance which he imparts to his Church,—his special concern in its extension, and the frustration of the designs of its enemies, Matt. 28: 20. 1 Cor. 15: 25, 26. 1 John 4: 4. 5: 4, 5.

Note. All the *hindrances* which stand in the way of the extension of Christianity, and the success of the designs of Christ to promote human happiness, are frequently called, ἐχθροὶ Χριστοῦ. This term is borrowed from Ps. 110: 2. Morus has enumerated these hindrances, as presented in the Scriptures, p. 180, sq. § 6. Christ has already removed these hindrances in a measure; he is constantly diminishing them, and at the end of the present dispensation, will have entirely surmounted them. Ps. 110: 1, 2. 1 Cor. 15: 25. Morus p. 181, sq. § 7.

B. *In future*, when the present state of the world shall cease (at which time the greatest revolutions will take place in the whole universe, 2 Pet. 3: 7, 10—13). Then, and not before, will Christ exhibit himself in all his glory, as Lord of the human race. Paul says expressly, that all the glory of Christ is not now displayed, Heb. 2: 8. Col. 3: 3, 4. For all have not yet acknowledged him as Lord, and his enemies have still power to harm. But then his glory will

become visible, 1 Cor. 15: 26, 27. Heb. 10: 13. Christ will solemnly and visibly reappear on the earth, Acts 1: 11. 1 Thess. 4: 16. 2 Pet. 3: 10, 13. Heb. 9: 28. Col. 3: 4. He will raise the dead, John 5: 21—23. Matt. xxv. He will sit in judgment upon the dead and the living, 1 Cor. 15: 26, 27. Rom. 14: 10. Phil. 2: 10; and will allot rewards and punishments, John 5: 21—23, 27, sq. Matt. xxv. Acts 17: 31. According to the doctrine of the universality of Christ's kingdom, he will judge, not Christians only, but all men. Cf. the passages above cited, and Acts 17: 31. Rom. 2: 6, 7. But the *time* of this Judgment is unknown, and was so even to the apostles, 1 Thess. 5: 1, sq. coll. 2 Thess. 2: 3. Many of the early Christians, however, appear to have supposed that it was near at hand, and was connected with the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, which was also called *παρουσία Χριστοῦ*. For the Jews believed that the temple would stand until the end of the world, Ps. 78: 69. But the apostles never adopted or favored this opinion; vid. Thess. *ut supra*.

(4) Some farther observations on the *nature* and *continuance* of the government which Christ as a man administers in heaven.

(a) The government of Christ is described by himself and his apostles as being not external and temporal, but *spiritual*, conducted principally by means of his *religion*, by the preaching of the gospel, and the power which attends it;—*ἀληθεία*, John 18: 37; or *ῥήματι*, Ephes. 5: 26; vid. No. 3. This fact excludes and refutes the objection, that Christ designed to establish an *earthly kingdom*, § 89; and it frustrates the hopes of the Chiliasts, who, agreeably to Jewish prejudices, are expecting such a kingdom yet to come.

(b) This government which Jesus administers, as a man, is not natural to him, or one which he attains by birth, but *acquired*. He received it from his Father as a reward for his sufferings, and for his faithful performance of the whole work, and discharge of all the offices, entrusted to him by God for the good of men. *Ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ ὄνομα*, and *διὸ αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε*, Phil. 2: 9. "We see Jesus, after he had endured death, crowned with glory and honor," etc. Heb. 2: 9, 10. The Father is described as *ὑπόταξας Χριστῷ πάντα*, 1 Cor. 15: 24, 27. Acts 2: 31—36, the discourses of Jesus in John 17: 5. Matt. 11: 27, sq. 28: 18, also many of the texts which speak of his *sitting at the right hand of God*, § 99. Paul, in his epistle to the Hebrews, frequently makes use, in relation

to this subject, of the word *τελειωθῆναι*, which is applied literally to the reward of victors. He explains the idea in a very intelligible manner, Heb. 5: 8. Christ learned by his sufferings to obey God, and do his will; and he who knows how to obey so well, is also qualified to govern well. Vid. Morus p. 184, § 9, for other texts and comments. This kingdom is therefore called, at one time, the *kingdom of God*, from its founder; at another time, the *kingdom of Christ*, who accomplished the plan of God; and still again, the *kingdom of God and of Christ*, because God and Christ were united in its establishment.

(c) The Israelites imagined, according to the instruction of the prophets, that the kingdom of the Messiah would be an *everlasting* kingdom (*αἰώνιος, perpetuus*), continuing as long as the world should endure. Thus it is always represented in the New Testament. "He will reign over the house of Jacob εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται τέλος," Luke 1: 33. The text Ps. 45: 7, ὁ θρόνος σου εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, is explained in the same way, Heb. 1: 8. Christ himself says expressly, Matt. 16. 18, πύλαι ᾗδου οὐ κατισχύσουσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας, i. e. the society established by him should not decline and perish, like so many others; but always endure. He said with great explicitness, Matt. 28: 20, that his assistance and special care should extend to his followers ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος. His friends should enjoy his constant presence, support, and assistance, in every condition of life, until the end of the world that now is.

(d) From what has been said, it appears, that the government which Christ as a man administers in heaven, will continue only while the present constitution of the world lasts. At the end of the world, when the heavenly state commences, the government which Christ administers as a man, will *cease*; so far, at least, as it aims to promote the holiness and happiness of men; since those of our race who labor for this end, will then have attained the goal, and will be actually blessed. So Paul says expressly, 1 Cor. 15: 24—28, in entire accordance with the universal doctrine of the New Testament respecting the kingdom of Christ as man. He is speaking of the kingdom of Jesus, or of his office as Messiah, and refers to Ps. 110: 1, "Sit on my right hand, *until* I subject to thee all thine enemies." The phrase, *to sit on the right hand of the Father*, he explains by βασιλεύειν, and comprehends under this term all the offi-

ces of the Messiah, and the institutions which he has established for the good of men, i. e. for their holiness and eternal blessedness. These offices (his kingdom) will cease at the end of the world, when all the opposers of the advancement of his kingdom upon earth, and even *Death*, the last enemy of his followers, will be subdued, and when his friends will be introduced by himself into that eternal blessedness, to which it is his aim to exalt them. Then will his great plan for the happiness of men be completed, and the end of his office as Messiah will be attained. Thenceforward the Father will no more make use, as before, of the intervention of the Messiah to govern and bless men; for now they will be actually blessed. Christ then will lay down his former charge, and give it over to the Father, who had entrusted him with it. For we cannot expect, that the preaching of the gospel will be continued in heaven, and that the other institutions of the Christian church, which relate only to the present life, will be found there in the same way as they exist here upon the earth. In the abodes of the blessed, the Father will himself reign over his saints with an immediate government, and in a manner different from the rule which he causes to be exercised over them through Christ, his ambassador, while they continue upon the earth. Vid. Scripta varii argumenti, p. 60, sq. ed. II. The glory and majesty of Christ will remain, however, unaltered; and he will still far excel his friends and brethren, who enjoy a happiness similar to his own. He will still be honored and loved by them as their Lord, and as the author of their salvation, John 17: 24. Rom. 8: 17. 2 Tim. 2: 12.

§ 99. *Remarks on the form and sense of the scriptural representation respecting the KINGDOM OF GOD and OF CHRIST; and on the signification of the phrase, TO SIT ON THE RIGHT HAND OF GOD, as applied to Christ.*

I. Origin and design of the formulæ respecting the kingdom of Christ.

(1) We must begin with the principle, that many of the images, expressions, and phrases, which are applied to God and his government, are borrowed from those applied to earthly kings. We regard God as possessing every thing which is considered great, exalt-

ed, and preëminent among men; but in a far higher degree. With us, every thing is small and limited; with him, great, comprehensive, and immeasurable. But now, again, we reason retrogressively from the deity and from heaven to earth. God by his agency is the cause of every thing great and wonderful which takes place on the earth; οὐδὲν ἄνευ θεοῦ. Even the government of kings is of divine origin; and they are appointed by the Deity himself.

Τιμὴ (διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος) δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ, γιγνέει δὲ ἐκ μητρίεσσιν Ζεὺς,

Hom. II. II. 197. "Jupiter bestows upon kings their sceptre, and the right to reign over others," V. 205. See also II. IX. 98, 99; and Callim. Hymn. in Jov. ἐκ Διὸς βασιλῆες, κ. τ. λ. They are accordingly the representatives and ambassadors of the gods, bear their image, govern and judge in their stead. Hence they are called *gods, sons of God, διογενεῖς, διοτρεφεῖς, θεῖοι, ἀντιθεοί, κ. τ. λ.*

All these ideas and expressions were common with the Israelitish nation, and were solemnly sanctioned by their prophets under direct divine authority. The God *JEHOVAH* was their proper king, supreme over their state and nation. He governed them through the instrumentality of human regents and deputed kings. Their constitution was *theocratic*, to make use of a happy term, first applied to this subject by Josephus. Hence the Israelitish state and nation are called the *possession*, and the *peculiar people of Jehovah*, and also the *kingdom of Jehovah*: as Ex. 19: 6. Ps. 114: 2. In the same way the later Jews applied the phrases, *kingdom of God* or of *heaven*, to the Jewish state and church, and to the whole religion and ritual of the Israelites. When a proselyte was received by them, he was said to be admitted into the *kingdom of God* or of *heaven*; vid. Schöttgen, De regno cælorum (Hor. Heb. T. I. extr.); and Wetstein on Matt. 21: 25, Note. On this account the Jews called themselves *υἱοὺς βασιλείας*, Matt. 8: 12; and Christ said, *the kingdom of heaven* (the rights of the people of God) should be taken from them, Matt. 21: 43.

(2) The Jews, according to the instruction of their prophets, conceived of the Messiah as a *ruler* and *religious reformer*, like Moses and the pious kings of antiquity; only far greater, more exalted and perfect than they, vid. § 89; and so they speak of the *eternal king*, and the *eternal kingdom of David*, 2 Sam. vii. Ps. LXXXIX. They therefore called the happy condition of the church and state under the reign of Messiah, and the subjects of his govern-

ment, by way of eminence, βασιλεία θεοῦ or οὐρανῶν. They believed that they exclusively should enjoy this kingdom, and together with the Messiah, should reign over all nations. After the Babylonian exile, this appellation, applied in this sense to the kingdom of the Messiah peculiarly, became very common, and was probably taken from Dan. 7: 13, 14. It must have been common in Palestine at the time of Christ; but it occurs very rarely in the later Rabbinical writings.

(3) Jesus and his apostles did not, then, *invent* these words and phrases; they only preserved the terms which they found already existing, and gave them a meaning more just and pure than the common one. This they did, however, with wise caution and forbearance. Christ admitted the expectations of the Jews of *freedom* in the kingdom of the Messiah; but he showed that this freedom was not *civil* liberty, but freedom from the power of *sin*, John 8: 32. Luke 17: 20. He confirmed the opinion of the Jews, that the Sacred writings testified concerning the Messiah, and he agreed with the Jews as to the very passages containing this testimony; but he taught them the more just and spiritual interpretation of these passages, vid. § 90, III. By *receiving the kingdom of God*, he means, believing in Jesus Christ, submitting to his guidance and obeying his precepts, and thus obtaining the right of enjoying the divine favors promised through the Messiah, John III. Mark 10: 15. The same is meant by *being received into the kingdom of God*, Col. 1: 13. Ephes. 5: 5. It was for this object that John the Baptist had before labored, although he was ignorant on many points belonging to the new dispensation; the essentials, however, he understood; and his theme was, "Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand." He knew Christ to be the "Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world;" and described the Messiah as the ambassador of God, a teacher and expiator, John 1: 29. 3: 27, 32, 34.

(4) These attempts of Jesus and his apostles were very much facilitated by the fact, that the terms, *kingdom of God* and *kingdom of heaven*, were used figuratively even by the Jews. They frequently gave these phrases a moral and spiritual sense, denoting and comprehending all the divine appointments for the spiritual welfare of men,—for their happiness in this and the future life; every thing, in short, which serves to promote the progressive holiness and proportionate happiness of man in this life, and the life to come, which

is his true destination. Hence they conceived of a twofold *kingdom* or *state* of God ; one upon *the earth*, of which the dispensation under the Messiah constitutes the brightest and greatest epoch ; the other, *in heaven*. The pious worshippers of God, are translated from the former to the latter. *Here* they live as strangers in a land of pilgrimage ; *there*, they are at home, in their native land. So they called the latter place, *the Father's house, the upper church, the heavenly or new Jerusalem*. And so comprehensively, the entire sum of happiness after death and in the future world, was called *the kingdom of God*.

Now Jesus and the apostles frequently use the phrase βασιλεία θεοῦ or οὐρανῶν, in this sense ; and still more frequently do they connect the two senses together. One who is a member of the kingdom of the Messiah upon the earth, and obeys his precepts, has a title to citizenship in the kingdom of God which is in heaven (in the city of God, in the new Jerusalem), Phil. 3: 20, 21 ; coll. Matt. 25: 34. James 2: 5. 1 Cor. 15: 50. 2 Thess. 1: 5. 2 Tim. 4: 18. 2 Pet. 1: 11. The remark made respecting βασιλεύειν σὺν Χριστῷ, κ. τ. λ. belongs in this connexion ; vid. § 98, II. 1.

(5) From what has been said, it appears that images derived from a *king* and his *subjects*, and their mutual relations, are more proper and suitable than any other, to represent and describe the duties, benefits and privileges of the worshippers of God, and especially of the true followers of the Messiah. But the Jews, who had little taste for what is spiritual, were content with the mere image, and so forgot the thing itself, which the image was designed to indicate. They imagined a king reigning *visibly* upon the *earth*.

Jesus and his apostles preserved these same images, but showed in what way they ought to be understood and applied. They showed that the Messiah, after his ascension, did not visibly and bodily reign on the earth, but that henceforward he reigned in heaven ; and there, invisible to mortal eyes, would rule the inhabitants of heaven and earth, (the latter by his religion and visible support,) until the end of the world. They showed, moreover, that this invisible and heavenly government was of far wider extent than the earthly government expected by the Jews, and would embrace not one nation only, but all nations without distinction ; because the kingdom of morality, of truth and happiness, is a kingdom for *all*, such being the destination of all, and God, as a father, being soli-

citous for the happiness of *all* his children, John 10: 16; ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν Χριστῷ, Eph. 1: 10, also πληροῦν πάντα (comprehendere imperio), Ephes. 1: 23. 3: 19. Col. 1: 18. They taught that the whole visible disclosure of the majesty of Christ, and his return to the earth, would not take place before the end of the present constitution of the world. Thus they preserved the ancient expressions and phrases respecting the Messiah and his royal office, which had been common among the Israelites; but so defined and modified the meaning of them, as to give them an entirely different aspect,—a different and far more elevated sense, than was common,—a sense, too, which entirely agreed with the real meaning of the Old Testament predictions.

Kings are the *sons of God*; and the most illustrious kings, are the *first born*. And so the Messiah; but he, in a far higher sense than all earthly kings, is υἱὸς Θεοῦ, πρωτότοκος, μονογενής, John 1. Heb. 1: 6. Rom. 8: 29. Col. 1: 15, coll. v. 18. The *sons of kings*, especially the *first born*, are the heirs and possessors of the kingdom; and among the Israelites, themselves ruled, as representatives and deputies of the father over particular provinces of his kingdom; vid. Anmerkung zu Ps. 45: 17. So too the Messiah rules over the most important parts of the paternal or divine kingdom. Hence he is called κληρονόμος, *Lord, possessor of the kingdom*, Heb. 1: 2. *Kings* decree justice, and hold judgment, in the name of God, as his ambassadors and deputies, Ps. 72: 1. So too the Messiah; but he will hold judgment over the living and the dead, in the name of the Father, at the end of the world. In the same way, the other forms and expressions may be easily solved.

(6) This kind of representation and mode of instruction is in a high degree intelligible at all times; it possesses internal truth and reality. But it was particularly adapted to all the conceptions of the Jews, and even of the heathen at that age. It conveyed to them, when it was properly understood, the most exalted and proper ideas respecting God, and his designs in the establishment of the Christian institute and church. At the time of Christ and the apostles, the belief universally prevailed among the Jews, and indeed appears to have been entertained even by the prophets, that God governed the world by means of *angels*, as the servants and instruments of his providence, vid. Vol. I. §§ 58, 60. The belief too of many subordinate deities, through whose instrumentality the supreme God

governed the world, prevailed among heathen nations, cf. 1 Cor. 8: 5, 6. The apostles therefore showed, that God had now entrusted the government of the world, and the care of our spiritual welfare, directly to the man Christ; and that these ministers of divine providence, as well as all the other instruments which it employed, were now subjected to him; that all might trust in him alone, as the author of salvation; vid. 1 Cor. *ut supra*. And so Paul, Heb. 1. 11. proves that Christ is far exalted above all the servants and ministers of God (angels), who are now indeed made subject and obedient to him. This reference of the apostolical doctrine is very clear from Heb. 2: 5, οὐκ ἀγγέλοις ὑπέταξε τὴν οἰκουμένην τὴν μέλλουσάν (i. e. the times of the New Testament), but to Christ *only*; although he lived in humiliation upon the earth (vid. the verse following); which was always revolting to the Jews.

Note. To say the whole briefly; the phrase, *kingdom of God* or of *Christ*, in the sense in which John the Baptist, Jesus, and his apostles understood it, signifies, *the whole work of Christ for the good of men, and every thing which is effected by this work*. Hence the phrase denotes (a) all the benefits, rights, privileges and rewards, which his followers receive in this and the future life; comprising the doctrine respecting Christ, forgiveness of sin, and all the blessedness which we owe to him; and sometimes comprising too, the *followers of Christ* themselves (*cives*), who enjoy these blessings; (b) all the duties and the worship which we owe to God and Christ; and so the *conditions* on which we obtain the blessings above enumerated. Thus are the comprehensive phrases, *to enter into the kingdom of God*, *to see it*, etc. to be understood. Vid. especially Morus pp. 184, 185. n. 3. Cf. Storr, "De notione regni cœlestis in N. T." Opusc. Acad. T. I. n. V.

II. Signification of the phrase, *to sit on the right hand of God*, as applied to Christ.*

(1) The phrase is borrowed from Ps. 110: 1, which the Jewish teachers at the time of Christ must have considered to be a Messianic psalm, as appears from Matt. 22: 44, sq. [Vid. for the explanation of this psalm, the Note to the author's German translation, 3d ed.] The origin of this expression, too, is to be sought in a comparison of God with earthly kings. We conceive of kings, rulers, judges *as sitting on thrones*, when they exercise rule, pronounce judgment, or display all their splendor and majesty. Hence the *verba sedendi* (as

* Vid. the Programm cited in the preceding Sections, in which the various explanations which have been given to this phrase are enumerated and examined. Cf. Morus, p. 185, n. 6.

יָשַׁב signify also *to rule, to reign*. God has his throne in the *heavens*, and there Christ, after his ascension, seated himself with God, 1 Pet. 3: 22. Ephes. 1: 20. Heb. 1: 13. Now for any one to be appointed a place with a king,—to be seated with him, or at his right hand, is frequently,

(a) A mere external *mark of honor*, showing that such a person is highly *respected, esteemed and loved* by the king. So 1 Kings 2: 19, sq. 1 Sam. 20: 25. 1 Macc. 10: 62—65. *Standing* at the right hand is the same thing, Ps. 45: 10. The Grecian and Roman writers furnish abundant examples of the same usage. But it denotes,

(b) *Participation in the government, and associated rule*, though not full equality in rank and dignity. Sitting *with* the king is plainly used in this sense, Matt. 20: 21, and frequently in Grecian and Roman writers, and in Grecian mythology. Minerva is represented by Homer as sitting beside Jupiter, and by Pindar, as sitting at his right hand, and as giving charges and commands. Apollo is represented by Callimachus as sitting at the right hand of Jupiter, and as *rewarding* singers and poets. In all these cases, *participation in the government and associated rule* are indicated, though not *full equality*.

(2) Now when this phrase is applied to Christ, we easily see from this analogy what it must mean, and how it must have been understood by ancient readers and hearers. The phrase is never applied to Christ, except when his *humanity* is spoken of; or when he is mentioned as Messiah,—as θεάνθρωπος. It is not spoken of his divine character; though Michælis so explains it, referring it to the seat of God upon the ark of the covenant. The language, “Christ left *his seat at the right hand of the Father* in order to become man,” was first used by the fathers who lived after the fourth century. Such language never occurs in the New Testament. *Sitting at the right hand of God*, is always there represented, as the reward which the Messiah obtained from God, after his death and ascension, for the faithful accomplishment, when upon earth, of all his work for the salvation of man. It is the promised reward (τελείωσις, βραβεῖον,) which the victor receives after a long contest; vid. Acts 2: 31—36. Heb. 12: 2. Hence the Father is said to have placed Jesus at his right hand, Ephes. 1: 20. This phrase, therefore, beyond doubt, implies every thing which belongs to the *glory* of Christ considered as a *man*, and to the dominion over the entire *universe*,

over the *human race*, and especially over the *church* and its members, which belongs to him as a *king*; vid. § 98. This is the reward which he receives from the Father; he takes this place, as a man, for the first time, immediately after his ascension to heaven, 1 Pet. 3: 22. Mark 16: 19. Acts 2: 32, sq. etc. With this, his reign in heaven commences. Paul himself explains the phrase by βασιλεύειν, 1 Cor. 15: 25, and opposes λειτουργεῖν, (which is applied to angels, vid. Heb. 1: 3, 4,) to καθίζειν ἐκ δεξιῶν θεοῦ, Heb. 1: 13, 14. One of the most decisive texts is Ephes. 1: 20—22, “ God raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand,” v. 20. The exaltation and dominion of Jesus, which extends over every thing in all the universe, is described, v. 21; and finally his reign over the church is particularly mentioned, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδωκε κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ πάντα (supreme ruler) τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, v. 22. Cf. 1 Pet. 3: 22.

CHAPTER THIRD.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

§ 100. *Of the higher nature in Christ, and how it is proved.*

We have before shown (§ 93), that Christ was a true man, both as to soul and body ; but have now to show that, according to the representation of the New Testament, he was not a *mere* man ; but that he possessed at the same time such exalted perfections, as cannot be ascribed to any mere man, or indeed to any created being ; or, to speak in the language of the schools, that he possessed a *divine nature*. Caution is necessary in the selection of the texts by which this doctrine is proved.

(1) This doctrine *cannot* be proved,

(a) By *every* text in which Christ is called *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, for this is frequently a name by which his work and office, and not his nature are denoted. There are passages, however, in which *υἱὸς θεοῦ* and *μονογενής* clearly indicate the higher nature of Christ, vid. § 73, 6, b. Such texts only must be chosen, as are determined by the context and predicates to have this reference ; e. g. John 5: 10, and the appellation *μονογενής* John 1., also the texts in which Christ calls God his *Father* in a sense in which this name is never used by any created being ; those, too, in which he ascribes attributes to himself, as Son, which never were, or could be predicated of a mortal or created spirit ; the texts, e. g. in which he says, that he works in common with his Father. It deserves however to be remarked, that many theologians, ever since the earliest ages, have considered the appellation *Son of God*, as denoting simply the divine nature of Christ. These remarks apply equally to the appellation *λόγος*, in itself considered.

(b) By those expressions, (when taken by themselves,) which ascribe to Christ *resemblance to God* in some high degree, e. g. *ἐκὼν θεοῦ*

ἀοράτου, Col. 1: 15, and ἀπαύγασμα δόξης and χαρακτήρ ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, Heb. 1: 3. Ἀπαύγασμα δόξης signifies *the radiance of the divine splendor* or *majesty*; χαρακτήρ ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, *a visible image* (imago expressa) *of the divine substance*. The sense, then, of these representations is this, “the Son is he through whom God hath clearly revealed, or visibly made known himself to men.” So Paul himself explains it, 2 Cor. 4: 4, “As God, at the creation, gave light to the obscure earth; so Christ, by his religion, gave light to men, and led them to a clear knowledge of God.” Vid. John 1: 14, coll. v. 18. But *other* expressions in the passages just cited, clearly ascribing divine attributes to Christ, are proof of this doctrine, as may be seen below.

(c) Nor is this doctrine proved by those passages, which treat of Christ’s state of exaltation, and of the eminent privileges which were conferred upon him, as a man, when he entered upon that condition: e. g. a large portion of the passages Phil. 11., and Heb. 1: 6, sq., which are often improperly adduced as proof-texts of his divine nature.

One great evil of an incautious selection of proof-texts is this, that when one particular passage is found not to prove the point for which it was adduced, the conclusion is readily made, that the whole doctrine is incapable of scriptural support.

(2) This doctrine *may* be proved,

(a) By the texts in which Christ is described as far exalted over all the creatures of God,—over men, angels, and every thing in the universe besides God himself; and indeed as the creator and preserver of all things. Such texts are Col. 1: 15, 16, and others already explained, § 38. The proof in point is not derived so much from the term, εἰκὼν θεοῦ, as from what is there predicated of Christ. Πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, does not mean, the *greatest* or *first* of all creatures; for we find immediately after, that he himself *created all things*; and we must therefore conclude, that he is not the first of all creatures, since he is himself the Creator. Πρωτότοκος must be rendered either *king*, *ruler*, Heb. 1: 6, and Rev. 3: 14, where we read ἀρχὴ (i. e. ἄρχων) κτίσεως θεοῦ; or *he who existed prior to all creatures*, in which sense the Jews called God *primogenitum mundi*.

(b) By the texts in which attributes are ascribed to Christ which can be predicated of no mortal, and which are never ascribed to an-

gels, or to the prophets or other inspired teachers, whom God has employed for the accomplishment of his purposes upon the earth. Such texts are found most frequently in John. Among them are those which contain the phrase, so often occurring, "*he descended from heaven*," John 3: 31. 6: 31, sq. v. 62. 8: 23. 13: 3. 16: 28. This phrase denotes *superhuman, heavenly, or divine origin and nature*; and is spoken of *manna*, John 6: 31; and of *wisdom*, James 1: 17; cf. 1 Cor. 15: 47. This language is never used with respect to any mere prophet or inspired teacher. Even John, whose baptism was ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (of divine origin), distinguishes himself from Christ, who came *from heaven*, John 3: 31; and speaking of Christ's return *to heaven*, he says, "he returned thither ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον," John 6: 62 and xvii. This text is so clear, that Socinus and others, who denied the superhuman nature of Christ, invented a *rapture* of Christ into the heavens (raptum in cælum); or considered the text as referring to the *pre-existence of the human soul*; although not a trace of such an opinion appears in the Bible.

Here it might indeed be objected, 'that Christ is described as an *exalted, heavenly spirit, but not as God; he might still have been created.*' So the Arians. The objection, however, is not valid; because in these passages, and elsewhere, he is said to exist before any created things (i. e. ab æterno), John 1: 1. and xvii. vid. § 37, in prin. Before the creation of the world, nothing existed besides God. So that whatever had existence then, was God himself, belonging to his being and his attributes. This is the direct and incontrovertible conclusion of John, in the passage cited. Indeed, Christ is distinctly affirmed to have enjoyed supreme, divine glory in heaven. "Restore to me (by *exaltation*) the glory ἣν εἶχον πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι παρὰ σοί," i. e. in heaven (referring to his divine nature), John 17: 5. Such language is never used in respect to any prophet, angel, or any created intelligence. Δόξα, in the last case, cannot refer to the *office* of Christ, or to his *dominion*, for he had none "before the creation of the world." Hence he is called by way of eminence, ὁ υἱὸς θεοῦ, John 5: 10; ὁ μονογενής, John 1: 14; because, among all who are elsewhere called the *sons* or *children* of God, he is alone in his kind, and bears this name in an exalted sense, in which no man, no angel, no created being can appropriate it, John v., vid. § 37.

Christ also frequently alludes in his discourses to his divine nature, in another way; e. g. by the word εἰμί, John 7: 29, 34, 36;

"before Abraham was, I AM," John 8: 58. This is the very language in which the immutable God speaks of himself, in the present time. So the Jews understood it; and regarded it as blasphemy for Christ to apply it to himself, and on this account began to stone him, v. 59. For never had a prophet, or any created being, spoken thus of himself.

Christ also frequently ascribed the miracles which he wrought to himself. He professed that he *worked*, or acted *in common with* God, John 5: 17. 10: 31. This again, was never said of any of the prophets. In the miracles of which they were the instruments, nothing indeed was done by them, but *every thing* by God. Accordingly, the Jews affirmed, that by this claim, Christ made himself *equal with God*, ἴσον θεῷ, John 5: 18. 10: 31, sq. They perceived that he used the term *filius Dei* in a sense, in which no mere man could use it with respect to himself; and that he made himself *equal with God*, by ascribing to himself what can belong to God only. And Christ does not disapprove, but rather authorizes their conclusion, John v. and x.

There are many other expressions in the last discourses of Jesus to his disciples (John xiii., sq.), which never are used in the Bible, and never can be used, in respect to any created being: as John 14: 6—9; also vs. 13, 14, where Christ ascribes to himself the hearing of prayer; etc.

These classes of texts prove clearly against Photinus and the Socinians, that the writers of the New Testament did not understand Christ to be a *mere man*, but that they supposed him to possess a *higher* nature, far exalted above that of men and angels. This the Arians concede. But they affirm that these texts are not sufficient to prove his equality with the Father. Even these texts, however, go far towards proving this point. But it is proved more directly,

(c) From the third class of texts, which show that Christ is represented by the writers of the New Testament as partaking of the divine nature as fully as the Father, and being as truly God (ἴσος πατρὶ) as the Father; and from texts in which he is called God. All the necessary considerations respecting these texts are found Vol. I. §§ 37, 38.

§ 101. *Of the connexion between the deity and humanity of Christ, according to what the Bible directly teaches, and the consequences which may be deduced from its instructions.*

I. What the Bible directly teaches respecting the union of the two natures in Christ.

(1) When we compare, without prepossession or prejudice, the various passages which treat of Christ, we clearly perceive that two parts, as it were, or two aspects, are distinguished in the same subject or person. This subject, called *Christ*, is considered as *God*, and as *man*; divine and human attributes are equally ascribed to him, in one and the same context; as in his own prayer, John 17: 5. It was for this reason, that even as early as the third century, the appellation *θεάνθρωπος*, or *θείανδρος*, was given him; vid. § 102.—The clearest passages in point, are found in John; especially 1: 3, coll. v. 18, which clearly teach, (*a*) that the same *λόγος*, who created all things, and existed from eternity with the Father, as his Son and confidant;—the same *λόγος* (*b*) became man (*σὰρξ ἐγένετο*), and lived among men. Hence the *ἐνσάρκωσις* of the fathers. The passage of Paul, Gal. 4: 4, agrees with the one last mentioned; but, *taken by itself*, is not so clear. So the text John 16: 28, “he who came down from heaven, the same returns again to heaven.” The same person who, as man, lived among men, came down from heaven, and existed previously in heaven. John 3: 13. 6: 62. 17: 5. Also, 1 Tim. 3. 16. John 8: 40, 57, 58, and ch. xiv.

From these texts it follows, (*a*) that the Logos, who was from eternity with the Father, is the same person who afterwards appeared upon the earth under the name of Jesus Christ; (*b*) that this Logos became a real man (*σὰρξ ἐγένετο*), or received a human nature; and not merely assumed an apparent human form. Now, except we deviate arbitrarily from the words of the Bible, we can explain these facts only on the supposition, that in Christ *deity* and *humanity* are distinguished, and yet connected.

(2) This connexion between the Son of God and the man Jesus, commenced, when Christ was conceived; vid. § 93. For the supposition of the Gnostic sects, and of Cerinthus, that the higher nature was united with the man Jesus at some later

period, as at his baptism, is wholly unscriptural. John plainly declares, 1: 14, that the λόγος (the same to whom divine predicates had been ascribed, v. 1) *σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. From this passage we are compelled to conclude, that the divine nature connected itself with the human, when the latter was conceived. Theologians illustrate this by the human soul, which in conception is united with the human body, and thenceforward animates and governs it. In the same way was the divine nature united with the human, thenceforward composing with it one person, Christ; as our soul and body united constitute one individual *man*, consisting of two very dissimilar natures.

(3) *Σάρξ* must here be taken in its common scriptural sense, to denote not merely a man, but one infirm like others; *only without sin*. The theologians of the earliest ages, even of the second century, took occasion from this term to call Christ's becoming man, *ἐνσάρκωσις* and *ἐνανθρώπησις*, Lat. *incarnatio*. In after times, they denominated the same event *πρόσληψις*, *assumptio*, the assuming of human nature; since we must suppose that the superior nature condescended to the human and became united with it; and not the reverse. This mode of speech, although in itself unobjectionable, is not scriptural. For the phrase, *σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται*, Heb. 2: 16, means that *he assisted, took care of the children of Abraham*. How could *σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ* denote human nature? *Ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι* and *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τίνος* literally mean, *to take hold of any one*, Acts 23: 19; then *to assist, to take care of any one*, Sir. 4: 12. Luke 1: 54.

II. Conclusions from these scriptural statements; and a more precise explanation of them.

The connexion of deity and humanity in Christ was,

(1) *Not* of such a nature, as that either the deity or humanity was deprived of any essential and peculiar attributes, or in any essential respect changed. For,

(a) The *divine nature* cannot be supposed to have changed. Such a supposition would contradict our very first ideas respecting God. It is not therefore just and proper to say, as some of the Fathers did: *The eternal SON OF GOD*, (i. e. the Deity,) *LEFT heaven, SURRENDERED or RENOUNCED his glory, and condescended to suffering, indigence, etc. on the earth*. Such language is never used in the Bible; and the idea implied by it is inconsistent with the di-

vine glory. But for the Deity to unite itself with frail humanity is no more unsuitable, derogatory, or dishonorable, than for God to give proofs of his glory in the meanest of his works, to connect himself with them, and in and through them to exert his power and agency.

(b) Nor could the *human nature* be altered in any essential respect, by this its connexion with the divine. For Christ would then have ceased to be a true man. If one should say therefore, that Christ as a man, had, from the beginning of his existence, the possession and use of all divine attributes,—that as a man, he was almighty, omniscient, omnipresent,—and that, as many theologians suppose, he merely forbore the exercise of these attributes as a man; he would thus, in reality, deify the human nature of Christ, *vid.* § 92, III. 2. Besides, the passages of the Bible, which speak of the *increase* of his knowledge, Luke 2: 52; of his *not knowing*, Mark 13: 32; etc. clearly teach the contrary. For these representations do not bear the explanation which some have given them, that he merely *pretended* that he did not know, (*simulabat se nescire*, as Augustine said,) that he *pretended* to increase in wisdom; etc. In short, those who form such hypotheses, confess with the mouth the true humanity of Christ,—while in fact they deny it, and allow to Christ, only the veil of a human body and the external appearance of humanity.

(2) The connexion of the two natures must rather be placed in the two following points; viz. (a) in a close and constant connexion of the deity of Christ with his humanity, from the commencement of his existence; (b) in a cooperation of the two natures in action, where it was requisite and necessary, and as far as the nature and attributes of each admitted. The scriptural doctrine is this: ‘the glory (δόξα) which Christ, in his superior nature, had with the Father from eternity (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου), was imparted to his human nature, and shared with it when he became man, so far as this human nature was susceptible of this glory; and was manifested whenever and wherever it was necessary upon earth,’ John 17: 5, 22, 24; ch. xiv. coll. Phil. 2: 9—11.

By the following remarks, something may be done to elucidate this subject, and to render it as intelligible as the limitation of our conceptions will permit.

(a) The agency of God is not always *exhibited* with *equal* clearness in his creatures. His influence, at certain times and in certain circumstances, appears more strikingly and visibly, than at others. The nature of God, however, remains unchanged, amidst all these changes of things which are extrinsic to himself. He is indeed *equally* connected and united with all nature, at all times, and under all circumstances, from its first origin. In a similar way must we conceive of the relation of the divine to the human in Christ. In the *state of humiliation*, the divine in Christ supported his humanity, wherever and whenever there was any necessity for it; especially whenever his Messianic offices required. The divine nature, however, did not impart to the human any attributes, of which the latter, especially in its earthly state and condition, was incapable, or of which it did not stand in need. Nor did the divine nature in itself suffer any alteration by the fate of Jesus while he was upon earth,—his sufferings, death, etc. But in the *state of exaltation*, the sphere of the agency of Jesus was infinitely ennobled and enlarged. There the influences and the effects of his divinity could appear more visibly. There, in heaven, he is far more susceptible of its cooperation and support, in the government of the world and of the church, than in his humble life upon the earth, John 17: 5, 22, 24. Christ, as a man, could not have been raised to such a degree of dignity and glory, as to receive supreme dominion over the spiritual and material world, if his nature had not been so united with that of the Lord of the universe, that the boundless perfections of the latter, became also the perfections of his nature. The Bible always regards the subject in this point of view: as John 1. xvii. Phil. 2: 9, sq. Heb. 1. Ephes. 1: 20, sq.

(b) Writers who proceed with caution upon this subject, describe the *manner* of the connexion of the divine and human natures in Christ, rather negatively than positively. Many, however, endeavour to explain the subject by supposing a *praesentiam arctiorem*, or a *peculiarem praesentiae gradum*, and remark that a *praesentia localis*, or *approximatio*, cannot be understood. The subject has been frequently illustrated, ever since the fifth century, by a comparison of the union between soul and body; and from this comparison the ideas and phraseology relative to this subject have been derived. According to this comparison, the human nature of Christ was the instrument and organ of the divine nature, as the

body is the organ of the human soul, with and through which it acts and operates upon things extrinsic to itself. The body could not act without the cooperation of the soul. The soul has a deep concern in every thing which affects the body, and the reverse. And yet each of the two parts remains, as to its essential nature, unaltered. Vid. Ernesti, Progr. Dignitas et veritas incarnationis, Opusc. Theol. p. 395, seq.

This comparison casts some light upon the subject, but is not entirely applicable, and must not be extended too far. In the union of soul and body, the question regards the state and actions of a *spirit* in a *body*. But in Christ, as a man, his deity does not act upon his body *only*, (as Apollinaris supposed,) but upon the human *body* and *soul both*; and indeed upon the human body principally through the human soul. Here, then, the question regards the union and cooperation of *one spirit with another*.

But here we are destitute of clear conceptions and definite knowledge; as we know not even how the human soul acts upon the body, and is united with it. And here we see the reason at once, why this subject is so obscure to us in our present condition, and why we are so little able to explain the *modus*. When we hear of the *presence* of a spirit, if we avoid considering it as material, we shall obtain only this definite idea; that the spirit is present with us and acts upon us *by thought*. So we are present in spirit with an absent person, when we think of him. Farther than this, we know nothing. Vid. § 23, I. on the omnipresence of God.

After these observations, we can form this general conclusion: that the deity of Christ, as deity, is indeed every where present; i. e. acts in every thing; but that it is present with the humanity of Jesus in a peculiar manner, in which it is not present with any other man, or any other created being; that is, that his divinity acts in and through his humanity, so far as the latter is susceptible of this cooperation, in such a way that this deity and humanity united in Christ, must be considered as one person. This union is represented in a similar manner by Origen, *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, l. 2. This union or connexion of the humanity of Jesus with God, is not *limited* and *temporary*, as in other spirits with whom God is connected, John 5: 26. That here there is something peculiar, which does not take place with respect to others, is shown by the very peculiar expressions which are used in the Bible with respect to this union,

and which are never used with respect to the union of God with his creatures in general.

(c) These thoughts may afford us some conception of the union of the two natures ; but they are very insufficient to render the subject entirely intelligible, or to explain the *manner* of this union in a satisfactory way. Morus gives the right view of this subject, p. 138, § 10. Theologians call it, *mysterium incarnationis*, and the more judicious fathers are unwilling to give any farther distinctions respecting the *modus*, (τὸ πῶς,) than the Holy Scriptures warrant. But nothing more can be determined with certainty from the New Testament, than what has just been remarked. From the limitation of all human conceptions, we cannot believe, that even the apostles or first Christians understood the subject better than we do. But they did not pretend to insist upon an explanation of things, beyond the reach of their senses, and the sphere of human knowledge and science. They did not doubt or deny these things, because they could not be satisfactorily explained ; cf. 1 Cor. ii. iii. Such was the fact, only after men adopted the oracular decisions of an arbitrary metaphysical philosophy, as pronounced first by the Platonists, then by the Aristotelians, and in modern times by other philosophical schools. They now began to insist upon having every thing demonstrated ; by a natural consequence, they refused to believe any thing which could not be demonstrated ; and the direct consequence of this was scepticism.

The union of soul and body in one person is as inexplicable to philosophy, as the union now under consideration. Indeed, if we were mere spirits, and did not know from experience, that a spirit, which is immortal and which belongs entirely to the moral and spiritual world, is, as a matter of fact, united with an animal body, which is dust and earth, into one personal *I* ; we should consider it as highly improbable, and indeed contradictory ; and our metaphysicians would perhaps make bold to *demonstrate à priori* its impossibility from principles of reason.

NOTE. Some have questioned, whether the ideas entertained upon this point might not be illustrated by a comparison of the religious opinions of other nations. We find that many nations not only worshipped deities who had been men, and had lived upon the earth, but believed that certain deities had assumed bodies, and *become incarnate*. This is true especially of those nations which believed in the transmigration of the soul, and were extra-

giant in their veneration for the *founders of their religions*; e.g. the Indians, Mongoli, Tartars, Druses, and Persians. But these nations exhibit a rudeness and coarseness of conception, and a gross anthropomorphism, from which Christ is far removed, and which never appear among the first Christians, nor indeed in the whole age in which they lived. Whatever distinct conceptions *they* had upon this subject, were evidently more refined and suitable to the nature of God, than those of other nations. The idea held by the Greeks of an attendant Demon or Genius, who constantly abode in men, is also entirely different from the Christian view.

(d) Considering, then, how much there is in this subject which is obscure and inexplicable, we ought neither to prescribe any universal formulæ respecting all the more minute distinctions of this doctrine, farther than they are clearly founded in the Scriptures; nor, after the example of Cyril and Leo the Great in the fifth century, to condemn those who are unwilling to assent to these human formulæ. One particular view may be very important to *us*, and contribute greatly to *our* satisfaction and conviction; but we ought not for this reason to force it upon all other Christians, or to consider them as less pious and devoted to Christ, because they differ on some points of this doctrine, from our creed and our phraseology. In fact, the subject lies too much beyond and above our sphere. The opinions of men, therefore, respecting the *modus* of this truth, and their formulæ of this doctrine, will always continue divided and various; and the hypotheses of the learned will always be differently modified, according to the different systems of philosophy and different modes of thinking which may prevail.

During the first ages of the church, nothing was decided upon this subject; the simple doctrine of the Bible was adopted; and the more learned Christians were left at liberty, from the second century, to philosophize upon this subject at pleasure. So it continued till the end of the fourth century. The creeds only decided: *Jesus esse Dei filium à Maria natum*. Even during the violent controversies which began to rage in the fifth century, many of the more moderate concurred with the views just expressed. Melancthon remarked justly and excellently in his '*Loci Theologici*,' that it is not worth while to bestow much laborious diligence on the *minute* developement of this subject; that to know Christ, is to know the salvation which he has procured for us; and not studiously to investigate his nature, and the manner of his incarnation: '*Christum—oportet alio quodam modo cognoscamus, quam exhibent*

scholastici. To scholars, indeed, the historical knowledge of these investigations is useful and necessary. But all these subtile inquiries and distinctions are not proper for the instruction of the common people and of the young. This wise counsel of Melancthon was very much disregarded in the Lutheran Church at the very period in which it was given; in the Formula of Concord, the theologians prescribed definite forms of doctrine, upon which the greatest stress was laid; vid. § 102.

(e) The instructions of the Holy Scriptures upon this subject, (1) are intended to show, that this exalted dignity of the person of Christ, confers a very high value upon all that he taught, performed, and suffered for men;—that we are thus bound, according to his precepts, to believe his whole doctrine and work, and to apply these to our own benefit;—and that his doctrines are the doctrines of God, his works the works of God, his guidance and assistance, those of God. Morus gives some fine views to enable religious teachers to present this subject in a truly practical manner, p. 139, sq. §§ 12, 13.

(2) But there is one more principal circumstance, to which the Scriptures often direct the attention, and by which the importance of this doctrine in a practical respect is still more illustrated. Almost all men feel the necessity of having a *human God*. It is difficult to love and heartily confide in that immeasurable, invisible, inaccessible God, whom we learn from philosophy. But Jesus Christ, (the Logos become man,) is not *merely* the immeasurable, the invisible, the inaccessible God. He is a true man of our own race; and we are his brethren. It is, therefore, easy to love him, and heartily to confide in him; especially considering how much, as a man, he deserves of the human race, by suffering and dying for us. Thus our love to him and our dependence upon him, rest mostly upon the fact that he is *man*, and indeed, a man united with God, in such a sense, as no other man ever was; vid. 1 Tim. 2: 5. Heb. 2: 14—18. 4: 15. (John 14: 1.) John 5: 27.

(f) There have been some theologians who have maintained, that the interposition of a divine person was *necessary* for the recovery of men;—that men *could* not have been delivered in any other way. Some have carried this so far, as to seem to set limits to the divine freedom, and to force from God, by presumptuous demonstration, what was merely a free gift; vid. § 88, ad finem. It

were enough to show the *suitableness* of this means; without attempting to prove its absolute necessity. This plan of God is wise, and fully suited to the wants of men; and therefore God has chosen it. The Bible always labors to exhibit this fact, as the greatest proof of the free and unmerited love of God; John 3: 16. How opposite to this is the attempt to demonstrate this truth *a priori*! So thought Athanasius; and Augustine calls those *stultos*, who undertake to demonstrate metaphysically, that God *could* not have saved men in another way. Still we find this mistaken wish to have every thing demonstrated, even among the fathers. Tertullian said: "God must have become man, in order to unite God with men, and men with God." Anselmus of the eleventh century, argues thus: 'Without *satisfaction*, men could not be saved. To give this satisfaction to God, was the duty of men; but the duty was too hard for them. None but God was able to give it. But to him, as the Judge of men, it must be given. Therefore the Son of God must become man, in order, as God-man, to afford this satisfaction to God;' vid. § 114, 2. Some theologians, even in modern times, especially from the school of Wolf, have pretended to demonstrate, that this was the only means of rescuing man, and was absolutely necessary for this purpose.

Such demonstrations are entirely unsuitable for promiscuous popular instruction. Christ commissioned his disciples, not to demonstrate this truth philosophically, but to *exhibit* it (1 Cor. 1—111); to teach it, from their own conviction and experience, with plainness and simplicity, but still with sincere interest, and then quietly to leave the consequences with God. This was surely very wise; and this is the course which we should pursue. Besides, in this constant vicissitude of philosophical opinions and schools, there is this evident disadvantage, that the truth itself, which is demonstrated by the help of the philosophy of the schools, is either doubted or rejected, as soon as the school goes down.

§ 102. *Historical observations explanatory of the origin and progressive developement of the ecclesiastical system, respecting the person and the two natures of Christ, until the eighth century.*

I. Earliest opinions, from the second to the fourth century.

As early as the third century, many points had been established by the Catholic councils respecting both the *divine* and *human* nature of Christ, separately considered; in opposition (*a*) to those who denied that Christ had a real human body (the Docetæ), or (*b*) to those who either maintained that he was a mere man, or, allowing his higher nature, yet denied his essential divinity and equality with the Father. From that period, the Catholic fathers introduced into their authorized symbols such distinctions and formulæ, as were calculated to oppose the above named errors.

But it was not until the fifth century, that any thing definite was established *respecting* THE UNION *of these two natures in Christ*; and on this subject, the most various modes of thinking and speaking prevailed, even among the Catholic fathers themselves. Those difficult points in this doctrine, respecting which so much controversy existed after the fourth century, do not seem to have occasioned much trouble to the earlier Christians, who had not as yet learned to apply the metaphysics of the schools to the doctrines of religion. And it is found to be precisely so with common unlearned Christians at the present day, who have not their heads filled with those metaphysical systems, in conformity with which, as their models, others adjust and square all their opinions. Hence, it does not appear, that any Christian teacher of the two first centuries made any attempt to elucidate the mysteries of this subject, and even the heretics of this period passed them by without taking offence. All which was distinctly conceived of, during this early period, respecting the *manner* in which God became man, was simply this, that God, or the divine nature of Christ, became visible in a *true human body*, and assumed real human flesh. Hence, the earliest fathers and symbols are satisfied with the term ἐνσάρκωσις, without going into farther explanations: πιστεύω εἰς νόον θεοῦ σαρκωθέντα. So Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian (Adv. Prax. c. 2), and even Origen (περὶ Ἀρχῶν).

[The general truth of the above statement of our author, that the early fathers supposed that the Logos assumed only a human *body*, is confirmed by the testimony of Muenscher, Dogmatic History (Translation), p. 63 ; of Haln, Lehrbuch, S. 456 ; of Neander, Al. Kirchengesch. B. I. Ab. III. S. 1063. But there is one exception to this statement in the opinions of Justin, which were formed under the influence of the Platonic philosophy. Adopting the three-fold division of man, into *body*, *soul*, and *spirit*, which was so common with the Platonic fathers, and of which a fuller account has been given in the first volume (§ 51, I. 1, Note), he supposed that Christ consisted, like other men, of these three parts ; except that in place of the erring human *reason* (Germ. *Vernunft*, in opposition to *Verstand*, or Gr. *πνεῦμα* as opposed to *ψυχή*), which is only a ray of the divine *Logos*, he had this Logos himself, as the higher controlling principle of his being. In these speculations with regard to the manner of the connexion between the divine and human in Christ, Justin went before the age in which he lived, and furnished the germ of the system, which was afterwards farther developed by Apollinaris, whose doctrinal predecessor Justin may therefore rightly be considered. Cf. Neander, Allg. Gesch. der chr. Rel. und Kir., B. I. Abth. III. S. 1063.—Tr.]

The systems of religion from which many of the earlier Christians were converted, appear to have contributed something towards enabling them to receive without difficulty the doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God. They were familiarized from their youth, in the midst of heathenism, with the idea of the visible appearance of the deity in human forms ; and although, when they afterwards became Christians, they considered the accounts of the incarnations of the heathen gods as fabulous, still, by having been familiar with such accounts, they were prepared to receive more easily the fact of the incarnation announced in Christianity ; they now had a seeming analogy for it.—But on this very account many of them conceived of the *incarnation* as a degradation of the deity, vid. § 93.—The converts from Judaism to Christianity had also some analogy for this doctrine in their previous system of belief, which very much facilitated their reception of it ; since they were taught by their ancient books, even by those of Moses, to believe in the appearance of angels, and of God himself, in human form. [The student may find many interesting views, illustrating the re-

lation of the various systems of heathenism to Christianity, in Schlegel's "Philos. der Geschichte;" also in Kreutzer's "Symbolik."—Tr.]

But while, in opposition to the Docetæ, the early fathers contended zealously for the reality of the human *body* of Christ; none in either of the contending parties, before the end of the second century, thought it necessary, to prove particularly, that he had also a *true human soul*. This was not indeed directly denied [except by Justin as just mentioned, Tr.], still the necessity of proving its existence was not at that time felt; nor indeed was the essential distinction between the nature of the soul and body at all so obvious at that time, certainly it was not used in common practice, as it has since been.

[Tertullian was the first, who distinctly taught the doctrine of a proper human soul in Christ. In his anthropology, he rejected the common division of man into body, soul, and spirit; and admitted only two distinct principles in all animated existences, viz. *body* and *soul*; the latter of which, however, in man, he supposed endowed with higher properties than in the inferior orders. He had not therefore the convenient resort of the Platonic theologians, of interposing an animal $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ between the Logos and the body in Christ; but must either connect the Logos immediately and without intervention with the body (which would be to attribute at once to the divine Logos the pain and sorrow, the progress in knowledge, the ignorance, and all the other indications of an imperfect human soul, which appear in the life of Christ); or, he must ascribe to Christ a proper and entire human soul. With this necessity in view, he chose the latter part of the alternative, preferring the mystery and complexity attending the connexion between the divine and human, to the absurdities resulting from the former theory, though commended by its simplicity to the speculative reason. Cf. Neander, Geschichte, B. I. Abth. III. S. 1064.—Tr.]

After the third century, Origen first [?] gave importance to this doctrine of the human soul of Christ in his Theology, and brought it distinctly into light; though not on the same grounds by which the doctrine is now supported. [Although Origen agreed with Tertullian in maintaining an entire human soul in Christ, his views respecting the mode of union between the two natures, differed widely from those of Tertullian, and took their coloring from his

peculiar philosophical system. The union of believers with Christ furnished him with an analogy for the connexion between the Logos and the human nature in Christ. If believers, he argued, are *one spirit* with their Lord, as Paul affirms, much more must this be true of that soul which the Logos had taken into inseparable union with himself. As the *πνεῦμα* in believers is the actuating principle, from which all their feelings and actions spring; much more is it in Christ, the forerunner of believers, the actuating, controlling, and pervading principle, by which his entire humanity is guided and filled. By urging this analogy he drew upon himself the objection, which has often been repeated against the same view, that he made Christ a mere man, distinguished from other believers only by a higher degree of the same participation in the divine nature which they enjoyed. Whether this objection fairly lies against the views of Origen, this is not the proper place to inquire. TR.]

[But the theory respecting the person of Christ advanced by Tertullian and developed and supported by Origen, was particularly offensive to Arius and Eunomius, and to all who contended for the subordination of the Logos to the Father. According to the earlier doctrine of the Church, which they adopted, and which connected the Logos immediately with the body of Christ, they had been able to allege all the appearances of limitation and natural imperfection which he exhibited, as proofs against the doctrine of the absolute divinity of the Logos, and in favor of their own views of his subordination. But of this argument they were deprived, when a human soul of which all these imperfections could be predicated, was ascribed to Christ, and his higher nature was allowed in no sense to infringe upon his full and proper humanity. On the theory of Origen, it was no longer possible for them to invalidate the proofs of the absolute divinity of Christ, by opposing the numerous evidences of subordination appearing in his life and words; since all these must of course be understood of his humanity, leaving his divine nature, though intimately connected with the human, unimpaired by the limitations of the latter. Hence Arius and his followers strenuously opposed the doctrine of the proper humanity of Christ, and insisted upon the older, indistinct, and undeveloped form of belief, by which the Logos merely animated

the body of Christ. Cf. Neander, *Geschichte u. s. w.* B. II. Abth. II. S. 904, ff.—Tr.]

[While on one side, the Arians at this period infringed upon the human nature of Christ; on the other side, Marcellus and Photinus, of whom we have before spoken (Vol. I. § 43, p. 307), infringed upon the divine nature and its personal union with the human. Marcellus, inclining, as he did, to Sabellianism, supposed there was a merely outward and temporary operation of the Logos upon Christ, though still, it must be allowed, in such a way, as to secure the being of God in him. Photinus went farther, and giving great prominence to the human in Christ, made nothing more of the divine in him, than the general illuminating influence, which he enjoyed in common with the prophets and other ambassadors of God, though in a higher degree. This doctrine is properly called Photinianism.—Tr.]

[Between these diverging tendencies of opinion, Arianism and Photinianism, the Catholic fathers (e. g. Gregory of Nazianz, Gregory of Nyssa, and others) endeavoured to reconcile the personal union of two natures in Christ, with the completeness of the human nature. We have thus all the elements of that violent controversy respecting the person of Christ, which shortly followed. Tr.]

Now, after the middle of the fourth century, Apollinaris arose, and denied the existence of a human soul in Christ, or at least of the higher power of the soul; vid. § 93, II. [His theory was in general the same as that of Justin before mentioned, only more systematically developed. It seems to have resulted in a great measure from the speculative interest, which endeavoured to conceive clearly, and to explain, what had before been indistinct. And it has certainly the advantage in many respects, and especially in point of distinctness and consistency, over the older indefinite belief, and over the Arian theory respecting the person of Christ, with which in general it agreed. It also sprung from the Christian interest, to see in Christ the full, immediate, undisturbed manifestation of the deity, which, as it seemed to Apollinaris, could not be on the theory of Origen, where a human soul was made the organ of the divine operations.—The controversy against Apollinaris brought distinctly into view the necessity, in order to the purposes of man's redemption, of the entireness of the human nature of our Redeemer.—Tr.]

After this period, the investigation of this point took a new turn, the first ground of which was laid in the Arian controversies of the same century. The endeavour now became to make every thing clear and determinate; and since the metaphysics of the schools were becoming more and more common, the ancient simplicity was thought to be no longer sufficient.

II. The two opposing systems having their origin in the fourth century, and appearing in conflict in the fifth.

The foundation of both of these was laid by the Arian and Apollinarian controversies.

(1) Some of the Christians of the East, e. g. those of Syria, [and in general the disciples of the school at Antioch,] always made the most accurate distinction between the two natures in Christ, and in all their discourses used terms which indicated this distinction between the divine and human in his person, in the most definite and discriminating manner. This had been before done by some of the earlier teachers, e. g. Tertullian (*Adv. Prax.* c. 27), still more frequently by Origen, and by some of the earlier councils. But after the middle of the fourth century, when the Apollinarian controversies commenced, the Orthodox teachers in Syria and the other Oriental provinces became still more accurate in making these distinctions, and especially were more decidedly opposed to every theory which took from the humanity of Christ its peculiar properties. These were the precursors of the Nestorians.

(2) Others observed no such accuracy, and often employed phraseology, which *appeared* to indicate an entire mixture of the two natures, and a deification of the human nature. This was occasioned by the Arian controversies; for many, in order to exalt Christ in opposition to the Arians, seemed almost to forget that he was also a true man.* This tendency exhibited itself more par-

* There is reason to doubt the correctness of the reason here assigned by Dr. Knapp for this tendency of the Alexandrine school (for it was this school, which objected to the distinction of natures contended for by the school of Antioch). The Arians wholly agreed with the followers of Apollinaris, and with the theologians of Alexandria, in objecting to the distinction of natures in Christ, and in contending for their mixture and oneness, and the transfer of the attributes belonging to each. And it is easy to see, how this want of distinction should be promotive of their belief; since it enabled them to transfer

ticularly in Egypt, and in the Western church, and was carried out into farther developement at the end of the fourth and commencement of the fifth century. Those who opposed this tendency were of opinion, that by phraseology of the kind which the Alexandrine theologians used, the doctrine of Apollinaris was countenanced; for his followers often used terms like the following; viz. *God is man, is born, suffered, died*, etc.; Mary is the *mother of God* (θεοτόκος). But the Alexandrine teachers could plead in their justification the example of many of the older fathers, who had used similar phraseology. Even Athanasius had spoken of a deification of the body of Christ after the resurrection. Eusebius of Cæsarea, and Gregory of Nyssa had said, that the human nature of Christ was *swallowed up* by the divine, etc. Sometimes even Origen had used similar expressions.—These were the precursors of the *Monophysites*.—In reality, however, these parties were more agreed than they believed themselves to be, or than they seemed to be, judging from their different terminologies. Every thing was now ready and prepared for the controversy, which finally broke out in the fifth century.

[Neander in his Church-History (B. II. Abth. III. S. 946, ff.) traces back these diverging tendencies, to the fundamental difference between the Alexandrine school and that at Antioch, as to the relation between reason and revelation. The Alexandrine school, in following its more contemplative and mystical direction of mind, was disposed to assert the unintelligibleness of the union of the two natures, and to magnify the mystery of this union, and to resist all attempts at definite conception and explanation. The school at

to the higher nature of Christ the appearances of limitation in his life, and thus to obtain a proof of the subordination of the Logos, of which they would be deprived, were an accurate distinction of natures introduced, and the application to the one of the predicates belonging to the other forbidden. It is a fact deserving of particular notice, that those who have contended most strenuously for the absolute divinity of Christ, have been also those who have insisted most upon the rights of his humanity, and for a careful distinction between the predicates of the two natures; while those who have held, that the Logos is the most perfect among all created beings, but not God in the proper sense, have equally infringed upon the humanity of Christ, and have always opposed the distinction of natures. It was not then in opposition to the Arian, but rather to the Photinian form of doctrine with regard to the person of Christ, that the Alexandrine tendency found the occasion for its farther developement. Tr.]

Antioch on the contrary, in conformity with its more free and speculative bias, while it did not assume fully to explain the *ὑπὲρ λόγον* of this union of natures, still undertook to discover how much in it was *κατὰ λόγον*.—TR.]

III. Theory of Nestorius, and the controversy relating to it.

Nestorius, Patriarch at Constantinople, being born and educated in Syria, adopted the Syrian form of doctrine with regard to the person of Christ, and endeavoured to employ terms which would accurately distinguish between his divine and human natures. This, however, had never before been done in Constantinople. After the Arian controversies, the term *θεοτόκος* had been used very frequently in application to Mary, the Mother of Christ, which was also a favorite term with the followers of Apollinaris in Syria. But when in the year 428, Nestorius became patriarch at Constantinople, he was much surprised by this language. He objected to the term *θεοτόκος*, on the ground, that it could not be said, that *God* was born or died; and instead of this term he proposed to substitute *Χριστοτόκος*. With this the controversy commenced.

His doctrine as appears from his Homilies, was this; 'Christ had two *ὑποστάσεις*, a divine and human, (meaning by *ὑπόστασις*, as many of the ancients did, *natura*, *φύσις*, or as Tertullian himself employed it, *substantia*,) and only *πρόσωπον μοναδικόν*, *one person*. These two natures stood in the *closest connexion* (*συνάφεια*), which he considered as consisting principally in the agreement of will and action; but were not *mixed* or *transformed*. Each nature still retained its peculiar attributes; as is the case in man, who consists of two *ὑποστάσεις*, soul and body. All these attributes and actions were predicable of one person (*πρόσωπον*), but not of both the natures; the *inferior* were predicable only of the human nature; the superior, only of the divine nature. Accordingly the terms, *Deus natus*, *mortuus est*, *Mater Dei*, *θεὸς ἔνσαρκος*, were very unsuitable and unscriptural. These could be properly predicated only of *Christ* (the name of the person).'

Hereupon Nestorius was openly attacked, at first, in Egypt. His chief opponent was Cyril, the Patriarch of Alexandria, who maintained his own theory in opposition, and accused Nestorius of dividing Christ into *two persons*: because *φύσις* was the word used

at Alexandria for what Nestorius called *ὑπόστασις*, and *ὑπόστασις* for what he called *πρόσωπον*. They disagreed, therefore, more in words, than in reality. At length in the year 431, the followers of Nestorius were condemned as heretics by the council at Ephesus. The whole party separated from the Catholic church, and continues in the east to the present day. [For a more full account of the doctrines of Nestorius, with the original passages, cf. Gieseler, *Lehrb. d. k. Gesch. B. I. § 85, ff.*—Neander, *Gesch. B. II. Abth. III. S. 951.*—As to the separate community of the Nestorians, cf. Neander in his Appendix to the History of this doctrine, *B. II. Abth. III. S. 1171.* Also Mosheim (*Murdock's Trans.*), Vol. I. p. 431, Note. Whether the whole dispute between Nestorius and Cyril was mere logomachy, is a matter of dispute.—Tr.]

IV. The doctrine of Eutyches, and the controversy respecting it in the fifth century.

Eutyches, an Abbot, and Presbyter in a cloister at Constantinople, was one of the most zealous opponents of Nestorius. In order to oppose his doctrine more successfully, he affirmed, after the year 448, that Christ had only *one* nature (*μία φύσις*) after his deity and humanity were united. He called this nature, *φύσις σεσαρκωμένη*, the nature *made human*. In this way, he supposed he could express the most intimate connexion between the *two natures*, which, in his opinion, were too widely separated by Nestorius, so as to make two persons in Christ. He meant, in fact, to say nothing more nor less, than that there was only *one Christ*. The whole obscurity consisted in the word *φύσις*, which he understood to mean *person*; as Athanasius himself did in the fifth century, and also Ephraem the Syrian. This controversy, therefore, like the former, was, in fact, mere logomachy.* Eutyches appealed, and with truth,

* [The doctrine of Eutyches respecting the person of Christ has been more definitely stated by other writers on doctrinal history. The principal peculiarity of it is placed in this point: while Eutyches admitted that before the incarnation (or, which was doubtless his meaning, *according to conception and not in reality*), there were two natures in Christ, yet after this, they did not remain distinct, but constituted *one nature*, not merely by a *συνάφεια*, as Nestorius held, but by a real *σύγχυσις* or *μεταβολή*, so that his human nature could no longer be said to be *consubstantial* with that of other men. Briefly, it is Eutychianism to say, that Christ is constituted *of or from* two natures, but does not exist *in* two natures (*ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, not *ἐν δύο φύσεσι*). Cf. Neander, *Gesch. B. II. Ab. III. S. 1078.* Also Murdock's Mosheim, Vol. I. p. 433, Note.—Tr.]

to Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, and other ancient, and especially Egyptian teachers, who *appeared* to abolish the distinction of the two natures. *Eutychianism* may therefore be truly said to have existed before Eutyches; to prove which Salig published a treatise at Wolfenbütel, 1724, 4to.

Hence arose another unhappy division in the church. The Patriarch of Constantinople joined with Pope Leo the Great in opposing Eutyches, and accused the latter of reviving the heresy of Apollinaris, and of denying the true humanity of Christ. He protested against this conclusion; but they would not allow that his words admitted any other sense, and he was too obstinate to alter his terminology. At the Council at Chalcedon, in the year 451, his doctrine was condemned as heretical. Here arose the sect of the Monophysites, which continues in the East to the present day.

In order to render the difference between themselves and the Catholics and Nestorians clearly discernible, some of these Monophysites employed paradoxical statements and phrases, like the following, viz. one of the Trinity suffered and was crucified; the deity of Christ so penetrated his humanity, as to render his body *incorruptible* (ἄφθαρτον). This, however, was denied by others, because it favored the Docetæ. Some also, even of the Monophysites, believed that the divine nature was omniscient, but not the human nature connected with it (Mark 13: 32). These were called Agnoëtæ.

[Note. As Photinianism and Apollinarianism were the opposite extremes of this doctrine in the former period; so now were Nestorianism and Eutychianism. Between these the Catholic Fathers took a middle course, and condemned on the one hand the *συνάφεια* of Nestorius, as indicating a mere external and moral connexion between the two natures in Christ, and on the other, the *σύγχυσις* or *μεταβολή* of Eutyches, as indicating such an entire interpenetration of the two natures, as must destroy the peculiarities of each. The Catholic doctrine in opposition to these extremes is expressed in the following Symbol, established at the Council at Chalcedon, 451, under Marcian.

Ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατέρεσιν, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κείριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀνθρώπον ἀληθῆς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοοῖσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοοῖσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας· πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν, δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν, ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου

κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, νῦν, κίριον, μονογενῆ, ἐκ δύο φύσεων [ἐν δύο φύσεσι] ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· οἰδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἐνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἐκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἐν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαριζόμενον, ἀλλ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νῦν καὶ μονογενῆ, θεὸν λόγον, κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν· καθάπερ ἄνωθεν οἱ προφηταὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐξεπαίδεν, καὶ τὸ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν παραδέδωκε σύμβολον.

There can be no reasonable doubt which of the two readings ἐκ δύο φύσεων or ἐν δύο φύσεσι ought to be preferred. The whole force of the Symbol, as far as it is directed against Eutychianism, lies in the latter reading, since Eutyches would allow that Christ was constituted ἐκ δύο φύσεων. The reading ἐν δύο φύσεσι is supported by good authority, probably from the whole course of events at the Council of Chalcedon, and more consistent than the other with the context, as the word γνωριζόμενον is of difficult construction with ἐκ, and on the contrary reads naturally with ἐν. Cf. Neander, B. II. Abth. III. S. 1110.—TR.]

V. The theory and sect of the Monothelites.

This sect arose in the seventh century, from the attempt of some who were rather inclined to the side of the Monophysites, to unite the Nestorians and Monophysites with the Catholic church. They persuaded the emperor Heraclius to enact, that Christ, after the union of his two natures, had only *one will* and *one action of the will*. To this, it was thought, all parties might assent, and thus become united. At first, many were inclined to adopt this opinion, and among others the Patriarchs at Constantinople and Rome. But a number of Councils were held upon the subject, and the Catholics at last came to the conclusion, that this opinion would introduce only a different form of the doctrine of Eutyches. They therefore maintained a *twofold* will in Christ, i. e. one for his divine, and one for his human nature; but at the same time, that these were never opposed and always agreed. The other party maintained, that there was but *one will*; since the human will of Christ did not act separately, but was subject to the divine will, and governed by it. Both parties were right in opinion, and only misunderstood each other. The latter, however, was outvoted, and at the third Council at Constantinople in the year 680, was condemned as heretical; and thus the sect of the Monothelites arose in the East. [Cf. Hahn, S. 464.—Gieseler, § 162.]

Note. Another controverted point, was the *relation* of Christ to the Father, in the union of his two natures. The ancient fathers had commonly used the appellation *Son of God*, as a name of the divine nature of Christ, and not as a name of his person and office. They found some texts of Scripture, however, in which the human nature of Christ is also plainly designated by this name; as Luke 1: 35. In order to relieve themselves from this difficulty, without relinquishing their position, they said: 'Christ, as God, was the *natural* Son of God, (i. e. he was, in a literal sense, eternally generated by the Father, he received his deity communicated to him from eternity, Ps. 11.) but as man, he was the Son of God by *adoption* (i. e. by the communication of the divine nature at the time of his conception, he was raised as a man to this dignity). And in this there is no heresy. But as these terms and representations respecting *adoption* were frequently employed by the Nestorians, they were gradually omitted by the Catholics. This doctrine was, however, revived in Spain in the eighth century, 783, et seq. by Felix, Bishop of Urgel (Urgelitanus), and was approved by many in the West. Others regarded it as a revival of Nestorianism;—councils were held upon the subject in Italy and Germany; and at length the opinion of the Adoptionists was condemned as heretical.

Respecting all these controversies, vid. Walch, *Ketzergeschichte*.

These unhappy dissensions should serve as a warning to every Christian who loves peace, not to take upon himself to define and decide respecting subjects which the Holy Scriptures have left undecided; as Morus truly observes, p. 133, § 10, coll. § 101.

§ 103. *Historical observations continued; the ANCIENT ecclesiastical terminology respecting this doctrine explained.*

I. Terminology of the Fathers.

The ecclesiastical terminology on this subject came gradually into use, and originated, partly before the controversies of the fifth century, partly at the time of these controversies, and in consequence of them. Many ancient terms were differently defined and understood after that period. This indefiniteness of phraseology, and the various use of terms, were the principal occasion of these controversies. The terms employed ought, first of all, to have been explained and understood.

(1) *Some ANCIENT general terms respecting the person of Christ, and the relations and actions of his deity and humanity.*

(a) The ancient fathers were in the habit of calling the mutual relation of the deity and humanity united in Christ, *οἰκονομία*, which signifies, *arrangement, institution, regulation*; also, *the fashion and manner in which any thing is done or arranged*. So it is used by Polybius, and Cicero in his Letters to Atticus, and by Paul, Ephes. 1: 10. In the same way Tertullian (Adv. Prax. 2) used the word *œconomia*, and rendered it *dispensatio*.

(b) They endeavoured to find some term, which should appropriately designate the whole person of Christ, as composed of deity and humanity. As the New Testament contains no single word of this kind, they at last decided upon the word *θεάνδρος* or *θεάνθρωπος*, *God-man*; as Tertullian had been accustomed to say, *Deus et homo*, and Origen, *θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος*.

(c) They called the power which the deity and humanity of Christ had of working in common, *ἐνέργεια θεανδρική*, *vis*, sive *operatio deovirilis*. This phrase first occurs in the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagitus, Epist. 4. Theologians, therefore, afterwards called the particular actions of Christ as God and man, or his Mediatorial works, *operationes deoviriles*; also, *ἀποτελέσματα*, vid. § 105.

(2) Various terms were originally used to denote the two subjects (*πράγματα*, *res*, as Cyril of Alexandria calls them) connected in Christ. In the *Latin* church the oldest term was *substantia*. So Tertullian, “*substantiæ duæ,—CARO ET SPIRITUS*,” Adv. Prax. 27. They had previously been contented with the simple formula: “*Christum esse Deum et hominem verum*.” The word *substantia* was still used in this sense by the Latin church in the fourth century; and sometimes even by Leo the Great in the fifth century. It signified as they used it, *ens singulare*, or *individuum*. It was, however, regarded as ambiguous, since it also signified, *existence itself*, and *that which really is*. The word *natura* was gradually found to be more appropriate and definite. It had been early used by Ambrosius; but after the Council at Chalcedon, in the fifth century, it became, by means of Leo the Great, the usual and characteristic term of the Catholic Fathers.

In the *Greek* church, also, many terms were originally in use. (a) *Υπόστασις*. This word answers exactly to the Latin *substantia*. It was used by Nestorius, and before him, by many whose orthodoxy was never doubted. (b) *Φύσις*. This word was used at the same time in Egypt, and was one cause of the controversy between

Cyril and Nestorius ; vid. § 102, III. (c) *Οὐσία*. This word was early in frequent use ; but through the efforts of Cyril and the Roman Bishop, in the fifth century, the word *φύσις* became current as orthodox.

(3) The terms used to denote the *whole Christ*, as consisting of two natures.

The Latin church used the word *persona* for this purpose ; and this being very definite and unambiguous, has been retained. Respecting its definition, etc. vid. § 104. But the Greek church had a great variety of terms to express the same thing, which occasioned the greatest confusion.

(a) *Πρόσωπον*. This word was in fact the least ambiguous, and answered exactly to the Latin *persona* (a *suppositum intelligens*, which has its own proper subsistence). In many churches, this was originally the most common word. It was so even among the Syrians, who derived their word *parsopa* from it. Accordingly Nestorius said, *πρόσωπον ἓν, καὶ δύο ὑποστάσεις* (natures) *ἐν Χριστῷ*. But the word was uncommon in Constantinople, Egypt, and elsewhere. In these places they used instead the word

(b) *ὑπόστασις*. Among the Greeks this word means *the actual existence* (*ὑπαρξις*) of a thing, *the existing thing* ; also *an individual*. It was therefore a far more ambiguous word than the other. Cyril used it to denote the whole Christ ; but Nestorius, his separate natures ; vid. § 102, III. Cyril and the Roman Bishop said : *εἷς Χριστὸς, μία ὑπόστασις, δύο φύσεις ἐν Χριστῷ*. This party prevailed, and introduced *ὑπόστασις* as the common word by which the Orthodox were distinguished. Even they, however, sometimes still used the word *πρόσωπον*. The word *ὑπόστασις* may also have been regarded as more scriptural, from Heb. 1:2, *ἡ χαρακτὴρ ὑποστάσεως* ; but here the *person* is not the subject of discourse : vid. § 100. The Nestorians still adhered to their *πρόσωπον* and *parsopa*.

(c) *Φύσις*. This word was applied to the person of Christ by many teachers of the fourth century, long before Eutyches. Athanasius and Ephraem the Syrian had affirmed, without being pronounced heretics, that there was *μία φύσις* in Christ. Eutyches, then, in the fifth century, thought that this word, already authorised by the Catholic fathers, was the best adapted to express the most intimate connexion between the deity and humanity, in opposition to Nes-

torius; vid. § 102, IV. His opponents, however, understood the word differently, and so made heresy out of it.

(4) *The words, comparisons, and established distinctions employed to illustrate the manner of the union of the two natures.*

(a) The most ancient words used by the fathers to denote the union of the two natures, convey the idea of a mixture of these natures. Among others was the word σύγκρασις, *commixtio* and *misceri*, which is used by Tertullian (adv. Prax.) and by Cyprian, and even in the fourth and fifth centuries by Gregory of Nyssa and Ephraem the Syrian. This word occasionally escaped even from Leo the Great, the zealous opponent of Eutyches. Of the same kind were the words which frequently occur in the writings of the Grecian, and more especially the Egyptian teachers of the third and fourth centuries, viz. μεταβολή, μεταποίησις, μεταμόρφωσις. But the word, συνάφεια, was preferred by Nestorius and some others. But for this very reason it was rarely employed by his opponents. The other words, σύγκρασις, &c. &c. which denote a mixture of natures, were rejected at the Council at Chalcedon, because they were used by Eutyches, and the word ἕνωσις, *unio*, was there established in their place.

(b) The illustrations of the manner of this union employed by the ancients.

(a) *Comparisons and images.* Some of these are very gross, and exhibit very imperfect conceptions. Tertullian said (Adv. Prax. 27): "the deity and humanity in Christ were *mixtura quædam, ut electrum ex auro et argento*." Origen and Basilus the Great compared this union to iron heated in the fire (penetrated through and through by the fire); Ephraem the Syrian, to a compounded medicine; Origen in another passage, and Theodorus of Mopsuestia, to the marriage connexion (*two, one flesh*)—a comparison of a more moral cast; Cyril of Alexandria and Leo the Great, to the union of soul and body, which comparison they particularly advocated.

(β) Many new terminologies were invented after the controversies commenced, in order to distinguish one sect from another, and to obviate various unscriptural representations. Thus the natures in Christ were said to be connected ἀχωρίστως, ἀδιαιρέτως and ἀδιελύτως, i. e. indissolubly and permanently, and not merely for a season. For the Gnostics taught, that the Aeon Christ was separated from the man Jesus at the time of the death of the latter; and Marcel-

lus taught, that the Logos would at some future time return to the Father. In opposition to these and similar errors, the above determinations were therefore adopted by the Council at Chalcedon. Thus, too, in opposition to Eutyches, this union was said to be *ἀσυγχύτως* (such that a third nature had not arisen from the union of the two natures, as when material things are mingled); each nature existed by itself, unaltered in its kind, *ἀτρέπτως*. Christ, it was said, should be *one*, *ἓν πρόσωπον*, *μία ὑπόστασις θεανθρώπου*. This *ἕνωσις* was said to be *οὐσιώδης* (not apparent, but real); *ὑποστατική* (such that the two natures remained unchanged as to their kind, although they were essentially united—a term used by Cyril); *ὑπερφυσική* (supernatural); etc. After the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the schoolmen of the west adopted these terminologies into their systems. The orthodox Greeks also constantly preserved them, in opposition to the Monophysites, Nestorians, and other heretics.

II. Later Distinctions.

During the sixteenth century, after the death of Luther and Melancthon, not only were the old subtilties in the doctrine respecting the nature and person of Christ, revived by many Lutheran theologians, but many new ones were introduced. The occasion of this was, the controversy respecting the Lord's Supper between the zealous adherents of Luther and the Reformed theologians. The Reformed doctrine was at that time approved by many Lutheran theologians. The opposing party, therefore, and especially James Andreaë, Chancellor at Tübingen, and Mart. Chemnitz, endeavoured, by new distinctions in the doctrine respecting the person of Christ, to draw the line of distinction between the two systems as finely as possible. Ecclesiastical authority was given to these distinctions by the "Form of Concord." Such subtilties as these do not appear in the "Loci Theologici" of Melancthon. On this subject the following particulars should be known: viz.

(1) Luther affirmed the *true* and *substantial* presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper. But in the sixteenth century, many of his disciples and zealous followers went beyond their teacher in this matter. Some of them advocated, in fact, if not in words, a *physical* presence of the body of Christ. Beza, on the other hand, and other Reformed theologians, showed,

as Zwingli had done before, that this could not be supposed ; considering that the human body of Christ is now in heaven, and could not, as a real human body, be present in more than one place at the same time.

(2) Against these objections, the Lutherans maintained, either the *actual constant* omnipresence of the body of Christ, as Andreä appears to have done ; or, that it *could* be present every where (*ubique*), whenever and wherever he would, and the case required. This was the view of Luther, Chemnitz, Hülsemann, and many others. Hence they were called by their opponents *Ubiquitarians* ; and there was much controversy respecting the omnipresence of the body of Christ.

(3) In order to render this presence of the body of Christ more intelligible, assistance was sought from the doctrine *de communicatione idiomatum interna et reali*. Here Chemnitz was the most active. They proceeded on the ground, that the human nature of Christ was united in the most intimate manner with the divine nature ; that it was penetrated, as it were, by the divine nature, and received all divine attributes by communication. They invented for this purpose the “*genus communicationis idiomatum majestaticum*.” At length they displayed this fine web of subtilty and terminology in the “*Form of Concord*.”

(4) Hereupon new dissensions and schisms arose in the Lutheran church, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For the theologians of Brandenburg rejected the ‘*Form of Concord*’ altogether, and the theologians of Helmstädt disapproved and rejected particular doctrines contained in it ; such as the doctrine of the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ. The controversy which thus arose did great injury to the Lutheran church.

§ 104. *A brief exhibition of the ecclesiastical system respecting the person and the two natures of Christ ; an explanation of the ecclesiastical phraseology now in use in the doctrine DE COMMUNICATIONE IDIOMATUM ; and a critical judgment upon the same.*

From §§ 102, 103, the gradual origin and increase of the learned ecclesiastical distinctions and terminologies, is clearly seen. The

most important of these only are still retained. How many of them are plainly founded in the Holy Scriptures, may be determined by §§ 100, 101.

I. Established form of doctrine respecting the person of Christ, and the union of his two natures.

There are two natures in Christ, the *divine* and *human*. The *Son of God* (i. e. the divine nature) united himself so closely and intimately with the human nature, that *one person* is made from these two united natures. *Person*, in philosophical language, is a *rational existence* (beasts then are not persons) *which has its being and subsistence in itself* (subjectum intelligens, volens, libere agens). Thus Boëthius in his book, "de persona et natura," cap. 2. The abstract of person, or the existence of such a being, is called *personalitas*. This union, therefore, in being *personal* (unio personalis) is distinguished from the other kinds of union of God with his creatures, and even from that of God (the Father) with the man Jesus; vid. § 101. We may say, that the triune God is in some sense united with Jesus. But neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit have so connected themselves with the human nature of Christ, that we can say, that the Father or the Holy Spirit *became man*. This can be said, on the authority of the Bible, only of the Son of God. The condition which arises from this union is called *unio* (ένωσις); the beginning of this union, or the act of uniting, *unitio*, which is therefore synonymous with *incarnatio* (ένσάρκωσις). This personal union is a real, not simply a moral, mystical, or figurative union; still it is a *supernatural* union; such that one nature is, as it were, *penetrated* by the other (*permeata*); although the manner, the internal *modus* of this, is to us inexplicable, and such, that the most intimate connexion subsists between the two in their mutual actions. Theologians call this union of one nature with the other, and their mutual relations, *περιχώρησις*, observing, however, that no mixture (*σύγχυσις*) of the two natures takes place, and also, that this union is inseparable and indissoluble (*άχωρίστως*). Other distinctions and terminologies, which had their rise in the controversies relating to this subject, may be seen in § 103.

II. Effects of this personal union of the two natures; and the consequences deduced from it.

(1) The *impersonality*, ἀνυποστασία, *impersonalitas*, of the man Jesus, or of the human nature of Christ. Theologians maintain, that the human nature of Christ does not subsist in itself, but in the person of the Son of God, or that in itself it is ἀνυπόστατος, and that it has ἐνυποστασίαν in him. For, if personality is ascribed to the human nature of Christ, he must be conceived as composed of two distinct persons. This distinction was directed principally against the opinions ascribed to the Nestorians; and also against the opinions of the Apollinarians, Monotheletae and Agnoëtæ. If we would form any clear idea from this distinction, we must understand it, not in a physical, but in a *moral* sense, as Ernesti remarks in his Programm 'De incarnatione'. All that is intended by it is this, that the man Jesus never was a *mere* man, and never acted from *simple* human power (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ), in any such way as to be separated from the Son of God, and, as it were, independent of him. And this is the representation of the New Testament. When therefore, Christ says, *I* do, *I* teach, etc., he speaks of the *whole Christ*, in which the divine is the superior and reigning nature, by which the inferior or human nature is governed, and used as an instrument; just as we, when we speak of ourselves, *our persons*, mean soul and body together.

Note. In this way, and in this way *only*, can we explain the fact, that Christ should speak of himself in the very same discourse, and indeed, in the very same sentence, as man, and again, in such terms as the eternal and immutable God alone uses of himself: e. g. John 17: 5, "Glorify me with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was;" in the same manner, as when we speak of ourselves, we sometimes employ terms which are applicable only to a spiritual nature, and at other times, terms which are applicable only to a corporeal nature; the former in relation to the soul, the latter in relation to the body; because these two natures are united in us in one person.

(2) Another consequence deduced from this community of the two natures, is *that one nature communicates its own attributes to the other (communicare idiomata)*.

(a) If by this statement it is meant, that the properties of each of the two *natures*, are *regarded* as belonging to the *whole person*; it is unobjectionable. For in the very same way we ascribe to man the attributes of soul and body, though exceedingly diverse. Ac-

cordingly the New Testament and the discourses of Christ himself represent, that the glory which Christ, as to his divine nature, had with the Father from eternity, belonged also to his human nature, and, so far as this nature was susceptible of this glory, was communicated to it, and became particularly visible from the commencement of his state of exaltation; vid. John 17: 5. Phil. 2: 9—11. Cf. § 101.

(b) There is great objection however to the opinion, that all the attributes of one nature are *really* (*interne et realiter*) communicated to the other. But the strict Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth century, and especially Chemnitz, were led by their views respecting the Lord's Supper, to insist strongly upon this opinion; vid. §103, II. To meet the objections which would be brought against it, they made the following limitations: viz.

(α) Because the deity is incapable of change, the attributes of the human, were not communicated to the divine nature; but only the attributes of the divine to the human. This *communicatio idiomatum* was not, then, *mutual* or *reciprocal*.

(β) All the attributes of the divine nature cannot be communicated to the human; but only the *attributa operativa* (those which imply action and activity), e. g. omnipotence, goodness, justice, etc. The *attributa quiescentia* (those which imply rest and inaction), e. g. infinity, eternity, etc., are incommunicable; vid. Vol. I. §18, III. 2.

But this opinion, after all these fine distinctions, is not founded in the Scriptures; and the texts cited in its behalf do not prove it; vid. *infra*, de *propositionibus idiomaticis*. Moreover, it is liable to many objections.

(γ) Nothing more was necessary in order to the action of the human nature of Christ, than for it to be determined and impelled by the divine nature; in something the same way as the human body is impelled by the soul; in which case, each part retains its own attributes, and there is no necessity for the attributes of the soul to be communicated to the body. This was the view of many of the most ancient and orthodox fathers of the church.

(δ) The attributes of the deity are *inseparable*. Where there is one, there are all. And no conception, certainly no clear conception, can be formed of such a division. The divine nature is altogether incapable of change. And if the human nature were changed in any essential respect, Christ could not continue a true man.

(5) Christ himself said, that as a man, he was unacquainted with many things. He changed his place as a man. He learned and increased in wisdom. How then can I say, that, as a man, he was omniscient, omnipresent, and all-wise ?

It is far better to be content with the more simple and more scriptural opinion, that each nature retained its peculiar attributes ; and that the human nature was supported, guided, and endowed with strength and wisdom, by the divine nature, whenever there was occasion ; vid. §§ 100, 101. And many good Lutheran theologians, even of the sixteenth century, acknowledged that this was sufficient.

(3) Still another consequence deduced from the personal union of the two natures is the *communio operationum*, i. e. all the actions done by either of the two natures must be considered as the actions of the whole person. So whether Christ acts from the impulse of the divine nature, or as man, in either case the whole person acts. In the same way the actions of a man, whether of his soul or his body, are ascribed, without hesitation, to the whole person. The most rational and intelligible opinion on this subject, however, is this, that the humanity of Christ is the instrument by which his deity acts ; though in such a manner, that the peculiar attributes and properties of his humanity are not set aside. In all those actions, therefore, where the humanity of Christ had occasion for instruction, support, and guidance, it received the same from his divinity. Such actions, (and all which belong to his mediatorial work are such,) are called by theologians, *operationes deoniriles* ; vid. § 103, I. 1.

The ancients expressed the same thing by saying, that there was *one will* in Christ, and that his humanity assented to the will of his divinity, and acted according to it. So Nestorius, and even the orthodox of that age. But after the controversy of the Catholics with the Monotheletæ, the former advocated two wills in Christ, the latter only one ; vid. § 102, V.

(4) From the theory of the *personal union*, and the *communication of attributes*, various formulæ and modes of speech have been derived. Only a part of them occur in the Scriptures. The rest, which should have been omitted, were occasioned by theological controversies. They are called *propositiones*, and are divided into two principal classes. Respecting all the minutiae of this subject,

vid. Baumgarten, Glaubenslehre, where they are treated at length. [Cf. also Hahn, § 94, S. 445.]

I. *Propositiones personales sive hypostaticæ*, i. e. such as are derived from the notion of the personal union itself of the two natures in Christ. These are again divided into two classes.

(1) Propositions in which the peculiar properties of either of the two natures, are ascribed to the *whole person*; or in which the *concrete of the person* is connected with the *concrete of either of the two natures*; e. g. *Christ is man, the son of man, the son of David*, where the concrete of the person is connected with the concrete of the *human* nature; or, *Christ is God, the only begotten Son of God* (in the theological sense), where the concrete of the person is connected with the concrete of the *divine* nature. Such propositions occur in the Bible and occasion no mistake.

(2) Propositions in which the *concrete* of one nature is predicat- ed of the other nature (*concreta naturarum de se invicem prædicantur*): e. g. *God is man, the man Jesus is God, the son of Mary, or of David, is God*. Theologians observe here, that the case is not the same with the *abstracta naturarum*. Thus it would be improper to say, *the humanity* (of Christ) *is the deity* (of Christ.) Anciently, in the fourth and fifth centuries, such propositions were frequently employed, vid. § 102; but they were objected to by Nestorius. They are indeed capable of a proper explanation, but they easily occasion mistake. Besides they have no analogy; as nobody says: *animus est corpus, corpus est animus*, etc. The texts which are appealed to (Rom. 1: 3. Luke 1: 35. Matt. 16: 13, 16), are not in point. For the appellation, *Son of God*, in these texts, may be the name of person and of office, and is not necessarily the name of nature. In the text, 1 Cor. 15: 47, "the second Adam is the *Lord* from heaven," *κύριος* also is the name of person, and not of nature.

II. *Propositiones idiomaticæ, sive de communicatione idiomatum*; such as denote the communication of attributes (*idiomata, proprietates, affectiones*). These again are divided into two principal classes.

(1) Propositions in which the attributes of one nature are ascribed to the whole person (named from one of the two natures), or in which the *subject* is either a concrete of person or a concrete of nature, but the *predicate* is an *idioma* of the divine or human nature. These are divided into three classes; viz.

(A) Propositions in which the attributes and actions of one nature or the other, are ascribed to the *whole* person; or, where the subject is a *concretum personæ*, but the predicate an *idioma alterutrius naturæ*. A proposition of this kind is called *idiomatica*, or *ἀντιδοτική* (*ἀντιδοσις*, retributio). This has analogy in its favor; e. g. *man* (*the soul*) *thinks*; *man* (*the body*) *eats*. In this case, both of these actions are predicated of the whole person. Such propositions frequently occur in the Scriptures; e. g. *Christ suffered, rose from the dead, wrought miracles by his own power, is mortal, is omnipotent*. Thus in John 16: 51, “*I* (the whole person speaks) *came from heaven* (the divine nature);” John 10: 12, “*I lay down my life* (the human nature) *for the sheep*;” and in many other texts; vid. Morus p. 143, § 4.

(B) Propositions in which the attributes peculiar to *each* nature are predicated of the *same*, or in which the subject is a concrete of one nature, and the predicate an *idioma* of the same nature; as when we say, *the soul is immortal, the body is mortal*. Thus, Matt. 2: 1, *Jesus was born*; Acts 2: 22, 23, *Jesus was crucified*; or, making the subject a concrete of the *divine nature, the only begotten Son of God*, (if this name is given to the divine nature,) *was from the beginning, created the world, is omnipotent*, etc. This language is very common in the Bible; and the nature which is the subject of discourse is often expressly mentioned: e. g. Christ *κατὰ σάρκα*. Vid. Morus p. 142, § 1, n. 1.

(C) Propositions in which the peculiar attributes of *one* nature are predicated of the *other*. These propositions are divided into two classes, corresponding to the two natures in Christ.

(a) Propositions in which the attributes of the human nature are predicated of the divine nature, or, where the subject is a *concretum divinæ naturæ*, but the predicate an *idioma naturæ humanæ*. This is called *ἰδιοποίησις*, because the divine nature appropriates to itself what belongs to the human nature. The texts cited as examples are the following; viz. Gal. 4: 4, “God sent his Son, born of a woman;” Rom. 5: 10, “We are reconciled with God, through the death of his Son;” Acts 3: 15, “The prince (auctor) of life was slain;” 1 Cor. 2: 8, “Ye have crucified the Lord of glory;” but especially, Acts 20: 28, “God bought the church with his blood.” But the reading in the last passage is very uncertain; vid. Vol. I. § 37. And though some of these and other texts may possibly be

examples in point, they are not distinctly so. For the appellation *Son, Son of God*, in these passages, may be the name of the whole person of the God-man (Messiah), and is not necessarily the name of the divine nature.

(b) Propositions in which the attributes of the divine nature are predicated of the human nature; or, in which the subject is a concrete of the human nature, but the predicate an attribute of the divine nature. This is called, *κοινωνία τῶν θείων*, sc. *ιδιωμάτων, μετάδοσις, ὑπερῶνσεις, βέλτιωσις, genus ἀγχηματικόν*, sive *majestaticum*, because divine attributes are communicated to the man Jesus. E. g. *Jesus, or the Son of man, is almighty, omnipresent, omniscient*, etc. The most probable texts are John 3: 13. 6: 62, "the *Son of man* will return to heaven, where he was before." But these do not teach, that divine attributes are *communicated* to the human nature of Christ; and, in truth, the phrase *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου* here denotes the whole person, the Messiah, although the appellation is taken from his humanity. The texts, Matt. 28: 18, 20, "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth," and "I am with you," etc. (from which the communication of *omnipotence* and *omnipresence* to the humanity of Christ has been concluded,) are irrelevant to this point. For they treat of the state of exaltation, and the *whole Christ* speaks of himself, and not merely his humanity. For other texts vid. Morus p. 144, n. 3.

Note. This whole third class of propositions was disapproved even by many of the ancient fathers, who were of the opinion that it should be entirely discarded, because it has no clear authority from Scripture. So Origen and many others. But Cyril and Leo the Great, in the fifth century, advocated these propositions in opposition to Nestorius. And in the seventeenth century, Chemnitz and the 'Form of Concord' brought them again into vogue; and especially the *genus propos. achematicum*, on account of their bearing on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, Morus, l. l. n. 2.

They ought to be discarded, for the following reasons; viz. (1) They have no clear support from Scripture; vid. supra. (2) They are contradictory to all the analogies to which we can appeal in other cases. Who would say, the soul dies; the mind eats, digests; the body thinks, philosophizes? although, indeed, the *concretum naturæ, man*, is used in such cases. They give rise to propositions which, though capable of a reasonable explanation, are very offensive in their form, and the occasion of ridicule from the thoughtless. Such are the following: *God died, and was buried; the man Jesus is eternal; Mary was the mother of God; one of the Trinity was crucified*; etc. All the offensiveness of these propositions is removed, by using the name of the person,—Christ. (3) Such expressions lead the great mass of men into gross and material con-

ceptions of God, and confirm them in such conceptions, which they are always inclined to form. For this reason they were discarded by Nestorius; though even *he* admitted, that they *might* be explained in such a way as to give a true sense. Cf. Morus p. 145, n. 2.

(2) The second class of *propositiones idiomaticæ* comprizes those propositions, in which the works belonging to the Mediatorial office of Christ, are ascribed to the person, named from either of the two natures, or from both united. This class is called, *genus propositionum ἀποτελεσματικόν*, from ἀποτελέσματα, *effectus sive opus*, sc. *mediatorium*. This is thus described in the language of the schools: “*Apotelesmata, sive actiones ad opus mediatorium pertinentes tribuuntur subjecto, vel ab humana, vel a divina, vel ab utraque natura denominato.*” This corresponds with analogy; because these actions were performed through the union of the two natures. Such propositions frequently occur in the Scriptures, and are founded upon the *communiō operationum utriusque naturæ*. Thus I can say, *CHRIST raises the dead, redeems and judges men*. But I can also say, either that *the Son of God*, (in the theological sense,) or that *Jesus, the Son of man, does the same things*; Luke 9: 56. Gal. 3: 13. 1 John 3: 8. Heb. 1: 3. 6: 20.

This *genus apotelesmaticum*, is made very prominent in the ‘Form of Concord,’ on account of the controversy in the sixteenth century, between Osiander and Stancarus, theologians of Königsberg. Osiander taught that Christ atoned for the sins of men *only as God*, and not as man. Stancarus, on the other hand, taught that the *human nature only*, and not the divine, was concerned in the Mediatorial work. The other theologians decided justly, that both natures were here concerned. These two theologians, indeed, expressed themselves inaptly, but appear not to have been so unscriptural in their opinions, as many supposed them to be. Osiander only designed by his declarations, to exhibit, in a clear light, the high worth of the merits of Christ. And Stancarus only wished to obviate the mistake, that Christ endured sufferings and death *as God*. As for the rest, vid. Morus p. 146, last Note.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

THE WORK OF CHRIST, AND WHAT HAS BEEN EFFECTED BY IT.

§ 105. SCRIPTURAL NAMES *and descriptions of the works of Christ, and their salutary effects ; also, the names of Christ, as the Saviour of the world.*

I. General names of the works of Christ for the good of men.

(1) "*Έργον* is frequently used in the New Testament in the discourses of Christ himself, John 4: 34. 17: 4. It signifies the *business, works*, which he had undertaken. In the passages cited, his business is called *Έργον τοῦ πατρός* or *τοῦ πέμψαντος* ; because it is considered as a commission given him by the Father. It is also called *έντολή*, *mandatum, commission*, John 10: 18. 12: 49.

(2) Many *ecclesiastical* terms were afterwards adopted, in addition to these Scriptural terms. Among these is the word *munus*, which is very appropriate, as it means *business, work* ; and thus answers to *Έργον*. The word *officium* was used in the same sense, and became the most common name for the work of Christ in the Latin church. Tertullian says (con. Marc. III. 16) respecting Christ, "*Officium prophetæ, nuntiantis divinam voluntatem.*" Hilarius of Poitiers, in the fourth century, says : "*Officium Christi proprium cognitionem Dei afferre,*" and, "*Officium Christi pœnale.*" These terms were retained in the Protestant church, and *officium* and *officia* were the most common terms with Melancthon, Chemnitz, and others. But because, in Germany, *munus* and *officium* were commonly rendered by words which denoted *offices, posts of honor*, (Germ. *Amt, Ehrenamt,*) they were so rendered here, and in this way occasion was given to associate several incorrect ideas with this subject. So they spoke of the Mediatorial *office* of Christ, instead of his Mediatorial *work* ; and of the three *offices* of Christ,

instead of his *three-fold work*, or the three parts of his Mediatorial work. On account of this ambiguity of the words *officium* and *munus*, Ernesti preferred to say : “ De opere Christi salutari.”

II. General description of the objects of the mission of Christ, and of the benefits flowing to men through him.

(1) In some passages the object of his advent to the earth is stated in general terms to be, to rescue men from their unhappy condition, and to transfer them into a more happy situation : e. g. John 3: 16, “ Those who believe in him, shall not be miserable (μὴ ἀπόλλυσθαι), but shall become happy (ζωὴν ἔχειν).” Also Heb. 9: 15, where ἀπολύτρωσις means *liberatio ab infortunio*, and κληρονομία, *possessio beatitudinis* ; cf. Luke 19: 10. 1 Tim. 1: 15. Christ is said to have come, 1 John 3: 5, 8, ἁμαρτίας αἰρεῖν and λύειν ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου, *peccata*. The word σώζειν which occurs frequently in these passages, like the Hebrew שׁוּבָה, involves the two ideas of freeing from misery, and translating into a happy condition. The same is true of the word σωτηρία.

(2) In other passages, the benefits which Christ has bestowed, and his desert of the human race, are comprised in a shorter description, and only particular parts of his work are mentioned ; e. g. John 1: 17, which treats of the great advantages which Christianity has over the Mosaic doctrine and institute (νόμος). Christianity bestows the greatest blessings, χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια,—assurance of the most sincere love of God, or of his free, unmerited *grace*, and of his *truth*. John 14: 6, “ I am the *way*, the *truth* and the *life*,” i. e. I am he, through whom you come to God, who qualifies you to enter the abodes of the blessed ; and this my promise is true, you may safely confide in it ; I am the author and giver of life ; i. e. of happiness. Heb. 2: 14, “ By his *death* he deprived the devil, the author of all injury and wretchedness, of his power to harm ; he freed us from the *fear of death*, and procured us the pardon of our sins.” The passage, 1 Cor. 1: 30, should be cited in this connexion. “ Through him, God has bestowed upon us true wisdom,—has established a dispensation which truly deserves the name of a wise dispensation (in opposition to the pretended wisdom of men, v. 21) ; he is the cause of our *forgiveness*,—God pardons us on his account ; he *sanctifies* us through him (after forgiveness has been bestowed) ; to him we owe *deliverance* from the power, dominion, and punishment of sin.”

III. Scriptural titles which are given to Christ as the *Saviour of the world*.

The names *Messiah*, *Christ*, *King*, *Lord*, which denote the elevation and dignity of Christ, have also a reference to the benefits which he bestowed upon us, and to the works which he performed for the good of men. For he is *Messiah*, *King*, *Lord*, for the very purpose of delivering us from misery, and of bestowing blessings upon us. These titles have been considered, §§ 89, 98. Their *doctrinal* meaning, then, as applied to this subject is *Σωτήρ* (*νόσ-μουν*), *Saviour*, *Benefactor* of men. The following titles, imply more directly the idea of his being the *Benefactor* of our race.

(1) *Ἰησοῦς*. This is indeed the name by which he is more properly distinguished as man; but at the same time, it may have been given to him as a *significant* name, denoting his future works and destination, according to the custom in giving names, common in the East. Indeed the New Testament expressly declares that he received this name by divine appointment, on the command of the angel: *Σώσει λαὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ ἁμαρτιῶν*, Matt. 1: 21. Luke 1: 31. 2: 21. This name was common among the Jews at the time of Christ, and is the name of the Jewish leader, *Joshua*, which is accordingly rendered *Ἰησοῦς* by the LXX. and Heb. 4: 8. The Hebrew name יְהוֹשֻׁעַ or יְהוֹשֻׁעַ is derived from יָשַׁע, Hiph. יְהוֹשִׁיעַ, which answers to *σώζειν*, (as *σωτηρία* does to *ῥῆναι*), and signifies, according to Hebrew and Greek usage, not merely *a deliverer*, but in general a *benefactor*, *one who bestows blessings*.

(2) *Σωτήρ*. This word agrees in signification with *Ἰησοῦς*, and answers to the old German word, *Heiland* (*Saviour*). For *σωτήρ* denotes one, who has not only saved a person from extremity and wretchedness, but *translated him into a happy condition*. Cicero says, (in Verr. II. 63,) "*Is est Soter, qui salutem dedit,*" and remarks that it is, "*ita magnum, ut latino uno verbo exprimi non possit,*" vid. Ernesti, Cl. Cic. in h. v. In this sense the Greeks applied it to their gods, e. g. to Jupiter; (so also it is applied to God, Luke 1: 47;) also to their rulers, e. g. Antiochus, Ptolemy *Soter*. So Philo names the emperor. The LXX. give this name to Moses, and other Jewish Leaders. Christ, now, is called in the New Testament, by way of eminence, *σωτήρ τοῦ κόσμου*, *the Saviour of the world, the Benefactor of the human race*; Luke 2: 11. John 4: 42.

So when the word *σώζειν* is spoken of Christ, it signifies *to bless*; and *σωζόμενοι*, *the blessed*, is a name given to pious Christians, 2 Cor. 2: 15; and *σωτηρία* signifies *all* the blessedness which Christians receive from Christ, not only in the life which is to come, but in that which now is, 1 Pet. 1: 10, sq.

(3) *Μεσίτης*. This word was used in various senses by the ancients. Among the Greeks it meant *conciliator*, (a negotiator, or peace-maker between contending parties,) *sponsor*, *arbiter*. When this term is applied to Christ in the New Testament, it is taken from Moses, and implies a comparison of Moses with Christ. Moses is called by Philo (de v. Mos.), and by Paul, Gal. 3: 19, *μεσίτης*, in the sense of *mediator*, *ambassador*, *negotiator* (*internuntius*, *interpretes*), as *mediator between God and the Israelites*; because he spoke and acted in the name of the Israelites with God, and in the name of God with the Israelites. The passage, Deut. 5: 5, where Moses describes himself as standing *ἀνὰ μέσον Κυρίου καὶ λαοῦ*, affords the origin of this appellation. With this, the works of Christ were compared; he was called, 1 Tim. 2: 5, *μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων*, *partly* inasmuch as he treats with God in the name of men, and does with God every thing which is possible for our good; and *partly* because he treats with men in the name of God, and as his ambassador founds a new institute, and assures to men the complacency and favor of God. In this respect he is called, Heb. 8: 6, *μεσίτης καὶ ἐτεροῦ διαθήκης*; 9: 14, *καὶ νῆς διαθήκης*, the founder of a new and more excellent dispensation, than the ancient Mosaic dispensation; cf. 12: 24.

(4) *Ὁ προφήτης*, מָשִׁיחַ, *the prophet*, an ancient Jewish appellation of the Messiah; since he was conceived to be the greatest of all the messengers and teachers sent from God. This term is derived principally from the passage, Deut. 18: 15, which is referred to Jesus by Peter, Acts 3: 22, sq; and by Stephen, Acts 7: 37; vid. § 91.

(5) *Ὁ ἀπόστολος*. This appellation occurs Heb. 5: 1, *ἀπόστολος—τῆς ὁμολογίας ἡμῶν*, i. e. the *messenger*, *ambassador* of God, whom we (Christians) profess. Christ frequently, especially in John, applies to himself the phrase, *ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ὁ θεός*, John xvii.

The various other titles which were given to Christ, from the particular benefits which he conferred upon men, including the

figurative names, ἀρχιερεύς, ἀμύνης, ἄμπελος, θύρα, will be noticed in their proper places.

§ 106. *What is considered in the Scriptures as properly belonging to the work which Christ performed for the good of men; explanation of the word, REDEMPTION, as used in the Bible; and what is the most convenient and natural order and connexion for exhibiting the doctrine of the entire merits of Christ.*

I. What belongs to the work of Christ, or to redemption?

(1) The declaration of his *doctrine*, and instruction respecting it. To this, many of the titles applied to him refer; as ὁ προφήτης, ὁ ἀπόστολος (§ 105), διδάσκαλος, &c. &c. Respecting the discharge of his office as teacher, vid. § 94. It needs only to be remarked here, that instruction in this divine doctrine is by no means mentioned in the New Testament as the *only* object of the advent of Christ; still it is represented as a *great object*, and as an *essential part* of his work upon the earth, or of the work of redemption. So he himself represents it. In John 17: 3, 4, he expressly mentions instruction in the true religion ("that they should acknowledge thee as the true God,") as belonging to the ἔργον which was given him by the Father to do; and in John 18: 37, he says, "that he was born and had come into the world, in order to propagate the true religion (ἀλήθειαν). He every where taught that he was law-giver and king, so far as he was a true and infallible *teacher*; that he reigned over the minds of men, not by external power and constraint, (like the kings of the earth,) but by the internal power of the truth which he preached. Cf. John 3: 34. 12: 49, 50.

(2) The *sufferings* and *death* which he endured for the good of men. This, too, Christ himself always mentions as an essential part of this work: e.g. John 3: 14, sq. In the allegory, John 6: 51, where he compares himself with the manna, he means by the *bread of heaven* the doctrine respecting his person, and especially respecting the sacrifice of his body for the good of men (ὑπὲρ ζωῆς τοῦ κόσμου); which he inculcates as a doctrine of the first importance.

In John 12: 27, he says, "For this purpose, (to die for the good of men, vid. v. 24,) God had brought him into such distress, and therefore he would readily and cheerfully endure it." Cf. John 14: 31. The institution of the Lord's Supper, was designed to commemorate "his blood shed for the remission of sins," Matt. 26: 28. That Christ died for the good of all men, is the universal doctrine of all the apostles, Heb. 2: 9. Paul calls this suffering of Jesus *ὑπακοή*, Rom. 5: 19, coll. Phil. 2: 8. Heb. 5: 8; because he endured it in obedience to the will of God. He contrasts it with the *παράκοή* of Adam, and says that by it we have obtained forgiveness and the remission of sins. If then we would adhere to the declarations of the Scriptures, we shall not separate this part from the other; but consider them both, one as much as the other, as belonging to the work of Christ.

Many indeed maintain, that the annunciation and diffusion of his *doctrine* was the only object of the *life* of Christ upon earth, and that his *death* is to be considered merely as a *martyrdom*, by which he gave an example and pattern of steadfastness and devotion to the will of God, and a confirmation of the truth of his doctrine. But,

(a) The assertion that this was the *only* object of his life, is inconsistent with the declarations of Scripture. We do not find that the Scriptures particularly mention his death as an example of *steadfastness*; at least, they do not dwell upon this view, or regard it as the principal point. *Remission of sins* and *eternal life* are mentioned by Christ himself as the principal object which he had in view, John 3: 16. Matt. xxvi.

(b) As to the other assertion, that his doctrine was *proved* and *confirmed* by his death, we find not a single passage, among all that speak of his death and the object of it, which give us to understand, that the truth and divinity of his religion was *proved* and *confirmed* by this means; although they were so, by his *resurrection* and *ascension*. The passage, Heb. 2. 10, cannot be appealed to in proof of this assertion; for *διὰ παθημάτων*, means *after* sufferings and death had been endured, and refers to Christ. Nor can the passage John 17: 19, be appealed to, "I have *sanctified* (according to some, *sacrificed*) myself, that they also might be sanctified by the truth." The meaning of this passage is: 'I have entirely *consecrated* (as v. 17) myself to this service, in order to give them an exam-

ple, which they should follow in the proclamation of the true religion; that they also may deny themselves, take up my cross, renounce all worldly prospects, and live solely for me and my cause.' Thus we see, that on this subject, the opinions of Christ and of the first Christians were entirely different from those above mentioned; and we ought not to ascribe to those times and writers the ideas which are now current among so many. But, in *not* considering the death of Christ as designed to confirm the truth of his doctrines, the Scriptures are entirely right. And if they had so considered it, they would plainly have been wrong. It is strange that those who advocate this point, should have overlooked this. For,

(c) The steadfast death of a martyr, can never prove the truth of the doctrine for which he dies. For almost all religions can point to their heroic martyrs. *His own firm belief of the truth for which he died*, is all that can be concluded from the death of a martyr. The religion of Jesus, therefore, would have a very uncertain ground, if it rested upon this fact, and depended for proof upon this argument. Besides, although Jesus died with great firmness and magnanimity, it is still certain that he did not endure death with that tranquillity and joy, which have been admired in so many martyrs of the Christian and the other religions. Consider his agony in Gethsemane, Luke xxii. and previously, John 12: 27. If this then were all, Jesus has been surpassed by many martyrs, vid. § 95, II.

(d) During the short continuance of his office as teacher, Jesus did not exhibit the whole compass of the doctrines of his religion, even to his apostles; because he was with them but a short time, and the truths to be taught were many; and the disciples were as yet incapable of receiving most of them, John 16: 12. It was not till after his death, that these doctrines, in all their extent, were exhibited, developed, and applied by the apostles, and were at the same time increased by the addition of many others about which Jesus had said nothing clearly. He designed to prepare the ground, and to begin to *sow*; but they were to enter into the full harvest, John iv. If, then, as is frequently said, he designed to seal or confirm his doctrine by his death, he could only confirm so much of it as he himself had already taught, leaving us in uncertainty respecting the rest, and respecting its whole later development.

(e) If the writers of the New Testament believed that Jesus lived upon the earth *merely* for the purpose of *teaching*, it is hard to see why they should ascribe such distinguished excellencies to his person; and why the deity should be united with him in a manner in which it never was with any other man, or any other created being. As a mere man, he might have been taught by God, and have preached a doctrine revealed to him by God, and have founded a new religion and religious institutions; as Moses and the prophets did, and afterwards the apostles themselves. He himself delivered only the smallest part of his doctrines; nor did he widely disseminate even these. He taught only three years, in a few provinces, within the small circuit of Judea and Galilee; and he saw but little fruit of his labors. The apostles on the other hand, lived through a long course of years; added to the number of the doctrines of the Christian religion, and widened their scope; disseminated them through many countries, and saw the happiest results of their labors. In short, they did, as Christ himself predicted, *greater* things than he himself accomplished, John 14: 12. Were Christ, then, a *mere teacher*, he must, in many respects, give place to his apostles, and rank as inferior to them. On this supposition, he would only have the preference of originating, founding, and *giving the tone* to his religion. While, on the contrary, according to the representations of the apostles, and before them of John the Baptist, he had an infinite superiority over them, and over all the teachers who had preceded or would follow them. These had done, and could do nothing, which could bear any comparison with what he had done for the human race. For to him *alone*, are men indebted for their entire happiness here and hereafter. Even John the Baptist, whom Christ described as the greatest of all prophets, esteemed himself unworthy to offer him *the most menial service*, John 1. and 3: 28—36. “Who-soever believes in him, has eternal life,”—Where was this ever said of a prophet or apostle? Where is it said, that whoever believes on Moses or Paul, has eternal life? The writers of the New Testament, then, must have supposed, if they do not speak and judge quite inconsistently, that the design of God, in the mission and death of Christ, extended to something more than mere *instruction* and *example*. They must have believed that he was a far more exalted person than any human teacher who preceded, or would follow him.

(f) Where is it said, respecting James, Stephen, or any other martyr, that he *died for men*? But this would have been said of them, if this language had meant nothing more, than giving an example and furnishing confirmation to a doctrine. Paul himself protests against this idea, as derogatory to Christ, and abhorrent to the feelings of Christians, 1 Cor. 1: 13.

II. Explanation of the word ἀπολύτρωσις or λύτρωσις (redemption), and a developement of the idea contained in it.

(1) The primary and literal signification of λυτρώω is, to *redeem* by the payment of a ransom of money or something else. For λύτρον is *pretium redemptionis*, and is used by the LXX. to translate the Hebrew כֶּנֶז, Ex. 30: 12, sq. Thus it is used, e. g. when speaking of redemption from captivity or slavery, which is effected by the payment of a ransom; or when speaking of a person's property, which is in the hands of another, and which he then *redeems*. In this sense λυτρώω frequently corresponds to the Hebrew words לָקַח and קָנָה, and λύτρωσις to the substantives derived from them; e. g. Lev. 25: 25, 30, 48, 49. But,

(2) Λυτροῦν and λύτρωσις frequently convey the general idea of any *rescue* and *deliverance* from an unhappy situation, as from *slavery*; or deliverance from any other, even moral evil, without either the literal payment of a *ransom*, or any thing like it; precisely like קָנָה and לָקַח. *Slavery* and *captivity* so often befel the Hebrews, that they were in the habit of comparing every species of wretchedness with this severe calamity. Captivity stood with them for great calamity; as Job 42: 10, God freed Job from *captivity* when he restored him to health and prosperity. *Captured people*, Ps. 53: 7, signifies *unhappy people*. Every deliverance from misfortune, even where no *ransom*, in the literal sense, was paid, was with them λύτρωσις, the deliverer λυτρώτης, the means of deliverance λύτρον, as Morus properly translates it. It is not said merely of deliverance from bodily evil; but is transferred to spiritual evil. Accordingly the LXX. frequently translate קָנָה and לָקַח by σώζειν, Job 33: 28; and by ῥύεσθαι, Is. 50: 2; which are then synonymous with λυτροῦν.

(3) The writers of the New Testament follow this Hebrew and Hebrew-Greek usage; and employ these words to denote any preservation and deliverance, even in cases where no ransom, in the

proper sense, is paid : e. g. *ἡμέρα ἀπολυτρώσεως*, Eph. 4: 30 ; *ἐγγίξει ἀπολύτρωσις*, Luke 21: 28 ; and *ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος*, Rom. 8: 23 ; and Moses is called, Acts 7: 35, the *λυτρώτης* of the Israelites, although he paid no ransom for them. In this sense, is *ἀπολύτρωσις* applied by Jews and Christians to the Messiah, and denotes when spoken of him, the *rescue* and *deliverance* which he has procured for us.

In all the variety of their opinions respecting the Messiah and his designs, the Jews differed also in opinion respecting this deliverance, which they were expecting from him.

(a) Many Jews, who supposed the Messiah would be a temporal ruler, placed this *λύτρωσις λαοῦ*, principally at least, in a temporal deliverance of their nation from its enemies and oppressors. Cf. *λυτροῦν Ἰσραὴλ* spoken of the Messiah, Luke 24: 21 ; which is expressed by *ἀποκαθιστάναι βασιλείαν τῷ Ἰσραὴλ*, Acts 1: 6.

(b) But those of the Jews who were better instructed, understood this *ἀπολύτρωσις* which was ascribed to the Messiah in a spiritual and moral sense only. In this sense Christ himself and his apostles always understood it. Now it was common to conceive of Sin, as having a power and dominion which it exercised over sinners (vid. § 85, I.) ; and to conceive of the author of sin (the deceiver of our first parents), in the same way ; and so of *death* (the consequence and punishment of sin), which is described as a tyrant, who has men in his power. One who perishes, or becomes miserable, is his captive and slave. But according to the representations of the New Testament, Christ frees us (α) from the power and dominion of sin, by means of *instruction* and counsel, received by us in faith. *Ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς—υἱὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλευθερώσει*, κ. τ. λ. John 8: 32—36. He accomplishes this deliverance by means of his *doctrine* and *example*. But, (β) he frees us also from the punishment of sin, or procures us forgiveness, by his *death* (atonement). We cannot experience the good resulting from the *first* part of this redemption, and have no true capacity for it, before we are made sure of the *second*.

This two-fold deliverance is expressed by various phrases, which sometimes denote the one kind, sometimes the other, and sometimes the two together. Among these phrases are the following : *σώζειν ἀπὸ ἁμαρτιῶν*, Matt. 1: 21 ; *καθαρίζειν ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας*, John 1: 7, 9, etc. So also *λυτρώω* and *λύτρωσις* are used, sometimes to ex-

press the one kind of deliverance or the other, and sometimes both together, Heb. 9: 12. 1 Pet. 1: 18. Rom. 3. 24. What is expressed by the phrase *λυτροῦν ἀπὸ ἀδικίας*, Tit. 2: 14, is expressed by *ἐξαγορεῖν*, Gal. 1: 4; and Christ himself says, he gave his life *λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*, i. e. he died for the delivery and rescue of men, Matt. 20: 28. In the same way, the other words of *buying and redeeming*, are used mostly for *every kind* of rescue and deliverance, and in this sense are transferred to Christ: as *ἀγοράζειν*, *ἐξαγοράζειν*, 1 Cor. 7: 23. "The Lord that *bought* them," 2 Pet. 2: 1. Gal. 3: 13. Rev. 5: 9.

III. The order and connexion in which the particular topics belonging to the Article respecting the *merits* of Christ, may be most conveniently and naturally treated.

It is most natural here to have respect to the two-fold object of the mission of Christ; (a) to free men from the unhappy condition into which they are brought by sin; "that they may not perish," John 3: 16; and (b) to procure for them true happiness in the present and the future world; "that they should have eternal life," John, *ubi supra*. Hence appears the propriety, in the systematic treatment of theology, of separating the doctrine respecting the work (*opus*) of Christ, from the doctrine respecting the *good*, or the *benefits* themselves, which Christ has procured for us by his work (*beneficia Christi*). The *first* part exhibits the means, which God employs to recover the human race through Christ; the *second* part, the results of what Christ did. This same distinction is made in the Holy Scriptures in other places besides John 11.; as Rom. 5: 9, 10, *θάνατος* is the *opus Christi*; *καταλλαγή* is the *result*, or the blessing which Christ bestows; 2 Tim. 1: 10, "through the *Gospel* (*opus Christi*), he has brought life and immortality to light (*beneficia*)." According to the example of the Bible, therefore, the whole subject may be arranged in the following manner: viz.

I. Of the *work* of Christ; or, the *redemption* which he has effected,—his *mediatorial work* (redemptio). This comprises,

(1) Deliverance or redemption from the punishment of sin, which is effected by his death, or his blood; together with the doctrine of the *justification* or *forgiveness* of men,—the fruit of this redemption; §§ 108—115, incl.

(2) Deliverance from the power and dominion of sin; which is

effected, through divine assistance, by the instruction which Christ gives by his doctrine and example ; §§ 116, 117.

Each of these kinds of deliverance belongs equally to this ἀπολύτρωσις or *redemption*. Only we must have the forgiveness of our past sins, and assurance of the same, before we can avail ourselves of what is contained in the second part. Hence we have adopted this order. And so the Bible teaches : we are first *pardoned*, then *sanctified*. The first is effected by the death of Christ ; the second, with divine assistance, by the instructions of Christ, when received and obeyed in faith.

II. On the result of all these works undertaken for the good of men ; or the *blessedness* to which men attain in this life and the life to come, in consequence of these works (beneficia Christi) ; §§ 118—120, incl.

But before we enter upon this plan, we must say a few words respecting the method commonly pursued, especially in former times, in discussing the doctrine of the mediatorial work of Christ ; § 107.

§ 107. *Of the method formerly adopted of considering the work of Christ, as consisting of the prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices.*

It has been for a long time the custom in the Protestant, and especially in the Lutheran Church, to consider the mediatorial work of Christ as consisting of three *offices* (*munera, officia*, Germ. *Aemtern*) ; viz. *the prophetic, priestly and kingly*. This method was not universal among the Lutheran theologians ; though it was the most general from the seventeenth century down to the time of Ernesti. In 1768—69, he wrote two *Programma*, ‘*De officio Christi triplici*,’ which are found in his ‘*Opusc. Theolog.*’ p. 411, sq. and in which he objects to this method, for many reasons. Most of his reasons (for they are not all of equal validity) have so much weight, that Zachariä, Döderlein, and many other Protestant theologians since his time, have pursued an entirely different method. Seiler, Less, in his ‘*Prakt. Dogmat.*’ and others, adhered to the old method, and endeavoured to defend it. Also Dresde, whose ‘*Obss. in tripartitam divisionem muneris mediatorii*,’ Vitel. 1778. 4to, contain

many excellent historical remarks. We shall speak *first* of the origin and history of this method ; and *then* of the reasons why it does not appear to be proper in the systematic treatment of theology.

I. Origin and history of this division.

The title מָשִׁיחַ, *Xristós*, *Unctus*, gave rise to this division. In its common use, it properly signifies a *king*. But it was considered according to its etymology, and thus new significations were formed. The question was, 'Who, in the Old Testament, was *anointed*, or consecrated to office by *unction*?' This was found to have been the custom most frequently with respect to *kings* and *priests*. Accordingly Ambrosius, Ruffinus, and other ecclesiastical fathers, declared that מָשִׁיחַ denoted the *kingly* and *priestly* office. But it was found, that *prophets* also were sometimes anointed. And so Clement of Alexandria and others declared, that Christ was called מָשִׁיחַ because he was a *prophet*, vid. Dresde, S. 5. Now when they saw that Christ was actually called *King*, *Priest* and *Prophet* in the Scriptures, they put these two things together, and declared that the whole mediatorial work of Jesus consisted in these three kinds of works. Eusebius, in the fourth century, in his Church History, and also in his 'Demonstratio Evangelica,' (IV. 15,) is the first who appears to have distinctly connected these three parts, and to have considered them as belonging to the mediatorial work.

This division, then, is not so modern as Ernesti appears to suppose. Indeed, it may have been originally derived by the Christians from the *Jews*. For the Rabbins and Cabbalists ascribe to the Messiah a *three-fold dignity* (crown); viz. *the crown of the law, of the priesthood, and of the kingdom*; vid. Schoettgen, in his work on the Messiah, SS. 107, 298. At least both of them formed the division in the same way. But among Christians it was never the general rule of faith; but only employed as a figurative mode of representing the doctrine. Anciently it was most common in the Greek Church. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, show traces of it. It was therefore seen in the Confession of Faith of the modern Greek Church in the seventeenth century; and it is still common in the Russian Church. Anciently in the Latin Church it was sometimes, though seldom used. But the schoolmen never used it in their acroamatical instructions. For which reason the theologi-

ans of the Romish Church in after times used it but seldom; although Bellarmin and many others do not discard it. For the same reason, Luther and Melancthon, and other early Lutheran theologians, who separated from the Romish Church, do not make use of this method in treating of the doctrine of the mediatorial work of Christ. But after the seventeenth century, it was gradually introduced into the systems. It appears to have been first introduced by Joh. Gerhard, in his 'Loci Theologici.' At least it is not found in Chemnitz. It was afterwards employed in popular religious instruction, and was admitted by Spener into his Catechism. Until at last, it became universal to treat of the doctrine respecting the mediatorial work of Christ according to this division and under these heads. In the Reformed Church it was adopted by Calvin, who was followed by many others. It is also adopted by many Arminian and Socinian writers.

II. A critical judgment respecting this method.

Morus, indeed, acknowledges that nothing depends upon exhibiting the doctrine in this particular form, and that the truths themselves may be expressed in other words, and without this figurative phraseology. At the same time he undertakes to defend it, though not in a very satisfactory manner. The following reasons seem to render it unadvisable for theologians, to make use of this form in the scientific treatment of this doctrine.

(1) It appears from No. I. that this manner of presenting the subject arose entirely from an etymological explanation of the word מָשִׁיחַ, and from an allegorical sense of this title founded upon its etymology. For according to the true use of the word in the Bible, Messiah signifies only *king*. Many were anointed; but kings were called, by way of eminence, *the anointed*.

(2) All these words, when applied to Christ, are figurative. Such figurative expressions are, indeed, very good and instructive in themselves, and must be suitably explained in the acroamatical and popular treatment of theology. But it is more convenient to express the ideas themselves, in the first instance, by literal language; and not to make figurative expressions, although they may be scriptural, the ground of our divisions. And so indeed we proceed with respect to the other figurative terms applied to Christ in the Bible;

as *lamb, physician, shepherd, door, vine*. And why should we proceed differently here? Thus we can consider Christ as *king*, and as a divinely authorized *teacher* (prophet), in both his states; and especially as making atonement (High Priest); and *then* we can explain the figurative terms, and show the meaning of the words *sacrifice, intercede, and bless*, when spoken of Christ.

(3) When theologians attempt to determine definitely which of the works of Christ are denoted by each of these titles, they themselves differ widely from one another; because these titles are figurative, and so admit of various significations, according as they are understood in a more limited or a wider sense. On this account, it is inconvenient to make this division the basis of our treatment of this subject. It may easily occasion confusion of ideas. Some (No. I.) admit only two offices, the *royal* and *priestly*, and comprise the *prophetic* office in the *priestly*; because the priests were employed in teaching. But even those who admit three offices are not united. The opinion which Baier formerly held, and which Seiler follows, is one of the most current in the Lutheran church: viz. the *prophetic* office comprehends the works of Christ as divine teacher, in order to free men from ignorance and to point out to them the way to happiness (*oblatio amissæ salutis*); the *priestly* office comprehends the whole work of atonement, or deliverance from guilt and the punishment of sin (*acquisitio amissæ salutis*); the *kingly* office comprehends the labors of Christ for the good of his followers and of his church, and for the more general diffusion of truth over the earth (*collatio amissæ salutis*). But others again define and divide differently.

(4) The advocates of this division appeal to the Bible, where these figurative titles, king, prophet, high-priest, frequently occur in application to Christ. But the sacred writers do not mean to designate by these titles, the *very works* of Christ, as Redeemer, which theologians understand by them. The sacred writers mean frequently to describe by these titles, the *whole* object of the mission of Christ, and his *whole* work. These titles were derived from the ancient Jewish constitution, and were used by the apostles, for the most part, in their instructions to Jews and converts from Judaism, to whom the sense concealed under these figures was at once intelligible. At first the Jewish institute was administered by prophets and priests only, and if this state of things had continued, and the

Israelites had never been governed by kings, Christ would not have received the name of *king*, and would not have been compared to a king. But since the royal dignity was the highest among the Israelites, the dignity of Christ was compared with it, and so he was called a *king*.

The following remarks may show the idea which is attached to these names in the Scriptures, and the manner in which they are there used.

(a) *Prophet*. This name was given to Christ not *merely* because he was a *teacher*; but also because he was a *messenger* or *ambassador* of God, according to the original signification of the word. He performed *all* his works, suffering and dying, as well as teaching, as *prophet*, i. e. as the messenger of God. He is called a prophet especially in comparison with Moses, according to the text, Deut. 18: 15, coll. Acts 3: 22; vid. § 91, I. But Moses, besides being a teacher and the founder of the Jewish religion, performed also the works of a *ruler* and *priest*, and did not transfer, till afterwards, one part of his duties, the priesthood, to Aaron. Moses, therefore, enacted laws, instructed, ruled, sacrificed,—all, as *prophet*, i. e. as commissioned by God.

(b) *King*. Here the case is the same as above. This name is given to Christ not *merely* because he rules, guides, and protects his followers and his church; but also because he is a *teacher of the truth*; as he himself declares, John 18: 37, that his kingdom consists in announcing, promoting, and diffusing the truth; vid. § 106, I. 1. Now according to the common explanation, and the minute distinction which is here introduced, this would intrude upon the *prophetic* office.

(c) *Priest*. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, from the fifth chapter, and onward, Christ is often compared with *priests*, and especially with the Jewish High-priest. But this comparison is derived from the text, Ps. 110: 4, which Christ refers to himself, and to which Paul appeals in the above named epistle. The reason why such frequent use was made of this comparison in this Epistle, is, that it was written principally to converted Jews, who, however, were inclined to apostatize from Christianity, and who looked upon the origin of the Mosaic religion and the whole Jewish ritual, as far more elevated, splendid and magnificent, than the Christian. In comparison with this, the origin and rites of Christianity appeared poor and insignifi-

cant. *On this account*, Paul compares Christ, in the first place, with Moses ; and then from the fifth chapter, and onward, with the Israelitish priests. He shows his resemblance to them, and at the same time, his great superiority over them. These figures and comparisons are not, therefore, so intelligible to Christians, who are unacquainted with the Levitical ritual and priesthood. To such, then, all this must be explained, before they can properly understand these comparisons. Is it not, therefore, more suitable and judicious, first, to exhibit the truth itself in plain and literal language, as Christ and the apostles so frequently do on this subject ; and, *then*, to show, by what figures and comparisons this truth is represented in the Scriptures, and to explain the meaning of these figures and comparisons ? We do not mean to imply that these figurative terms are in themselves objectionable, and should not be used in the more popular Christian instruction. We only mean, that in the first place the truth should be taught without figures ; that then the figurative terms contained in the Bible should be explained ; and that afterwards literal and figurative language should be used *alternately*. And for this we have the example of the Scriptures themselves. These figurative terms are by no means in themselves objectionable. For according to the principles of the human mind, they exert a more powerful influence, illustrate truth more clearly, and impress it more deeply upon the heart, than can be done by literal terms. Only they must be properly explained.

[The ancient method of considering the work of Christ under the form of a three-fold office has been revived of late, and is adopted in the systems of De Wette, Schleiermacher, and Tholuck.—
TR.]

We now enter upon the plan marked out at the close of § 106.

PART FIRST OF CHAP. IV.

ON REDEMPTION FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN ; OR, ON THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST, AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF MEN BEFORE GOD,—THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ATONEMENT ; §§ 108—115.

§ 108. *Of the various opinions respecting the forgiveness of sin by God, and the conditions on which forgiveness may be granted ; and an application of this to the Scriptural doctrine of the atonement.*

I. *The forgiveness of sin ; various opinions respecting it, especially in regard to the conditions of it.*

It is the uniform doctrine of all religions, that transgression of the divine law incurs inevitable punishment ; but that no sins are altogether irremissible ; that, on the contrary, God is inclined to remit the punishment of sin, on certain conditions. For the object of religion is not only to point out to men their destination, but also to impart to them peace and composure of mind with regard to their destiny here and beyond the grave. The opinions of men respecting the conditions on which the pardon of sin depends, may be divided into several classes. Some have united many of these conditions together, as requisite to pardon ; others have depended wholly on some particular one.

(1) *Sacrifice, and other religious rites and ceremonies.*

(a) We observe that sacrifice is *universal* among all nations, as soon as they rise above the first brutal condition. The Bible places it in the very first period of the world, Gen. iv. 8: 20, 21. Many ancient and modern philosophers have greatly wondered how an idea in itself, as it seemed to them, so unworthy of God, could have

occurred to men, or could have prevailed so universally among them. But there is a feeling lying deep in our nature, which compels men to look around for some means of conciliating the favor of the deity, and of averting the deserved punishment of sin; vid. infra, No. II., and § 88, I. 2. Why *sacrifice* was the means selected for this purpose, and why accordingly it was sanctioned by divine appointment among the Israelites and their ancestors, may appear from the following considerations.

Men conceived of the deity as *corporeal* and *like themselves*; vid. § 19. Hence arose the idea of sacrifice. They hoped to conciliate the favor of God, by the same means by which they endeavoured to gain the favor of men; supposing that what was pleasing to men, would be so to God. The thought that internal goodness and integrity of heart are alone pleasing to God, however plain this may appear to us, was entirely beyond the comprehension of rude and uncultivated man. But even allowing him to have some idea of this, he would still feel, as we must, that his holiness was very imperfect, and afforded a very doubtful pretension to the approbation of God. Besides, he would be disquieted by the fear that his *past* transgressions might not be cancelled, or be undone, by any *succeeding* holiness, and that punishment therefore was still to be apprehended. He accordingly brought *gifts* and *presents* to his gods, to render himself acceptable to them. And so, in the ancient languages, the words which mean *gifts*, *presents*, also signify *sacrifice*. It was supposed in the earliest times, that the gods were personally, though *invisibly* present at the offering of these gifts, and when the offerings consisted of food, as was commonly the case, that they themselves partook, and enjoyed the *sweet savour* (the sweet smell of the flesh of the offerings, *νίσσα*, Hom. II. IV. 49. XXIV. 68, sq.). Hence offerings were called the *food and drink* of the gods. Homer describes Jupiter and the rest of the gods as going from Olympus to a festal sacrifice which the Ethiopians presented to him, and which lasted twelve days, II. I. 423, sq. XXIII. 206, 207. It was the object of these gifts to express gratitude to the gods for blessings received, to obtain future benefits, and to avert the evils which they were supposed to ordain or to inflict in anger.

The opinion of Ernesti, Daederlein, and many others, that sacrifices were originally only *thank-offerings*, and that the *expiatory sacrifice* was first introduced by Moses, is without proof. The

three kinds of sacrifice above named are found to exist together in all nations. Even the sacrifices of Abel and Noah, Gen. iv. and viii. were designed to obtain good from God, and to avert evil (the anger of God). Homer gives, Il. IX. 495, the great principle on which all nations who have sacrificed, have uniformly proceeded, "that meat and drink-offerings conciliate the gods with men, when they err and sin." Even *men* were sacrificed to the gods, when it was thought that the common flesh of beasts was insufficient to appease their anger, or to avert their displeasure. This was the case principally in the ages of the greatest rudeness and barbarity, when men imagined their gods to be as wild, revengeful and blood-thirsty, as themselves. But such sacrifices were resorted to even by the cultivated Greeks and Romans, in case of plague or any great calamity; and, notwithstanding the strictness with which they were forbidden by the laws of Moses, they were frequently practised even by the Jews.

Respecting the origin of sacrifices, vid. Sykes, *Vom Ursprunge der Opfer*, with Notes by Semler, Halle, 1778, 8vo.; and Wolf, *Vom Ursprunge der Opfer*, in his *Vermischten Schriften*.

(b) As some of these nations became gradually more civilized, many among them perceived that such a use of sacrifices was inconsistent with just ideas respecting God and his attributes, and that men could never obtain from the deity by sacrifices, even those things which they hoped to obtain by them. The use of them, however, could not be done away immediately by legislators and the institutors of religion, because nothing could be substituted for them; they were thus, of necessity, continued as a part of the external worship of God. All that the more enlightened could do, was to prevent them from becoming injurious, and, if possible, render them promotive of higher objects. To the ancient usage they must affix nobler ends, and employ sacrifices as sensible representations for teaching virtue and improving the moral condition of the people. Such attempts were made in many cultivated nations. The ancient forms were preserved, while a more elevated and better sense was affixed to them. But the results of this course were not equally happy in every case. The ordinances which Moses was required to make by divine commandment, are distinguished in this respect above all that we find among the ancient heathen nations. Moses was fully convinced, that offerings in themselves could never secure

the actual forgiveness of sin *from God*. He did not therefore ordain them for this purpose. He proceeded on the principle which Paul declares, Heb. 10: 1. All the prophets who succeeded Moses, held the same views, Ps. 50: 8. i. e. Is. 1: 11. Jer. 6: 20. Amos 5: 22, etc. But, it was necessary that sacrifices should be preserved. Otherwise that gross and uncultivated people would soon have deserted the worship of God. Moses therefore ordained sacrifices, as Paul justly says, Heb. 9: 13, for *external purification* simply. For this reason, no sacrifices were appointed by God in the Mosaic institute for such offences as murder, adultery, etc.; not because such offences could not be forgiven by God, but because the civil welfare required that the punishment of them should not be remitted. For it was the object of God in appointing these sacrifices,

(*α*) That they should release from the *civil* punishment of certain crimes. The commission of a crime rendered one unworthy of the community of the *holy* people, and *excluded* him from it. The offering of sacrifice was the means by which he was *externally* readmitted to the Jewish Community, and rendered *externally* pure; although he did not, on this account, obtain the pardon of his sin from God. It was designed that all who offered sacrifice, should, by this act, both make a public confession of their sins, and at the same time see before them, in the sacrifice, the punishment which they had deserved, and to which they acknowledged themselves exposed. Hence sins were said to be *laid upon* the victim and *borne away* by it, when it was sacrificed. This transaction manifestly had its ground in the idea of substitution. "What thou deservedst to suffer, (death, punishment,) this beast now suffers." Therefore the design of the sacrificial code of Moses was not to provide atonement for sins, but to represent sin as great and deserving of punishment; in a word "to lead to the knowledge of sin," Gal. 3: 19.

(*β*) Another end of the sacrifices appointed by Moses, was, as we are taught in the New Testament, to point the Israelites to the future, and to prefigure by types, the greater divine provision for the recovery of the human race; and to excite in the Israelites a feeling of their need of such a provision; vid. Gal. iii. and iv.; also the Epistle to the Hebrews. On this subject, cf. § 90, III. 9.

Old and cultivated nations, like the present nations of Europe, now for a long time unaccustomed to sacrifices, would not be so favorably affected by seeing death inflicted as a punishment upon a

victim, as by having the truth represented by this rite, stated simply and impressively. But a gross people, still in the infancy of its improvement, would be more moved and influenced by such a transaction. They have more sympathy with beasts than we have; as is shown by the great influence of the fables of Æsop. And hence many heathen nations began to neglect, and sometimes even to despise sacrifices, as they gradually advanced in cultivation. The case was the same with the Jews, and especially with the more cultivated Grecian Jews. But at the time of Christ, there were still some Jews zealously devoted to the service of the altar, who committed the frequent and very general mistake, that God would forgive their sins, *on account of their sacrifices*; notwithstanding the decided testimony which their ancient prophets had borne against this opinion. Paul, therefore, argues against it in some of his epistles.

Note. Many suppose that sacrifices were appointed in the very earliest times, by an express command from God himself. This supposition is rendered probable by the consideration, that the Bible always regards sacrifices as rites well-pleasing in the sight of God. They are represented as acceptable to him, and approved by him from the time of the flood, and even before, Gen. iv. and viii. If sacrifices were actually commanded by God, we must suppose that God instructed the first race of men on this subject, after the manner above described; but that his instructions were gradually forgotten and passed out of mind. The fact, however, of the *original* divine appointment of sacrifices is not clear from the Mosaic records. And as the results of the investigation are the same, whether the supposition be true or false, we have had no reference to it in the previous remarks upon sacrifices.

(2) Self-inflicted *penances*, and arbitrary sufferings which the sinner lays upon himself, in order to obtain from God the remission of punishment.

This is a foolish error. We should think a human legislator very irrational, who should permit the criminal to select a punishment at pleasure, in place of the one threatened in the law. This error, however, is very widely spread, especially among the Indians, and nations who inhabit southern climates, whose religions require of them self-inflictions which are incredibly severe. They frequently go so far as to believe, that an *innocent* man may undertake such sufferings for *others*; and thus obtain for them forgiveness from God. This error is founded upon the mistaken opinion, that God, like man, will be touched with *compassion* at the sight of these self-inflicted sufferings, and thus be inclined to remit those

which are due. *Fasting* was also regarded in the light of a self-infliction, by which the forgiveness of sin might be procured. The great mass even of the Jews practised all these penances, with the grossest conceptions of their nature and efficacy; vid. 1 Kings 18: 28. The prophets, therefore, frequently reprove them for this erroneous opinion, and teach them the truth, Is. LVIII. seq. Cultivated nations frequently entertain these same false religious views, which are extremely injurious to morality. Even Christians are not entirely freed from them, after all that the New Testament contains to the contrary.

(3) *Good works*, so called, on condition and account of which God is supposed to remit sin.

It was supposed (a) that one who had reformed, might atone and make satisfaction for his *past* sins, by some works of distinguished virtue; or (b) that even one who had not reformed entirely, but was still addicted to certain sins, might be pardoned by God for these sins, on account of some great, difficult, and useful labors which he might perform;—suppositions, to be sure, both false and unphilosophical! They have their ground, however, in the fact, that good works are sometimes the means and motives *with men*, in bestowing pardon. An injured man sometimes forgives the offender on account of some favor which he may have received from him. A government sometimes forgives one offence in a person, who in other respects has deserved well of the rulers as individuals, or of the State; on account, therefore, of *their own interest* which he has promoted. This circumstance, that in these cases men forgive offences on account of their *own advantage* which has been promoted by important services, is overlooked, when they are compared with the conduct of God. We are not able to confer any good or benefit upon God, by our best works. By these works we serve and benefit *only ourselves*; and we cannot demand or deserve a reward from God for actions, for the very performance of which we are indebted to him, Luke 17: 10. It would be as foolish for us to require recompense from God for these services, as for one who has been rescued from danger to demand reward from his deliverer, instead of giving him his thanks; or for a patient to demand reward from his physician, instead of paying him his fee, on the ground that by following his directions he had escaped from danger or sickness.

This opinion has taken such deep root in the minds of men of

all classes, and has spread so widely, that it cannot be entirely eradicated even from the minds of Christians. It prevailed among the ancient heathen, and especially among the Jews. The latter held the foolish opinion, (which has been revived, in another form, among Christians,) that the worth and merits of their pious ancestors, particularly of Abraham, would be imputed to them, and that thus, through their substituted righteousness, they themselves might be freed from the strict observance of the law. Against this mistake, John the Baptist, Christ, and the apostles zealously labored; vid. Matt. 3: 9. Rom. 3: 5. The Jews believed that God was bound in justice to forgive and save them, on account of the promise which he had made to Abraham; vid. Rom. ix.—xi. coll. § 125.

(4) *Repentance and reformation.*

This condition of forgiveness has always appeared the best and most rational to the more improved and reflecting part of mankind, to whom the former conditions must have appeared unsatisfactory. Even the Old and New Testament are full of passages which assure us, that God forgives sins after deep repentance, and the moral reformation consequent upon it, Ps. 32: 3—5. 51: 8, 12, 17. Luke 18: 13, sq. The writings of the Grecian and Roman philosophers, also, are full of passages, which mention this as the only acceptable condition. Seneca says, "*Quem pœnitet peccasse, est innocens.*" But even after recognizing this condition, very disquieting doubts must remain; respecting which, vid. No. II. A satisfactory assurance respecting the forgiveness of *past* sins, would still be wanting. This leads us to the second part.

II. Application of these remarks to the scriptural doctrine concerning the *atonement* of Christ.

(1) The condition mentioned, No. I. 4, however reasonable and obvious it may be in itself, appears from experience and the history of all times, to be unsatisfactory to the great body of men. They never have received or can receive from it, a quieting assurance of the forgiveness of sins, and especially of those committed before their reformation. All nations hope, indeed, that God is disposed to forgive sins, when they are forsaken. But men need something more than this. They must have something *external* and *sensible*, to give them assurance and conviction that their sins have actually been forgiven. This assurance they endeavoured to obtain by sac-

rifices, vid. No. I. They believed universally that, *besides* the moral improvement of the heart, some additional means were necessary to conciliate the favor of God, and to avert the punishment of sin. Cf. Hom. II. IX. 493—503. This opinion is so deeply wrought into the human soul, and arises from such an universal sense of necessity, that any attempt to obliterate it or to reason it away, would be in vain. To deprive men of this opinion, that the favor of God may conciliate and the positive assurance of pardon obtained, would be to tear away the props upon which their composure and confidence rest, without being able to substitute for them any thing so clear and satisfactory; and thus would be an act of injury and cruelty.

(2) But what is the origin or ground of the feeling that reformation alone is insufficient, and that something else is necessary to avert the judgments of God from the sinner, and to inspire him with confidence that they are or will be averted? This feeling is founded in the moral nature of man, or in the voice of *conscience*; vid. § 88, I. 2. For,

(a) However far a man may advance in holiness, his conscience still declares to him, that his holiness is very defective, and that he frequently commits sin, and that his sin deserves punishment. And the more upright and virtuous the man is, the more tender and strong will this feeling be. How then can he hope by a holiness so imperfect, polluted, and stained with sin, to secure the favor and approbation of God, and to escape unpunished! To one who feels thus, how desirable and welcome must be the assurance, that, notwithstanding his imperfect holiness, God will still be gracious to him on certain conditions!—the more desirable and welcome, the more he sees that he can never attain this assurance on any of the conditions above mentioned, No. I. 1, 2, 3. This assurance it is the object of the Christian doctrine of *atonement* to impart.

(b) Although a man were thoroughly reformed, and should commit no more intentional sins, he would still remain in an anxious uncertainty with respect to his past sins. For there is no ground to believe that, *on account of one's improvement*, God will remit the punishment of sins committed before this improvement commenced. Indeed, without an express assurance from God to the contrary, there are many reasons to fear that he will punish the former sins even of the penitent. This assurance to the contrary, can be found alone in the Christian doctrine of the atonement of Christ.

This feeling of necessity therefore, this apprehension and belief that, besides improvement, we need and must find some other means of obtaining assurance from God, that the punishment of sin will be averted from us ;—this feeling lies deep in the soul of man, and is founded in his moral nature, in the voice of conscience. Let no one say, that all men do not have this feeling, and that he himself neither has it now, nor ever has had it. This feeling may be suppressed for a time by levity, or the tumult of passion, or by cold and heartless speculation, or by both of these causes united ; but it commonly revives in due time ; especially in the hour of affliction, on the approach of death, or on other occasions which compel men to serious reflection. It then demands from them, as it were, its rights, and frequently to their great confusion ; it excites anxious doubt and solicitude ; and spreads out a dark futurity to view. This is a situation of frequent occurrence, but one in which no person would wish to be. Kant therefore refers to this feeling in his philosophical theory of religion. On occasions like these, such disquieting doubts and fearful apprehensions will often rise irresistibly, even in the minds of those who are above superstitious weakness, and, indeed, of speculative philosophers themselves, whose feelings had been the most suppressed and deadened. From these feelings no one is secure, however firmly established in his theory. For the philosophy of the death-bed, is a different thing from the philosophy of the study and of the school.

A religion, therefore, coming with credentials from heaven, which, on divine authority, gives to man satisfaction upon *this subject* ; which shows him a means, elsewhere sought in vain, by which he can obtain composure and assurance against anxious doubts ; and which teaches him to look forward with joy into the future world ; such a religion may well claim to be considered a religion of high and universal utility. Those who rob the Christian religion of this doctrine, rob it of that which, more than any thing else, makes it a blessing to man.

(3) There is still another view of this subject. The great mass of mankind in all ages have no correct ideas respecting virtue and vice, or respecting God and divine things. It is not strange, therefore, that they should have always and almost universally believed, that God might be conciliated by the most insignificant actions which they might perform, without sincere reformation, and which,

indeed, they sometimes supposed, might take the place of reformation. This was their idea of sacrifices, ceremonies, penances, fasts, etc. They made but little account of moral purity and holiness of life. To relieve themselves of the trouble of caring for their own virtue, they supposed that the virtue of others might be imputed to them; vid. No. I. and Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen*, S. 125, f.

At the time of Christ and the apostles, these common mistakes prevailed, though in different forms, throughout the Jewish and heathen world. Now in the establishment of a universal religion, such as the Christian was intended to be, this fact demanded special attention; (and not merely on account of that particular age, but on account of all following ages; because these same mistakes prevail among men in different forms, at all times;) for the moral improvement of men, and the sincere, and pure worship of God must be the great objects of this religion. But while it has these high and spiritual objects in view, and should make it possible for men to attain them, it must also be *universal*, designed for *every individual*. It must regard the necessities of *all* men, and not merely of the few who account themselves wise, and esteem themselves philosophers. Sacrifices, on account of their imperfections and perversion, were to be forever abolished. The other conditions of forgiveness were no longer to be tolerated, being false and injurious to morality. *Sincere reformation* was the only condition left, and this was accompanied with the anxious solicitude before mentioned. This internal reformation and holiness was made by Jesus, the indispensable condition of forgiveness; though not the *procuring-cause* of it; since owing to the *imperfection* of our holiness, we could, then, never have obtained forgiveness. Now in order to relieve the mind from the solicitude still accompanying this condition, and to satisfy this feeling of need; something *external* must be added, which should powerfully affect the senses, not only of the Jews of that age, but of the heathen and of men in general. This must be something which would be obvious to every one, and not merely to a few; something, too, which would not hinder or weaken the personal exercise of virtue and holiness of life, but rather promote and strengthen them.

Such is the doctrine of the *atonement of Christ*. This can never lead to security in sin or indifference with regard to it, (as

it has often been supposed to do,) because *personal reformation*, and *holiness* (*μετάνοια, ἁγιασμός*) are connected with it, as an indispensable duty, as *conditio sine qua non*. Christ died for men once for all, and suffered the punishment which they would have endured for their sins, and which their consciences tell them they could not have escaped, even after their reformation. And thus, the necessity of continuing to sacrifice was removed; and the injurious consequences which attended sacrifices were obviated. “*By Christ, and his sacrifice, men obtain from God (as Paul declares, Acts 13: 38) the forgiveness of all their sins; (and consequently) even of those which, according to the law of Moses, were unpardonable, i. e. would be irremediably punished*” (for which reason, sacrifices were now no longer necessary, No. I.).

On one side, the infliction upon Christ of the penalty which we deserved, places the authority and sanctity of the divine law in the clearest light, and shows the certainty of the execution of the divine punishment upon sin, in a manner at once striking, and in the highest degree *alarming*. Cf. Rom. 3: 26, *Εἶναι αὐτὸν (θεὸν) δίκαιον*. This doctrine thus guards against indifference to sin; and as experience teaches, exerts a powerful influence in reforming and ennobling the moral character of every one who believes it from the heart.

On the other side, this doctrine awakens in those who heartily receive it, *love to God*, who has made use of so great and extraordinary means for their forgiveness. It also excites gratitude to God and to Christ; vid. the passages of the New Testament cited by Morus p. 153, § 6. One who really believes this doctrine, and does not feel the most lively love and gratitude to God and to Christ, and does not sympathize with all which the New Testament says upon this subject (1 John 4: 10, 11. John 3: 16. Rom. 5: 8. 8: 32); must be destitute of every tender sensibility and of every human feeling. The proof that this doctrine does actually excite this feeling, and is adapted to the necessity of man, may be seen not only in the joyful reception with which it met from the better part of the Jews at the time of the apostles, but also in the approbation of it in succeeding ages, which has been, and is still expressed, by so many men of all nations; and also in the astonishing effects which it has produced.

God, therefore, as the Scriptures represent (Rom. 3: 25), has

set forth Jesus as a *Propitiator*, to assure men of his gracious disposition towards them; in order, by this means, both to lead them from a merely external service of him to a *spiritual* worship, and also to convince them, in an affecting manner, as well of his holiness and justice, as of his compassionate goodness and grace; and so, by the alarming apprehensions and thankful feelings, which flow from such considerations, to influence them to exercise pure virtue, sincere piety, and devotion to God,—to cherish and exhibit love to him, who first loved them. This representation, which is founded on the Holy Scriptures, contains nothing irrational, and is entirely suited to the moral nature of man.

§ 109. *Scriptural doctrine respecting the NECESSITY of the forgiveness of sin; what is meant by forgiveness, pardon, justification; and the Scriptural terms by which they are designated.*

The necessity and indispensableness of forgiveness.

As sin is justly represented in the Holy Scriptures as a very great evil, from which no one is free; so, on the other hand, the forgiveness of sins is described as one of the greatest benefits, which no one can do without. It is very important for the religious teacher, to lead those committed to his charge to consider this subject, as it is exhibited in the Scriptures; for almost innumerable mistakes are made respecting it by men in every rank and of every character, the high and the low, the enlightened and the ignorant. Many make but little account of sin; and, through levity or erroneous speculation, overlook its consequences, and of course make light of forgiveness. Others believe that they can easily obtain forgiveness, and rely on the mercy of God, or on the *merits of Christ*; without on their part performing the conditions, upon which their trust in these merits and their experience of them must depend.

These injurious mistakes are opposed in many passages of the Bible.

(1) In such as describe the ruinous consequences of sin, and which present the judgments of God in a fearful and terrific light, as

severe and intolerable; e. g. Heb. 10: 31. Ps. 90: 11. 130: 3. To the same purpose are many of the examples given in the Scriptures, especially in the history of the Israelites.

(2) In such as describe the judgments of Heaven upon those who do not fulfil the conditions prescribed, and are destitute of faith in Jesus Christ, as *certain* and *inevitable*, e. g. Heb. 3: 12, 13. Rom. 2: 1—3, coll. 1: 32.

(3) In such as show, that no one can enjoy tranquillity and happiness, who has no assurance that his sins are forgiven; e. g. Heb. 10: 26, 27. The example of David and other saints, who have been deeply troubled on account of their sins, and anxious for the consequences of them, contain much instruction upon this subject, Ps. LI. CXXX. etc.

II. Scriptural terms and phrases denoting forgiveness.

The pardon or forgiveness of sin which men obtain from God, is expressly mentioned in the New Testament as the effect and consequence of the Atonement or redemption (*ἀπολύτρωσις*) of Christ. In Eph. 1: 7, the *ἄφεσις παραπτωμάτων* is represented as belonging to the *ἀπολύτρωσις διὰ αἵματος Χριστοῦ*, and as a *consequence* of it; cf. Col. 1: 14. Heb. 9: 15, “Christ died *εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων*.” Rom. 3: 24, “We are pardoned, *δικαιούμενοι διὰ ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ*,” etc. The principal terms are the following: viz.

(1) *Καταλλαγή*, *reconciliation* (Germ. *Versöhnung*), and *καταλλάσσομαι*. Cf. Morus, pp. 113—166, §§ 9—11. This phraseology was primarily used with respect to *enemies*, who were reconciled, or who became friends again, 1 Cor. 7: 11. Matt. 5: 24. Then it was transferred to God. The first origin of this phraseology with respect to him, is to be found in the fact, that men had gross conceptions of the subject, and supposed the manner of the divine conduct, to be like that of men. Whoever transgressed the law of God, provoked him to anger, i. e. to displeasure and to a strong expression of it. (Hence the judgments of God are called *ὀργή*, *ἐκδίκησις θεοῦ*.) God must now be appeased, and the transgressor must endeavour to make God again his friend. Such was the common and popular language on this subject;—language which was universally intelligible, and which is always used in the Holy Scriptures in a sense worthy of God; vid. § 86. Thus when it is

said in the New Testament, θεὸς ἡμῖν καταλλάττεται, the meaning is, that through Christ he withholds the expression of his displeasure, the punishment of sin. Thus Paul uses this phraseology, 2 Cor. 5: 19, and explains it by the addition, μὴ λογιζόμενος παραπτώματα like the Hebrew יָצַח בְּעֵינָיו, Ps. 32: 1, 2. In Rom. 5: 11, he uses the phrase καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν, in the same sense, i. e. we obtain from God the forgiveness of sin. The latter passage shows clearly that καταλλαγὴ does not denote the *moral improvement* of men, as Eberhard, Gruner, and others explain it. On the contrary, the term always implies the idea of the *mutual reconciliation* of two parties, by which two or more, who were not previously on good terms, become friends again. Καταλλαγὴ, then, as Morus remarks (p. 165, ad finem), means the *restoration of friendship, and the means of effecting this, through Christ*; and καταλλάσσειν, is to *bring about, or restore harmony and friendship*. This harmony does not subsist between God and men, as long as men are considered as transgressors, and God is compelled to punish them as such. They do not love God as their father, and he cannot love them as his children. That they learn how to love him, and that he is able to love them, they owe to Christ. *He* therefore is the *peace-maker*, the restorer of friendship, ὁ καταλλάσσων.

(2) "Ἀφες αἰμαρτιῶν, ἀγίεναι, and the similar phrases καθαρίζειν, χαρίζεσθαι αἰμαρτίας, πάρεσις, κ. τ. λ.

(a) *Explanation of these terms and of the sentiment contained in them.* "Ἀφες and ἀγίεναι are used literally to denote *release*, as from captivity, Luke 4: 18; also remission of debt (debiti), Matt. 6: 12. Now *sin* was very frequently compared both with captivity and with debt; and hence, probably, this term was first used by the LXX. as correspondent with יָצַח בְּעֵינָיו. This phrase was always opposed to the *inflicting of punishment*, or the *wrath of God*, and denotes *remission, forbearing to inflict punishment*; Ex. 34: 7. In Mark 3: 29, ἔχειν ἄφεσιν is contrasted with ἐνοχὸς εἶσθαι κρίσεως. *To take away sin, and take away punishment*, were thus one and the same thing with the Hebrews, Is. LIII. And so it comes to pass that the words which stand for *sin*, also stand for *punishment*. Thus to *forgive sin*, and to *heal sickness* (pæna peccati), were frequently the same, Matt. 9: 2, 5, 6, coll. Ps. 103: 3.

Similar to these are the other popular terms: as, πάρεσις which is the *act of overlooking*, Rom. 3: 25. God does not *look* upon sins,

he *forgets* them, does not think of them ; in opposition to *thinking of them, placing them before his countenance* (Ps. 90: 8), i. e. *punishing* them, etc. Also, *χαρίζεσθαι παραπτώματα*, Col. 2: 13, spoken of the *remission of guilt* ; *ἐξαλείφειν ἁμαρτίας*, Acts 3: 19, answering to the Hebrew *נָסַח*, Is. 43: 25 ; used also by Lysias. The figure in this case is taken from an *account book*, in which the name of the debtor is obliterated when he has paid his debt, or when it is remitted to him.

The phrases, *καθαρίζεσθαι ἀπ' ἁμαρτιῶν, ραντίζεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. to be purified, washed, to purify one's self*, occur very frequently. They were derived from the very common comparison of sin with stains and impurities. Hence Moses ordained purifications and washings, as significant or symbolical rites. These phrases were used, first, in respect to men, and denoted self-purification (*καθ' ἐαυτόν*), i. e. moral reformation, 1 John 3: 3. 2 Cor. 7: 1. Heb. 10: 22 ; which however could not be done *independently* of God, but by his assistance ; secondly, in respect to God. He is said to *purify* men from sin, i. e. to consider them as pure, innocent,—not to punish them. So Ps. 51: 4, “ *Wash me from mine iniquities ;*” 1 John 1: 9. 2 Pet. 1: 9, *καθαρισμὸς τῶν πάλαι ἁμαρτιῶν*.

(b) Some are not content with making the forgiveness of sins to consist in the removal of the *punishment* of sin ; but would have it extend to the removal both of the *guilt* (*culpa*), and *punishment* of sin ; since both belong to the *imputation of sin*. This statement, understood in a popular sense, is not objectionable ; but strictly understood, it is. The established theory respecting the remission of sin, has been transmitted from the time of Anselmus (§ 101, ad fin.), who brought the whole doctrine of justification into a judicial form, and arranged it like a legal process. Thus, when a thief has stolen, he must both restore the property stolen, and suffer punishment. The *guilt*, in this case, is not removed by the punishment. The advocates of this opinion, therefore, comprehended under justification, a special *acquittal of guilt*, different from the *acquittal of punishment*. This acquittal of guilt they considered as the *imputation of the righteousness of Christ*, imputed to men by God, in the same way as if it had been wrought by them. In this way, as they thought, was the guilt of sin removed ; vid. § 115. But,

First. This distinction between the guilt and punishment of sin is never distinctly made in the Bible, when the forgiveness of sins

is spoken of. Some have considered this distinction as implied in the passages which speak of the *purification*, or *washing away* of sins, or in which sins are compared with debts; but without sufficient reason. The Bible makes justification the mere forgiveness of sins, i. e. removal of the punishment of them; without any special *acquittal of guilt* connected with it: as Rom. 6: 7, sq. vid. § 110, “De obedientia Christi activa,” from which the doctrine “De obedientia Christi passiva,” must not be separated. The obedience of Christ shown in acting and suffering, is one and the same. The fruits of this obedience we enjoy, as will be seen from the texts cited below. The Bible does not separate one kind of obedience from the other; neither should we; vid. § 115.

Secondly. The remission of the guilt of sin is not essential, and does not contribute to the real tranquillity of the sinner. The guilt of a sin once committed cannot be effaced. The conscience of the transgressor can never be made to pronounce him innocent, but will always regard him as having sinned. It is enough to compose his mind, to know and be convinced, that the punishment of sin has been remitted. But how can he be made to believe, and be happy in believing, that he is innocent, when, according to the testimony of his own conscience, he is guilty.

Thirdly. The theory which teaches that the guilt of sin is removed, is founded upon a comparison of the conduct of God towards men, with the conduct of men among themselves; which is here entirely inapplicable. A criminal (e. g. a thief) who sins against his fellow men, does them an injury. He must, therefore, make good their loss, besides suffering punishment. But men, by sinning, do not injure or rob God. They wrong *only themselves*. Now if men fulfil the prescribed conditions of obtaining pardon, God remits the punishment of sin; but *God himself* cannot remove the *guilt* of sin, in its proper sense. For God cannot err, and consider an action which is actually wrong, and consequently involves guilt, as *right* in itself. He, however, can forgive us, or remit the punishment which we deserve. He can regard and treat us, on certain conditions, as if we were innocent.

(3) *Δικαιώσεις, δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαιοῦσθαι, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, κ. τ. λ.*

These terms of the Grecian Jews can be explained only from the Hebrew usage. *נָצַח*, in Hebrew and Arabic, in its primary

and physical sense, means *rectus, firmus, rigidus fuit*; then, in a moral sense, *rectus fuit*, in various modifications, degrees, and relations: e. g. *verus et verax fuit, bonus*, sc. *benignus fuit*; *severus, æquus*, JUSTUS, INNOCENS *fuit, right, such as one should be*, Ps. 143: 2, "No man is right in the sight of God." Hence we can explain the significations of דָּיָק, δικαιῶν, *facere justum*; and of δικαιῶσθαι, *ficri justum*. A man may be justified in two ways: viz.

(a) By perfect holiness, virtue, or uprightness of conduct; by being actually just, or, *such as one should be*. Hence the phrase *to justify*, or *to consider, pronounce, treat, reward one, as right*, according to the above mentioned sense. In this sense, it is used by the LXX. Ps. 143: 2, οὐ δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώπιόν σου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, and Ezek. 16: 51, 52. This is called *justificatio interna*. In this sense it is understood, in the important passage respecting justification, Rom. v., both by Socinians, who reject the doctrine of *satisfaction*, and by those of the Romish Church, who advocate good works as the procuring cause of salvation. But this interpretation does the greatest violence to the words in this passage.

In connexion with this meaning, δικαιῶν sometimes signifies *emendare, probum reddere*, Ps. 73: 13 (in the Septuagint), and Rev. 22: 11, seq. Some of the schoolmen call this *justificatio physica*.

(b) One who is guilty is said to be justified, when he is declared and treated as *exempt from punishment* or *innocent*, or when the punishment of his sins is remitted to him. This is called *justificatio externa*. The terms *justification, pardon, accounting righteous*, occur in the Bible much more frequently in this sense than in any other, and so are synonymous with *forgiveness of sin*. This sense is founded on the *judicial* meaning of the word דָּיָק, to pardon, acquit, pronounce innocent, spoken of the Judge, (דָּיָק, innocens); and of the opposite, דָּרֹשׁ, damnere, pro reo declarere, (עֲשֵׂה, reus); e. g. Ex. 23: 7. Prov. 17: 15, sq. This is transferred to God, who is conceived as the *judge* of the actions of men. Here, however, we must be careful not to carry the comparison too far, and must abstract from our conceptions all the imperfections which belong to human conduct. He *condemns*, or *judges*, i. e. he *punishes*;—*antecedens* (the part of human judges), *pro consequente*. The opposite of this, to *acquit, pardon* (δικαιῶν), is then to *remove punishment*. This is done, however, as the Bible every where teaches, not *propter justitiam internam hominis*, as at human tribu-

nals; for no one is innocent and pure from sin, Rom. 3: 19, seq. According to the gospel, God bestows favor upon men gratuitously, on account of faith in Christ, on condition of holiness and of persevering in Christian confidence.

The principal texts which support this doctrine, and in which *δικαίωσις* and *δικαιοσύνη* stand in this sense, are Rom. iii. iv. v., in opposition to the Jewish doctrine of the desert of works. These passages will be examined in the following sections. In Rom. iv. the term *δικαιοῦν* is used v. 5; *λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην* (to pardon, the opposite of *λογίζεσθαι ἁμαρτίαν*, to punish) v. 6; and *ἀγίεσαι ἁμαρτίαν* v. 7. In Rom. 5: 9, 11, *δικαιοῦσθαι* and *καταλλάττεσθαι*, are interchanged in the same way; and *δικαιοσύνη* is explained by *ἐλευθερία ἀπὸ—ἁμαρτίας καὶ θανάτου*. The words *δικαιοῦν*, *δικαιοσύνη*, are also opposed to *ὁργή* θεοῦ, Rom. 1: 17, 18; to *κατάκρισις*, Rom. 5: 16, 18; to *ἐγκαλεῖν*, Rom. 8: 33. Cf. Storr, "De significatione vocis *δικαίος* in Nov. Test." Opusc. Academica, T. I.

Note. The writings of theologians present great diversity and difficulty in determining the idea of *δικαίωσις* and *δικαιοῦν*. Most of the ancient Lutheran theologians, with whom Döderlein and Seiler agree, consider justification as being merely *the removal of punishment*; while Koppe, Zachariä, Less, Danov and others, comprise in this idea the whole purpose of God to bless and save men, of which the removal of punishment is only the commencement. These theologians maintain, that *justification* is the same as *predestination*, only that justification is the less definite word of the two. Vid. Zachariä, Bibl. Theol. IV. S. 543, sq. and especially Danov, Drey Abhandlungen von der Rechtfertigung, Jena, 1777; in answer to which Seiler wrote, "Ueber den Unterschied der Rechtfertigung und Prädestination," Erlangen, 1777, 8vo.

Those who hold the former opinion, consider the conferring of good as a consequence of justification, and appeal to the obvious texts, Rom. 5: 1, 18, 21. Gal. 3: 11. They remark, that exemption from punishment, and bestowment of blessing, are not one and the same thing; since one who is acquitted in Court, is not, of course, promoted and rewarded. Those who hold the latter opinion mention the fact, that *כָּפַר* frequently means, *benefit, blessing, recompense*, and construe the phrase *כָּפַר אֱבְרָהָם*, *λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, which is first spoken of the faith of Abraham, Gen. 15: 6, to mean *to reckon as a merit, to reward*; in the same way Ps. 106: 31, and Rom. 4: 4, where Paul himself explains *כָּפַר* by *μισθός*. The declaring Abraham righteous, did not consist in the simple forgiveness of his sins, but in the bestowment of blessing and reward. Cf. James 2: 21.

The following considerations may help to settle the controversy.

(1) The purposes of God to forgive the transgressor his sins, and to make

him happy, are one and the same ; but they may be distinguished in our *conceptions of them*, and then his bestowing reward is the immediate consequence of his granting forgiveness. For when God forgives one his sins, the bestowment of the promised good immediately succeeds. And when God sees one incapable of this good, he does not forgive his sins.

(2) The sacred writers do not, in their terms, so carefully distinguish and so logically divide these two ideas, which are so nearly related, as we do in scientific discussion. This is the less strange, as the words *δικαιοῦν* and *δικαιώσις* have very many and various senses, one of which frequently runs into the other. The words are sometimes used in the Bible *exclusive*, beyond a doubt, of the idea of *blessing*, and sometimes also inclusive of it.

(3) But this should not hinder us from distinguishing these ideas, and considering them separately, for the sake of clearness in scientific discussion. Here, however, as in respect to all the divine purposes, we must guard against the idea of *succession* ; and also against mistake from a comparison with human tribunals, where one may be entirely acquitted, without however receiving reward, or any farther provision for his welfare. The accused is absolved ; and then left to seek his fortune where he pleases. But this is not the manner of God. Upon every one whom he forgives, or whom he counts righteous, God immediately bestows, on the ground of faith in Jesus Christ, all the good and blessing, which the subject of his grace is capable of enjoying. This is the reason why the sacred writers frequently connect these two ideas in the same word. Cf. Noesselt, Pfingstprogramm, *De eo quid sit, Deum condonare hominibus peccata, penasque remittere ?* Halae, 1792 (in his Exercitt.).

Morus (p. 151, § 5) has therefore well defined and explained the scriptural idea of the *forgiveness of sins* in the wide sense in which it frequently occurs in the Bible, as including (1) exemption by God from the fatal consequences of sin, i. e. from fear of the suffering or punishment consequent upon sin, and from this suffering and punishment itself (*μὴ ἀπολέσθαι*, John III.) ; (2) the bestowment of blessings (*ὡνὴν ἔχειν*), instead of this deserved punishment. For both we are indebted to Christ. The ground and motive however, of the forgiveness of sin on the part of God, is his unmerited *goodness* and *benevolence*. This is the uniform representation of the Holy Scriptures, John 3: 16, seq. Morus p. 152, § 6.

§ 110. Illustration of the Scriptural statement, that men owe it to Christ alone, that God justifies them, or forgives their sins.

Since sin consists in transgression of the *divine* law, it is the prerogative of *God alone* to forgive sin. So the Bible every where teaches, Ps. LI. James 4: 12, coll. Luke 5: 21. The Gospel teach-

es, that we are indebted for this forgiveness to Christ alone,—that God forgives sin, on *account of Christ*. It every where magnifies this, as one of the greatest divine favors, and as the foundation of all our blessedness; John 3: 16. ch. vi. Heb. 9: 15. Rom. 5: 1. Accordingly the doctrine of forgiveness through Christ, is always enumerated by the apostles among the principal doctrines and elementary principles of Christianity, which were never to be withheld in religious instruction; vid. 1 Thess. 1: 10, Ἰησοῦς ὁ ὑνόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ἐρχομένης, et alibi. The Acts of the apostles and their epistles show, that they always commenced with this doctrine, and referred every thing to it, both with Jews and Gentiles, enlightened and ignorant; because it is equally essential to all.

The following classes comprise the principal proof-texts relating to this point.

(1) The texts which declare that Christ has *atoned* for us; and that to procure the remission of sins, was the great object of his advent to the world; and that he accomplished this object, 1 John 2: 1, 2. Heb. 1: 3, *ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*. Heb. 9: 26, “He has appeared before God (*πεφανερωται*, v. 24) with his offering (*διὰ θυσίας αὐτοῦ*), to take away sin (*εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας*);” i. e. he sacrificed himself for us, he died for us, to free us from the punishment of sin (vid. v. 14).

(2) The texts which require from us an unlimited *confidence* (*πίστις*) in Christ, for the reason, that we are indebted to him and to his person for our spiritual welfare and our acceptance with God. Acts 26: 18, *λαβεῖν ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν—πίστει τῇ εἰς ἐμέ*. 2: 38. Rom. 5: 1, *Δικαιωθέντες ἐκ πίστεως, εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς θεόν* (the favor of God and peace of mind) *διὰ Χριστοῦ* (which we owe to Christ). Ephes. 1: 7, *Ἐν ᾧ (Χριστῷ) ἔχομεν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ αἵματος αὐτοῦ*, i. e. *τὴν ἄφεσιν παραπτωμάτων*.

(3) The texts which teach, that there is no other way besides this, in which the forgiveness of sin can be obtained. Heb. 10: 26, “For those who apostatize, contrary to their better convictions respecting Christ (*ἐκουσίως ἁμαρτανόντων*, v. 23. 3: 12, 13), there remains no atoning sacrifice (*θυσία περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*);” i. e., there is no way for them to obtain the forgiveness of their sins; since this is the only way, and this way they despise; cf. Heb. 6: 4, sq. The discourse of Peter, Acts 4: 12, *Οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ σωτηρία, κ. τ. λ.* *Σωτηρία*, in this passage, is *good, happiness*, here and

hereafter. *This happiness can be obtained through no other person.* The name (person) of no other man under heaven, is given to us for this object. "Ὄνομα here is connected ἐν ἀνθρώποις, *no name among men.* The meaning is: 'We are directed by God to no other man, however holy, through whom to obtain safety and happiness, besides Jesus Christ.'

(4) The texts which teach clearly and expressly, that God forgives men their sins, or justifies them, and frees them from the punishment of sin, solely on account of Christ. Acts 10: 43, "To him gave all the prophets witness, that whoever believes in him, should through him (διὰ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ) receive remission of sins." (Cf. Ps. XXII. XL. CX. Is. LIII.) Acts 13: 38, Διὰ Τοῦτου ὑμῖν ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν καταγγέλλεται, even of those, from which you could not be justified according to the Law of Moses." 1 John 2: 12, Ἀφείωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, *propter Christum.* Rom. 5: 10, Κατηλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, coll. v. 18, and 1 Thess. 1: 10. 2 Cor. 5: 21, "God treated him, who had never sinned, as a sinner, in our stead, that we might be forgiven by God; γενώμεθα δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (i. e. δίκαιοι ἐνώπιον θεοῦ) ἐν αὐτῷ," *on his account*, v. 19.

But the passage which exhibits the mind of Christ and the apostles most fully and clearly, is Rom. 3: 21—28. Cf. Næsselt, Abhandlung, Opusc. T. II. Paul here opposes the prevailing mistake respecting the *merit* of good works, and of the observance of the Law, and the opinion that God loved the Jews alone, and comparatively disregarded every other people. Paul shows that, on the contrary, God feels a paternal interest in *all* men; and is willing to forgive *all*, since all, as sinners, need forgiveness; but that men can never obtain a title to this forgiveness by their own imperfect obedience to the Law, but only by faith in Christ, to whom they are indebted for this favor, and in a way exclusive of all personal desert. "Now (in the times of the New Testament) we are made acquainted, by the Christian doctrine, with the purpose of God to forgive us (δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, vs. 22, 24), without respect to the observance of the Law, as any thing meritorious (χωρὶς νόμου); of which purpose, frequent indications appear, even in the Old Testament. This is God's purpose to forgive men, on account of their faith in Jesus Christ, without their own desert. This forgiveness is extended to all (Jews and Gentiles), who believe in Christ. *All* are sinners, unworthy of the di-

vine favor, and deserving of punishment. But God, in the exercise of his impartial, paternal love, desires to make all men happy ; and accordingly intends this to be the means of the happiness of *all*. But this forgiveness is bestowed upon them, without their *deserving* it (*δωρεάν*), from the mere *mercy* (*χάρις*) of God, through the atonement of Christ. God hath appointed Christ to be an atoning sacrifice (*ἱλαστήριον*), or a propitiator *through faith in his blood* (i. e. God forgives us on his account, if we place our whole reliance upon his death, endured for our good). He now indulgently forgives us our past sins (committed before our conversion to Christ ; cf. Heb. 9: 15). He now shows, (in these times of the New Testament,) how merciful he is to *all* men, by forgiving (*δικαιοῦντα*) every one (Jew or Gentile) who believes in Jesus Christ (*τὸν ἐκ πίστεως*)."

The question arises, *how* and *by what means* has Christ procured for us pardon from God, or the forgiveness of sins ?

We find many clear declarations upon this point in the discourses of Jesus himself ; especially in the Gospel of John, where he frequently speaks of his death, and of the worth and advantages of it ; John 3: 14. Matt. xxvi. We find passages of the same kind even in the discourses of John the Baptist, John 1: 29 ; and in the prophecies to which Christ appeals as referring to himself, Ps. xxii. xl. Is. liii. But this doctrine is more clearly explained, developed, and applied, in the instructions of the apostles. While Christ was visibly upon the earth, he laid the foundation for this doctrine ; but left it for his disciples to make a more full developement and application of this, as well as of many other doctrines, after his sufferings and death should have become facts which had already taken place. That the views which they give upon this subject, did not originate merely in the conceptions then prevalent among the Jews and heathen, but are exactly suited to the universal necessities of man, is clear from § 108.

But there have always been some in the Christian Church, and many in modern times, to whom this doctrine, so clearly taught in the New Testament, has been offensive, as it was formerly to many Jews and heathen ; 1 Cor. i. ii. And so they endeavour to give a different view, from that given in the New Testament, of the nature of the benefits which Christ has conferred upon the human race, confining them to his *doctrine*, and the results of it. So Socinus,

and many of the same opinion in other parties. Sometimes they endeavour to deduce their opinions, by a forced interpretation, from the Bible. Sometimes they hold that the subject should not be definitely stated, at least in popular discourse ;—that it is sufficient to say, in general, *we obtain forgiveness of sin through Christ, or through faith in Christ*, leaving every one to understand this statement in his own way. But the meaning of this indefinite phraseology must certainly be explained in theological instruction. Should it then be withheld from the people ? and is it honest, to refer the common people and the young to the Holy Scriptures, by the language employed, and at the same time to teach them something widely different from what is contained in the Bible ? If the conscience of any one does not pronounce such conduct inexcusable, he should renounce the idea of being a Christian teacher. The question here is not, how the doctrine may be understood by learned men, judging independently of the authority of Revelation ; but how the doctrine is taught in the New Testament ? Since this book lies at the foundation of religious knowledge ; the doctrines and ideas which it contains should be explained, and in a way which will be intelligible to those who hear. And considering how adapted to the wants of man the Scriptural doctrine of forgiveness is ; what a powerful influence it exerts ; how much it does to tranquilize the mind, to purify and elevate the character ; it would be an act of rashness and cruelty to destroy the faith of men in it ; and to rob them of a belief, in place of which nothing can be substituted at once so plain to the reason, so beneficial to the character, and so consoling to the heart.

The Bible ascribes the forgiveness which is procured for us by Christ, principally to the following points : viz. (1) his *sufferings* and violent *death* ; which is often called, according to the Hebrew idiom, *αἷμα Χριστοῦ* and *σταυρός*. This is the principal thing. In connexion with this it places (2) his *resurrection*, and (3) his *intercession*. On these grounds, God justifies or forgives men. These three parts will therefore be separately considered, §§ 111, 112.

Note. We should not stop with one of these particulars, and overlook the rest. The resurrection of Christ, according to the New Testament, assures us of the validity of his atonement ; and his intercession imparts a deep conviction, that although he has ascended into the heavens, he is still mindful of

us, and cares for our welfare. These three points together compose the entire *meritum Christi*. Persons are said *mereri*, or *bene mereri de aliquo*, when they assist another to obtain possession of any advantage. Sometimes these advantages themselves, which are obtained by the assistance of a benefactor, are called *merita*. But the custom of the schools, ever since the time of the schoolmen, has been, to call the *death* of Christ, so far as we are indebted to it for pardon and eternal happiness, the *meritum Christi*, by way of eminence; meaning that we owe these spiritual blessings to the death of Christ, without denying that he has deserved well of the human race in other ways. Considering that this phraseology has now become established in systematic theology, Morus (pp. 171, 172, § 5.) justly thinks that it should be preserved; as a deviation from it might produce confusion.

§ 111. *Of the SUFFERINGS and DEATH of Christ; how far we are indebted to them for our justification or pardon; together with observations on some of the principal attributes (affectiones) of the death of Christ.*

We shall adhere, in this place, simply to the doctrine and representations of the New Testament; and hereafter (§ 114) treat of the various explanations which have been given in later times of this doctrine, and of the various ecclesiastical opinions DE SATISFACTIONE.

I. The sufferings and death of Christ; and how far men are indebted to them for their justification or forgiveness.

By the sufferings and death of Christ, according to the Scriptures, many objects and ends, which God had in view, were attained; and they may therefore be considered in various lights, all of which are important and full of instruction. Thus the death of Christ furnishes a proof of the great love of God and of Christ to us. It is an example of the greatest steadfastness, confidence in God, and patience; etc. And these views of it are often presented in the New Testament; but by no means the most frequently. The sufferings and death of Christ are mainly considered, as the *ground* or *procuring cause* of our forgiveness and of our spiritual welfare. "All men are sinners, and consequently deserving of punishment. The ground on which God pardons them, or forgives their sin, is,

the *sufferings* and *death* of Christ, or his *blood* shed for them. He endured the misery which we should have endured as the penalty of sin, in order that we might be saved from deserved punishment." Such is the uniform doctrine of the Bible; the reason and object of it are plain from what was remarked in § 108. Without this doctrine, the Bible is not consistent. Our forgiveness, then, does not depend upon our *reformation* and *holiness*, by which we deserve nothing from God (Gal. 2: 21); but upon the *death of Christ*, of which our holiness is the result. The death of Christ is the *antecedent*; our holiness the *consequent*.

This doctrine is briefly and summarily taught in the following passages, part of which have been already explained, and the remainder of which will be hereafter: viz. Matt. 26: 28. Rom. 3: 25. 5: 8, 9. Eph. 1: 7. Heb. 9: 12, 15, 23. 1 John 1: 7.

The *death* of Christ, however, is not here mentioned, exclusively of his other sufferings; vid. § 95. All together constitute that which Paul calls the *ὑπακοή* of Christ, Rom. 5: 19; because he endured them from obedience to God, Phil. 2: 8. Theologians call them all *obedientia passiva*. But death, especially a violent death, most deeply moves our sensibilities, and comprises, as we regard it, the sum and substance of all other sufferings and punishments. For this reason the New Testament makes more frequent mention of the *death*, *blood*, and *cross* of Christ.

The following passages clearly and distinctly teach, that Christ has effected the deliverance of man from the deserved punishment of sin, by means of his sufferings and violent death; viz.

(1) The texts which teach that Christ suffered or died *for* all sinners, or *for* all the sins of men; διὰ (παρὰ πτώματα), περὶ (πολλῶν), but more commonly ὑπὲρ (ἀμαρτιῶν or παντῶν or ἀμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν), Hebrew, לְכָל. E. g. Matt. 26: 28, "The blood shed *for* many, for the remission of sins." Rom. 4: 25. 5: 6. 1 Cor. 15: 3. 2 Cor. 5: 14, 15. 1 Pet. 3: 18. Is. 53: 5, sq.

It has been objected against this proof, that to do a thing ὑπὲρ τίνος sometimes means simply to do it *for the good of any one*, to instruct him, improve him, or to give him an example. So Col. 1: 24, where Paul speaks of his sufferings *for the good of* (ὑπὲρ) the Colossians and of the whole Christian Church, because he was persecuted by his enemies, and then imprisoned at Rome. But the sense even here is: 'he congratulates himself that he can undergo

in his own person, what would otherwise have befallen the whole Church ; while the general hatred lights upon him, others escaped.' When now this phraseology is used in the New Testament with reference to Christ, it never means that he died *to teach men*, etc. ; but always, *instead, in the place of men, to deliver them*. He suffered, what we should have suffered ; endured the penalty of the Law, which we should have endured. This is confirmed by the passage, Is. LIII. from which these terms are so frequently borrowed in the New Testament. And this is decisively proved by the passage, Rom. 5: 6, where it is said that *Christ died for (ὑπὲρ) sinners*. This cannot mean, that by his death he gave men an example of firmness, or sought to reform them. For in v. 7, we read : "There are but few instances among men (like that of Damon and Pythias) of one dying for an *innocent* friend ; and indeed the examples are rare of one dying (as Peter was *willing* to do ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ, John 13: 37) even for a *benefactor* (ἀγαθός). But there is no example of one dying for rebels and criminals, to rescue them from the death which they deserved ; and yet so did Christ die for us." Paul could not have expressed his meaning more clearly. Accordingly he says, 2 Cor. 5: 14, "Did one (Christ) die for all, then were all dead."

Farther, if this phraseology meant nothing more than is contended for by the objector, it might be used with reference to the death of the Apostles and other martyrs. But this is never the case in the New Testament. No one of them is ever said to have died for the world, for sinners, or sin. It is said respecting Christ exclusively, ὅτι—εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανε, 2 Cor. 5: 14, 15, coll. 1 Cor. 1: 13, 'Was Paul crucified for (ὑπὲρ) you ?'

The meaning then of the phraseology, "Christ suffered *for us*, or *in our place*," is this : 'Since Christ suffered for our sins, we ourselves are freed from the necessity of enduring the punishment, which they deserved. It is the same as if we had ourselves endured this punishment ; and therefore it need no longer be feared.' The epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians and Hebrews, are full of texts of this import. Cf. Morus, p. 151, and Storr, *Doctrina Christ.* p. 254.

(2) The texts which teach, that Christ was treated as a sinner ; and this, in our stead, that we might be considered as forgiven by God. 2 Cor. 5: 21, where ἁμαρτία or ἁμαρτωλὸν ποιεῖν, is, *to treat one as a sinner, to punish him* ; as the opposite δίκαιον ποιεῖν or δικαι-

οὖν, is, *to treat as innocent, to forgive*. Jesus was treated in this way ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, which is explained by what follows, “that we, on Christ’s account, might be treated by God as just or innocent,” i. e. might be saved from deserved punishment; γινώμεθα δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, i. e. δίκαιοι ἐνώπιον θεοῦ. So also Gal. 3: 13, ‘Christ hath redeemed us (who as sinners must fear the threatnings of the Law) from the threatened punishment of the Law (κατὰ τοὺς νόμους), γε- νόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους,’ for ἐνικατάρατος (as in v. 10); i. e. by enduring for us a cruel capital punishment (to which, according to the Law of Moses, only the grossest offenders were liable). Cf. Is. 53: 4—6, from which the Apostles frequently borrow these and similar expressions.

(3) With the passages already cited belong those which teach, that Christ *took upon himself* and *bore* the sins of men; i. e. endured the punishment, which men would have endured for their sins. In Hebrew the phrase is, נָשָׂא אִשְׁמוֹ, or כָּבַד; in the Septuagint and the New Testament, *φέρειν* or *αἶρεν ἁμαρτίαν*. It occurs in the text, Is. 53: 4, which is always referred by the New Testament to Christ. Also John 1: 29. 1 Pet. 2: 24. Heb. 9: 28, etc. Some would render *φέρειν* or *αἶρεν ἁμαρτίαν* by *auferre peccatum, to make men virtuous, to reform them in a moral respect*. The only passage in the New Testament, in which the phrase will bear this interpretation is 1 John 3: 5, where it is equally capable of the other rendering. The phrase commonly has the meaning first given, and a different interpretation does the greatest violence to the passages in which it occurs; the comparison being so clearly derived from *sacrifices*.

But what is the origin of this signification of the term? In the Old Testament, sin is frequently compared with a *burden*, which *oppresses* any one, and which he is compelled to *carry*, when he feels the unpleasant consequences of sin, or is punished. So in Arabic, *to bear one’s own or another’s burden*. Hence the phrase was used in reference (a) to the *victim*, which was sacrificed for the atonement of sin. The victim was supposed to have the sin or punishment *laid upon* it; Lev. 16: 21, 22. (b) In reference to *men*; and *first*, to such as were punished for their own sins, Lev. 20: 19, 24: 15; and *secondly*, to such as were punished on account of the *sins of others*, Lam. 5: 7, “We must bear the sins of our fathers.” Ezek. 18: 20. Also Is. LIII., “The punishment *lies* on him,

he *bears* our sins." This sense holds in the passages cited from the New Testament. John 1: 29, "Behold the (sacrificial) lamb acceptable to God, which *bears* the sins of the world!"—a comparison drawn from sacrifices. This comparison is inapplicable, according to the other interpretation,—the Lamb, which makes us pious and virtuous. In Heb. ix. the figure implied in *προσενεχθείς* is taken from sacrifices. In 1 Pet. 2: 24, the two ideas are distinguished; first, "he bore our sins on the cross" (i. e. suffered on the cross the punishment of our sins); then "that we might die to sin (spiritually), and live wholly to holiness (*δικαιοσύνη*)."

(4) The passages which teach, that the death of Christ was a *ransom* for us (*λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον*), 1 Tim. 2: 6, and even in the discourse of Christ, Matt. 20: 28. The term *λύτρον* denotes any thing by which one is *freed, delivered*; vid. § 106, II. The meaning of the proposition, then, is this: *The death of Christ was the means of delivering and rescuing us from the greatest misery, from the punishment of sin*; or, according to Heb. 9: 12, "Christ, *αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν ἐνθάμενος*, effected our eternal liberation from misery and punishment;" Is. 43: 3, 4.

(5) All the texts which compare the death of Christ with the sacrifices and Levitical ordinances of the Old Testament; also the texts which teach that the death of Christ obtained, *once for all*, and in a far more perfect manner, the advantages which men had hoped to obtain from their sacrifices and expiatory rites. This doctrine was indeed founded in the ideas prevalent at that period, and was particularly evident and convincing to the Jews then living, and to such of the heathen nations as were accustomed to the rites of sacrifice. But it was by no means intended for such exclusively; since it is also founded in a feeling, which is universal among men, that some means of atonement are necessary; § 108. The apostles, therefore, in their instructions to *Jews, heathen and Christians*, derive their expressions and comparisons from *sacrifices*; and only in their instructions to Jews, from the particular services of the Mosaic ritual.

The idea which lies at the foundation of this comparison is this: '*Christ, by his death, liberated us from death* (punishment of sin), which we should have suffered; and we should see in him, (a) what dreadful consequences our sins incur, and (b) how gracious God is, in forgiving us for the sake of Christ.' Ephes. 5: 2, *παρέδωκεν ἑαυ-*

τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν θεῶν προσφορὰν, θυσίαν, ὁσμὴν εὐωδίας. Rom. 3: 25 (ἰλαστήριον). Heb. 9: 7, 11—28. 10: 1—14. Acts 13: 38, etc. Hence the term αἷμα (*cædes cruenta*), which so frequently stands for the death of Christ, is to be understood in its full sense. It frequently stands in such a connexion as shows, that the figure is derived from the blood of the sacrificial victim, and from the qualities ascribed to it. E. g. Heb. 9: 13, 14, αἷμα ταύρων καὶ τράγων, in opposition to αἷμα Χριστοῦ—καθαριεῖ. 1 John 1: 7, "The blood of Christ cleanses, etc." 1 Pet. 1: 19, "The blood of Christ, a lamb, without spot or blemish."

Taking all these texts together, there is no room to doubt, that the Apostles entertained the opinions respecting the death of Christ and its effect, which were ascribed to them at the commencement of this Section. These opinions have been shown (§ 108), not only to correspond with the particular circle of ideas with which they were familiar at that period, but to meet a universal necessity of man. This is a necessity, indeed, which is but little felt by the learned, and least of all by the merely speculative scholar. Vid. I Cor. 1—111.

II. Universality, and perfect and perpetual validity of the Atonement.

(1) Its *Universality*. Two points must here be noticed.

First. According to the clear testimony of the Bible, Christ endured death for the *whole human race*; 2 Cor. 5: 14, 15, ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπεθάνη. V. 19, "God reconciled the *world* to himself through Christ." 1 Tim. 2: 6, δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντὶ λυτῶν ὑπὲρ πάντων. 1 John 2: 2, "He is the propitiator, not only for our sins (i. e. those of Christians), but also for the sins ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου," etc. But the passages which are most explicit upon this subject are found in the Epistle to the Romans, where Paul controverts the mistaken opinion of the Jews, that the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom belong exclusively to the posterity of Abraham. He shows, Rom. 5: 12—19, that as one man was the Author of sin in the world, and of the consequent punishment, which *all* now endure; so one man is the Author of salvation and forgiveness for *all*. In Rom. 3: 9, 22, he shows, that as the moral disease is universal among men, the remedy must needs be universal; and in v. 29, that the benevolence of God is not confined to a small portion, but embraces the whole family of man.

In such passages of the New Testament, the term πολλοί or οἱ πολλοί frequently stands for πάντες. E. g. Rom. 5: 19, οἱ πολλοί stands for *all men* who are obnoxious to punishment and need forgiveness; as it reads vs. 12, 18. The same in v. 15. Cf. Matt. 20: 28. 26: 28. 1 Cor. 10: 33, etc. The Hebrews used the word רבים, in the same way, Is. 53: 12. *All* involves the idea of *many*, and hence in the ancient languages, the words which signify *many* are often used to denote *universality*;—*so many! such a multitude!* This was the case especially, where only one was pointed out in contrast to the many; *one for so many!*

Note. The question has been asked, *whether Christ died for the ungodly.* The strict Particularists and Predestinarians answered this question in the negative, on the ground that the death of Christ does not actually secure the salvation of the wicked, and is of no advantage to them. But because some, by their own fault, derive no advantage from the death of Christ, we cannot say that the death of Christ does not concern them, and that Christ did not die for them; any more than we can say, that divine instruction has no power in itself to reform mankind, because many will not allow themselves to be reformed by it. Moreover this opinion is inconsistent with the New Testament. In 2 Pet. 2: 1, the false teachers and deceivers, whom a dreadful destruction awaited, are said expressly, *to deny the Lord who bought (redeemed) them.* Misunderstanding and logomachy may be obviated by attending to the just remark of the school-men, that the *design* of the death of Christ, and the *actual* results of it, should be distinguished. *Actu primo*, Christ died for all men; but *actu secundo*, not for all men, but only for believers; i. e. according to the purpose of God, all might be exempted from punishment and rendered happy, by the death of Christ; but all do not suffer this purpose actually to take effect with regard to themselves; and only believers actually attain to this blessedness.

Secondly. Christ removed the *whole* punishment of sin; his death atoned for *all* sins. So the apostles declare. 1 John 1: 7, 'The blood of Christ cleanses from *all* sin.' Rom. 5: 16. 8: 1, οὐδὲν κατάκριμα τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ. Acts 13: 38, etc. But an apparent difficulty is here suggested, which must be answered from the discussion respecting punishments (§§ 86, 87), and can therefore only be touched here.

Now there are two kinds of punishments; viz. *natural*, such as flow from the nature and character of the moral action itself (e. g. debility and disease from luxurious excess); and *positive*, such as do not result directly from the nature and character of the moral action, but are connected with it by the free will of the Lawgiver. God actually threatens to inflict such positive punishments upon the

wicked, especially in the future world ; just as he promises, on the other hand, to bestow positive rewards in the future world upon the righteous, § 87. Again ; the natural punishments of sin are of two kinds : viz. (a) *physical*, as sickness in consequence of immoderation ; and (b) *moral* (by far the worst !), such as disquiet of mind, remorse of conscience, and dread of God ; § 86, II. 2.

Now has Christ redeemed us from all these punishments ? Those who mean to speak strictly and logically reply, *no !* Christ has redeemed us, properly speaking, only from *positive* divine punishments in the future world, and from that kind of *natural* punishments which may be called *moral*, or the evil results of sin in a moral respect. Even the man who is reformed still retains the consciousness of the sins which he has committed, and reflects upon them with sorrow, shame and regret. But the pardoned sinner knows that God, for Christ's sake, has forgiven his sins ; and so is no longer subject to that disquiet of mind, pain of conscience, dread of God and despair,—the *pæna moralis* of sin, which render the wicked miserable.

The *physical* part of natural punishment indeed remains, even after the transgressor is reformed. If any one, by his extravagance has made himself sick and poor, he will not, in consequence of being pardoned and renewed, become well and prosperous. The physical consequences of sin continue, not only through the present life, but probably through the life to come. They can be obviated only by a *miraculous* interference of God, which is nowhere promised. But these very physical consequences of sin, whose evil is so lasting, are like a bitter medicine ; they have a good effect, and secure us from turning again from the right path. Although one who is pardoned has, therefore, no right to expect that the physical evils resulting from his transgression will be counteracted by his being subsequently forgiven ; yet he may hope both from what has now been said and from common experience, that these evils will be very much diminished, will lose the terror of punishment, and contribute to his good. Such is the case exactly with bodily death.

The same truth is taught in the Bible, not indeed in a scientific manner, which would be unintelligible to men at large, but in the popular manner in which it should always be taught. (1) The Bible never says, that Christ has entirely removed the physical evils, which naturally result from sin. (2) When the sacred writers say,

that *Christ suffered punishment for us*, they mean principally the *positive* punishment, from which he has liberated us by his sufferings and death; vid. § 87, No. 2. They also teach, (3) that one who trusts in Christ can take courage, can love God and confide in him, without dreading his anger, and without distressing himself in view of his past guilt, which is now forgiven him for the sake of Christ. The remission of the *moral* punishments which naturally flow from sin, is thus set forth in a manner, which ought to be followed by the public teacher; vid. § 109, ad finem. (4) But the terms *pardon* and *forgiveness* of sin, are frequently used in the New Testament in a wider sense, comprehending all the divine favors which the pardoned receive from God; they denote the whole amount of the *blessedness*—the *salvation*—which the pardoned enjoy; vid. § 109, Note. If, therefore, (5) the natural physical consequences of past sins are not removed, they still lose their severity; they are rendered mild and in many respects beneficial; they are vastly overbalanced by the various blessings bestowed, and thus cease, in their actual effects, to be punishments. The Holy Scriptures, therefore, declare with truth, that the blood of Christ atones for *all* sins. Cf. the programm of Næsselt, above cited.

Note. Theologians have been divided on the question, whether the apostles held that the sins committed before Christ, or during the Old Testament dispensation, were forgiven by God on account of the atonement to be afterwards made. Döderlein and others take the negative side. They say that the ἄφαισις προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων, Rom. 3: 25, may denote the remission of the sins which the Jews and gentiles of that age had committed before their conversion to Christianity. The παραβάσεις ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ, Heb. 9: 15, may be understood in the same way, or may denote the sins which were irremissible during the Old Testament dispensation; vid. v. 9. But the context of this passage is more favorable to the common interpretation.

Besides, the affirmative of this question is supported, (1) By the whole analogy of Scripture. The Jews of that age agree with Christ and the apostles in teaching, that men of the earliest times hoped for the Messiah, that the divine ordinances of the former dispensation referred to him, and pointed him out, and that all the pious of antiquity confided in him. Vid. John 8: 56. Luke 10: 24. 1 Pet. 1: 10, 11. Cf. § 90. (2) By the passage Heb. 9: 26, where this doctrine is plainly implied. "God appointed that Christ should suffer and die for *all* sins, and *once for all*. Otherwise, it would have been necessary that he should suffer more than once (πολλὰκις) from the beginning of the world; since there were always sinners in the world." This plainly involves the sentiment, that Christ died for the men who lived before him. The opinion of Læffler and other modern writers, that pardon through the death of Christ related only to

the new converts from Judaism and heathenism, is entirely false and contradictory to the New Testament. Vid. Gal. 3: 21, sq. Rom. 1: 18, sq.; coll. 1 Thess. 1: 10. John 3: 13—16. Rom. 5: 18, 19, and especially 1 John 2: 1, 2.

(2) The other attribute of the atoning death of Christ, is its *permanent* and *perfect validity* (*perennitas, perennis valor meriti Christi*).

This doctrine is held in opposition to those who believe, that the expiatory sacrifice of Christ is not valid and sufficient for the atonement of some particular sins, and who therefore seek for other means of obtaining pardon, such as penances and satisfactions. This opinion has not only prevailed in modern times, especially since the middle ages, throughout the whole body of the Romish Church, but formerly, though in different forms, even in the times of the apostles, among Jews and Gentiles; vid. § 108, No. I. Paul therefore shows, especially in his epistle to the Hebrews, that Christ had sacrificed himself *once for all* (ἅπαξ) for all sins, and that now no more sacrifices, penances and expiations are necessary for men. Heb. 7: 27, Τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἑφάπαξ, ἑαυτὸν ἀνενέγκας. Heb. 9: 25, 26—28, ‘He appeared at the close of this age ἅπαξ εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας’ and then ἅπαξ προσενηχθεὶς εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας. So also, 10: 14, μιᾷ προσφορᾷ τετελείωκεν εἰς τὸ διηγεῖς τοὺς ἁγιαζομένους. Accordingly Christ is said, 9: 12, by his once entering into the heavens, to have procured *eternal redemption* (αἰώνιαν λύτρωσιν).

§ 112. *Of the influence which the resurrection of Christ, and his subsequent exaltation and intercession, have upon our forgiveness or justification.*

It was observed (§ 110, *ad finem*), that the New Testament points to three particulars in the justification procured for us by Christ. The first of these, the death of Christ, was considered, § 111. We come now to treat of the two remaining particulars.

I. The influence of the resurrection and exaltation of Christ upon our justification.

We have before examined (§ 97), what is uniformly taught in the Bible respecting the resurrection of Christ, and the great *importance* of this event; and all this is here presupposed. The resurrection of Christ is mentioned in connexion with our justification, with the most distinctness in the two following texts: viz. 2 Cor. 5: 15, "Christians should not live for their own pleasure (*ἐαυτῶ ζῆν*), but for the honor of Christ, and according to his will, *τῷ ὑπέρ αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγεροθέντι*" (sc. *ὑπέρ αὐτῶν*); and Rom. 4: 25, 'He died (according to the divine purpose) *διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν, ἡ γέροθὴ διὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἡμῶν.*'

What is meant by his being raised for our justification, must be gathered from other passages. 1 Pet. 1: 3, "God has made us, by means of Christianity, reformed men (*born again*), that we might cherish a firm hope (*εἰς ἐλπίδα ζωσαν*, sc. of future happiness, v. 4), *through the resurrection of Christ.*" 1 Pet. 1: 21, "God has raised Christ and rewarded him with glory (the state of exaltation in the heavens), that he—the risen and glorified Christ—might be your confidence and hope in God," i. e. that you should consider him as the person, to whom alone you are indebted for the confidence which you now are enabled to repose in God. 1 Cor. 15: 17, "If Christ were not risen, then the confidence (*πίστις*) which you feel in him, would be vain; *ἔτι ἐστὶ ἐν ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν,*" i. e. you could not be certain of that forgiveness which you now hope to obtain from God through Christ. Cf. Rom. 8: 34.

From these passages taken together, we can easily gather the relation and connexion, in which the resurrection and exaltation of Christ, stand to our justification and forgiveness. The resurrection of Christ, then, cannot be considered to have any desert *in itself alone*, nor can it be supposed, *separately considered*, to have freed us from the punishment of sin. But according to the Bible, the resurrection of Christ, and his subsequent reward in heaven, give attestation and confirmation to all that he *taught* and *suffered*. For since *God* raised and rewarded Christ, we must conclude that *He* fully approved of every thing which Jesus taught and performed; and that Christ must have accomplished His designs. Did Christ suffer and die with the intention of liberating us from the

punishment of sin ; we may be sure, since his resurrection and exaltation, that he fully attained this object, and that we can now through him lay claim to reward and eternal happiness. This is what Peter means by *πίστις καὶ ἐλπίς ἡμῶν*. In the passage cited from I Cor., Paul means to say, that if Christ were not risen, we might be led to suspect that he had not performed, what he promised and undertook to perform.

We are now prepared to understand the meaning of the declaration in the Epistle to the Romans, *ἡγέσθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην ἡμῶν*, viz. *in order to afford us certainty of our forgiveness*, of which we could have no certainty if Christ had remained in the grave ; vid. Acts 13: 37, 38. Accordingly, the resurrection and exaltation (*δόξα*, as Peter has it) of Christ, are the *confirmation* and *assurance* of our justification ; while the sufferings and death of Christ are properly the *procuring* cause of it.

II. The influence of the intercession of Christ upon our justification.

(1) *Sketch of the history of this doctrine.*

Many theologians, and some of the ecclesiastical fathers, represent intercession, as a continued external action of Christ, different from his atonement, by which blessings are not only *imparted* to us, but likewise *procured* for us. Among the fathers who held this opinion, were Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory the Great, Paulus of Aquilia, and others ; among modern theologians, Calvin, and of the Lutheran Church, Chemnitz, Baumgarten, and others. These writers regard the intercession of Christ, as a distinct work performed by him, in his state of exaltation in heaven. They have very different conceptions, however, respecting the manner of this work, some of which are very gross. Many of them contended for an *intercessio verbalis*, e. g. Cyprian and Augustine ; and their opinion was adopted in the Romish Church. Accordingly Luther renders *ἐντυγχάνει*, Heb. 7: 25, “ *Er bittet für sie*” (*he prays for them*). So Petavius, Hollaz, Quenstedt, and many others, among the Lutherans. They also differ widely from one another respecting the nature, object and continuance of this intercession. Some consider it as belonging to the sacerdotal office ; in which case the comparison is drawn from the Jewish High Priest in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Nothing definite upon the subject appears in the Symbols, except in the Augsburg Confession ; and even there no distinct explanation is given.

Another theory which entirely divests the subject of its material dress, and which has therefore been more generally approved in modern times, was first distinctly stated by Philip Limborch, the Arminian theologian, and by Musæus in the seventeenth century. They consider the intercession of Christ to be merely the relation in which he, in his state of exaltation, stands to sinners, as their Redeemer; and not as a continued action, by which he still promotes the welfare of men, and by which salvation is still *procured* for them. The same opinion is found in Ballhorn's dissertation, *De intercessione Christi sacerdotali* (among Walch's *Vorsitze*), Göttingen, 1774. This opinion however does not exactly correspond with the doctrine of the Bible.

(2) *Explanation of the texts relating to this subject, and an elucidation of the ideas contained in them.* These texts are,

(a) 1 John 2: 1. "When a Christian has committed sin, (let him not despair of pardon, but encourage himself with the thought, that) we have *παράκλητον* πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, in Jesus, the righteous." Here, *παράκλητος* is *patronus*, *advocate*, *defender* (*Fürsprecher*, Luther). This name is given by Philo to the ministers and favorites at court, who promise to any one the favor of the king; and also to the High Priest, the expiator of the people; vid. Programm, *De Christo et Spiritu Sancto paracletis*, in "Scripta varii argumenti," Num. iv. In this respect it is, that Christ is called *παράκλητος*. He is our *expiator*, *ἱλασμός* περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, v. 2. Accordingly the meaning of this passage is, that since Christ is exalted to heaven, and while he continues there, we may be firmly convinced that God will be gracious to us, and for Christ's sake, will remit the punishment of our sins; and that Christ, in his state of exaltation, continues without intermission his cares for the welfare of men.

(b) Rom. 8: 34. Here Paul says: "No one can condemn (*κατακρίνειν*) the friends of God (Christians). They are exempt from punishment. Christ died for them; and indeed (what might add to their comfort), had risen again, was seated on the right hand of God, *ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* (*vertritt uns*, Luther). *Ἐντυγχάνειν*, joined with the dative, means *occurrere alicui*; then *adire*, *convenire aliquem*, Acts 25: 24; joined with *κατὰ* (*τίνος*), *accusare*, Rom. 11: 2; with *ὑπὲρ* (*τίνος*), *medium se alterius causa interponere*, to interpose in behalf of one, to intercede for him; as here,

intercedere pro aliquo, deprecari, causam alicujus agere. From this text it does not appear, that this intercession was performed by *words*. The principal idea is: 'Christ is now, as it were, our patron with God: his being with God in heaven, gives us the consoling assurance, that through him we are forever reconciled with God and freed from the punishment of sin; and that, as the advocate and patron of the pious, Christ still prosecutes in heaven his labors for their welfare.'

(c) Heb. 7: 25, sq. Here the case is the same. "Christ (being an eternal High Priest) can forever bless (σώζειν εἰς τὸ παντελές) all those who seek the favor of God through his mediation; since he ever lives εἰς τὸ ἐντυγχάνειν," i. e. since Christ ever lives with God in heaven, we can always be sure of forgiveness and of every divine blessing; for he is not in heaven in vain, but even there continues to be engaged for our welfare. The phrase *intercessio sacerdotalis*, is taken from this passage. For the figure here, as in the whole chapter, is borrowed from the Jewish High Priest, who on the great day of atonement entered into the most holy place, and made expiation for the sins of the people (*pro populo intercedebat apud Deum*). He did not do this, however, by *words* (he spake no word, vid. Ex. xxviii. and Lev. xvi.), but by action, namely, by offering the blood of the victim. The object of this comparison then is, to show that Christ performs with God in the heavenly world, what the Jewish High Priest did yearly for the people upon the earth. It refers then, both to the permanent validity of the atonement of Christ, and to his continued labors in heaven for the salvation of men. Respecting this figure, cf. Morus, p. 155, sq.

(d) Heb. 9: 24,—a parallel passage, which confirms the above explanation. "Christ did not enter into an earthly temple, like the Jewish High Priest, but into heaven itself, νῦν ἐμπαριστῇ νὰ τῷ προσώπῳ θεοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν,"—the very phrase applied to the High Priest, when he presented to God in the temple the blood of atonement for the people. It means, therefore, "in order to procure for us a firm assurance of being expiated, or of the forgiveness of our sins, and of the enjoyment of all the spiritual blessings connected with forgiveness."

The intercession of Christ before God in the heavenly world denotes, then, both the lasting and perfect validity and efficacy of his

atonement, of which we obtain consoling assurance by his abiding with God in his state of exaltation ; and also the continued wakeful care which Jesus Christ exercises in heaven over his followers on the earth. In short, the intercession of Christ is one of the chief employments which Christ prosecutes in heaven in his state of exaltation, as the King and Patron of men, and especially of the Christian church, and its individual members ; § 98. He is our paracletus and patron, therefore, not merely in respect to what he formerly did for men, while upon the earth, but also in respect to the efforts which he still continues to make for our welfare.

The Bible no where teaches, that this *intercession* consists in *words*. But considering that Christ must still be regarded as a man, though in heaven ; there is no objection to representing the thing under the figure of actual intercession. In brief, Christ does for us all and more, than could be done among men through verbal intercession, or other kinds of interposition, by a powerful human advocate. The passage Heb. 12: 24, may here be compared : "The blood of Christ speaks better (for us), than the blood of Abel." The blood of Abel cried to God for vengeance upon Cain. The death of Christ moves God, not to punish, but to bless and forgive.

§ 113. *The Scripture doctrine of pardon or justification through Christ, as an UNIVERSAL and UNMERITED favor of God.*

I. *The universality of this benefit.*

It is universal as the atonement itself ; vid. § 111, II. If the atonement extends to the whole human race, justification must also be universal ; i. e. all must be able to obtain the actual forgiveness of their sins and blessedness, on account of the atonement of Christ. But in order to obviate mistakes, some points may require explanation. Justification, then, is *universal*,

(1) In respect to the *persons to be pardoned*.

All men, according to the Bible, may partake of this benefit. It was designed for all ; vid. especially Rom. 3: 23. 5: 15 (§ 111),

in opposition to Jewish exclusiveness. It is bestowed however *conditionally*; certain conditions are prescribed which are indispensable. Those who do not comply with these conditions, are excluded from the enjoyment of the benefit. Justification and forgiveness are not, therefore, universal in effect (*actu*); and this *solely* through the fault of men.*

Another conclusion from the universality of justification is, that every one may be *sure* of his forgiveness. This certainty, however, must not be founded upon inward *feelings*, which are frequently deceptive; but upon an actual compliance with the conditions on which God will forgive sins. If any one finds in himself the signs of true faith, of sincere love to God and Christ, of a renewed heart, and of a virtuous Christian disposition, he is justified. Rom. 8: 16, "The holy, Christian temper (*πνεῦμα*) wrought in us by God, gives us the clearest and surest proof, that we are the children of God." 1 John 3: 7. 2 Pet. 1: 9, 10. This certainty is in the highest degree necessary to our tranquillity and happiness. 1 Tim. 1: 16. 1 Cor. 6: 11. 1 John 5: 18—20.

(2) In respect to *sins* and the *punishment of sin*.

(a) As to *sins*; the position that all sins, without exception, are forgiven for Christ's sake, is proved partly from the power and efficacy of the atonement of Christ, which is extended to all sins (vid. § 111, and the texts there cited); and partly from the texts which promise forgiveness of all sins, even the greatest and blackest, to those who comply with the prescribed conditions of pardon. Ezek. 18: 21, 22. Ps. 103: 3. 1 Cor. 6: 11. Ephes. 2: 5. 1 Tim. 1: 15. The sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be regarded as an exception; vid. § 84.

(b) As to the *punishment of sin*; the answer to the question whether the pardoned are exempt from *all* the punishments of sin, whether therefore justification is *plena et perfecta*, may be learned from § 111, II. The *natural* and *physical* evils which result from past sins, indeed, remain; but they are mitigated and rendered more tolerable, and are divested of the terror of punishment, by the ces-

* [This is very conveniently expressed by the terms *objective* and *subjective* justification. Objective justification is the act of God, by which he proffers pardon to all through Christ; subjective, is the act of man, by which he accepts the pardon freely offered in the Gospel. The former is universal, the latter not. Tr.]

sation of the *moral* evils which result from sin ; which takes place in consequence of the entirely different relation in which men stand to God, after they are once pardoned. The *positive* punishments of sin are entirely removed ; and man receives, even here, the expectation of *positive* divine rewards, and of the full enjoyment of them in the life to come.

(c) In respect to *time* and *lasting continuance*.

First. The Scriptures uniformly teach that forgiveness extends through the whole life of man. He may receive pardon at any time, while life continues, *so soon* as he fulfils the requisite conditions of forgiveness. This last clause should be carefully and expressly annexed, in order to preserve men from security and carelessness in sin. Formerly many teachers, especially in the Lutheran Church, were incautious in the use of language on this subject. They used the general phrases, *the door of mercy stands ever open, man can obtain favor (forgiveness) in the last moment of life*, without suitable explanation and cautious limitation. But while it is important on the one hand to show, that God is indeed ever ready to forgive ; it ought, on the other hand, to be observed, that man is not always capable of forgiveness ; that forgiveness is necessarily connected with repentance, as an indispensable condition (not implying by any means, that repentance is the procuring cause of forgiveness) ; that repentance and holiness are important things, which cannot be accomplished in a few moments ; and that, therefore, it is extremely dangerous to delay them to the end of life, especially considering that we do not know that we shall then have our reason, or that we shall not die suddenly. The sincere Christian teacher will render such considerations as impressive as possible, in order to disturb *security* in sin. He should guard, however, with equal caution against the mistake of those, who represent repentance and holiness as the *meritorious ground* of forgiveness.

The frequent perversion of the doctrine of justification gave rise, at the end of the seventeenth, and commencement of the eighteenth century, to the *terministic controversy*. Joh. Ge. Böse, a Deacon at Sorau, in endeavouring to avoid one extreme, fell into another. He held that God did not continue to forgive, even to the last, such persons as he foresaw would harden themselves in impenitence ; but that he established a *limit of grace* (*terminum gratiae sive salutis peremptorium*), to which, and no farther, he would afford them grace

for repentance. He appealed to the texts which speak of God as *hardening* or *rejecting men*; some of which have no reference to conversion and forgiveness, and some of which are erroneously explained by him; vid. § 85. Ad. Rechenberg at Leipsic, and others, assented to this opinion, though with the best intentions. But Ittig, Fecht, Neumann and many others, opposed this opinion, and wrote against the work of Böse, "*Terminus peremptorius salutis humanæ*," and against Rechenberg. They were in the right. This opinion is not taught in the Holy Scriptures, and is calculated to lead the doubting and anxious to *despair*, and to place them, as many sorrowful examples teach, in the most perilous condition both as to soul and body, especially on the bed of death.

The doctrine that repentance and holiness are the *meritorious ground* of salvation, would have equally terrible consequences. According to this doctrine, we should be compelled to deny all hope of salvation to one who had lived an impenitent sinner, till the last part of his life; which the Bible never does, and which is, in itself, cruel. The conscience even of the good man, must say to him, on his death-bed, that his imperfect virtues are insufficient to merit heaven. In neither of these instances, then, would there be any consolation; but despair would be the result of this doctrine in both.

Secondly. If one who has obtained the forgiveness of his sins is guilty of new transgressions, he forfeits the blessing of forgiveness, and all its salutary consequences; and by new offences, incurs new punishments, which, after his fall, are justly more severe and intolerable, than before. Still it cannot be said, as it has been said by some, that in case of apostasy, God considers the sins once forgiven at the time of repentance, as not forgiven, and that he still imputes them to the transgressor. There is no reason for this supposition; and such is not the case in human courts. The Bible uses the terms, *sins are blotted out, no more remembered*, Ezek. 18: 22. 33: 16. Ps. 103: 11, 12. So Paul says, Rom. 11: 29, that God will never recall, or take back, the gifts which he has promised and bestowed (*ἀμεταμέλητα χαρίσματα*). Vid. Wernsdorf's Dissertation on this subject in Coll. Dissertat. T. I. p. 607, sq.

Thirdly. Even those, who, after their reformation and the bestowment of forgiveness, fall away and transgress anew, may again obtain the forgiveness of their sins, as soon as they repent and believe in Christ. So the Bible every where teaches, both in the Old

and New Testament ; Ezek. 33: 11. 1 Thess. 5: 9. Christ commands us to be forgiving to our neighbor who has wronged us, since in this we shall resemble God, who is easily reconciled, and who willingly forgives sin. Therefore the precept, Matt. 18: 21, 22, is applicable to God. This position is confirmed by the examples of many apostates in the Bible, who, after the commission of great offences, were again received into favor ; e. g. David, 2 Sam. xii. ; Peter, Matt. xxvi. ; etc. The condition of repentance and faith, however, is indispensable ; vid. Ps. li., Morus, p. 211, sq.

But from the earliest ages, Christians have entertained various erroneous opinions upon this subject. The opinion prevailed, even during the earliest ages, that great sins, committed after baptism, (by which ordinance the Christian was supposed to receive the remission of sin,) could not be pardoned without great difficulty, if indeed, at all ; on which account many delayed baptism till the end of life.

The *excommunication* of great offenders had been common among Christians from the time of the apostles, (as it was among the Jews, which indeed at that time was necessary). But now, in the second and third centuries, Montanus, Novatian, and many others, began to exercise this prerogative very severely, and in order to invest it with more terror, insisted that the excommunicated should never be restored, in opposition to those who were too lenient in readmitting them. Montanus, however, declared expressly, that they might still obtain forgiveness from God (Tertullian) ; and even Novatian was willing to leave it undetermined how God would deal with them.

But afterwards some particular teachers and some whole sects, maintained, that one who is excluded from the Christian Church, is excluded from the favor of God, and placed beyond the reach of pardon. This opinion prevailed extensively in the Romish Church. It was based on the principle, *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. In opposition to this error, the ancient Creeds prescribed the declaration *Credo remissionem peccatorum*. This same error is controverted in the Augsburg Confession, Art. 13. The ancient apostolic Church was far removed from such an opinion. In the second epistle to the Corinthians, Paul advises that the incestuous person, whom he had required to be excommunicated in his first epistle, should now be restored, since he had repented of his crime

and had put away his offence. And even there, where he advises his excommunication, and even undertakes to punish him, 1 Cor. 5: 5, he will by no means have him excluded on this account from the favor of God; but declares on the contrary, that he inflicts punishment with the very intention of saving his soul, ἵνα πνεῦμα σωθῇ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κυρίου.

II. Justification or forgiveness is an unmerited divine favor.

That man can merit the divine favor and forgiveness by good works or virtues, is an old mistake, which continues to be widely prevalent, and is ever appearing again in some new form. Against this mistake, which prevailed among the Jews and the Christian converts from Judaism, the Apostles labored incessantly, in entire accordance with that reasonable declaration of Jesus, Luke 17: 10, "When we have done every thing which we are bound to do, (although no one can ever pretend, that he has,) we are still servants who have deserved nothing (ἀχρεῖτοι); for we have done only our duty." All our good works do not confer favor upon God, or lay him under obligation. The observance of his laws is our duty, and tends to our own good merely.

In Rom. III., Paul particularly illustrates this doctrine. V. 24, he says, "Through Christ we are justified δωρεὰν, τῇ χάριτι θεοῦ," i. e. from mere free grace, which we have not deserved and which we cannot repay; vid. Matt. 10: 8. Paul therefore calls justification, δωρεὸν θεοῦ, Ephes. 2: 8. But the Jews and the Christian converts from Judaism, in that age, were particularly inclined to the opinion, that the external observance of the divine law, especially of the Mosaic ceremonial law, the most perfect of any, was meritorious, and more than any thing else procured forgiveness from God. This mistake is controverted by Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians. He shows that man is justified by God, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, or χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου, (not because he observes the Law, Tit. 3: 5. 2 Tim. 1: 9,) Rom. 3: 20, 21, 28. ch. VI. Gal. 2: 16, 21, seq. Νόμος has frequently indeed in these chapters a special reference to the divine law given by Moses, because this was regarded by the Jews as the most perfect. But it is by no means to be limited to this sense. Paul affirms the same in respect to obedience to all the divine precepts; since this obedience is always imperfect, Rom. 3: 28. 6: 14. Gal. 3: 17, 29, 23; and οἱ ὑπὸ νόμου are not

merely the Jews, but all who subject themselves to the divine laws, thinking to merit the favor of God by obedience. The Jews considered their observance of the Law as meritorious, and many Christians hoped to be justified on the same ground. Paul opposes this opinion, and proves that Christians cannot consider obedience as the meritorious ground of justification, for which they are indebted to Christ alone. But what Paul says respecting works, applies equally, in his opinion, to obedience to all laws, to works in general, even to *Christian* works. He does not speak exclusively of the law given by Moses; his positions are general, applying equally to all the laws of God, whether given by Moses, by Christ, or in any other manner; vid. Progr. ad Rom. 7: 21, in *Scripta Varii argumenti*, No. XII. Our obedience to the divine law is not, and cannot be, in itself *meritorious*. That this is a general doctrine, is perfectly clear from Rom. iv. c. g. v. 4, “He that works for hire (ἐργάζεσθαι, 1 Thess. 2: 9, sq.) receives his wages, not through the *grace* of him for whom he labors, (as *we* all receive pardon from God,) but from the *obligation* of his employer to recompense him.” Now if we receive the reward through grace, our works contribute nothing to this end,—they are not the meritorious ground of our pardon.

Paul also employs the argument, that if we by our obedience to the Law could merit pardon, the *atonement* of Christ would be entirely in vain. The fact that we do not obtain forgiveness in this way, renders the atonement necessary, Gal. 2: 21.

But why is this doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures? If God made our works of legal obedience the measure by which he bestowed pardon and reward, we should have but a poor prospect. For how imperfect is our obedience, especially during the early stages of the Christian life! How defective is it, even in the best and most advanced Christians! The greater advances a man makes in holiness and in Christianity, the more he sees and feels his imperfection. What feeble hope would the good man then have, if his own works, (which his conscience pronounces very imperfect,) should be the procuring-cause of his pardon! The Christian teacher who inculcates such an opinion, knows not what he does. Melancthon expressed this very well in the Augsburg Confession, Art. 4.

For a farther consideration of this subject, and an account of the controversies respecting it with the Romish Church, vid. *infra*, §§ 124, 125.

§ 114. *Of the various theories respecting the nature and manner of the atonement of Christ ; and a notice of some of the most important works on atonement and justification.*

The common word authorized by ecclesiastical usage for denoting the atonement, is *satisfactio* (Germ. *Genugthuung*). This word is not indeed found in the Bible, but is in itself unobjectionable, taken in the large sense in which it was formerly understood in the Church, and freed from the false opinions sometimes connected with it in later times. This word was originally a *judicial* term, and was applied for the first time (with many more of a similar nature) by Tertullian, who was himself a jurist, to the atonement of Christ. “*Christus peccata hominum, omni SATISFACTIONIS habitu expiavit,*” De patientia, c. 10. It has since been retained in the Latin Church ; though it occurs but seldom in the Latin fathers, and did not become general until the time of the schoolmen, and especially of Anselmus.

The words *satisfacere* and *satisfactio* relate originally to *matters of debt* ;—*the payment of debt, debiti solutio*. They are then applied *figuratively* to other things, which have, or are supposed to have, some resemblance to debt. Hence we find them used in the following senses ; viz. *to discharge a debt for any one (satisfacere pro aliquo debitore)*, *to make him content, to comply with his wishes, to fulfil his desire, to do what he was bound to perform, to beg him off, and obtain his pardon*. Hence the phrases *satisfacere officio, muneri, expectationi, promissis* ; *satisfacere populo* (to comply with its wishes), *ἱκανὸν ποιεῖν*, Mark 15: 15 ; *accipere satisfactionem* (to accept the payment or apology offered, or the request for pardon). *Satisfacere* often denotes not merely payment with money, though this is the ground of this usage, but every other mode of discharging debt or obligation.

Now when Tertullian and other ancient writers found the words *λύτρον* and *ἀντίλυτρον* applied in the Bible to the Atonement of Christ (§ 106), they were very naturally led to adopt the word *satisfactio*. The two former words properly denote a *ransom, pretium redemptionis*. These writers retained the figure, and compared the unhappy, sinful condition of man, sometimes with *captivity*, sometimes with *debt* ; both of which comparisons are scriptural. Sins

are frequently called in the Bible *ὀφειλήματα*. From these Christ freed men by his death. This death of Christ was, therefore, compared with the sum, which is paid as ransom for captives or debtors, to liberate them from captivity or release them from debt. At first, this was considered only as a figurative mode of speech, denoting that God was by this means *satisfied* or *appeased*. But afterwards this phraseology came to be understood literally, and many hypotheses dishonorable to God were suggested in explanation of this idea.

But as Morus has justly observed, there is no injury to be apprehended from retaining this word, which is now authorized by ecclesiastical usage, if it is only so explained as to convey the same meaning as *λύτρον*, *ἀπολύτρωσις*, and similar scriptural terms. The phrase, *Christ has made satisfaction for us*, should therefore be explained to mean, that Christ by his death has procured for us from God, perfect forgiveness and the remission of sins; so that now, we have no punishment to fear, but rather blessings to expect.

The following are some of the principal methods of explaining this subject, and the ecclesiastical theories respecting it.

(1) During the two first centuries, most of the ecclesiastical fathers adhered, in a great measure, to the simplicity of the scriptural representation of this subject, and attempted no definite explanation of the manner of the atonement, beyond what is given in the Scriptures, and in doing this made use for the most part of scriptural phraseology. They represented the death of Jesus as a *sacrifice*.

But a theory, some traces of which had appeared even during the second century, became prominent during the third and fourth centuries, and continued a long time the prevailing theory among the learned in the Greek and Latin Churches. The advocates of this theory took the word *λυτρόω* in its primary and literal sense, denoting release from captivity or slavery, by the payment of a ransom (*λύτρον*, § 106). With this they associated the idea of the power and dominion of Satan over the whole human race, in a sense not warranted by the Bible. They referred to the texts affirming, that Christ freed us from the power of the Devil. Thus originated the following theory. *Ever after the fall, the Devil had the whole human race in his power; he ruled over men, like a tyrant over his vassals, and employed them for his own purposes.* Thus far they had the support of the Bible. But here they began to philosophize beyond what is written. *From this captivity God might indeed have*

rescued men, by the exercise of his omnipotence. But he was restrained by his justice from doing this with violence. He therefore offered Satan a ransom, in consideration of which he should release mankind. This ransom was the death of CHRIST (as a divine Being). In accordance with this theory, Origen interpreted the text, Matt. 20: 28, "He gave his life a ransom for men," as denoting the ransom paid to the Devil, not to God. Satan had consented to the compact. But he wished fraudulently to retain Jesus, whom he considered only as the best and most pious man, under his own power, and so slew this innocent being. He was now, therefore, justly COMPELLED to liberate the human race.

This theory was first adopted by the Grecian church, and especially by Origen (Comm. in Matt. xx. et alibi); through whose influence it became prevalent, and was adopted at length by Basilus, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzen, Nestorius, and others. From the Greeks it was communicated to the Latins, among whom it was first distinctly held by Ambrosius, and afterwards by Augustine, through whose influence it was rendered almost universal in the Latin Church. In this church they endeavoured to perfect the theory. Satan, they added, was *deceived* in the transaction; for taking Jesus to be a mere man, and not knowing that he was also the *Son of God*, he was not able to retain even *him*, after he had slain him. And it was necessary for Christ to assume a human body, in order to deceive the Devil, as fishes are caught by baits. This view occurs frequently in the writings of Leo the Great, in the fifth century. Cf. Semler, *Geschichte der Glaubenslehre*, prefixed to Baumgarten's "Polemik;" Dæderlein, *Diss. de redemptione a potestate diaboli*, in his "Opuscula;" and Cotta, *Hist. doctrinæ de redemptione sanguine Christi facta*, in his edition of Gerhard's "Loci Theologici," prefixed to Th. 4.

So prevalent was this theory in the Latin Church before the twelfth century, that Abelard declares, '*Omnes doctores nostri post Apostolos, in hoc conveniunt*'; and Bernhard of Clairvaux was so firmly persuaded of its truth as to declare that Abelard, who held that the Devil never possessed in a literal sense such power as was ascribed to him, ought rather to be chastised with rods, than reasoned with.

But after the twelfth century, this theory gradually lost ground, through the influence, principally, of the schoolmen who lived after

the age of Anselmus and Abelard ; and another theory was substituted in its place ; vid. No. 2. Peter of Lombardy, however, still continued more inclined to the ancient theory. In the Greek Church too, this hypothesis was gradually abandoned, and was opposed even earlier than in the Latin Church. John of Damascus attacked it as early as the eighth century, and maintained (*De fid. Orthod. L. 3*), that Christ brought his blood which was shed as a ransom, not to the Devil, but to God, in order to deliver men from the divine punishments. So the Scriptures, "He offered himself to God for us, a spotless victim." This is implied in the whole scriptural idea of sacrifices, which were offered only to God.

(2) The other theory, of which also some traces appear in the early ages, is the following. Proceeding on the idea of *debt*, the authors of this theory maintained, that the relation of all sinful men to God, is the same as that of a debtor to his creditors. We find it distinctly said, as early as the fourth century, that Christ paid what we should have *paid*, or what we owed. The idea of sacrifice and of his offering up himself, was still associated with this. The learned now began to carry out the former idea, at first, indeed, in a manner not inconsistent with the Scriptures. The *debt* was *sin* ; and could not be cancelled, or the *punishment remitted*, unless satisfaction or payment were made. Since men were unable to do this of themselves, Christ did it for them ; and God accepted the ransom (the death of Christ), and forgave men, as if they themselves had made satisfaction.

We find very clear traces of this theory as early as the fourth century in the writings of Athanasius, of the Grecian Church ; and still more clear, in the writings of John of Damascus, who expressly rejected the theory stated in No. 1. At the same period in the Latin Church, we find indications of the same theory in the writings of Hilarius of Poitiers (*Comm. in Ps. LIII*). But the schoolmen of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, gave this theory a greater currency than it had had before, and spun it out to a finer subtlety. They attempted to determine the idea of atonement with philosophical and dialectical accuracy. But they could not do this, if they confined themselves to the plain and popular phraseology of the Bible ; they therefore selected the judicial word *satisfactio*, which had been already used by the older writers. The idea on which they began, in this case as in others, was itself scriptural ; but by phi-

losophizing upon it, they gradually declined from the simple doctrine of the Bible. This was the case particularly with Anselmus, whose system has been generally adopted, even by Lutheran theologians. He defined *satisfactio* to be *debiti solutio*. His system is exhibited most fully in his work, *Cur Deus Homo?* He maintained the *absolute* necessity of satisfaction, in the metaphysical sense. His whole theory is derived from *the civil process respecting debt* among men, transferred to the tribunal of God. But such is not the representation of the Bible, where the compassion and undeserved love of God, is made the ground of this transaction, and not any judicial notions of this nature. God is compared with a ruler who forgives from his forbearance and his compassionate love, and does not proceed according to stern justice, Matt. 18: 26, 27.

The following is the system of Anselmus. Man owes reverence to the character of God, and obedience to his laws. Whoever withholds this reverence and obedience due to God, robs God of what belongs to him, and must not only restore that which he withheld, but pay an additional amount, as amends for the dishonor brought upon God. Thus it stands with sinners. The payment of this debt is the *satisfaction*, which every sinner must make to God, according to the nature of his offence. For God cannot, in justice, remit the debt (or punishment), unless satisfaction is made. This man could never do, nor indeed any other than God himself. And yet to him, as judge, must this satisfaction be made. The expedient was then devised, for the Son of God, as God-man, by his death to make this satisfaction. He was able to make this satisfaction, only as God. But as man, he was also able to be surety for men, and then himself actually to pay the debt, or make satisfaction for them. Cf. § 101, ad finem.

This fine-spun juridico-philosophical theory, was exactly in the spirit of that age, and was almost universally adopted by the schoolmen, though with various modifications; e.g. by Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Gabr. Biel, and others. Among these, however, a controversy arose respecting the *value* of the blood of Christ in cancelling the debt of the human race. Thomas Aquinas maintained, that the value and worth (*valor*) of the blood of Christ were in themselves *infinite*, on account of the infinite dignity of the person of Christ; and that this ransom not only *balanced*, but *outweighed* all the sins of all men. He was followed by the Dominicans. This appears too, to have been the

opinion of Anselmus. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, maintained that God was *satisfied* with this ransom, although it had not in itself any infinite value or worth. God however accepted it as sufficient and equivalent. He thus endeavoured to approximate to the doctrine of the Bible, which always represents justification as a free gift, and a proof of the entirely unmerited love of God. He was followed by the Franciscans. But even this statement was founded upon the judicial doctrine of *acceptilatio*, when any thing insufficient is accepted as valid and equivalent. Cf. Ziegler's Essay, *Historia dogmatis de redemptione inde ab ecclesiæ primordiis usque ad Lutheri tempora*, Göttingen, 1791, 4to.

(3) On the theories and explanations of this doctrine which have prevailed since the sixteenth century.

(a) The system of Anselmus had been extending through the Romish Church, ever since the twelfth century, through the influence of the schoolmen, who added to it various new subtleties, distinctions, and terminologies. This same system was adopted, in main, though with the slight alteration of some terms and representations, by a considerable number of Protestant theologians. Luther, Malancthon, and the other early Reformers, adhered to the simplicity of the Bible, and avoided these subtelties. But after the death of Luther, the theologians of the Lutheran church took sides in great numbers with Anselmus and Thomas Aquinas. They now introduced many of the unscriptural hypotheses and distinctions established by the schoolmen, and thus deformed the doctrine, and rendered its truth doubtful in the minds of many. Their great error consisted, in representing this subject too much after the manner of men, and of course, unworthily of God. The symbolical books of the Protestants have, in the mean time, adhered to the simple biblical representation; and these exaggerated opinions have been held rather by particular teachers and schools, than by the Protestant church generally.

The following are examples of these faulty representations and expressions. *God*, it is said, *was actually INJURED by the sins of men; he was ANGERED and ENRAGED! in the strict sense; it was necessary that he should be PROPITIATED, and that his ROBBED honor should be restored; that he could not be moved to compassion till he saw blood flow.* These figurative expressions ought either to be wholly avoided in the scientific statement of the theory, or to be

justly and scripturally explained. God cannot be injured in the literal sense; his honor cannot be destroyed or diminished. But those who used these inconvenient expressions, did not mean by them what they really imply. The proper idea which lies at the foundation of such phraseology is this: that the laws of God must be kept holy and inviolate; that God does, and must strongly express his displeasure at the transgression of his wholesome laws; and that therefore punishments are necessary for their maintenance.

Again; many held that the guilt of sin is infinite (*infinitum debitum*, § 81, ad finem); and that consequently Christ endured *infinite punishments, the pains of hell itself* (Morus p. 169, No. 4), to the same amount as all sinners taken together would have been compelled to suffer; that the satisfaction of Christ was absolutely necessary, and the only possible way for the restoration of the human race; that some particular sins were atoned for, by each part of the sufferings of Christ; that the blood of Christ had a physical efficacy; etc. etc.

(b) These false representations, and others like them, which are so dishonorable to God, gave rise to various controversies. Reflecting persons rejected much of this phraseology and this mode of representation, as contrary to reason and Scripture. Many also disapproved of the harmless term *satisfactio*, and of all the figurative expressions relative to *debt* and the *judicial processes* respecting it, which had been introduced by Anselmus; because they were so often perverted. At the same time, they did not deny any essential part of the doctrine itself, but only wished to simplify the subject, and to adhere closely both to the principles and words of the Bible. This scholastic system, and this technical phraseology, were, on the contrary, defended with great zeal.

(c) But since the sixteenth century, there have not been wanting persons, who not only disliked and rejected the ecclesiastical form and phraseology of this doctrine, but who opposed the doctrine itself, on philosophical and theological grounds. Among these were Lælius Socinus and Faustus Socinus, in the sixteenth century, and their numerous avowed or secret adherents in the same and the following centuries. They made the desert of Christ to consist merely in his *doctrine* and *instruction*. By his death, he only confirmed his doctrine, and gave an example of patience, firmness in suffering, and obedience to God. The followers of Socinus en-

deavoured to show that there are no *positive* divine *punishments* ; since if this were true, the atonement, which principally relates to the removal of these, would fall away of itself (§ 111, II.). These views were embraced by many of the Arminian and English theologians and philosophers, who were followed, in the eighteenth century, by great numbers of German Protestants. Vid. the Essays on this subject in Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates* ; and Steinbart, *System der Glückseligkeitslehre* ; etc.

Philosophers are at liberty to speculate upon this subject, according to their own views and their favorite theories, variable and transient as they are. If they please, they may investigate the subject independantly of the Bible, and propose the results of their investigation for the examination of the learned. They ought however, to avoid the error, so frequently committed ever since the time of Socinus, of thinking that the Bible must necessarily contain the doctrines approved as true on the philosophical principles of their own particular schools ;—the fault of interpreting the Bible, not according to its own spirit, and the spirit of the age in which it was written, but according to the views of particular sects of philosophers in their own times ;—a fault which has been often repeated of late by the adherents of Kant, and his successors. Let any one consider the various and contradictory theories of the different philosophical schools in our own age. Now each of these schools attempts to support its own theory by the authority of the Holy Scriptures. But *all* of these theories cannot possibly be founded in the Bible ; and who can say, which of them all is so ?

What is *essential* in the common ecclesiastical system respecting the atonement, is clearly revealed in the Scriptures, and is entirely adapted to the spirit of the sacred writers and their whole mode of thinking, to the wants of the age in which they wrote, and to the wants of mankind at large ; vid. § 108, sq. Morus has briefly exhibited the *essentials* of this doctrine, pp. 150—155, §§ 4—6.

(4) Many Protestant theologians began as early as the seventeenth century, to depart by degrees from the theory of Anselmus, which presents so many difficulties and is liable to so many weighty objections, and to bring back this doctrine to the simplicity of the Bible. The book of Grotius, “*De satisfactione Christi*” (Leiden, 1617 ; Halæ, 1730, ed. Joach. Lange), was the first thing done towards undermining the system of Anselmus. Grotius indeed made the ec-

clesiastical system the ground of his work; but he deduced the necessity of satisfaction, not so much from the injury done to God, as from the holiness and inviolableness of the divine laws, which render punishments necessary for the good of men. In this he exactly accorded with the Bible. He showed, that there was no internal and absolute necessity for this satisfaction; but that the necessity was only *moral* or *relative*. These and other views of this scholar became gradually more current among theologians, who sought both to bring them into a still nearer agreement with the Bible, and also to reconcile them with the established system of the Church.

Some Protestant theologians have made use of the new systems of philosophy which have become successively prevalent in modern times, to illustrate and defend the doctrine of the Bible and of the church. Thus Carpzov, Baumgarten, and others, made use of the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy. Vid. also Reinbeck, *Tract. theol. de redemptione per lytron*, Halle, 1710, 8vo; Theod. le Blanc, *Erweis der Genugthuung Jesu Christi*, with the preface of Rambach, GiesSEN, 1733, 8vo;—one of the best of the older works. Stäudlin and others have made the same use of the philosophy of Kant; as Kant himself has done in his “*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*.” But others, with equal zeal, have employed these very same philosophical systems in opposition to this doctrine of the Bible. One of the most zealous opponents of the doctrine of the atonement in modern times is Dr Löffler, in his work, “*Ueber die kirchliche Genugthuungslehre*, Züllichau, 1796, 8vo.

(5) The frequent attacks made in our own age both upon the ancient ecclesiastical system and upon the doctrine of the Bible itself, have made it necessary to state this doctrine more accurately than was formerly done. Many moderate theologians have endeavoured so to exhibit this doctrine, that it should agree both with the decisions of Revelation, and with the acknowledged principles of sound Reason, thus rendering it intelligible, and obviating the most important objections against it. Since the middle of the eighteenth century many have labored to effect this object, though not with equal success. Among these are Ernesti, Töllner, Danov, Næsselt (*Vom Werth der Moral*), Less, Griesbach (*Praktische Dogmatik*), Döderlein (*Dogmatik*), Michaelis (*Gedanken von der Sünde und Genugthuung*, Göttingen, 1779, 8vo), and Seiler (*Ueber den Ver-*

söhnungstod Jesu, with some essays, etc. 2d ed., Erlangen, 1782, gr. 8vo; in connexion with which the doctrine of justification is treated). The last mentioned writer endeavours to refute the objections of Eberhard and Steinbart. Among the latest writers on this subject is Dr. Gottlob Christ. Storr (Pauli Brief an die Hebräer erläutert, Tübingen, 1789, 8vo; 2d Ausg. Tübingen, 1809. Second part, *Ueber den eigentlichen Zweck des Todes Jesu*, SS. 363—692). He holds that the object of the death of Christ is not directly the *reformation* of men, and that their exemption from punishment is not the effect of their reformation; but that the direct and immediate object of his death is, *to procure the forgiveness of sin, and to make atonement*. Another writer is Schwarze (in Görlitz), “*Ueber den Tod Jesu, als ein wesentliches Stück seines Wohlthätigen Plans zur Beglückung der Menschen*, Leipzig, 1795, 8vo. The discourse delivered by Dr. Reinhard, at the *Reformationsfeste*, on the text, Rom. 3: 23, sq., containing a brief and practical statement of the scripture doctrine of the atonement, excited much attention, especially from the unusual manner of its publication, and led to many writings for and against the doctrine of the Bible. Among these the following work is in many respects favorably distinguished: “*Der Widerstreit der Vernunft mit sich selbst in der Versöhnungslehre, dargestellt und aufgelöst*, von Krug,” Züllichau, 1802, 8vo.

The essential points in the theory adopted by the moderate theologians of the Protestant Church may be thus stated. God had a two-fold object in view: viz. (a) to preserve inviolate the authority of his law given for the good of man. How could this be effected otherwise than by the punishment of transgression, threatened and actually inflicted? (b) But as a slavish fear of God is utterly inconsistent with pure religion (*φόβος ἐκβάλλει τὴν ἀγάπην*, 1 John 4: 18), some means must be chosen to free men from their reasonable *fear of punishment*, and to give them a certain *assurance* that God would forgive them, be gracious to them, and count them worthy of his favor; in such a way, however, as not to occasion indifference with regard to sin. Both of these objects were attained by the sufferings and death of Christ; the *first*, by the proof given through the sufferings of Jesus, that God abhors sin and will not leave it unpunished;—the *second*, by the declaration of God that Christ had suffered these punishments for our good, in our stead, and on our behalf. Death is the consequence of sin, and is

in itself a great evil. We must regard it as the sum of all evils and terrors. (Hence in the Bible *death* stands for *every kind of misery*.) Especially is this the case with a violent and excruciating death, which is the punishment of the greatest criminals. Such a death did God himself inflict upon Christ, who was himself entirely guiltless (*ἄγιος καὶ δίκαιος*). God, however, could not be so unjust and cruel, as to inflict such a punishment upon an innocent person without object or design. Hence we may conclude, that Christ endured his sufferings and death for men, who should properly have endured these punishments, in order to inspire them with confidence in God, with gratitude and love to him, and to banish all fear of the divine punishments from their hearts. It all comes back therefore, at last, to this, that God chose this extraordinary means, from the impulse of his own sincere love and benevolence to men. Thus the Scriptures always represent it, and on this view we should always proceed in our religious instructions. Vid. Morus, p. 152, sq. § 6. But if men would be certain, that they have in this way obtained the forgiveness of their sins, they must place their entire dependance on Christ; they must repent of their sins; by the help of God lead a holy life, and punctually observe all the divine laws. This is an indispensable duty and an essential condition of salvation through Christ; and to one who has sincere love to God and to Christ, this will not be difficult. Obedience to God, being prompted by love and gratitude, will be yielded with cheerfulness. No one, however, must consider his repentance or holiness as the *meritorious* ground of forgiveness. For forgiveness is not the effect and consequence of our holiness, but flows from the death of Christ.

This doctrine thus exhibited cannot be injurious to morality; on the contrary, it produces the most beneficial effects upon those who believe it from the heart (§ 108, II.). So experience teaches. We see the most convincing proofs of the beneficial tendencies of this doctrine in those Christian communities, both of ancient and modern times, where it has been faithfully taught and cordially believed. [Cf. Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, S. 104, ff. Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, S. 475—500. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, B. II. S. 245—355. Neander, B. I. Abth. II. S. 70—78. Flatt's Magazine, B. I. S. 1—67, Ueber die Möglichkeit der Sünden-Vergebung.—Tr.]

§ 115. *Of the active obedience of Christ.*I. What is meant by *active obedience* ; and a history of this doctrine.

Christ's cheerful discharge of the commission given him by God, is called, his *obedience* (*ὑπακοή*) ; according to the example of the Bible, e. g. Phil. 3: 9. Rom. 5: 19. Morus, p. 161, § 7. Morus justly defines the obedience of Christ to be, *peractio eorum, quae peragere debuit, et in peragendo summa virtus*. Christ exhibited this obedience in two ways : viz. (a) by *acting* (*agendo*), i. e. by keeping and observing the divine laws ; (b) by *suffering* (*patiendo*), i. e. by cheerfully undertaking and enduring suffering for the good of men, in accordance with the divine determination. Cf. § 93, III. and § 95, ad finem. The former way is called, *obedientia activa* (not *active* in the sense of *busy*, which would be *actuosa*, but in the sense of *acting*, Germ. *thuender*) ; the latter, *obedientia passiva*. These two ways may be thus distinguished *in abstracto*. But they ought not to have been separated from each other. Christ's active obedience is not properly different from his passive obedience. His obedience is one and the same in all cases. *Suffering*, in itself considered, so far as it consists in unpleasant sensations, is not obedience. A person may suffer and not be obedient, but impatient, disobedient and refractory. But for one to suffer obediently, or to show obedience in suffering, this is an *acting*, a fulfillment of duty, or that virtue which is called *patience* ;—one of the greatest and most difficult of virtues ! But how can a virtue, which consists entirely in acting, be called *passive* ? In truth then, the obedience of Christ is one and the same thing, consisting always in *acting*. It is that virtue by which Christ fulfilled not only the moral laws of God, but also the positive divine commands which were laid upon him, to suffer, to die, etc. Obedience is never wholly passive, and what is simply passive is not obedience. But a person shows obedience by acting in suffering.

Theologians commonly hold, that the active obedience of Christ was as much a part of his Atonement or satisfaction, as his passive obedience. This opinion might be more clearly and definitely expressed as follows : the satisfaction which Christ has made, consists both in his enduring the punishments incurred by men, and in his

yielding a perfect obedience to the divine laws. This is what is meant by theologians. This opinion is derived from the two-fold obligation of men, (a) to keep the divine laws, and (b) when they have failed, to suffer punishment for their sin. In this way the satisfaction of Christ came to be considered as consisting of two parts, *active* and *passive*. This view was then connected with the theory of Anselmus, respecting the removal of the *guilt* and *penalty* of sin. The suffering of Christ removes the *penalty*, and his active obedience, the *guilt* of sin; and the perfect righteousness of Christ or his fulfillment of the Law, is imputed to us, in the same way, as if we ourselves had fulfilled the Law, and thus our defective obedience is made good. Respecting this doctrine *de remissione culpæ et poenæ*, vid. § 109, II. 2. This is in brief the common theory, which will be more particularly examined, No. II.

We subjoin a brief *history* of this doctrine. Good materials for this history may be found in Walch's Inaugural disputation, *De obedientia Christi activa*, Göttingen, 1754, 4to.

Passages are found even among the ancient fathers, which teach that the fulfillment of the divine law by Christ is to be considered as if done by us; vid. the passages cited by Walch. Many of these passages, however, appear very doubtful and indefinite, and this doctrine was by no means universally established in the early Church. Even Anselmus, who built up such an artificial system, did not make this application of the two-fold obedience of Christ. This, however, was the tendency of his theory, especially of the doctrine, *de remissione culpæ et poenæ*. But after his time, this explanation of the satisfaction made by Christ by means of his two-fold obedience was adopted by several schoolmen, who now looked up texts for its support. But it was never very generally adopted by theologians of the Romish Church. In the Protestant Church, on the contrary, it has been almost universally taught by our Theologians since the sixteenth century, and even introduced into the "Form of Concord" (Morus, p. 169, n. 5); which however never received an universal symbolical authority in the Lutheran Church. This explanation is not found in the other symbols. One reason, perhaps, of the reception of this explanation in the Protestant Church, is the supposition that the theory *de obedientia activa* could be used to advantage against the Catholic tenet of the value of one's own good works. Another reason is, that the imputation of the active

obedience of Christ was denied by the Socinians and Arminians. For these reasons, most of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians accounted this doctrine essential to sound orthodoxy. But doubting whether the active obedience of Christ constitutes a part of his satisfaction, has no influence upon the plan of salvation through repentance, faith and godliness. Baumgarten and Ernesti have, therefore, justly enumerated this dispute among those of secondary importance. And, in fact, the difference among theologians upon this subject has often been more apparent than real. There were, indeed, some Protestant theologians, even in the former century, who denied the desert of the active obedience of Christ. E. g. the Lutheran theologian Karg, or *Parsimonius*; also the Reformed theologian, John Piscator, who had many followers; more lately Jo. la Placette, and others. The same was done by many of the English theologians, who in general adopted the Arminian views. But from the end of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, the opinion was by far the most prevalent in the Lutheran Church, that the active obedience of Christ is of the nature of satisfaction or *vicarious*. This opinion is defended even by Walch in the place just referred to.

But since the time of Töllner the subject has been presented in a different light. He published a work entitled, “*Der thätige Gehorsam Christi*,” Breslau, 1768, 8vo. In this he denied, that the active obedience of Christ is of the nature of satisfaction. Upon this a violent controversy commenced. Schubert, Wichmann and others wrote against him, and he, in reply, published his “*Zusätze*,” Berlin, 1770. The best Critique of this matter is that of Ernesti, *Theol. Bibl. B. IX. S. 914, f.* For the History of the whole controversy, vid. Walch, *Neueste Religionsgeschichte*, Th. III. S. 311, f. The subject is considered, also, in Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*, Th. II. S. 310, f. Of late years, a great number of Protestant theologians have declared themselves in behalf of the opinion, that the active obedience of Christ is properly no part of his satisfaction, which is the effect solely of his passive obedience. Among these are Zachariä, Griesbach, Döderlein.

II. The worth and uses of the active obedience of Christ.

That Christ did render this perfect obedience is clear, both from the fact of his being *sinless* (§ 93, III.), and from the express

declarations of the Bible, Matt. 5: 17. John 4: 34. 8: 29. Phil. 2: 8. Cf. likewise the text Ps. 40: 7, cited by Paul, Heb. 10: 5. This perfect obedience is useful to us in the following respects.

(1) This obedience of Christ stands in the most close and intimate connexion with his whole work for the good of mankind. His sufferings and death could not possibly have the worth and the salutary consequences ascribed to them in the Scriptures, if Christ had endured them otherwise than as innocent and perfectly holy. His *innocence* and *perfect virtue* are therefore frequently mentioned by the Apostles, when they speak of the worth of his sufferings and death, Heb. 9: 14. 1 Pet. 1: 19. 3: 18. In Heb. 7: 27, Paul shows that the death of Christ was so infinitely superior to all Jewish sacrifices, because Christ was *sinless*, and was not compelled, like the Jewish Priests, first to purify himself by offering sacrifice for his own sins.

(2) Christ's obedience to the divine laws is useful and instructive to us, in furnishing us with a perfect example of holiness and spotless virtue. Christ explained the divine laws not merely by instruction, but by action. His whole conduct was a living recommendation of the purest and most perfect morality, and powerfully plead in behalf of virtue. To this the New Testament frequently alludes, 1 John 3: 3. 1 Pet. 2: 21. Heb. 12: 2.

(3) But besides this, the active obedience of Christ, taken by itself, is considered by many a separate part of his satisfaction, as well as his passive obedience; vid. No. I. They suppose it to be *vicarious*, in itself considered; or that it will be *imputed* to us; i. e. that merely on account of the perfect obedience yielded by Christ to the divine law, we shall be regarded and treated by God, as if we ourselves had perfectly obeyed. Accordingly they suppose that Christ, in our stead, has supplied, or made good, our imperfect obedience to the divine law. To this view there are the following objections: viz.

(a) Christ never spoke of an imputation of his obedience and virtue, as he frequently did of his sufferings and death. The same is true of the Apostles. Christ frequently speaks in general of his doing the will of his Father for the good of men, and teaches that this obedience will be for the good of those who believe on him. He does so very frequently in the Gospel of John, III. IV. VI. XIII, sq. XVII. But here he refers to his whole obedience both in acting

and suffering, and does not separate one from the other. Indeed, there are passages where the apostles must necessarily have spoken of the active obedience of Christ as *vicarious*, if they had held any such doctrine. E. g. Rom. vii. viii., where Paul laments the weakness and imperfection of human nature, by which man is unable, even with the best intentions, perfectly to fulfil the divine commands. In this connexion, nothing would have been more consoling than the mention of the vicarious obedience of Christ, by which our imperfect obedience is made good. But nothing of all this! For the consolation of the pious, he mentions only the *death, resurrection, and intercession* of Christ, Rom. 8: 33, 34.

The active obedience of Christ, however, is not excluded. In Rom. 5: 19, the Apostle makes mention of it. In this passage, which is cited as one of the most important proof-texts, we read, "As through the disobedience of Adam, many became sinners; so through the obedience of Christ, many are made righteous," or are pardoned. In v. 18, the *παράπτωμα Ἀδάμ* and *δικαιώματα Χριστοῦ* are contrasted. Now according to the uniform scriptural usage, this obedience of Christ does not refer simply and exclusively to his active obedience; but principally to his obedience to the divine command to suffer and die for us, Phil. 2: 8. Heb. 5: 8, 9. But in the passage cited, the Apostle clearly comprises under the word *ὑπακοή*, the whole obedience of Christ, and teaches that this, especially as shown in suffering for us, is for our good. Cf. Rom. 10: 4. On the whole, then, our position, that the perfect obedience of Christ to the divine commands, *separately considered* (i. e. disconnected from his death), is never mentioned in the Bible as meritorious, is confirmed. The Scriptures declare, that the whole obedience of Christ, exhibited both in acting and suffering, is for our good. But they never divide this obedience, as theologians have frequently done. The whole obedience of Christ is useful to us, principally on account of his obedience shown in suffering.

(b) The perfect obedience of Christ, it is asserted, must needs be imputed to us, in order to make good our defective obedience to the law, since the *justice* of God demands perfect obedience. But to this it may be answered, (α) That it is difficult to see how this is necessary. For our imperfect obedience to the divine law is either *guiltless* on our part, in which case there is no imputation of guilt, and consequently no reason why another's righteousness

should be imputed to us ; or, it is *guilty* and deserving of punishment. But this punishment is already removed by the sufferings and death (the passive obedience) of Christ. But that the guilt, as well as punishment of sin, is and must be removed by Christ, cannot be proved ; vid. § 109, II. 2. (β) It is inconsistent with many other principles and declarations of the Bible ; e. g. with the principle that man will be rewarded or punished, κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, Rom. 2: 6. Here the imputation of the merit of *another's* works is entirely excluded. The ancient prophets, and all the teachers of the New Testament, from the time of John the Baptist, contended strenuously against the opinion of the Jews, respecting the imputation of the vicarious righteousness of Abraham ; vid. § 108, I. 3. We should not therefore expect such a doctrine as this from them. But the scripture doctrine of the merit of the whole obedience of Christ, is fully secured against perversion, by the frequent inculcation of diligence in holiness ; vid. § 114, ad fin. It has as little resemblance to the Jewish doctrine of the merit of the good works of Abraham, as it has to that of the Romish Church, respecting the desert of the good works of the saints.

(c) Many questionable conclusions may be deduced from this doctrine, which would indeed be rejected by its advocates, but which cannot be easily avoided.

(α) We might conclude from the doctrine, that the obedience of Christ is imputed to us, and that on account of it we are rewarded by God, that the long continued and high virtue of a confirmed Christian, is of no greater value in the sight of God, and will receive no greater reward, than the imperfect virtue of a beginner. For the deficiencies of the latter in personal holiness, will, according to this doctrine, be made up by the perfect obedience of Christ, imputed to him, i. e. considered as his own obedience. But this is contrary to the fundamental principles both of reason and revelation.

(β) However much this doctrine may be guarded against perversion, by saying that the personal virtue of the Christian is not excluded or dispensed with, it must doubtless weaken the motive to holiness of life, and thus prove injurious to the interests of morality. Why was it necessary for Christianity to point out so many means of holiness, in order that we might attain perfect happiness, if in *this way* it could be at once attained, with so little difficulty and labor ?

Note. It may help to settle the controversy on this subject to consider, that it has originated solely in mistake. Two things have been separated, which never can be put asunder, and which never are in the Bible, but on the contrary are always connected. All that Christ did and suffered for our good, receives its peculiar worth from the fact, that he did it from obedience to the divine will. This is the virtue or obedience of Christ. If we would partake of the salutary consequences of his sufferings, we must, under divine guidance and assistance, follow his example. This is an indispensable condition. The two things are always connected in the Bible, and should be in our instructions; and then this doctrine cannot be abused. The remarks made by Morus, pp. 170, 171, are directed to this point.

The Bible indeed justifies us in saying, (1) that *every thing* which Christ *actively performed* during his whole life, in obedience to God, is salutary to us, was done on our account, and for our good. But (2) we therefore truly affirm, that *our whole happiness* (σωτηρία) *is the fruit in a special manner of his obedience to the divine command, both in his suffering and in all the actions of his life.* Had he not shown *this* obedience, we should not have attained to this happiness. So the Scriptures everywhere teach. The obedience of Christ in suffering is, therefore, the foundation, and imparts to us the assurance that all his other obedience, in respect to all the divine commands, will be for our benefit, John 6: 51. 3: 14—16. 12: 24. 1 John 4: 9. 1 Thess. 5: 9, sq. No injury to morals need be apprehended, if the Scripture doctrine is followed, and things which belong together are not separated; vid. § 114, ad finem.

PART SECOND OF CHAP. IV.

ON REDEMPTION FROM THE POWER OR DOMINION OF SIN.

§ 116. *Of the importance of this doctrine; its conformity with Scripture; and the manner in which we are freed from sin through Christ.*

I. Importance of this doctrine.

In treating of the Work of Redemption, writers have commonly considered only the first part,—the *atonement* or *freedom from the punishment of sin*. But *deliverance from sin*, belongs as really to the redemption of Christ, as deliverance from punishment, which indeed Ernesti and others have before remarked. By the *death* of Christ, we are indeed, as the Scriptures teach, delivered from the punishment of sin. But since the disposition to sin is so strong and universal among men, and this is the whole cause of their degeneracy and unhappiness; some means must needs be pointed out, in the proper use of which they may, under divine assistance, overcome this bias and propensity to sin, and may attain to true holiness and the practice of virtue, acceptable in the sight of God. If Christ had not shown us such means, his work of redemption would have been incomplete, and his atonement in vain. For we can participate in the blessings of redemption, even after we have obtained forgiveness, only by avoiding sin and living righteously. And had not Christ furnished us with means to do this, his atonement would be of no avail.

The reason why this has not been commonly considered in the systems of Theology, as making a part of the Work of Redemption,

is, that the Socinians have regarded it as constituting the whole of this work, exclusive of the *atonement of Christ by his sufferings and death*. Evangelical writers, therefore, though they did not entirely omit this important part of Christ's work, passed it by in this connexion, in order to avoid all fellowship with such an opinion, and to afford no appearance of diminishing in the least from the influence of the atonement or satisfaction of Christ. But in conformity with the Bible, even the ancient fathers considered both of these things as belonging to the work of redemption. E. g. Cyril of Alexandria, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great. The latter says : "Christ became man, not only to atone for us by his sufferings and death ; but also to instruct us and to give us an example." This is the full Scriptural idea of ἀπολύτρωσις, cf. § 106, II. Therefore redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις) comprises the two following parts : viz. (1) Deliverance from the *punishment* of sin (ἰλασμός, *atonement*, καταλλαγή) ; (2) from the *power* and *dominion* of sin. The former is effected by his sufferings and death, and is confirmed by his resurrection and intercession. The latter is effected by his *doctrine*, accompanied by divine power (the assistance of the Holy Spirit), and by his example.

The connexion of these two parts, as we learn it from Scripture and experience, is this : when an individual is assured of his forgiveness through Christ, he is filled with the most sincere love and gratitude to God and to Christ. "He to whom much is forgiven, loves much," Luke 7: 47. These feelings render him disposed and desirous to obey the commands of God and Christ. This obedience, flowing from love, is not burdensome ; but easy and joyful, 1 John 5: 3, sq. The actual participation in the benefits of this second part of Christ's Work, belongs, therefore, in all its extent, to those only who have experienced the benefits of the former part. A Christian teacher, therefore, proceeds preposterously and contrary to the example of the Holy Scriptures, when he exhibits and inculcates only the second part, either passing the first in silence, or exciting doubts with regard to it, or casting contempt upon it. He ought to connect the two parts, and to exhibit them clearly and scripturally, as the apostles have done. The method of the apostles has been proved the best by experience. Whenever the atonement of Christ, or the first part of the work of redemption, has been omitted, little has been effected by preaching morality, and holding

up the example of Jesus. Men may be taught in this way what they should be; but are left ignorant of the means of becoming so.

II. This doctrine true and scriptural.

It is the doctrine of the Bible, that Christ became man, not only to free us from the *punishment* of sin, but from *sin* itself. Jesus himself says this, John 8: 32, 36, sq. Cf. John vi. The writings of the apostles contain passages of the same import; e. g. Tit. 2: 11—14. Here Paul shows Titus what he ought to teach. He says (vs. 11, 12), that Christianity makes men pious and virtuous, and gives them the most cheerful anticipations of the future. Now (v. 14), he mentions the *redemption* of Christ, implying (a) that he died for us (ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν); (b) that he designed to deliver us (λυτρώσεται) from all unrighteousness (ἀπὸ πάσης ἀνομίας), and make us the friends of God, and ready for all good works (Christian virtues). Here plainly ἀπολύτρωσις implies both the particulars above mentioned. So 1 Pet. 1: 18, Christ delivered us (λυτροῦν) ἐκ ματαίας ἀναστροφῆς, *from a sinful, heathenish, vicious life*. Ephes. 2: 9, 10, “We are κτισθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς,” i. e. renewed, placed in a situation in which we can act virtuously. Gal. 1: 4, “Christ gave himself περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν (to deliver us from sin), and to rescue us from our former condition in the service of sin (ὅπως ἐξέλγεται ἐκ τοῦ—αἰῶνος πονηροῦ).” The two things are connected still more clearly, 1 Pet. 2: 24, “Christ suffered on the cross the punishment of our sins; we ought therefore to die to sin, and live entirely for holiness. For to his sufferings are we indebted for all our blessedness (this *twofold good*); *by his stripes we are healed*.”

In order deeply to impress the mind with the close connexion and the practical use of both of these parts, the apostles frequently transfer the terms relating to the death of Christ, to the moral improvement or holiness of men, effected by him. E. g. We ought to die spiritually to sin, as he died for it bodily; to *rise*, etc. Vid. the texts already cited; also Rom. 6: 4. 8: 10, etc.

More important still are the passages which teach that Christ delivered us from the *power and dominion of Satan*, as Ephes. 2: 2; that he has *destroyed the power of the Devil*, etc., John 12: 31, sq. This phraseology is best explained by the passage, 1 John 3: 8, ὁ

ποιῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ διαβόλου ἐστίν (diaboli filius, or *diabolo similis*, v. 12. John 8: 44); for he sinned of old (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς). Again, *Εἰς τοῦτο ἐφανερώθη ὁ υἱὸς Θεοῦ, ἵνα λύσῃ ἔργα διαβόλου*. The latter clause, *ἔργα διαβόλου*, is clearly synonymous with *ἁμαρτίαι*. Sins are thus described, because the devil is regarded as the author of them, and because by committing sin, we resemble him, and are instruments in his hand; as on the contrary, *ἔργα Θεοῦ* are *virtuous* and *pious actions*,—such as flow from likeness to God, or love to him.

III. The manner in which Christ delivers us from sin.

If we would obtain definite conceptions upon this subject, we must come down to the simplest possible ideas, and avoid the vague and obscure expressions, with which mystics are wont to darken their own views. In representing the matter briefly, writers are often content with saying, that *new power and ability* to do good is afforded us by Christ. This representation accords perfectly with the Holy Scriptures, with the promise of Christ, and with Christian experience. From this language, however, we are not to understand, that any *miraculous* assistance is furnished by Christ. This power is usually afforded in a natural manner, and the Scriptures themselves clearly point out the means by which it is obtained. That Christ frequently and distinctly promised his aid and support, at *all times*, to all his followers, if they, on their part, performed the requisite conditions, is made certain from the Scriptures, Matt. 28: 20. The term *δύναμις Χριστοῦ* occurs frequently in John and in the Epistles; vid. John 15: 1, sq. 2 Cor. 12: 9. 2 Pet. 1: 3, 4.

This assistance of God and Christ which is promised to Christians in connexion with their use of the Christian doctrine, does not act in a manner inconsistent with the powers and constitution of human nature, but wholly in accordance with them. According to the wise constitution of our nature, all our actions are principally dependant upon the fixed determination of the *will*, which is again dependant upon the *strength* and *clearness* of the motives present to the *understanding*. Now we are frequently hindered by external circumstances which are beyond our controul, from the practice of virtue. In this case, we are without guilt, and the omission cannot be imputed to us. (Here, however, we are liable to deception by

thinking we are without fault, when this is not true.) But often, the fault is in ourselves. We allow sense to rule our reason. We refuse properly to consider the motives placed before us, or we neglect opportunity of instructing ourselves respecting duty; or are chargeable, perhaps, with both of these faults. If now in this case, we disobey the law of God, we are apt to bemoan our weakness and want of power for doing good. Such faults and weakness of the understanding and will, cannot be corrected by any miraculous power afforded by Christ. And the virtue which should be effected by such a miraculous power, would cease to be a personal virtue of the one in whom it was wrought, and consequently could not be imputed to him. There is no other way, but for man to learn the motives to piety and the avoiding of sin which are presented in the Christian doctrine, and to form the fixed resolve, that, under divine guidance and assistance, he will govern his own will by what he knows to be the will of God and Christ. Only then, when he has done every thing on his part, can he count upon the divine assistance. Until man has done his part, he is incapable of that assistance which God and Christ have promised to afford. If we are wanting in this thankful love to God and Christ, which has been before insisted upon, we must also be wanting in the disposition either to learn or obey his will; and in this condition, we are of course disqualified for his assistance.

These remarks lead directly to the answer of the question, How are we delivered by Christ from the power and dominion of sin. When we derive the motives for obedience to the divine precepts from the instructions and example of Christ, and suffer these to control our affections, and when we do this from grateful love to God and to Christ; we then fulfil the conditions, which are essential on our part, in order that we may rely upon this promised guidance and assistance. We shall show in the following section, what is taught in the Bible respecting the efficacy of the instruction and example of Christ, in overcoming the power of sin. By the *instruction* of Christ we obtain exact and distinct information respecting the nature of sin and its consequences, etc. His *instruction* and *example* show the means and motives for avoiding sin, and leading upright and pious lives (*δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς*).

§ 117. *Of the deliverance from the power and dominion of sin, for which we are indebted, under divine assistance, to the instruction and example of Christ.*

I. Scriptural doctrine respecting the efficacy of Christ's instructions in subduing sin.

(1) The doctrine of Christ informs us distinctly what are the requisitions of the divine law, and how we should order our life in conformity with them; it teaches us to notice every deviation from this law, and the dreadful consequences of disobedience; and it gives these instructions in a manner which is plain and intelligible to every mind. This comprehensive and complete instruction as to the whole extent of Christian duty, gives the Christian doctrine a great advantage above other moral codes, in which only the more violent outbreaks of sin are at all noticed. The apostles every where exhibit, with great earnestness, this advantage of the Christian doctrine, and Christ himself declares it to have been one great object of his coming into the world, to give this instruction. Accordingly, Matt. 5: 21, sq. he gives examples of this more complete instruction about the duties of man, as drawn from the divine commands.

Those religious teachers, therefore, mistake very much, who make the *doctrines of faith* the only subjects of discourse, entirely omitting Christian ethics, and perhaps speaking contemptuously of them. These moral instructions constitute a most valuable portion of the Christian System. Even the enemies of Christianity, both in ancient and modern times, have done justice to the morality of the Gospel. But our own age does not need to be warned so much against this fault, as against the opposite one of inculcating the mere morality of the Bible, and of speaking disrespectfully of the evangelical doctrines. The teachers of religion should connect the two together, as the sacred writers do, and should draw the motives to holiness, virtue and moral purity from the doctrines of the Christian religion; vid. § 116, I. ad finem. It was not the manner of Christ, to teach the duties without the doctrines of religion. Neither he nor his apostles separated the one from the other. The Gospel contains both. The doctrine respecting Christ, and the other great doctrines of faith, afford a powerful support to moral lessons; and so they are uniformly employed by the apostles.

This method, however much disregarded at present, deserves to be seriously recommended to every teacher of religion, who is desirous of promoting the true and lasting interest of his hearers. Christian ethics teach us our duty; and Christian doctrines open the *sources* from which we must draw strength to perform it. In popular discourse, then, instruction in morals should always be connected with, and derived from evangelical doctrines.

(2) The Christian doctrine gives full instruction respecting the manner of suppressing our sinful inclinations, and the means we should use to overcome temptation to sin, to weaken the power of sense, and to make constant advances in holiness. Tit. 2: 11, sq. "The salutary system of Christianity is designed by God for all men. It teaches us (*παιδεύουσα*) to renounce all irreligion (*ἀσέβεια*), and all the sinful passions that prevail among men (*χοσμικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι*); and, on the contrary, to live wisely, piously, and virtuously on the earth." 2 Pet. 1: 3, 4, sq. This passage contains the following truths. "God gives us power to lead a *virtuous life* (*ζωὴ καὶ εὐσέβεια*), and shows us the means of doing this, *by* the knowledge of God" (i. e. the Christian scheme, whose author is God). V. 4, "By this knowledge we attain to pious and God-like dispositions (*θείας κοινωνοὶ γίνεσθως*, as children resembling our Father), and distinguish ourselves from the great mass of mankind, who live in immorality." "Thus we are placed in a situation to practise all the Christian virtues (vs. 5—7), and are not *ἀργοὶ οὐδὲ ἀκαρποὶ*" (i. e. are always employed in works of virtue, and disposed to whatever is good).

Christianity therefore justly requires of its friends, to whom it gives such perfect instruction as to the observance of the divine precepts, to maintain the most unsullied purity of character. John is fully justified in declaring (1 John 2: 4), that he is a liar, who professes to be a friend and follower of Christ, and does not keep his commandments. The same writer justly remarks, that the Christian who is in earnest in overcoming his sins, and who acts out of pure love to God and to Christ, will not find it difficult to fulfil the commands of God, *αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ βαρεῖται οὐκ εἰσὶν*, 1 John 5: 3, coll. Matt. 11: 30. He therefore assures us, in entire conformity with experience, that a true Christian, by his obedience to Christian rules, and by constant exercise, can advance so far, that virtue will become his confirmed habit, and the preponderating disposition to sin will become subordinate, *οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν*, 1 John 3: 8, 9.

Note. Paul and the other apostles were accustomed to connect the *history* of the person of Jesus Christ, in his humiliation and exaltation, with his doctrine. From this history they deduce some of the advantages which we enjoy as Christians, and also some of our duties and the motives to the discharge of them; or they refer to this history in inculcating these duties, in order to render them more impressive. Thus they frequently ascribe to the sufferings and death of Christ a power to subdue sin, and to excite pious affections. An example of this is Heb. 9: 14, sq., "If even the blood of beasts took away external impurity, and rendered those who were expiated externally clean, according to the Law of Moses; how much more must the blood of Christ purify us from *sin*" (dead works), i. e. render us holy; "that we may be placed in a situation to worship God in a manner acceptable to him." Still more clear is the passage 2 Cor. 5: 15, "He died for all, *that* they should not live according to their own choice (*ἐαυτοῖς*), but according to the will and commands of Christ, who died for them." The love of Christ in offering up himself for them, should incite them to grateful love, and to willing obedience to his commands. 1 Pet. 1: 18, 19, "Christ delivered us by his *blood*, from an idolatrous and sinful course of life." There are many more passages of the same nature.

From a comparison of these texts it is easy to see, that no direct or miraculous physical agency is here ascribed to the death of Christ, nor any power derived from it which is peculiar and distinct from the influence of the doctrine respecting Christ. The influence of the death of Christ in promoting a reformed and holy life, takes place in the following way. The consideration of the death of Christ promotes, (*a*) Abhorrence and dread of sin, and regard for the divine law, while we see so severe a punishment inflicted upon Christ. In the death of Christ, then, we see sin, in all its dreadful consequences, and the inviolable sanctity of the divine law. (*b*) Love, gratitude, obedience to God and Christ, and zeal in obeying his commandments, are also effects of contemplating Christ's death. Thus 2 Cor. 5: 15, coll. Gal. 2: 20. 1 John 5: 3. Rom. 8: 3, 4, "Because Christ was punished for our sins, we ought, from gratitude, the more carefully to obey the precepts of the law" (*δικαίωμα νόμου*). Here, then, the effect is produced upon our *affections* through our *understanding*.

The apostles ascribe a similar influence in promoting reformation and holiness, to the *resurrection* of Christ and his *exaltation* in the heavens, 2 Cor. 5: 15. Col. 3: 1. Heb. 12: 2. By the resurrection and exaltation of Christ, his whole doctrine and all which he did for us, receive new importance and are rendered clear and certain; and if we confide in him and obey his precepts, we may now look forward with cheerful anticipations to a reward in heaven. For (1) he has gone before to the place whither we shall follow him, if we love him and seek to resemble him, John 14: 2, 3; and (2) while we continue upon the earth, he still cares for us, and is active in promoting our welfare. Christ himself frequently connects these two things, John xv. xvi. xvii. Vid. § 112, II. What a powerful influence in promoting piety and holiness must these considerations exert upon the heart of every man, who cordially believes and embraces them!

II. Influence of Christ's example in aiding the practice of virtue.

There is a propensity to imitation implanted in all men. Good and evil examples often exert an influence upon the heart, indescribably great and sometimes almost irresistible. This propensity, as well as the love of distinction, ought therefore to be turned to account in education. Good examples do far more to improve and ennoble the character, and to perfect holiness, than mere lessons and rules. *Longum et difficile iter est per præcepta*, says Seneca, *breve et efficax per exempla*. Such examples act more strongly and directly upon the senses, and excite the heart to virtue and every thing noble and great.

The example of Jesus is held up for imitation every where in the New Testament, as the most perfect model of every virtue. It is made the indispensable duty of all his followers to conform to it, in all their conduct. Vid. 1 John 2: 6. 3: 3. 1 Pet. 2: 11, "He has left us example (pattern, *ὑπογραμμὸν*), that we should follow his steps." But the example of Christ is recommended to us for imitation, not only in respect to his general integrity, purity of morals, and entire blamelessness (in which he was perfectly exemplary, and the only one indeed, who ever was so, vid. § 93, III); but also in respect to *particular* virtues, especially those which are more high and difficult, which require a great struggle and effort, such as patience, trust in God, firmness in suffering, the practice of humility and self-denial. In these respects, Christ himself commends his example to the imitation of his followers; vid. 1 Pet. 2: 21—23. Phil. 2: 5, sq. We have still farther encouragement to imitate the example of Jesus, by the reward bestowed upon him, the man Jesus, in consequence of his piety and virtue, which we also may expect to receive, so far as we are capable of it, if we follow him; vid. Phil. *ubi supra*, and Heb. 12: 2, 3.

It is an excellent rule which is given by some of the ancient Greek philosophers, that in our whole life and in all our actions, we should have the example of some great, wise, and virtuous man in view, and that we should imagine him to be the witness and overseer (*custos et pædagogus*) of all our conduct. They advised, that we should do every thing under the notice, as it were, of such an inspector, and inquire at every step, what *he* would do or recommend in this case;—would he approve or disapprove? Could I do or say this thing, if he were present, without blushing? etc. Epictetus (Enchir. c. 51) re-

commends Socrates and Zeno for models; Seneca (Ep. 11. Extra.), Cato and Lælius. Christians can select no greater and more perfect man, to be the witness of their conduct and guide of their morals, than Jesus. And we know too, that we may not only *imagine* him to be the witness and judge of our conduct, but that he actually is so. He knows all our thoughts and actions, and will be the sole Judge of the living and the dead. So we are taught by Christ himself in his discourses recorded in John, and by all the Apostles. Both Christ and his Apostles require Christians, to do every thing *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*.

The passage Heb. 12: 1, 2, deserves to be noticed among the many, which speak of imitating the example of Christ. Paul first compares the firm and pious sufferers of antiquity, whose example in suffering the Christian ought to imitate, with spectators and witnesses, who look upon our race and contest, and encourage us to perseverance. Among these witnesses is Jesus, who far surpasses the rest, who is the best example of confidence in God, and of every virtue; and who constantly observes us, and will finally reward us, if we follow him.

But those only who possess the character described, § 116, I. *ad finem*, are properly capable of imitating this example of Jesus. Men who have not felt the consciousness that their sins were forgiven, and have not been renewed in the temper of their mind, have no taste or capacity for this imitation of Christ. Nor can we properly require of them, what they, in this situation, are incapable of performing. We can make them feel, however, if their moral sensibility is not entirely deadened, how far below this example they stand, and how good and salutary it would be for them to imitate it.

PART THIRD OF CHAP. IV.

ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WORK OF CHRIST.

§ 118. *Scriptural titles of the salvation procured by Christ for men ; its general nature ; the doctrine of the New Testament respecting the abolition of the Old Testament dispensation by Christianity, and the advantages resulting from it to the world.*

I. Scriptural names of the blessings of Christianity ; and their nature.

Some of these names are literal, others figurative. The most common are the following : viz. *Eὐλογία*, פְּרִכָּה, denoting every kind of benefit, Ephes. 1: 3. Gal. 3: 14. *Χάρις*, חֶסֶד, John 1: 16, “Through his infinite love we have obtained *χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος*,” *an undeserved benefit superior to the other*, in opposition to the Mosaic dispensation, v. 17, which could not secure this forgiveness of sin, and the blessings connected with it, which are here intended by the word *χάριν*. The word *ζωή* is also frequently used, *vita vere vitalis*, *happiness*. Also *ζωοποιεῖσθαι*, *ζῆν*, κ, τ. λ. in opposition to *ἀπωλεία* and *θάνατος*, *unhappiness*, John 3: 36. 10: 11. Ephes. 2: 5, where the figure is continued, “Through Christ he has *vivified* and *raised* us up,” etc.

The Jews had anciently very diverse opinions respecting the *nature* of the blessings to be expected from Christ. Only a few of the better instructed conceived, that these benefits were entirely of a *spiritual* nature. For such blessings the great mass had no taste. They expected, for the most part, temporal blessings, and hoped, under the Messiah, to be rich, honorable, and mighty ; vid. § 89. And these expectations have prevailed in a large portion even of the

Christian world. Accordingly many, in direct opposition to the spirit of Christianity, have associated the promises of earthly good and temporal welfare, made under the Mosaic institute, with the precepts of the New Testament. We may indeed hope and expect to obtain from God all that good, even of a temporal nature, of which we are capable, and of which we stand in need. But through *Christ*, and *observance of his precepts*, we cannot hope to obtain earthly good. For the design of his religion is to withdraw us from earth and sense, to improve and ennoble the heart, and to procure the enjoyment of high spiritual blessedness, Phil. 3: 14, 17, 20. On this ground therefore, the Jewish idea of the coming of a millennial kingdom of Christ upon the earth, is entirely objectionable. The apostles never indulge in such expectations, but take every opportunity to contradict them. They call those who entertain such ideas *σαρκικοί*, persons who adhere to what is sensible and exterior, have no taste for what is spiritual, and are not therefore real disciples of Jesus. Hence Paul says, Ephes. 1: 3, "God has blessed us, through Christ, *πάση εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν ἐπουρανίοις.*" *Πνευματικός* is here opposed to *σαρκικός*, and implies that the blessings spoken of are not designed for the body and the senses, but for the mind. The phrase *Ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις* (sc. *τόποις* vid. v. 20 and 2: 6, 12), does not signify *in the Christian Church*, but denotes literally, the blessings which we shall enjoy *in heaven*, which is our home, where we are citizens, (not in the visible world). Hence in Heb. 8: 6, he calls the blessings which are bestowed upon us through Christ, in comparison with the promises made under the Mosaic dispensation, *κρείττονα ἀγαθά*. In Heb. 7: 19, he says, that there is through Christianity, *ἐπεισάγωγὴ κρείττονος ἐλπίδος*, (i. e. it inspires the hope of more great and distinguished divine favors,) since the Mosaic institute is removed.

The blessings bestowed upon us through Christ are commonly divided into *general* or *public* (such as relate to the whole human species), and *particular*, *privata* (such as relate to each individual Christian). Among the former is, as the New Testament every where shows, the abolition of Judaism (the ancient institute), and the establishment of a new dispensation and institute, by which all the nations of the earth might be united in one common religion. We shall first treat of the removal of the ancient church of God,

and of the establishment of the new; and then of the particular benefits of Christianity.

II. The abolition of the Mosaic institute, and the union of Jews and Gentiles in one common religion.

(1) The Israelitish constitution and religion (*νόμος*) were only temporary and national. They were designed, in their first origin, only for a barbarous and rude people, destitute of moral cultivation. But the human race was not destined to remain always in a state of infancy. And as soon as men were prepared for a more high, perfect, and spiritual instruction, that more imperfect kind, intended for beginners, would of course be omitted. The Jewish institute was designed to be only preparatory; such is the uniform doctrine of the Apostles, especially of Paul; vid. the Introduction, § 12, where we have cited the most important texts, which are principally contained in the Epistles to the Galatians and Hebrews. Now therefore, according to their instruction, Christ had abolished the Law. (Christ himself, for good reasons, gave at first only hints which led to this conclusion. E. g. John 4: 21—24. 10: 16. He left the full developement of this doctrine for his disciples.) Rom. 10: 4, *τέλος τοῦ νόμου Χριστός*, i. e. *τέλος ἔφερε τῷ νόμῳ*. Heb. 7: 18, 19. Gal. 4: 4, 5. Ephes. 2: 14, 15. According to these and other passages, Christ has freed his followers from obligation to observe the law of Moses; and the punishments threatened in it, do not relate to those who believe in Christ. Vid. Gal. 3: 13, *Χριστὸς ἐξηγόρασεν ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς κατάρτας τοῦ νόμου*, i. e. from the punishments which the Mosaic law threatens.

Here two questions arise; viz.

(a) How are we to understand those texts which teach, that the Mosaic law and institute are removed and declared to be null, by the *crucifixion*? Such texts are Gal. 3: 13. Ephes. 2: 16. 3: 15, and especially Col. 2: 14, “He took it away, and nailed it to his cross,”—by his crucifixion he declared it invalid. The Apostles every where teach, that the new dispensation through Christ (*καινὴ διαθήκη*) commenced at his death, and was, by that event, solemnly sanctioned and introduced. Ephes. 5: 25, 26. Heb. 13: 20. 9: 14, 15, where the preparatory economy of Moses, consisting in sacrifices, is compared with the preparatory economy of Christ, consisting in the sacrifice of himself. Christ himself calls his blood which was

shed, αἷμα καινῆς διαθήκης, Matt. 26: 28. Consequently the ancient Israelitish dispensation ceased with the death of Christ, because at that event the new dispensation commenced. We see by this, what value was attached to the death of Christ, and how every thing in this new dispensation through Christ proceeds from it. The day of his death is the Consecration-day of the new covenant. The new covenant is not dated from the time when he began to teach, but from the time of his death.

(b) Are *all* the Mosaic laws abolished by Christ, and no longer obligatory upon Christians? From the passages cited, we must certainly answer in the affirmative. But the laws of Moses are of different kinds; and many of the older theologians maintained, that Christ abolished only the *ceremonial* and *civil* law of the Israelites, and not the *moral* law, especially that contained in the decalogue. But in the passages of the New Testament which treat of the abolition of the law, there is no allusion to this three-fold distinction. Paul includes the whole under νόμος, Rom. 6: 14. Gal. 3: 19, 25. Besides, many of the laws of Moses which are truly *moral*, are expressed and stated in such a way, as to show plainly that they were designed, *in that form*, only for the circumstances and wants of the Israelites at the time being. E. g. "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the *land*" (Palestine); and the law respecting the Sabbath.

The mistake upon which this limitation is founded, may be pointed out. Moral laws are in themselves universally obligatory, and unalterable as the laws of nature. There are doubtless many such moral laws in the code of Moses, as well as of Solon, Lycurgus and others. But they are not binding upon Christians because they are parts of the Mosaic code, and stand in the decalogue; but (a) because they are founded in the constitution of human nature, which God himself has given us, and are therefore laws of nature; and (2) because Christ has commanded us to obey them. In the same way, we observe the moral laws which stand in the codes of heathen legislators, Confucius, Solon, Lycurgus, etc.; not because they have given them, but because these laws are universal, and founded in our very nature. When a ruler introduces a new statute-book into his dominions, the old book, after its rejection, is no longer the rule by which right and wrong are determined, although much in it still remains true. Just such is the case here. *Morus*

well observes (p. 243, *infra*), that Christians observe the moral precepts in the Mosaic code, *quia ratio dictat, et Christi doctrina proponit, proponendoque confirmat. Judæi vero tenebantur ea observare, quia ratio dictabat, et Moses, jussu divino, præscripserat.*

In this way we may understand the declaration of Christ, Matt. 5: 17—19, “that he was not come to destroy the law and the prophets (*νόμον καὶ προφητάς*), and that all the divine commands contained in them must be punctually obeyed.” This does not conflict with the doctrine of Paul. Christ was neither able, nor willing, to abrogate these *universal laws*, because they were given by God for all men; not, however, because they were given by Moses. It was on the contrary the design of Christ still more to illustrate these laws, and to recommend obedience to them by his doctrine and example.

The question, Whether the ten commandments of Moses should be retained in the moral instruction of the common people and of the young, has been much controverted of late. (Cf. Thom. Boclo, *Etwas über den Decalogus, oder, von der Verbindlichkeit der zehn Gebote für die Christen*, Schmalkalden, 1789, 8vo; Hufnagel, *Ueber den Religionsunterricht, nach den zehn Geboten*; Zachariä, *Bibl. Theol. Th. 4*; Less, Döderlein, Reinhard, in their *Christian ethics*.) From what has been already said, it is plain, that the *Ten Commandments* are not obligatory because they are laws given by Moses. They are not therefore, *of necessity*, fundamental in Christian instruction. No injury, however, is to be apprehended from making them so, any more than in the first Christian Church, if the manner in which Christ and the apostles allude to the moral precepts of Moses and the Old Testament, be only made our model. The intelligent and conscientious teacher will be very cautious in declaring to the common people and the young, that the Ten Commandments are abrogated; since he might be easily understood to mean, that the duties enjoined in them are no longer obligatory. The instruction which God has given through Jesus, respecting the moral law and our duties, is much more perfect and extensive than that which was given, or could be given, through Moses. Our hearers should, therefore, be led directly to this more copious fountain of knowledge. This will not prevent our connecting instruction from the Old Testament with that from the New, as Christ and the Apostles did; especially since the history of the Old Testament so well elucidates and explains many points of duty.

In those churches in which the Decalogue is incorporated, by their very constitution, into the system of instruction, it is neither necessary nor advisable for the teacher to urge the discontinuance of this custom. By this course, he would do more hurt than good. He will proceed more properly and judiciously by confirming, completing, and enlarging from the New Testament all the particular moral precepts contained in the Decalogue; making the Decalogue, in this way, serve only as a guide to Christian instruction. He will do well also to connect with, or append to, the Catechism, a good outline of Christian doctrines and morals, exhibited in a natural order, and in an intelligible and practical manner, according to the Holy Scriptures.

(2) It was the great object of Jesus to establish an universal religion, by which all nations of the earth might be united in one common worship of God. Vid. John 10: 16, "One fold and one Shepherd." Cf. Reinhard, Ueber den Plan des Stifters der christlichen Religion. But this plan in its whole extent could not be carried into effect, nor indeed was it designed to be, until after his departure from the earth; vid. John 12: 32. In order to render this plan practicable, it was essential that the Mosaic institute should be abrogated, and declared to be thenceforward abolished. Without this, Jews and Christians could never be brought together, or united in a common religious society. The Jews were distinguished by national pride and contempt for all the rest of mankind. They considered themselves exclusively as a holy people, beloved of God. All other nations seemed to them to be desecrated, and hated by God. They exhibit, as Tacitus says (Hist. V. 5), *Odium hostile adversus omnes gentes*; and as Paul says, 1 Thess. 2: 15, *a universal misanthropy*, *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίοι*. And what was the occasion of this hatred and separation? Their misunderstanding the Mosaic laws, and putting a false interpretation upon them.

In opposition to this, the great principles of Christianity, are *the love of God* and *universal philanthropy*, and that all upright and true worshippers of God, of whatever nation they may be, are equally acceptable to him, have equal rights, and an equal share in the blessings of Christianity, John 4: 21—24. Acts 10: 35. Rom. 10: 12. Gal. 5: 6. This assimilation and union, by which all distinction between Jew and heathen would cease, could not be brought about except by the abrogation of the Mosaic institute, which was

designed by God to be only a preparatory economy. One of the principal passages relating to this subject, is Ephes. 2: 12—19, coll. Col. 1: 21, seq. Ephes. 2: 10, seq. “Christ has united the two (Jews and heathen), has done away the cause of their enmity, has established harmony, brought them both together into one society, and given them citizenship in the kingdom of God; this he did by removing the *wall of partition* (μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ, v. 14), that separated between heathen and Jews, and prevented their becoming one people.” This *wall of partition* was the Mosaic law, as he himself explains it, v. 15, νόμος ἐντολῶν. This he calls in v. 14, ἔχθρα, *the cause of enmity*.

§ 119. *The happiness which Christians obtain in this life from Christ.*

We treat now of the *particular* benefits of which every professor of Christianity partakes, when he performs the prescribed conditions; vid. § 118, I. ad fin. As our existence is composed of two very unequal portions, these blessings are likewise of two kinds. We enjoy some of them even in the present life, and others, not before we enter the future world, § 120. It must always be borne in remembrance, that the apostles derived all these spiritual advantages, of whatever kind, from Christ, and that they connect these, as well as the rewards of the pious (*natural* and *positive*), in such a way with the history of Jesus, that they represent him as the procurer of them all. This method of instruction is perfectly suited to the wants of mankind. General truths become much more intelligible, clear, and certain by being placed in connexion with true history, from which they receive a positive sanction. We find that the ancient teachers of religion among the heathen, pursued the same course. And this is a proof that they better understood the constitution of man, than those Christian teachers who would separate every thing historical from the exhibition of Christian truth; vid. § 108.

The spiritual blessedness which believers in Christ receive

through him even in the present life, consists, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, in the following particulars.

I. Assurance of the undeserved benevolence, the constant favor, and paternal love of God.

The apostles place this class of spiritual benefits in the closest connexion with the whole history of Christ, representing them always as the fruit of the atonement. Their doctrine is, that whoever is sure of the forgiveness of his sins (and this assurance he receives through the atonement of Christ, or through faith in Christ as a Saviour and expiator), and under the guidance and assistance of God and Christ, lives conformably to the divine precepts (which he learns from the Christian doctrine and from the example of Christ); such an one is capable of receiving the divine blessings which are promised to such, and he can at all times be assured of the favor and paternal love of God; he will be treated by God and Christ as a friend, and made partaker of their happiness, so far as he is susceptible of it.

Various figures and expressions are used in the Scriptures, to represent these fruits of the atonement and of faith in it. But they all convey one and the same idea. They ought not therefore, in systems of theology, to be separately considered, in different chapters or articles. The following expressions are some of the most common; viz. *sonship*, *the right of adoption*, *election*, *access to God* and *union* with him. We shall now briefly explain these terms.

(1) *Υιοθεσία θεοῦ*. This is a term which was originally borrowed from the Israelitish Church. In the ancient languages the phrase, *children of God*, denotes the peculiar friends, the favorites of the deity. The Israelites received this name, and also that of *first born*, to denote their preeminence above other people; vid. Ex. 4: 22, 23. Hence in Rom. 9: 4, the Israelites are said to possess *υιοθεσία*, i. e. the rights of the favorite people of God. This term is transferred to true Christians, in order to denote the relation which subsists between them and God. Those who endeavour to resemble God in their conduct, and who faithfully obey his commandments, have a higher capacity for happiness and reward, than others who are wanting in these traits of character. We hence conclude with reason, that God loves and favors them, more than others who are unlike him. One who loves God, as a son loves his

father, and seeks to resemble him, as a dutiful son seeks to resemble his father, will be loved by God in return, as a dutiful son is loved by his father. All the advantages and spiritual benefits, therefore, which we obtain through faith in Christ, and obedience to his precepts, are considered as belonging to *νιοθεσία*, because they are all proofs of the paternal love of God. Vid. Gal. 4: 4, 5. 3: 26. Rom. 8: 15 (*πνεῦμα νιοθεσίας*, a filial disposition), and v. 23 (the reward of Christians), Ephes. 1: 5. 1 John 3: 1, 2. This right of adoption we owe to Christ, as the author of Christianity and our Saviour. Those only possess this right who believe in him as *Χριστός* and *Σωτήρ*. Hence John declares (1: 12), "He gives to all who believe on him, the privilege (*ἰξουσία*) of considering themselves the *children of God*;" which privilege they obtain, according to v. 13, not by descent from pious ancestors, according to the Jewish prejudice, but solely by true faith in Jesus Christ, and from the holiness and likeness to God arising from and connected with faith.

The apostles give this appellation to the sincere worshippers of God the more readily and frequently, on account of the name of Christ, *νιὸς θεοῦ*. God treats Christians as his peculiar friends, on account of Christ, who is his most beloved and chief favorite, *πρωτότοκος, μονογενής*. Vid. Gal. 3: 26, 27. 4: 4—7.

Pious Christians are thus called the *children of God* in a two-fold sense: (a) because they love God as their Father, and obey him from love; (b) because they, on account of this disposition, are loved in return by God, as obedient children, and so obtain from him forgiveness of sins and other Christian blessings. Both of these ideas are sometimes implied at the same time in this term.

[In the older writers of the English Church, (as well as in the ancient Fathers, and the most devout and spiritual writers of other nations,) we frequently meet with the idea, that the relation existing between man and God, denoted by *sonship*, is not merely a relation of *feeling*, but also of *nature*. This is sometimes illustrated by saying, that we are not adopted by God into his family, in the same manner in which a wealthy benefactor sometimes adopts a destitute and orphan child, conferring upon him great privileges, and giving him the name of *son*, to which he has no natural title. In such a case, this name would denote only, that the person on whom it was conferred, held the same place in the affections of the benefactor, and exercised in return the same feelings of gratitude and dutiful reverence, as an own son would in similar circumstances. And this seems to be the more general sense in which this appellation was used in reference to the friends and worshippers of God before

the Christian dispensation, and to those few, who like the devout Cornelius, are found fearing God even in the midst of heathenism. But this term when applied to believers in the New Testament has a superior meaning, and points to the gift of the Spirit of adoption, which in the highest sense, is peculiar to the Christian dispensation, and consequent upon the completion of Christ's work. By being born of God, and receiving this peculiar grace, the Spirit of adoption, believers become partakers of "the divine nature," and possessed of an internal principle, the fruits of which are the love and obedience in which the essential nature of sonship is sometimes placed, but which are in reality only the signs or effects of that new life in which it really consists. The possession of this Spirit by Christ, though in a far higher degree of intimacy, seems to be one of the grounds of his bearing the title of Son. And the manner of the Spirit's presence and operation in believers, is compared by the sacred writers with the hypostatical union of the divine and human natures in Christ.—These ideas may be, indeed, carried so far as to involve error. But it is an important question, whether they have not a scriptural basis. Is the comparative infrequency, in our later theological writings, of these ideas which were so current in the Fathers of the English Church, the result of an advance or a decline in theological science?—TR.]

(2) All the words which literally signify to *choose* and *elect*, are frequently employed in order to denote the distinguished *favor* and *love* of God to his people. We are accustomed to select from many things, that which is the best, most desirable and valuable. Hence to say a thing is *chosen* is often the same as to say, it is *valuable* or *useful*; e. g. *συνεῖρος ἐκλογῆς*, Acts 9: 15. Now because our love rests upon those objects which appear to us good and valuable, the words which in the oriental languages signify to *select*, signify also to *love*, to *wish well to any one*, to *benefit him*, in a distinguished manner. In the same way is *בְּחַר* used in Hebrew; e. g. Deut. 4: 57, where *אָבָה* is added. The LXX. sometimes render it by the word *ἐκλέγεσθαι*, as in the passage cited, and sometimes by *εὐδοκεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*. The New Testament employs the words *ἐκλέγεσθαι* and *ἐκλεκτός* in the same manner. In the Old Testament the Israelites were denominated, by way of eminence, the *chosen* or *beloved* (*בְּחֵירָה*) of God. This term was then transferred to Christians who become worthy of the love of God by faith in Jesus Christ, and by conduct conformed entirely to the divine will: e. g. Matt. 24: 24. 1 Pet. 2: 9. *Ἐκλέγεσθαι* is therefore *Christianum facere*, as 1 Cor. 1: 27, 28. In the same way the *verba cognoscendi* in the ancient languages mean to *love*, to *be friendly to any one*,

Thus Christians are said to be *γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ*, *amici Deo*. Gal. 4: 9. 1 Cor. 8: 3, coll. Ps. 55: 14.

(3) The terms which denote the *drawing near* of God to men, or *union* with him. God was conceived of by the ancient world as corporeal and as resembling man. Thus many believed, that he was literally and actually more present in one place, than in another, and that he approached the place where he wished to exert his power, and that otherwise he *withdrew* or absented himself; vid. § 23, II. From such conceptions a multitude of figurative expressions have arisen in all the ancient languages. These expressions appear very gross and unworthy of God. At first, however, they were literally understood by the great mass of mankind. But afterwards, as the views of men became enlarged and improved, they were understood figuratively, and were interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with the divine perfections. The terms, *the approach, or coming of God to any one, the connexion of God with any one*, denote a high degree of his favor and love, and of the active display of these feelings,—his assistance and agency; and so the *withdrawment of God, and his forsaking any one*, denote, on the other hand, the withdrawing of his love and the benefits resulting from it. Thus קִרְבָּן denotes the *friendship of God*, Ps. 73: 28, coll. Zecl. 2: 10, 11. And thus Christ promises to his disciples, that he and his Father would *come* and make their abode with them, i. e. would be always connected with them, and never withhold from them their special assistance and protection; in short, would be to them, what one friend is to another, in guiding and upholding him; v. 21, ἐμμένειν. Thus Jesus consoles his disciples who were lamenting his departure. Cf. Rev. 3: 20. and Matt. 28: 20. The terms, ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν (or μένομεν) ἐν θεῷ, θεὸς ἐστὶν (or μένει) ἐν ὑμῖν, which occur John 17: 21, and 1 John 3: 24, etc. denote in the same way, a high degree of the special favor and friendship of God, agreement of disposition with him, and his assistance connected with his favor. Cf. John 15: 1, “whoever is and remains faithful and devoted to him, shall be treated by him in the same manner in return; he shall be united to him, as the branch is united to the vine.”

From these and similar passages the mystics have taken occasion to speak of a *secret union* (*unio mystica*) with God and Christ. They commonly express this by the terms, the *indwelling of God*

in the heart, sinking down into God, the communication of God, the enjoyment of him, etc. etc. Some of them associated very gross conceptions with these phrases; cf. Vol. I. § 23. After the eleventh and twelfth centuries, such language became more common in the Western church. It was understood by some in a literal manner, and in a sense unworthy of the character of God; by others in a manner entirely conformed to the Bible, but yet sometimes too indistinctly. Luther, Melancthon, and other Reformers retained the phraseology of the ancient mystics, and it was adopted into the systems of theology. Some made a special article on the subject of the *mystical union*; though Melancthon and others, took pains to controvert the gross ideas of the fanatical mystics. Hence it came to pass that this phraseology was thus used mostly in homiletical and catechetical discourses, and that formerly many sermons and books were written upon this subject.

In the Holy Scriptures these terms denote sometimes the agreement of the dispositions of the pious with the law of God; sometimes the peculiar favor and friendship of God towards them, and the special proofs of it, and also their enjoyment and feeling of the tokens of this friendship.

There is no reason, therefore, for making a particular article in the systems of theology upon this subject. Caution however should be used in Christian instruction to prevent the notion, that there is any thing properly miraculous in this matter, which is not according to the Bible. This caution is the more necessary, as many enthusiastic parties frequently employ such expressions with regard to these divine influences, and give them such a meaning as implies an *immediate illumination* independant of the Holy Scriptures. So the Quakers and Bohemians. And it has sometimes happened that well meaning, though unenlightened Christians, have received the doctrine of these sectarians as scriptural, because it was expressed in scriptural phraseology.

Another reason for calling these proofs of the love of God, and the experience of them, *unio mystica*, is, that they are inward, and enjoyed by spiritual fellowship, and are unseen and disregarded by those who have no taste or capacity for such experiences. A satisfactory and full explanation of these feelings cannot be given to those who have no experience of them, as is the case with all matters of experience. Paul said very truly, Col. 3: 3, “*Your* (the true

Christian's) *life in God*, (i. e. your divine life, which is acceptable to God,—your happy life, as Christians), like the present life of Christ in heaven, in the full enjoyment of happiness, is concealed (*κρύβεται*) from the great multitude of men ;” they do not regard it as happy or desirable, because they have no taste for it.

II. Happiness and peace of mind, and a joyful prospect of the future.

We owe to Christ, according to the doctrine of the New Testament,

(1) *Inward peace and happiness*. These spring from the firm conviction, that through Christ we have obtained from God the forgiveness of sin, and from the joyful consciousness of the power of God, and his approbation of our feelings and conduct. This state of mind is frequently expressed in the New Testament by *παρόρησία*, *cheerful confidence in God*, in opposition to an anxious and slavish fear of punishment. Thus Heb. 4: 16, *προσερχώμεθα μετὰ παρόρησίας τῷ θρόνῳ τῆς χάριτος*, “We may now with joyful confidence, expect unmingled good from God and supplicate him for it.” 1 John 4: 17, *παρόρησιάν ἔχειν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως*, to be able to look forward to the day of Judgment with cheerfulness; cf. 1 John 3: 20, 21, *peace of God, or with God*. Rom. 5: 1, 2, *Εὐθύνην πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἔχομεν, δικαιωθέντες,—προσαγωγήν εἰς χάριν θεοῦ*, etc. V. 11, “We can at all times rejoice in the assurance of divine favor (*καυχώμεθα ἐν θεῷ*); and this, Christ by his atonement has enabled us to do.” By this assurance and confidence, the soul of the true Christian comes to such a firm, steadfast and composed frame, as enables him to endure unmoved the greatest trials. He is deeply convinced, that the greatest adversities contribute to his highest good, and are the means which God, as a kind father, employs for the welfare of his children, whom he is educating not merely for this short life, but for eternity, Rom. 5: 3. 8: 28, 32.

(2) *The most cheerful prospect of the future, or a certain hope of our future blessedness*. One great object of Christian instruction is, to awaken, confirm, and cherish this hope. It is always used as a motive to diligence in holiness, to self-denial, and to steadfastness in all the sufferings and adversities of the present life. Rom. 5: 2, *ἐλπὶς δοξῆς θεοῦ*, i. e. of the divine rewards. Rom. 8: 17, 18, 24, sq. 1 Pet. 1: 3. 2 Cor. 7: 1. 4: 8, sq. All this is every where con-

nected with the history of the person of Jesus in his humiliation and exaltation ; and confirmation of the views now given is drawn from his *sufferings and death*, as Heb. 9: 15 ; from his *resurrection and subsequent exaltation*, as John 7: 28. 17: 24. 1 Thess. 5: 8—10. By his death we are delivered from death. His resurrection and his exalted station are pledges to us, that he will actually perform all that he promised, and will bring us to that place to which he has gone before,—to our proper home, and our Father's house.

We ought not, however, in hope of the future world, to forget the present. We should remember, that God designs that we should live for the present world, and that our happiness hereafter depends upon our good improvement of the time now allotted us. Faith in Christ, and grateful obedience to all his requirements, should render us happy even here. 1 Tim. 4: 8, *εὐσέβεια—ἐπαγγελίαν* (ἔχει) *ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης*. This cheerfulness and joy which so visibly distinguish the pious Christian, and more than ever, in the midst of sufferings and adversities, often compel those who are without, to wish that they were as pious and as enviably happy as they see him to be. Many are in the case of King Agrippa, Acts 26: 28, who confessed that but little was wanting to persuade him to become a Christian. But they stop here, because they are unwilling to employ the simple means necessary for obtaining the Christian character, and dread to sacrifice their sinful propensities.

§ 120. *The happiness which Christians obtain through Christ in the future life.*

This subject also is placed in the New Testament in the most intimate connexion with the history of the person of Jesus Christ, and is deduced from it. He is the procurer of this happiness. This subject needs only to be briefly and summarily stated here ; since the Scripture doctrine respecting the happy and unhappy condition of men after death, will be more fully exhibited, § 147, et sq.

I. Our deliverance from Death, obtained through Christ.

Death is always represented in the New Testament as the effect and consequence of sin. Now since Christ has delivered from the consequences and punishment of sin, he must also be regarded as the cause of our deliverance from death. The resurrection of the dead, i. e. the complete restoration of the whole man, both as to soul and body, is a blessing for which the human race is indebted, according to the New Testament, to Christ; vid. John 11: 25. 1 Cor. 15: 22. The resurrection of the dead was generally believed among the Jews at the time of Christ and the Apostles; and only the Sadducees denied it. But Christianity gave to this doctrine a new support and sanction. It now became intimately connected with the religion of Jesus and with the history of his person, like every thing else relating to the deliverance and welfare of man.

(1) Christ and the apostles have the merit, which is unquestionably great, of casting new light upon the doctrine of life beyond the grave, and the future restoration of the whole man, and giving it a certainty it never had before. They exhibited this truth in such a way, that on one side it serves for the comfort and consolation of mankind, and on the other to urge powerfully to the practice of goodness and holiness in the present life; vid. Heb. 2: 15. 1 Thess. 4: 13, 18. 1 Cor. 15: 30, 57, 58. Acts 24: 14—16. Paul therefore says very truly, 2 Tim. 1: 10, that Christ is *φώτισας ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*, i. e. by his instructions he brought to light, and clearly and infallibly revealed the doctrine of a happy immortality.

(2) But this doctrine is intimately connected in the New Testament with the history of the person of Christ. According to the New Testament we are indebted for our hope of a future restoration to life by the resurrection,

(a) *To the death of Christ.* For the deliverance of man from every kind of misery, and from all the punishment of sin, and consequently from death, is always derived in the New Testament from the death of Jesus; vid. § 111. The clearest passage of this kind is Heb. 2: 14, “Christ became man in order to take away (*ἵνα καταργήσῃ*) by his death the power of him who is the author of death,

the Devil" (from whom death and every calamity is derived, since he is regarded as the author of sin, which brought death in its train; vid. 1 Cor. 15: 56). Here belongs also the passage, Rom. 5: 14—19, where Christ is compared with Adam. Adam brought death into the world by his disobedience; Christ brought in *life* by his obedience (*ὑπακοή*, willing obedience to the divine will, especially to the divine purpose, that he should suffer and die for us). The same thing is briefly expressed, 1 Cor. 15: 21, thus: "As Adam was the cause of the death of all men; so all owe it to Christ that they shall be raised at the last." This corresponds with the language v. 55, *θάνατος κατεπόθη εἰς νίκης*, *death overcome* (by him), *henceforth ceases*; and also with 2 Tim. 1: 10, *κατάργησας τὸν θάνατον*, *taking away the power of death, vanquishing it*, i. e. freeing men from it, and awaking them to eternal life. And in the Revelation of John, the victory of Christ is made to consist principally in the fact, that through him *Death ceased to be*; Rev. 21: 4, *θάνατος οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι*, *or was cast into the lake of fire*, 20: 14, i. e. was removed and able no more to hurt.

Note. The Bible mentions it as one of the blessings resulting from the work of Christ, that all mankind will be raised by him; e. g. 1 Cor. 15: 21, 22, coll. John 5: 21, sq., and consequently the wicked as well as the good. Some theologians indeed have objected to considering resurrection in the case of the impenitent as a *blessing*, and have rather regarded it as a punishment. But a great value is ascribed in the Bible to mere existence, even in the present life, where we live in the midst of so many evils and adversities. Life in itself is always more valuable than nonexistence or annihilation; although it seems that for some men it would have been better never to have been born; as Christ himself says, doubtless in the language of a current proverb, Matt. 26: 24. Now although the wicked are to be punished in the future world through their own fault, the preservation of their life does not on this account cease to be a blessing; still less is it changed itself into a punishment, by the punishments which will be consequent upon it. The ancient fathers, Athanasius, Augustine, Theodoret, Hilarius, and others understood the subject very much in this way.

(b) *To the resurrection of Christ.* Morus p. 175, § 3.

The New Testament teaches, that from the resurrection of Christ, we may and should argue the possibility and reality of our own. Was God able to raise Christ, and did he actually raise him from the dead; he is both able to raise us, and will actually do so. The resurrection of Christ is therefore a sensible confirmation of the doctrine of our res-

urrection. So Paul argues 1 Cor. 15: 12—20. In Acts 4: 2, it is said, that the *apostles taught through Jesus the resurrection of the dead*, i. e. by his example. As God raised up Christ in order to confer upon him a reward in heaven; we are to share in the same reward and happiness, and to be with Christ. We can therefore be certain of our resurrection; 1 Thess. 4: 14. 2 Cor. 4: 14. 1 Pet. 1: 21. Christ is therefore called ἀπαρχὴ νεκροποιημένων, 1 Cor. 15: 20, 23, and πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, *the first that rose*, Col. 1: 18, because he must be ἐν πᾶσι πρωτεύων. Cf. progr. “de nexu resurrectionis Jesu Christi mortuis et mortuorum,” in *Scripta varii argumenti*, N. IX.

(c) *To the more perfect condition of Christ in heaven.* Christ and the apostles every where teach, that it is the will of God, that Christ should continue and complete in heaven the great work which he commenced on earth for the restoration of the human race. He has therefore empowered Christ to raise the dead, and to hold a day of judgment, with which Christ will accomplish his great work for the good of man. He himself declares this, John 5: 21, 25—29, and represents this charge as entrusted to him by the Father. In John 11: 25, he says, ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωὴ, i. e. the cause of the resurrection and vivification of men, he to whom they are indebted for this; cf. v. 26. Paul says Rom. 14: 9, that by his death and resurrection he has shown himself to be Lord (κυριεύειν) of the dead and living; and 1 Cor. 15: 25, 26, he will conquer and disable Death, the last enemy of the human race. Cf. §§ 98, 99.

II. Our deliverance from punishment after death, and our happiness in the future world obtained through Christ.

The consequences and punishment of sin continue even into the future world. And it is there first, according to the Scriptures, that the positive punishments of sin are completely inflicted. Now Christ has not only freed us from these punishments (eternal condemnation), on certain conditions to be fulfilled by us, (vid. Rom. 5: 9. 1 Thess. 1: 10, ὁνόμενος ἡμῶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης); but we owe to him our whole welfare and blessedness in the future world (ζωὴ αἰώνιος). There the happiness begun in the present life will continue and be perfected, and every thing by which it is

now interrupted, will be removed. Besides, according to the New Testament, we may expect that God will there confer positive blessings and rewards. Paul says, 1 Thess. 5: 9, ἔθεται ἡμῶς ὁ θεός οὐκ εἰς ὀργήν, ἀλλ' εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας (the attainment of happiness) διὰ Χριστοῦ. But how do we attain this happiness through Christ?

(1) *By the doctrine of Christ.* This gives us (a) Information respecting the nature of future happiness, so far as we are now capable of understanding it; vid. 1 Tim. 1: 10. 1 Cor. xv. (b) Direction how we may obtain the possession of it. The religion of Christ derives motives to piety and godliness from the blessedness of the future world, shows us the means by which we may attain it, and prepares us for it. John 3: 16. 6: 51. 1 John 2: 25, the great end of the Christian religion (ἐπαγγελία) is to give men ζωὴ αἰώνιος. By the Christian doctrine, and obedience to it, we are made (through divine assistance) to resemble the holiness and righteousness of Christ, in this world, in order that we may hereafter be rewarded, as he is; 1 John 4: 17. 2 Thess. 2: 13, 15. 4: 14. Hence the Christian doctrine itself is called ζωὴ and ζωὴ αἰώνιος, because it shows ὁδὸν ζωῆς, John 17: 3. But,

(2) Our enjoyment of this happiness is described as principally owing to *Christ's death and subsequent exaltation.* (a) Our entire freedom from misery, and our being placed in a happy condition, is ascribed to the death of Christ (vid. No. I.), and consequently the happiness of the future state must also be a consequence of this event; Heb. 9: 15, "We obtain through the death of Christ ἐπαγγελίαν αἰωνίου κληρονομίας." 1 Thess. 5: 10, "He died for us, ἵνα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν." (b) Since Christ is exalted in heaven, he cares for the good of men. He is αἴτιος σωτηρίας αἰωνίου τοῖς ὑπακούουσιν αὐτῷ πάνσι, Heb. 5: 9, coll. 7: 25. And as he has received power from the Father to raise the dead and hold a day of judgment; he has also received charge from him to distribute rewards to the righteous and to introduce his followers into the abodes of the blessed; vid. Matt. 25: 32, sq. John 10: 28, 29, ζων ἁίωνιον δίδωμι αὐτοῖς, 17: 2. 2 Tim. 4: 18, et sq.

ARTICLE ELEVENTH.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONDITIONS OF SALVATION.

This Article, and the following, exhibit the manner in which Christians may attain to the promised happiness. The Eleventh Article treats of the conditions which the Christian doctrine prescribes to men, and which must be performed by them, if they would actually enjoy this blessedness. These conditions are *repentance* and *faith*. The Twelfth Article treats of the assistances by which God enables men to perform the prescribed conditions; or, technically speaking, *De operationibus gratiæ, sive de æconomia gratiæ*.

§ 121. *Of the Christian doctrine of FAITH, as the only condition of salvation; together with remarks respecting the salvation of the heathen and of infants.*

I. Outline of the Christian doctrine respecting faith; the origin and ground of the same.

(1) Jesus and the apostles, in the instructions which they give to adults, who are acquainted with the Christian doctrine, always insist chiefly on *faith in Jesus Christ* as the great condition of obtaining the salvation purchased by Christ. The whole happiness of the Christian (his *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωτηρία*) is derived from this single source; and the *unbeliever* (*ἀπιστήσας*) loses this happiness, and brings upon himself *misery* (*ἀπώλεια, κατάρκεις*), Mark 16: 16. Rom. 1: 17. 3: 21, 22, “The Gospel makes known the determination of God to forgive all who believe on Jesus Christ, on account of their faith (*ἐκ* or *διὰ τῆς πίστεως*). Heb. 10: 38, 39, sq.

(2) The doctrine of faith is, therefore, inseparably connected with the doctrine of the *Atonement* and of *justification*. The latter can be obtained only through faith. Therefore, cf. § 108, where the plan of this doctrine is stated.

We are led even, by natural religion to the following points: "Man must regard himself as morally imperfect, and in such a way too as to imply guilt on his own part; or, which is the same thing, he must acknowledge himself to be a sinner,—a transgressor of the divine precepts. He must acknowledge, that he ought to avoid and abhor sin, place his confidence in the mercy of God, hope for pardon and forgiveness from him; and that he ought to form and execute the serious purpose of obeying the divine precepts and living acceptably to God." This might be called the *faith of reason*. But this philosophical faith is wanting in that certainty and evidence which is necessary to tranquillize the mind; it is insufficient to satisfy those whose consciences are awakened; as we have before shown, § 108. Experience teaches that a faith of this general nature is not able to answer those feelings which rise in the inmost soul even of the best of men. There must be something *positive* and *historical*, upon which they can rely,—some express assurance from God of his forgiveness, or they will be left in the most distressing uncertainty. The greater part of the human race, in all nations, are therefore united in believing, that something must be done in order to conciliate the favor of God to sinners, and to induce him to forgive their past offences; and also that their mere reformation, and their living in the practice of virtue, imperfect as their goodness will always be, is insufficient to secure the divine forgiveness, and can afford no quieting assurance that pardon is obtained, vid. § 108. Now Christianity rejects all the means of conciliating the favor of God, in which the great body of men place their confidence, and which were common among Jews and Gentiles at the time of Christ. It regards them, as affording false grounds of peace, and as being injurious to morality; and in place of them inculcates *faith in Jesus Christ*, and the atonement made by him; and makes this, exclusive of the personal deserts of believers, the sole ground of all the benefits which they enjoy.

In this manner, the doctrine respecting the conditions of salvation is brought into the closest connexion with the other positive doctrines of Christianity, and especially with the history of the per-

son of Christ. To the greater part of mankind this scriptural faith possesses far more interest, evidence and certainty, than a merely philosophical faith can ever give. The latter must be forever attended with uncertainty, doubt, and fear of the reverse of what is hoped for. And this uncertainty and fear may become, in moments of suffering and adversity, extremely disturbing, and perhaps lead to obstinate despair. For we cannot obtain from philosophy any express assurance of the will of God relative to our forgiveness. Again: the scriptural account of faith in Christ, as the only condition of salvation, excludes wholly all the false motives to duty which are so injurious to true morality. The essentials of the scriptural doctrine on this point, and their connexion with each other, may be clearly seen in the following statement. The Christian should strive after the greatest possible moral perfection (likeness to God). This effort should result from willing *obedience* to God, and this again from thankful *love* to God, and *confidence* in him, and not from slavish fear of punishment, 1 John 4: 18, 19. But this love, this grateful confidence, cannot exist, unless man is convinced, that God is graciously disposed towards him, and will forgive his sins. God does not forgive sins, however, on account of good works, self-inflictions, sacrifices, etc.; but on account of Christ; § 108. We must, therefore, believe that Christ, by his death, has procured forgiveness and salvation. But would we come to the actual enjoyment of the promised forgiveness, we are under indispensable obligations to live henceforward in the strictest observance of the divine commands from grateful love to God and to Christ. Consequently we must become familiarly acquainted with the divine precepts and must regulate our whole conduct according to them; and how to do this, we are fully taught in *the Christian doctrine*. And thus *faith* as much involves our *doing* the divine will, as it does our knowing it.

The personal enjoyment and possession of forgiveness and saving grace, and of the whole sum of Christian blessedness which God has promised to bestow, is called *applicatio gratiæ*, and the condition on which we obtain these blessings (*conditio gratiæ*), is *faith*. Vid. Morus p. 197, sq. §§ 1, 2. Those who enjoy these blessings are called in the Scriptures by different names, vid. Morus, p. 197, n. 3. Cf. Töllner, Wahre Gründe warum Gott den Gläubigen an Christum will, in his "Vermischte Aufsätze," Th. II. St. 2.

II. On the salvation of heathen and of children.

(1) When treating of the conditions of salvation established in the Christian scheme, we speak in reference to *Christians*, i. e. those who have opportunity and capacity to become acquainted with Christianity, and to convince themselves of its truth; without undertaking to say, what means for attaining salvation God may give those who are ignorant of Christianity, or who remain unconvinced of its truth through unintentional mistake, and without criminality on their part. God is not limited to one single method, which he is compelled to employ equally at all times and among all men. The Bible says, indeed, that God will punish the heathen on account of their sins; not, however, because they did not believe in Jesus Christ, if this was not their fault, but because they did not act agreeably to the knowledge which they possessed, and the law of nature with which they were acquainted; Rom. 1: 21, sq. Ephes. 2: 1, 2. The Holy Scriptures, therefore, never regard the heathen merely as such, as excluded from salvation. Such passages as Mark 16: 16, do not relate to the heathen, who are innocently ignorant of the Gospel. The word ἀπιστεῖν does not signify *not to believe*, but to *disbelieve*, and always implies guilt. The conclusion sometimes drawn from such passages is as improper, as it would be to conclude from 2 Thess. 3: 10, that the child, and the infirm man, should be left to perish by hunger; as Heilmann well observes. No one will ever be condemned for guiltless ignorance, or for unintentional and innocent mistake; but only for guilty rejection and contempt of the truth, or for living contrary to the truth when once known. What Mark expresses by ἀπιστεῖν, John expresses by μὴ πιστεύειν (*to be unbelieving*), John 3: 18. 12: 47, 48; and these two modes of expression are synonymous, vid. John 3: 36. Hence ἀπιστία and ἀπειθεία were frequently interchanged as synonymous, Rom. 3: 3. 11: 20, 23, 30. Now the ἀπειθοῦντες or ἀπιστοῦντες are (a) *the unbelieving*, those who do not receive the words and declarations of another as true, who do not give them credit; (b) *the disobedient, obstinate (contumaces)*; in which sense Xenophon and other classical writers use the word ἀπιστεῖν. Now the terms, ἀπειθεῖν Χριστῷ, ἀπιστεῖν, μὴ πιστεύειν, ἀθετεῖν Χριστόν, are used in the New Testament, to designate those who are disobe-

ent to Christ, and do not follow his precepts, always implying guilt on their part.—This is done in two ways; (α) by despising and rejecting Christianity, when it is once made known, or when opportunity is given for understanding and examining it, Rom. 3: 3. 2 Cor. 4: 11; (β) by living in opposition to Christian truth when it is understood and embraced, and by neglecting its precepts, vid. Tit. 1: 16. In both of these cases there is *guilt*; and hence punishment (*κατάκρισις*) ensues. The word *unbelief*, therefore, often designates at the same time these two kinds of guilt; e. g. Mark 16: 16. John 3: 18—21. 12: 47, 48.

Those heathen, now, who do not belong to one or the other of these classes, are not *disbelievers*, though they may *not believe* in Christ. Upon such, therefore, condemnation is not pronounced in these passages. They are not indeed *obedient* to Christ, nor yet *disobedient*. Thus one who is not the subject of a certain king, may not indeed be obedient to his laws, either because he is ignorant of them, or not bound in duty to obey them; but he cannot on this account be called *disobedient*. Disobedience always presupposes an obligation to obedience.

(2) God has not seen good, as yet, to bring all nations to the knowledge of Christianity. And, little capable as we are of understanding the plan of God in this respect, we ought not to conclude from this circumstance, that the Christian revelation is unnecessary and may easily be dispensed with. It has pleased God to leave many nations for thousands of years in a barbarous and savage state. But can we conclude from this fact, that intellectual cultivation and moral improvement, are superfluous and useless, and therefore missions are unnecessary? Nor, on the other hand, can we conclude from this circumstance, that God cannot save the heathen, because they have not enjoyed the light of Christian revelation. Human happiness has as many degrees and gradations, as human cultivation and refinement of manners; and all men are not capable of one and the same degree. They cannot all, therefore, be treated by God in the same manner. One thing may be indispensable to the happiness of some persons, and of some nations; while to others the same thing is quite superfluous, because they are as yet incapable of enjoying the happiness arising from it. It is not said in direct words in the New Testament, *that God will make the heathen eternally happy*. If this were said, there are many who would per-

vert it. But it is expressly asserted, that God does not demand more from any one, than he is able, with his knowledge and abilities, to perform, Luke 12: 48, sq; and also, that he who faithfully serves God according to the knowledge and means which he enjoys, and does what he considers to be his duty, is acceptable to him, Acts 10: 35, cf. Morus, p. 129, n. 9. According to the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, God will have reference in determining the character and conditions of men to the knowledge they have had, the dispositions they have cherished, and the actions they have performed. We may confidently expect from the goodness of God, that since he has heretofore given to so many nations only the light of nature, he will not make them miserable for the want of that higher knowledge of which they are innocently destitute. And since there is a future life, we may trust that he will there lead them to that higher degree of happiness and clearness of knowledge which they did not attain in this life, †because, without fault of their own, they were here incapable of receiving it. To such a dispensation in the future world, there is at least an allusion in Rev. 22: 2, *in the tree of life, by the river of life, whose leaves serve εἰς θεραπείαν τῶν ἔθνων.*

The great body of the Jews, from the earliest ages, denied salvation to the heathen, on the principle: *extra ecclesiam non dari salutem*. But this is entirely opposite both to the Old Testament and to the spirit of Christianity. Even Mahommed did not go to this degree of exclusiveness. Nor did the more ancient Grecian fathers deny salvation to the heathen; although they philosophized about it after their manner. E. g. Justin the Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, held that the λόγος exerted an agency upon the heathen by means of reason; and that the heathen philosophers were called, justified and saved by philosophy. But afterwards, especially after the third century, when the false Jewish notions respecting the Church (§ 134) were introduced into the West, and the maxim was adopted, *Extra ecclesiam non dari salutem* (which was the case after the age of Augustine), they then began to deny the salvation of the heathen; though there were always some who judged more favorably. Thus Zwingli, Curio, and others, believed that God would pardon the heathen on account of Christ, although, in this life, they had no knowledge of his merits. Cf. the historical account in Beykert's Diss. "de salute gentium," Strassburg,

1777, and a short statement of the opinions of others in Morus, pp. 128, 129, where he justly recommends to our imitation the exemplary modesty of the Apostles when speaking on this point. The whole subject was investigated anew on occasion of the violent attack which Hofstede, a preacher in Holland, made upon the *Belisaire* of Marmontel. This gave rise to Eberhard's "Apologie des Socrates." Cf. also Töllner, *Beweis dass Gott die Menschen auch durch seine Offenbarung in der Natur zur Seligkeit führe*, Züllichau, 1766, 8vo. Many modern writers have treated this subject in such a way, as to lead to a feeling of indifference towards Christianity; but this result need not be feared from the scriptural representation here given.

(3) We must apply these same principles to the subject of the *salvation of Infants*. None have ever really doubted respecting the salvation of those, who have died in infancy, before they attained to the full use of their understanding. For since there is a future life, we may expect with certainty, that God will make such provision there, that both children in the literal sense, and those who are children in understanding and knowledge, will be able to obtain what they were here deprived of, without their own fault; and that in his goodness, wisdom, and justice, he will bestow upon them that degree of happiness of which they are capable.

Theologians have pursued two different methods in treating of this subject.

(a) Some are content with saying, that God will pardon and save infants on account of the merits of Christ, which extend to all, although they may not have believed in Christ during their life time; and that their being born with natural depravity will not harm them, because they themselves are not to blame for it. These writers refer to Rom. 5: 15—17 for an analogous proceeding. This is the most simple and the safest view.

(b) Others, misunderstanding the passage, Mark 16: 16, suppose that faith in Christ is an indispensable requisite for salvation in all men; and have therefore (together with some schoolmen) embraced the doctrine of a *faith of infants*, which they have variously explained and described, as *fides præsumpta, implicita, per baptismum sine verbo* (some say, *sine cognitione*) *infusa; talis affectio in infante qualis deo placet*. The schoolmen describe it as *dispositio ad justitiam*. But none of them succeed in conveying any intelligi-

ble idea. Nothing is said in the New Testament about such a faith. Faith always presupposes *knowledge*, and power to exercise the understanding. Now since children have neither of these requisites, faith cannot be ascribed to them; nor indeed *disbelief*, unless the word is used very improperly. The mere *want of faith* is not *damnable*; but *unbelief* only, or the guilty destitution of faith. Those who have adopted this view, have thus been compelled, (as appears from the preceding remarks,) to vary the idea which is uniformly attached to the word *faith* when adults are referred to, as soon as they speak of children, and to call something in them by this name, which is nowhere else so denominated. The passage, Matt. 18: 6, does not bear upon this point, since the disciples of Christ are there meant. Cf. the Article on Baptism, § 142, and Morus p. 249. From the words of Christ, however, Matt. 19: 14, "Of such is the kingdom of God," it is clear, that he considers *children* as belonging to his kingdom. And this is enough.

§ 122. *Of the various significations of the word, faith, as used in the Bible; some of the principal passages relating to faith; the parts of which faith is made up; and some of the most important theological divisions of faith.*

I. Significations of *πίστις*; and explanation of the principal texts relative to faith.

The terms, *faith, the faithful*, etc. frequently occur in the religious dialect even of the Hebrews. They were originally taken from the language of common life, and transferred into the religious phraseology of the Jews, where they express various nearly related ideas. From this Jewish dialect, Christ and the apostles borrowed these terms. The Hebrew words אֱמוּנָה, אֱמִינָה, אֱמִינָה, were translated by the Hellenistic Jews (e. g. the LXX.) by the words πιστεύειν, πίστις, and were also rendered in the same way by Christ and his apostles.

אֱמִינָה primarily signifies, *to be firm*; and then *to be certain, sure, confident*. Hence אֱמוּנָה signifies, as *πίστις* does, aside from its religious use, *truth, faith, integrity, honor, proof* (Acts 17:

31), and *conviction* (Rom. 14: 23). When *things* are spoken of, יִשְׁמְרֵם and *πιστεύειν* signify *to hold them* (whatever they are, events, doctrines, laws) *as certain*; when *persons* are spoken of, they signify, *to trust in them, to rely on their words, declarations, works*. These words were used in the same sense, in reference to persons and things, in the language of common life among the Jews. In Hebrew they were construed with the particles, בְּ or עַל. Hence in the Septuagint and in the New Testament, *πιστεύειν* is construed with *εἰς* and *ἐν*, frequently too, as in pure Greek, with the dative; e. g. *εἰς* or *ἐν Χριστῷ*, *τῷ Χριστῷ*, *εὐαγγελίῳ*, etc. The term occurs for the first time in the religious sense, in reference to Abraham, Gen. 15: 6, *ἐπίστευσεν θεῷ*, i. e. considered his promise as sure, relied on it, and acted accordingly. It frequently occurs afterwards in the Old Testament, e. g. Ex. 14: 31. Ps. 78: 22, 32, etc.

To believe, therefore, (a) when commands, promises, doctrines, events, are spoken of, signifies, *to consider and regard them as fixed and certain*; (b) when God is spoken of, it denotes our whole duty to him, *love, confidence, and obedience to his commandments*, because every thing which comes from him is certain and infallible; (c) when prophets and the messengers of God are spoken of, *to believe them*, means *to receive and obey what they make known, as of divine origin and infallibly certain*. This term is employed in the Koran in the same way. These main ideas are differently modified, according to the different objects which are received by us as certain. And hence we can easily derive the strictly religious senses, in which this word is used in the New Testament.

(1) *Πίστις* frequently signifies *religion itself*, and the particular doctrines of which it consists (*fides, quæ creditur*, or *fides objectiva*); like *Iman*, in the Koran, and אֱמֶנָה in the Talmud. It is thus used for *Christianity* in general, Jude vs. 3, 20, *ἀγνωστῇ πίστει*, Gal. 3: 23. Also in the phrases *ἐπακοὴ πίστεως*, *fides apostolica, nicæna*, etc. *Νόμος πίστεως*, is the doctrine which requires faith.

(2) It is more frequently used *subjectively*, denoting the approbation which one gives to a teacher, and the obedience which he yields to his instructions, after being convinced of the truth of his doctrine, and the divinity of his mission. This approbation is called in the schools, *fides qua creditur*. Thus John 5: 46, *πιστεύειν Μωϋσῇ*, Matt. 21: 25, 32, *Ἰωάννῃ*. When used in the Gospels in

reference to Jesus, it denotes the acknowledgment of him, and obedience to him, sometimes as a prophet, and indeed the greatest messenger of heaven ; and sometimes, as Messiah. Hence Christians are called *πιστεύοντες, πιστοί*. Synonymous with *πιστεύειν* are *πίθεσθαι, ὁμολογεῖν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, εἶναι Χριστοῦ* or *ἐν Χριστῷ, Κύριον εἰπεῖν Ἰησοῦν, ἐπικαλεῖν ὄνομα Χριστοῦ*. The opposite terms are *ἄπιστεῖν, ἀπειθεῖν, μὴ ὑπακούειν εὐαγγελίῳ*. Closely connected with this is,

(3) The sense, *trust, confidence, πεποιθήσις*, which arises from the conviction of the truth and divinity of a doctrine, and is manifested in different ways.

(a) When one is convinced of the power and goodness of another, and therefore confidently hopes for help and assistance at his hand, and this not only because he is *able*, but also *willing* to help and befriend him. This use is common in profane writings, in Hebrew (פִּזְּזָה and מִיָּדָה), in the Septuagint, and in the New Testament. Is. 28: 16. Matt. 19: 2, etc. This confidence is therefore sometimes expressed by the word *ἐλπίς*, Rom. 5: 5, by *ἐλπίζειν*, with *ἐν* and *εἰς*, and by other similar terms. For the same reason, the confidence one may feel, that God will enable him in an extraordinary manner to work a miracle, is called *πίστις*, e. g. Matt. 17: 20. Acts 6: 5, 8. 1 Cor. 13: 2. This faith is technically called, *fides miraculosa, the faith of miracles*.

(b) When one is convinced, that another will do what he says (is veracious and faithful), he depends entirely on his promises and certainly expects their fulfilment in every case, and, from this confidence, complies with every thing which the other requires. Thus Abraham's faith in God is described ; and thus the terms *πιστεύειν θεῷ* and *λόγῳ θεοῦ*, are often used, Ps. 106: 12. Hab. 2: 1.

From this wider meaning has arisen the proper Christian sense of *saving faith*, which Paul frequently uses in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, where he controverts the mistake of the meritoriousness of observing the divine law. Here *πιστεύειν Χριστῷ* and *πίστις* denote the firm persuasion, that we owe our whole spiritual welfare to Christ, or to the free, unmerited mercy of God on Christ's account, and our trust in God and Christ arising from hence, Gal. 2: 16. 3: 6. Rom. 4: 16, sq. This kind of Christian faith is compared with that of Abraham. He confided in God in the same manner, according to the measure of his knowledge. He relied on the promise (*ἐπαγγελία*, Rom. 4: 20) of God respecting a

numerous offspring, and on the other great promises connected with this (although he saw the good, as Paul says, only *πόρρωθεν*), without doubting (*οὐ διεκρίθη*, and *πληροφορηθείς*, firmly convinced), though the thing promised was apparently improbable (*παρ' ἐλπίδα*, v. 18). Now as Abraham confided in the promise of God (*ἐπίστευσε θεῷ*), Christians should also confide in the promise of God and Christ, and look to God for salvation and blessedness in this life and the life to come, in and through Christ, and not on their own account, or on the ground of their own merit, of which they have nothing to boast. This is what theologians call *justifying* and *saving* faith.

The two former senses of faith are not excluded from this third signification; but are always presupposed and included in it. One who would obtain forgiveness through faith in Christ, must (*a*) have an acquaintance with the Christian religion, and a persuasion of its truth; he must regard it as of divine authority, and embrace it with all his heart; and (*b*) he must actually rely on the divine promises contained in this religion, and prove the reality of his confidence by his feelings and actions. The latter sense springs out of the former. How could Abraham have confided in God, if he had been destitute of the knowledge of God, of his attributes, and promises? Hence when Paul would give a complete description of true Christian faith; he often comprises both these ideas quite distinctly under the word *πίστις*, Rom. III. iv. and James 2: 19—24, where *πιστεύειν* refers sometimes to *knowledge* and the *assent of the understanding*, and sometimes to the *confidence* which springs from them.

Note. The passage Heb. 11: 1, has always been considered one of the most important with regard to the subject of faith, and so indeed it should be, though its sense has been frequently perverted. The meaning of this passage needs to be distinctly exhibited. Paul here speaks of faith, or confidence in the divine promises or declarations, *in general*, especially of that exercised in sufferings and persecutions, (in order to preserve Christians from apostasy,) not exclusive, however, of the peculiar saving faith of the Christian, as he also hopes to obtain forgiveness and salvation through Christ. This is taught by the examples of Rahab, Samson, Jephthah, and others, which are mentioned. Paul does not undertake to give a logical definition of faith; but only distinctly to describe its characteristics, without which one cannot lay claim to the possession of faith. But this is the very reason, why the passage is so worthy of note, and so practically useful. For it shows what is requisite to faith in

general, according to Paul's ideas of it, and what traits it must always possess, however different may be the objects to which it is directed. A person shows his faith, by being firmly and unhesitatingly convinced, on the mere testimony of God, (1) with respect to things, which are not actually present with us, and in our possession (*ἐλπιδόμενα*), e. g. future deliverance, future blessedness, promised by God, of whatever kind it may be, temporal or spiritual; (2) with respect to things beyond the reach of our senses (*οὐ βλέπόμενα*). *ὑπόστασις* and *ἔλεγχος* are synonymous in this passage, and signify *firma persuasio*. Paul himself explains his meaning in v. 6: the pious man must believe that God exists (although he does not see him); and that he will reward his worshippers (although the reward is not immediate). Here therefore both *knowledge* and *assent* to the truth, and the *confidence* which is the result of them, are requisite, in order to the existence of faith in the wider sense in which it is here used.

II. Theological divisions of faith; and the parts of which it is composed.

(1) The Bible frequently says respecting one who professes Christianity, *that he has faith in Christ*. Vid. No. I. But this faith is two-fold. One may understand and externally profess the doctrines of Christianity, without obeying them, or feeling their transforming influence upon his heart; or he may apply them, according to their design, to the improvement of his heart and the sanctification of his dispositions; in short, he may do all that God requires of him in the Christian doctrine. The faith of the former is called *fides externa, historica, or theoretica*; that of the latter, *fides interna, habitualis, salvifica* (*salutary, saving, σωτήριος*). The former kind of faith, disconnected with the latter, is sometimes called *dead faith*, because it is *ineffectual*, and contributes nothing to our improvement or salvation. The phrase is taken from James 2: 17, 20, 26. The latter is called *living, viva, actiosa*, because it exerts a salutary influence in promoting our happiness and true welfare.

Christian faith, in its whole extent, is therefore, a conviction of the truth and divinity of the Christian scheme of salvation, and a conduct conformed to this conviction. One who believes the Christian religion in such a way as to act in accordance with it, and who allows his affections to be governed by his belief, is a true Christian, and possesses *fides salvifica*. As to one who willingly and cheerfully follows the commandments of God and Christ, and sedulously

conducts himself by the rules which they have prescribed, the Bible says, either that *he is obedient to God and Christ*, or *he believes in them*. Hence these two terms are synonymous; Morus p. 201, n.

3. The definition therefore which Crusius gives in the passage before cited, is just: *saving faith is a cordial approval of, and compliance with the divine plan of salvation*.

(2) *On the different parts of which faith consists.*

Faith is made up of different parts, all of which however must belong to it, in order to its being perfect. The different objects of Christian instruction, to which faith refers, form the ground of this division. There is a faith in events, in doctrines, commands, and promises. These objects will be particularly considered in the following Section. Now Christian faith, in a general view, embracing all these objects, is considered by theologians as consisting of three parts, *knowledge, assent, and trust or confidence* (*notitia, assensus, fiducia*), which will now be considered. Whenever entire Christian faith is spoken of, as comprehending all the objects just mentioned, this division is perfectly applicable. But all these parts do not belong to Christian faith as directed to each particular object. They all belong only to the *faith in promises*. *Knowledge* and *assent* merely, are requisite to the faith in *events* and *doctrines*; and a will and inclination to obey, to faith in *the divine commands*. To avoid this inconvenience, faith might be made to consist in two particulars, *knowledge*, and a *disposition* of heart correspondent to this knowledge, (*ἐπίγνωσις καὶ αἰσθησις*, Phil. 1: 9), according to which one would be inclined to obey the divine commands and confide in the divine promises. Many theologians prefer this division. But in what remains, we shall follow the common three-fold division.

(a) *Knowledge of the subject to be believed*, is, from the very nature of the case, an essential part of faith, of whatever kind it may be. Paul asks, *How can men believe, if they are not instructed?* (if they do not possess knowledge of the things to be believed), Rom. 10: 14. This knowledge cannot indeed, in every case, be equally thorough and comprehensive. In many of the early Christians it was at first very general, and confined, as indeed it is often still, to some of the great, elementary truths. But however limited and imperfect this knowledge may be, it always implies certainty, and must amount to a *firm conviction*; otherwise from the very na-

ture of the human mind, it can produce no effect on the will, and it ceases to be *faith*. For we believe only that of which we are certain. Cf. the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *ἔλεγχος*, Heb. 11: 1, and *πληροφύρεισθαι*, Rom. 4: 21, where it is contrasted with *doubting*; also James 1: 6. But this conviction should be effected by reasons which enlighten the understanding, by instruction intelligible to the human mind; not by authoritative and compulsory decisions. The mere reception of a doctrine on the word or command of another, without being ourselves convinced of its truth, is not *faith*, but *credulity*. Christ and his apostles therefore prescribe *instruction* (*κηρύσσειν*), and make faith a result or effect of instruction; e. g. Mark 16: 16. And Paul derives *πίστις* from *ἀκοή*, Rom. 10: 17, etc. From these remarks we can easily see, how far to admit the *fides implicita* of the schoolmen. They mean by this, faith in such doctrines as we do not understand, and of which we are not convinced by reason, but must receive on the mere word and authority of the church. From these remarks, too, we can easily form an opinion respecting the *faith of children*, for which some contend. Vid. § 120, ad finem.

(b) *Assent*. This is divided into *general* (*assensus generalis*), by which is meant the general reception of known truth as credible and sure; and into *particular* (*assensus specialis*), by which is meant, the special application of certain general truths of the Christian doctrine to one's self; e. g. Christ died for men, and also for me. It is this latter kind, which more frequently produces salutary feelings and emotions in the soul. Vid. the examples, Rom. 8: 31—39. 1 Tim. 1: 15, 16. Morus. p. 201, § 6. This is commonly expressed in the New Testament by *δέχεσθαι* and *παραδέχεσθαι*, as Mark 4: 20, where *ἀκούειν* implies *the knowledge* of the truth, *παραδέχεσθαι*, *assent* to it, from whence the result *καρποφορεῖν*. 1 Thess. 2: 13, where *παραλαμβάνειν λόγον*, merely *to hear instruction*, is distinguished from *δέχεσθαι*. 1 Cor. 2: 14, the carnal man, obedient only to his passions, does not assent (*δέχεσθαι*) to the divine doctrine, etc.

Although assent should always be connected with the knowledge of the truth, because the will should be governed by the understanding; yet we find that it is often withheld from truths which cannot be doubted, from the prevalence of prejudice or passion. So it was with the contemporaries of Jesus in Pales-

tine. They could not deny that the miracles which he wrought were real miracles, and yet they did not yield him their assent. Like to these are all who at the present day, from love to sin, refuse obedience to the truth which they know. Such persons commonly endeavour to persuade themselves and others, that the cause of their unbelief has some other ground besides their own will; hence they give ready credit to every semblance of reason for doubting the truth and divinity of Christianity.

If this assent, therefore, is genuine, it must act on the heart of man. The will must be controlled and governed by the truths which the understanding acknowledges and embraces as true. Otherwise this assent resembles that which, according to James 2: 19, we allow even to devils. Cf. James 1: 22. Luke 8: 13, and Heb. 4: 2.

It will be understood, of course, that this assent has different degrees; respecting which we shall say more hereafter.

(c) *Trust or confidence.* Knowledge and assent become, in respect to the divine promises given to Christians, *confidence*, i. e. a firm conviction that the promises given by God will surely be fulfilled. Morus p. 202, n. 2, justly says, "that to the assent of the understanding, there must be added a *trust* in that grace (of God) *by which* one conducts himself conformably to this gracious promise." All the three parts, therefore, of which faith consists, are comprised in that faith which relates to the divine promises; while, from the very nature of the case, only knowledge and assent belong to the faith relating to events, doctrines, and commands. Here on the contrary from the very nature of the subject, all the three parts must consist together. This state of mind in Christians, is called in the New Testament *πεποίθησις, παρόρρησία, ἐλπίς, κ. τ. λ.* Ephes. 3: 12. Heb. 3: 6. 1 John 2: 28.

Note. *On the method pursued by Jesus and the apostles in teaching the doctrines of faith.* They do not confine themselves merely to enlightening the understanding (*διδάσκειν*); but in connexion with this, they would always have an appeal made to the heart (*παρακαλεῖν*). So 2 Tim. 4: 2. 1 Tim. 4: 13. 2 Cor. 5: 20, etc. They always employ the effect produced in the understanding by truth, to move and excite the affections of their hearers or readers. Thus their instruction is always *perfectly practical*. The beginning must indeed be always made, by informing the understanding. For how can a man believe or perform any thing, with which he is unacquainted? vid. Rom. 10: 14. But the Christian teacher, who is content, as is often the case, with giving

lifeless instruction to the understanding, and who supposes that the approval of the affections will follow of course, betrays great ignorance of human nature. For experience proves, that the state of the heart exerts a great influence on the attention paid to truth, and on the whole activity of the understanding. If the heart is wanting in love for the truth, the understanding will be very slow in coming to a clear knowledge, just discernment, and proper estimation of it; and the reverse. According to the method of Christ and his apostles, therefore, which is adapted to the very nature of the human soul, the teacher who labors to promote the conviction and conversion of men, must *begin at the very outset* by inculcating the most clear, practical truths, in order that the heart may first become favorably disposed to the truth, and that the understanding may thus become more susceptible of what is taught. He must then employ again the truths, which he has thus communicated, to excite and move the affections. And whatever knowledge is conveyed to the mind, should always be so directed by the Christian teacher, as to excite and move the affections.

§ 123. *Of the different objects of Christian doctrine to which faith refers; and the relation of faith to the same.*

These different objects were enumerated, § 122, II. 2, and will now be separately considered.

The truths of the Christian religion, which faith embraces, may be reduced to the following classes.

I. Doctrines, and historical facts.

Historical facts are here classed with doctrines, because the Christian religion is founded on facts; such, for example, as that Christ died, rose again, etc. The firm conviction that these doctrines or events are true, is called, with regard to the former, *fides dogmatica*, with regard to the latter, *fides historica* (in the more limited sense). For examples of the former kind, vid. Heb. 11: 2, sq.; of the latter kind, Rom. 10: 9, 10. John 20: 29. 1 Cor. 15: 3. The Apostles always placed the doctrines of Christianity in the most intimate connexion with the person and whole history of Christ, and in this way gave general truths, such as the paternal love of God, and his readiness to forgive, the authority of positive Christian doctrines; vid.

Art. x. Christ and the apostles teach no Christianity independent of the person and history of Jesus Christ. Their whole system is founded on the fact, that Christ is the great Messenger promised by God, and that life everlasting may be obtained through faith in him ; and to these truths they constantly refer ; John 20: 31. To extend and perpetuate the knowledge of these facts, all the gospels were written, and all the apostles labored in their oral and written instructions. As soon as the doctrines, laws, and promises of Christianity are separated from the history of Christ, they lose that *positive* sanction, which they must have, in order to answer the demands of the great mass of mankind. The apostles therefore, always built their instructions on the history of Christ ; cf. 1 Cor. 15: 2, 3, 14. And the teacher, who regards the directions and example of Christ and of the early Christian teachers, and who is convinced of the importance of these peculiar doctrines of Christianity, will follow their example in this respect, that instead of withholding these doctrines from the youth whom he is called to instruct, he will place them before their minds in a manner adapted to their comprehension. And he must disapprove the course of some, who confine their instructions to the truths of natural religion. But even supposing that the teacher should doubt in his own mind respecting the importance of these peculiar Christian doctrines, he ought to know, from the mere principles of human nature, that the dry exhibition of the truths of reason, without the vehicle of history, is ill adapted for the instruction of the common people and of the young. He ought to know too, that there is no history which can be used to more advantage for the purpose of rendering the great truths of religion evident, impressive, and practical, than the history of Christ. In neglecting this method, or objecting to it, he has considered only one side of the subject, and while he supposes he is proceeding very philosophically, his conduct is, in fact, exceedingly otherwise. Happy the teacher, who knows from his own experience the salutary efficacy of the positive doctrines of Christianity ! Supposing him, however, not to have this experience, he ought, for the reasons above given, to adopt this most reasonable method of instruction. Cf. Müller, Vom christlichen Religionsunterrichte, Winterthur, 1809, 8vo.

But in order that the general doctrines of Christianity may exert an influence on any one's feelings and dispositions, he must ex-

ercise the *assensio specialis* (§ 122, II.), i. e. he must be convinced of the applicability of these doctrines to himself; he must appropriate and apply them to himself; he must feel, for example, that Christ died not only for all men, but also for him. For our confidence in the divine promises given through Christ and on his account, must depend on our conviction, that they relate personally to ourselves,—that they are given to us. To produce this conviction, should be the great object of the teacher. For religion should not be so much the concern of the head, as the interest of the heart.

II. The divine promises.

The divine promises constitute a very important part of the Christian doctrine. The faith in them which is required of us as Christians, has not so much respect to the promises of *temporal* good, as to those of spiritual and *eternal* good, which we may obtain through Christ and on his account. The following particulars may be noticed with respect to this faith: viz.

(1) True faith in the divine promises, consists in a confident and undoubting hope, that God will fulfil them, and will actually bestow upon us the good which he has promised. All the three parts of which faith consists, (knowledge, assent, and confidence, Rom. 4: 16) belong to this kind, § 122. Paul illustrates the nature of this kind of faith by the example of Abraham, Rom. 4: 20. Gal. 3: 8, 16. Abraham had great promises made to him (*ἐπαγγελίαι*), the fulfillment of which, at the time they were given, was quite improbable; and yet he maintained a firm faith. We may mention here the examples of the faith of the Israelites, John 3: 14, coll. Num. xxi., and Heb. 4: 1. In the last cited passage, faith in *Christian* promises is not, indeed, the particular subject of discourse. But all which is true of faith in other promises of divine favors, is also true of faith in *Christian* promises. The only difference in the two cases, is the difference of the objects upon which faith fixes. The signs and characteristics of it are the same; vid. Heb. 11: 1 (§ 122, ad finem). Hence Paul calls all who believe in the divine promises (*οἱ ἐκ πίστεως*), *Abraham's children*; i. e. like him and capable of a similar reward.

(2) The promises given to Christians, as such, have all reference to *Christ*; Morus p. 203, § 7. They are placed in the most inti-

mate connexion with his person and history. Christ is therefore always described as the ground of our faith (*fundamentum fidei*). We are taught every where, that Christ died for us, that on his account God remits the punishment of sin, and bestows upon us everlasting happiness. It is in *these* divine promises that we are required to believe; i. e. we must be persuaded that God will fulfil them for us; vid. Rom. 3: 15. 8: 12, 17. 4: 24. Theologians call this kind of faith, or this firm conviction that God will perform his promises to *us*, and for Christ's sake be gracious to us, the *application* or *laying hold* (apprehensionem) of the *merits of Christ*. Both the theory itself and this term, rest upon the authority of the New Testament, although the term, παραλαμβάνειν Χριστόν in Col. 2: 6, signifies *to be informed respecting Christ and his religion, to hear Christian doctrines*. This idea is commonly denoted by the terms, πιστεύειν τῇ λογῇ τοῦ σταυροῦ, εἰς ὑψωθέντα, κ. τ. λ. Vid. Morus p. 203, n. 1. But in John 1: 12, the term λαμβάνειν Χριστόν is used to denote this *self-applying faith*, for it is directly explained by the term πιστεύειν.

(3) The *result* of this confident faith in the divine promises, is the possession or enjoyment of the promised good, or the reward. God is not only able to perform his promises; he is likewise *true* and *infallible*. But he never makes promises to men on the ground of their desert; for they have none; but all his promises are *undeserved*. He gives them, indeed, on condition of *faith* (διὰ πίστεως), Rom. 4: 4, 16; but yet δωρεάν and κατὰ χάριν, and not as ὀφείλημα. This truth is thus expressed in the same connexion (v. 3); a man's observing the divine law cannot be imputed to him as a merit, but faith only λογίζεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην. Cf. Gen. 15: 6. For obedience to the divine law, is what we *owe*. Nor can we find any where, even in the greatest saint, an obedience so perfect as to satisfy conscience. Now since Christians are to have good bestowed upon them through Christ, and on account of faith in the divine promises; and since this good is commenced in the removal of punishment, or the forgiveness of sin (*justification, pardon*); this faith is called *justifying* (*justificam*); as Paul says, in the passage cited, δικαιούμενοι δωρεάν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. Paul illustrates this by the example of Abraham. His faith in the divine promises was imputed to him by God as a merit; i. e. he was rewarded on account of his faith. The promises made to him of a favored posterity, and the

possession of Canaan, were fulfilled to him, as a reward. In Heb. 11: 31, Paul illustrates this by the example of Rahab. Her faith (a firm conviction that the God of the Israelites is omnipotent, and would fulfil his promises to the Israelites, and give them the land of Canaan,) was the occasion of her being *pardoned*, and not perishing with the rest of the Canaanites, οὐ συναπόλετο τοῖς ἀπειθήσασιν, or as James says (2: 25), ἐδικαιώθη. In this case, indeed, the object of faith, is different from the object of Christian faith. But the result (reward) is the same; and the *characteristics* of it are the same. In the case of Rahab, the good bestowed was earthly and temporal; in the other, spiritual and eternal.

III. The divine laws or precepts.

Since *to believe*, in the large sense, is the same as to receive and obey the Christian doctrine in *all its parts*; its *laws and rules* of action must be as perfectly acknowledged and received, as its *promises*.

(1) *Statement of the doctrine of the New Testament on this subject.* One who believes the divine promises, receives the good promised, on account of his faith; but it is not optional with him to receive this part only of the Christian doctrine, and to refuse obedience to the laws which it prescribes. No one can say, *I will hold fast to the promises, and leave the observance of the law to others.* These two things cannot be separated; and they are both implied in *believing in Christ or the gospel.* Christ and the apostles everywhere teach, that the observance of the precepts of Christianity, or holiness, cannot be separated from faith in Christ. Obedience is the fruit of faith. Matt. 7: 21, "He only who *does the will* of my Father, can enter into the kingdom of heaven." John 15: 14. Luke 6: 46—49. 1 John 2: 3—6, which is the most decisive text. Paul expresses himself in the same manner on this subject, Gal. 5: 6. Ephes. 4: 22, and here certainly he does not contradict James. The latter is very explicit on this subject, especially in the second chapter of his Epistle, where he remonstrates against the perversions of the doctrine of faith, as if a mere knowledge and cold assent to the truth, a dead faith in Christ, disconnected with the practice of holiness, could be sufficient.

This disposition of the Christian, to live in entire conformity with

the precepts of the Christian doctrine, is called *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, Rom. 8: 6, 7, 18, i. e. the renewed temper produced by God, by means of Christianity,—the holiness, love, and zeal for virtue produced in the Christian by the Holy Spirit. It is opposed to *φρόνημα σαρκός*, i. e. the disposition to live according to sinful propensities. This disposition is every where ascribed to God, or to the Holy Spirit, as the author of *Christianity*, the guide of the pious, and the promoter of all Christian perfection. In Rom. 8: 1, this state is described by the phrase *περιπατεῖν κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and in v. 9, by *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, a Christian state of mind, a disposition like that of Christ, and for which we are indebted to his assistance and instructions. In 1 John 3: 24, the same term is used. In Gal. 5: 22, the term *καρπὸς πνεύματος* is used, denoting Christian virtues, actions proceeding from a heart renewed by the Holy Spirit, through the influence of Christianity. In Rom. 6: 6, etc. this character is called, metaphorically, *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*, and the renunciation of the previous love and habit of sinning is called *μετάνοια*, the putting off of the old man, etc. which will be farther considered hereafter: Faith in the divine promises, thus connected with obedience to Christian precepts, or holiness, is called *living* or *active faith*, *viva*, *actuosa*, *operosa*, *practica*. Paul himself speaks of a faith (*δι' ἀγάπης*) *ἐνεργουμένη*, Gal. 5: 6.

(2) *On the use of the words, LAW and GOSPEL, in the Bible and in theology*; and inferences from it. Morus treats this subject as an Appendix to c. 3, pp. 238—244.

(a) When the words *νόμος* and *γράμμα* are used in the New Testament in opposition to *εὐαγγέλιον* and *πνεῦμα*, the former do not mean precepts respecting the conduct of men in general; nor the latter, merely the promises (*ἐπαγγελίαι*) given to Christians. But *νόμος* and *γράμμα* frequently denote the *Mosaic law*, or the whole Old Testament institute and religion; *εὐαγγέλιον*, *πνεῦμα*, and other similar terms, the whole Christian doctrine, its commands, as well as its promises. Thus, e. g. the sermon on the mount, Matt. v. is *purely evangelical*, even in the precepts respecting conduct which it contains. John 1: 17. Rom. 8: 2. 2 Cor. 3: 6. 4: 6, sq. Morus p. 240, § 4.

This will help us to explain many of the texts, in which the apostles speak of the great advantages which the *gospel* has over the *law*; where they say the law was imperfect, was not designed for all men

in all ages, is not obligatory on Christians, and is supplanted by Christianity. Much like this is found in Rom. III. IV. VII. VIII. and Gal. III.

But the schoolmen and many theologians who followed them, did not distinguish accurately between the various senses of the words νόμος and εὐαγγέλιον in the New Testament. And notwithstanding it is clearly asserted, that the whole Mosaic institute, as such, is superseded by Christianity (vid. § 118, II.); yet many held the opinion, that the law given on mount Sinai, was designed, as far as its moral part is concerned, for the whole world, and is obligatory at all times, even on the ground of its having been there given. They understand the *Christian law*, and the *law of Moses*, to be synonymous, and believe that the Mosaic law as such, (the Ceremonial part only excepted,) is obligatory upon Christians. On the other hand, they always understand εὐαγγέλιον, according to its etymology (joyful news), to mean, not the whole Christian doctrine, but only that part of it which contains the promises.

This departure from the scriptural usage gave occasion to adopt the division into *law* and *gospel* in the theological sense. Such, then, is the state of the case. *Gospel*, in the wider sense, is the whole Christian doctrine, as composed both of precept and promise. This is the most common sense in the New Testament. In the narrower sense, it is the promises of the Christian doctrine, especially those of pardon through Christ. In this sense it sometimes occurs in the New Testament, Rom. 10: 16, coll. vs. 3—15. Rom. 1: 16, 17. 3: 21. Acts 13: 32. 20: 24, εὐαγγέλιον χάριτος θεοῦ, 1 Cor. 9: 23. In this sense theologians have always used it. *Law* generally signifies in the New Testament the Mosaic Law; but sometimes, the precepts of God and of Christ, Gal. 6: 2, etc.

(b) By *Law and Gospel*, as used in theology, the whole sum of the doctrine of salvation is meant. By the *law* is understood, the sum of all the divine precepts given to man in the Old and New Testament; or, the whole *moral law*; Morus, p. 238, sq. § 2. From this we learn what God has commanded and forbidden, and of course what sin is. By *gospel* is understood all the promises relating to the salvation of man through Christ, whether contained in the Old or New Testament. These assure men of grace and forgiveness, and thus comfort and encourage the sinner; this is what is more properly called εὐαγγέλιον χάριτος.

This definite theological use, which is not in itself unscriptural, was common before the Reformation in the Romish Church, and was employed by the schoolmen in their systems. Because the Decalogue contains *moral precepts*, and is called, by way of eminence, *law*, and because νόμος occurs sometimes in this sense in the New Testament, they called all moral precepts, *the law*; and because εὐαγγέλιον signifies etymologically a *joyful message*, and occurs sometimes in this sense in the New Testament, they called all *the promises of God*, inasmuch as they are of a joyful nature, *gospel*. This was proper in itself. The fault lay in their regarding this as the only scriptural use, and accordingly endeavouring to adapt it to all the passages in which *law* and *gospel* occur. Luther and Melancthon, and also the Swiss Reformers, retained the established usage of these terms; and from them, it has been adopted by other theologians of the Protestant Church into their systems. The Arminians in the seventeenth century made the first attempts to show, some of them, that this is not to be found in the Bible, and others more justly, that it is not the only scriptural use. They taught, that the gospel comprehends laws as well as promises, and that one as well as the other must be comprised in faith in Jesus Christ. But the old division was for a long time retained by Protestant theologians, even in their homiletical and catechetical instructions; nor was there any thing objectionable in this. Although this use of these words is not the only, nor even the common scriptural usage, yet there is good reason for this distinction (Morus, p. 240, § 4), if it is only properly explained. The truth which is designated by it, cannot and ought not to be passed over. For it is plain, that rules for conduct and promises of blessing are of altogether a different nature, have different ends, and produce different effects, and that both therefore must have different predicates. The Christian doctrine contains both. From the nature of the human soul, promises of a great good awaken pleasure in the mind, and incite to willing effort to do every thing which can secure the enjoyment of this good. But this very nature of the soul, makes rules for feeling and conduct necessary. Precepts and promises must be most intimately connected. And the promises must be made to serve as a spring and motive to obey the divine commands. This obedience is an indispensable condition, and unless it is fulfilled, the promised good cannot be bestowed. This is the doctrine of the New Testament. The Christian teach-

er must therefore make use of the law, in order to promote the knowledge of sin and repentance, and to show the unhappy consequences which, according to the Christian doctrine, result from sin both in this life and the life to come; and that he may employ for this purpose every thing, as well in the Old as in the New Testament, which bears on this subject. Vid. Morus, p. 242, § 7.

Note. The passages, Rom. iii. and Gal. iii. and iv. relating to the law and its abolition, have been misunderstood in two different ways, which should be carefully guarded against.

(a) Some have taught, that believers have nothing to do with the law, since Christ has fulfilled it for them; and they appeal to these passages. They would embrace only one part of the gospel, its promises, and would gladly be relieved of the other, and thus overthrow all morality. Such were the doctrines of many of the fanatics at the time of the Reformation and afterwards; Morus, p. 241, § 6. The same thing was charged upon Agricola in the sixteenth century, and his followers, the Antinomians. Hence the fifth and sixth Articles were introduced into the Form of Concord.

(b) Others have supposed, that the Mosaic ceremonial or civil law *exclusively*, is intended in those passages where it is said, that man deserves nothing of God by observing the law; e. g. Rom. iii. and Gal. iii. and iv. They maintained accordingly, that although the favor of God could not be conciliated by obedience to the ceremonial law, it might be by the observance of the moral law. Thus the Socinians and many others. But Paul knows nothing of such a distinction, and what he says, he says of the whole Mosaic law, moral as well as ritual. The observance of the one, is as little meritorious as of the other. And what is true of the moral law of Moses, is true, according to his express declaration in these passages, of the whole moral law, whether learned from nature, or from the Christian doctrine. Vid. Progr. in Rom. vii. et viii., in "Scripta varii argumenti," Num. xii. The following is the doctrine of the apostles: Obedience to the divine law is not the ground, or the procuring cause, of our forgiveness and salvation. (And happy is it for men that it is not; for were it so, no man of an enlightened and tender conscience could ever be sure of salvation.) Faith in Christ who died for us, is the only ground of our acceptance. Still obedience to the divine law is an indispensable duty, in connexion with this faith. Indeed it is practicable and easy, only while this faith exists. The strict requirements of the moral law cause us to see clearly, how deficient and imperfect we are, since while we allow that the law requires only what is right, we are yet unable to conform to it. They also excite in us a deep feeling of our need of a different dispensation, coming in aid of our imperfection. And by seeing our need, we become disposed to embrace the provisions for salvation which God offers. Thus the law leads us to Christ, Rom. iii. vi. vii. and the Epistle to the Galatians.

§ 124. *Of the connexion of the parts of which faith is composed ; the characteristics and degrees of faith ; and the conditions on which it is saving.*

I. The relation in which the parts belonging to faith stand to each other.

Here the following cautions should be observed ; viz.

(1) We should not separate one part of faith from another, or insist more upon one than another, or imagine that the different parts may exist at different times. This mistake has been made by some with respect to the *promises* (gospel), and the *rules* of conduct (law). Some insist wholly or disproportionately on the latter, and thus alarm one who is just beginning a religious life, and who feels himself to be still weak. This is the fault of those who preach only the law or morality, who are always telling men, (though they generally know it sufficiently without being told,) what they ought to be, without showing them the proper means of becoming so, and how they may acquire the requisite power. Others dwell entirely on the promises, and neglect the law ; instead of deriving from the promises the motives and power to obey the law, as the Bible does, 1 John 4: 10, 19. 3: 3. Gal. 2: 20. Vid. § 123, ad finem. At the present day, the former mistake is the more common one ; and therefore needs to be guarded against more carefully than the other.

(2) We should not consider the manner in which faith arises in man, and in which one part of it follows another, to be uniformly the same in all cases ; nor should we prescribe the same order and succession as essential to all. The physical and moral constitution of men is so different, and the circumstances under which they begin to amend their lives are so unlike, that the same form and method cannot possibly be prescribed to all. The neglect of proper attention to this difference among men, gives easy occasion to uncharitable judgments, to hypocrisy, anxiety, and scrupulous doubts.

The common representation is that which Melancthon has given in his "*Loci Theologici*." Reformation is commenced by means of the law, which convinces man of his sins. Then follows the distressing sense of the merited divine displeasure, and the desire of obtaining pardon. Here the Gospel comes in for man's relief, and imparts comfort and consolation. Hence arise faith and

the fruits of it ; and from faith, forgiveness of sin and the assurance that it is remitted.

In this way does the moral change in men frequently, but not always take place. The order is not important, provided all the essential parts of faith are exhibited. Faith can no more be wrought in all Christians in the same manner, than the sciences and arts can be learned by all in the same manner. With one, the terrors of the divine threatenings and punishments must be used in the first instance ; with another of a more mild and gentle disposition, the infinite love of God, and his promises must be used. Though beginning in different ways, both may come to the same result. When we compare the accounts of conversions recorded in the Old and New Testament, we observe this very difference. They all exhibit the great essential of faith ; but the manner in which they came to the possession of it, is different. Books containing accounts of the conversion of particular men, are very useful. But we should beware of making the experiences of individuals, and the way in which they may have been led to faith, a rule for all. Vid. Toellner, *Theologische Untersuchungen*, St. I. II.

[Note. Neander has illustrated this important point very fully in his "Denkwürdigkeiten," and also in his "Gelegenheitsschriften." The Fifth Article in the latter collection of Treatises, entitled, "the manifold ways of the Lord in the work of conversion," is worthy of the careful study of all engaged in promoting religion in the world.—It is a deep saying of Origen, that what Paul said of his becoming all things to all men, that he might gain some, is applicable in a far higher sense to the Saviour himself, in the methods he employed while on the earth, and still employs in Heaven, to bring men to saving faith.—Tr]

II. Signs by which we can discover the existence of true faith.

To every Christian it is of the first importance to know whether he possesses true faith, that he may be sure of his being accepted by God. These signs may be reduced to two classes, which correspond with the instructions of the New Testament.

(1) *Christian dispositions.* These are called in the New Testament *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, or *πνεῦμα*, vid. § 123. Rom. 8: 14, 16, "The renewed Christian temper (*πνεῦμα*) produced in us by God, by means of Christianity, affords us inwardly the surest proof (*συμμετρῶν*), that we are the children of God,"—that we resemble him,

that we love him, and that he loves us, as a father loves his children. Ephes. 1: 13, 14, "Ye are sealed by the Holy Spirit, i. e. the Christian disposition, for which you are indebted to God, is a sure proof to you, that God loves you and will bless you; it is a *pledge* (ἀρροβόον) to you of future reward." Thus too 1 John 3: 24, "By the *spirit*, (that renewed temper for which we are indebted to Christ and the Holy Spirit,) we know that we are true Christians, and beloved by God." The Christian may, therefore, be sure that he has faith, when he is conscious of hatred to sin, sincere love to God and Christ, to the good and pious, and of a constant effort to increase in holiness or moral perfection.

(2) But these dispositions must be exhibited in *the external conduct, by actions* which flow from grateful love to God and Christ, and from other religious motives (καρποὶ πνεύματος). These, therefore, are infallible signs of faith. Vid. 1 John 2: 29. 3: 7, sq. Christ said, Matt. 7: 16, "By their fruits ye shall know them." Entire reliance cannot be placed upon evidences drawn from mere internal feeling. One may easily deceive himself with regard to his own feelings. And if a certain degree of feeling is insisted upon as necessary, those who do not come up to this standard, while yet they may have faith, will be easily led into mistake, and involved in doubt and distress. Nor can we properly demand, that every one should give the time and hour, when he began to believe. For faith is not always instantaneous, but, from the very nature of the human soul, is sometimes gradual. Vid. Spalding, Vom Werth der Gefühle.

Note. The common theological phrase, *internum testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, is derived from Rom. 8: 16. (The passage, 1 John 5: 6, 8, does not relate to this point.)

(1) This passage treats directly of the inward conviction which Christians obtain of their being forgiven by God, from the new disposition which he has produced in them by means of Christianity. By this they are sure, (*a*) that they are now free from the divine punishments, which they had reason to fear, while they continued unrenewed, and followed their sinful desires; and also (*b*) that they have a share in all the rights and privileges of believers, and shall be partakers of the promised blessedness in future.

(2) But under this phrase, theologians include *the internal conviction which Christians have of the divinity of the Christian doctrine*. But this conviction arises only *by way of inference*. The Christian reasons thus: because more is effected for the moral good of men, by means of Christianity than by all other means (as he can say from his own experience); it follows that this doctrine

is *divine*, or that we must believe what Christ and his apostles say, when they declare it to be divine. John 7: 17, "One may be sure from his own experience, that what Christ affirmed is true, that he did not speak of himself," etc. Cf. 1 Thess. 2: 13. This conviction depends, therefore, on the experience of each individual Christian. He himself must have felt the efficacy of the Christian doctrine in his own heart. Hence this is called the *experimental proof* of the divinity of the Christian religion; and Christ himself insists upon it, John 7: 16, 17. 1 Thess. 2: 13. Every true Christian must have *this experience*. But it cannot be used to convince one who is not a true Christian, because he has never felt in himself the better influence of the Christian doctrine. Still less can this experience be brought in proof of the divinity of the *books of the Bible*. It only proves the divinity of the doctrine contained in them. Vid. Less, in the Appendix to his "Wahrheit der christlichen Religion," and Næsselt, Diss. de Sp. S. test. Halle, 1766. Cf. § 7, II. ad finem.

III. The different degrees of faith; the possibility of losing faith and of falling away.

(1) The knowledge, intelligence, and whole mental state of men are very different, as well as their natural constitution, temperament, and faculties. Hence we infer, that faith cannot have the same degree of perfection in all. We are not responsible, however, for the weakness and imperfection of faith, any farther than it is *criminal*;—a subject the consideration of which belongs more properly to theological Ethics. The Bible accordingly distinguishes between a weak, imperfect, incipient faith, and a strong, perfect, confirmed, and assured faith. It compares the state of one just beginning to exercise faith, to childhood, and that of the more confirmed Christian, to manhood; vid. Rom. 4: 19. 2 Thess. 1: 3. Ephes. 4: 13, 14. 1 Cor. 3: 1.

(2) But no Christian can make pretensions to the highest possible degree of perfection in faith, although he should constantly strive after it. Great imperfections and innumerable defects always remain even in the best Christians, partly in respect to their knowledge, partly, and indeed mostly, in respect to their practice of known duties. Vid. Ps. 19: 13. Phil. 3: 12. James 3: 2. This ought frequently to be noticed by the teacher, in order to humble the pride of men, and to excite more zeal and effort in the pursuit of holiness, and more watchfulness against sin. This consideration leads us to say,

(3) It is *possible* that even the best and most perfect Christian, should lose his faith and apostatize. The Bible clearly teaches that one may lose his faith, and therefore fail of the blessedness

promised on condition of faith ; vid. 1 Tim. 1: 19. 6: 21. Christ himself mentions, Luke 8: 13, the *προσκαίρους*, who indeed possessed true faith, but did not remain steadfast. And for what purpose are the frequent exhortations to constancy in faith given in the Holy Scriptures, if there is no possibility of its being lost ? Cf. Gal. 2: 2. Heb. 6: 4, sq. Still the way of recovery stands open even to the apostate, while he lives ; Luke 22: 32. Ps. 51: 2—19, cf. § 113. But from the very principles of our nature it is plain, that reformation and the recovery of faith must be more difficult, the oftener one who had begun to walk in the way of holiness, returns to unbelief and sin, 2 Pet. 2: 20—22. 2 Tim. 2: 26.

Note 1. Many have held, that true faith can not be lost. Against this opinion the above paragraph is directed. (a) Some fanatics have held, that faith could not be lost or destroyed, even by living in sin and vice. So taught the Valentinians, according to Irenæus ; and more lately, the enthusiastic Anabaptists, Munzer, etc. at the time of the Reformation. They are condemned in the 13th Article of the Augsburg Confession. (b) The advocates of absolute decrees also held, that he who had once attained true faith, could not lose it, because God could not alter the irrevocable decree he had once formed respecting his salvation. And as faith is made in the Bible an indispensable condition of salvation, one predestined to salvation could not, in their view, lose faith. Cf. § 32, ad finem. Augustine was the first who held this doctrine. He was followed in the fifth century by Prosper of Aquitania, and in the ninth century by Gottschalk, although the latter expressed himself doubtfully on this subject. Calvin and Beza, in the sixteenth century, adopted this doctrine, which, together with the doctrine *de decreto absoluto*, was established by the Synod at Dortrecht, 1618, as an article of faith, in opposition to the Arminians.

[Note 2. On the doctrine of the Saint's Perseverance there has been much needless debate. To prevent this, and to arrive at a just and satisfactory conclusion as to this doctrine, it is important to dismiss whatever does not properly belong to it, and to make the subject of inquiry as specific and simple as possible.

First, then ; it is no part of this question, whether it is, in itself, *possible* that believers should fall away ; or whether they are *liable*, or *exposed* to this, or are *in danger* of final apostasy. The advocates of this doctrine may admit all this, as really as its opponents. Indeed, it is often asserted by them, (e. g. in the Articles of the Synod of Dort,) that believers not only may, but if left to their own strength, certainly will draw back to perdition.

Secondly. It is admitted on both sides, that Christians are to be warned of their danger, after the example of the Scriptures ; and that this danger should be set before them, as a means of awakening them from slumber, inciting to duty and watchfulness, and making them faithful unto death.

Thirdly. It is admitted also on both sides of this question, that the belief in

the doctrine of perseverance will probably have a bad influence upon those who think themselves Christians, when they are not, and even upon *true* Christians, in a state of declension.

Fourthly. All too will admit, that many who *appear* for a time to have Christian faith, and belong to the visible Church, do in fact apostatize.

When these conceded points are dismissed from the question, what remains at issue between the advocates and opponents of this doctrine? Merely this, *Whether God will actually preserve all true believers from final apostasy, and keep them through faith unto salvation?* In arguing this point, nothing is necessary for the advocates of this doctrine, but to prove from Scripture, that God has purposed and promised to preserve all whom he has renewed by his Spirit. If this can be shown, the warnings and exhortations contained in the Scriptures, so far from being inconsistent with the promise and purpose of God, are the most suitable means of securing their fulfilment; since no motive tends so powerfully to keep Christians, as intelligent and moral agents, from apostasy, and to secure their perseverance, as the exhibition of their danger.

As to the power of God to employ such means, and exert such an influence on Christians, in perfect consistency with their moral agency, as shall hinder the hurtful tendencies of the world and their own hearts, and bring them to heaven, there can be no reasonable doubt.

It may be proper to ask, in conclusion, whether the objections commonly urged against this doctrine do not derive their chief strength from misapprehension, and misstatement, and from a vague use of terms? Let the simple inquiry be made, whether believers will in fact fall away and perish; and let this question be answered in a purely scriptural manner; and the common objections will lose their force, and the doctrine of perseverance be acknowledged to be adapted to glorify God, and to comfort and animate the pious. TR.]

IV. The attributes essential to *saving* faith.

(1) *Constancy to the end of life (perseverantia).* This is called by Paul *ὑπομονή*, Heb. 10: 36, coll. 3: 14. 1 Cor. 15: 58. (In Matt. 24: 13 the subject is not *salvation*, but *temporal deliverance*.) This constancy must extend to all the parts which belong to faith. One must neither renounce the Christian doctrine in general, and apostatize from it, Luke 8: 13. 2 Pet. 2: 20; nor may he give up particular doctrines which are essential to the Christian system, 1 John 2: 24. He must remain unshaken in his reliance upon the divine promises, Heb. 6: 12. Col. 1: 23. He must avoid most cautiously all disobedience to the divine commands, 1 Tim. 1: 18, coll. Ezek. 18: 26.

(2) *Growth and increase in faith (incrementa fidei).* (a) We must endeavour to extend and perfect our knowledge of Christian

doctrines and duties, Heb. 5: 12. 6: 1, sq. Phil. 1: 9, sq. (b) We must make constant advances in holiness, and in the practice of all Christian virtues. We must strive daily to be freed from our remaining faults, and to cherish and deepen our hatred to sin (*penitentia quotidiana*), 1 Pet. 2: 1, 2. Holiness and the practice of Christian virtue must become habitual with us, 2 Cor. 7: 1. The observation often made by theologians, that there is no pausing here, —that we must either advance or recede in goodness, is true from the very nature of the human mind.

(3) *The evidence of faith by good works.*

A. The various meanings of the word ἔργα in the Holy Scriptures. A careful examination of these would have prevented many mistakes and controversies.

(a) Ἔργον denotes an action, in the widest sense, whether morally good or bad. E. g. God rewards man according to his works, Rom. 2: 6, etc. Hence ἔργον also signifies *an employment, business, office*; an office in the Church, for example; as in 2 Tim. 2: 21, sq.

(b) The phrase ἔργα ἀγαθὰ or καλὰ, or ἔργα simply, frequently denotes particular actions which are conformed to the law of God, or Christian virtues which God has promised to reward; in opposition to ἁμαρτίαι or ἔργα πονηρά, Matt. 5: 16. Rom. 2: 7. 1 Tim. 5: 24, 25, etc. In this sense the word ἔργα is used by James throughout the whole of the second chapter of his Epistle. Cf. James 3: 13. With James then, *good works* are pious actions, such as are done with reference to God; i. e. such as flow from love to God and a spirit of obedience. Such actions only, are pronounced by the Scriptures to be true virtues, because they flow from religious motives. They are *Christian* good works, whenever they are done with a particular reference to Christ.

But this term came to denote, in a narrower sense, *particular works of love*, such as *alms*, etc. Acts 9: 36. 1 Tim. 6: 18, etc. During the middle ages the Roman Church made this particular sense the prominent one, and accordingly ascribed great merit to *almsgiving, presents to cloisters, churches*, etc. § 125. But such works are called *good* in the Holy Scriptures, only so far as they are an active exhibition of love and obedience to God, and as they flow from religious motives.

(c) Quite different from this is the meaning of the term ἔργα νόμου (sometimes simply ἔργα), when used by Paul in opposition to

πίστις, Rom. II. III. IV. Gal. II. III., etc. Vid. Progr. "De dispari formula docendi, qua Christus, Paulus et Jacobus de fide et factis disserentes uti sunt, itemque de discrimine *ἔργων νόμου* et *ἔργων ἀγαθῶν*" (1803), in "Scr. Var. Argum," Num. XIII. (Translated in the Bib. Repository, Jan. 1833.) Correspondent to this phrase is that in the writings of the Rabbins, מַעֲשֵׂים הַתּוֹרָה יִי, which denotes the fulfilment and observance of the divine law and of its particular precepts, whether they are of a moral nature or not, and whether they are given by God through Christ, Moses, or by the law of nature. Vid. § 113, II. and § 123, and fin. in the Note.

Paul allows, and frequently expressly declares, that whoever should perfectly obey this law, in whatever way made known to him, should actually *live* by it, or enjoy the blessedness promised by God as a reward, not because he could demand this, as something which he had earned, but because God had promised it. But no man, in his present condition, can boast of such an obedience as this, and therefore none can hope to be accepted with God and blessed, on the ground of his obedience to the divine commands (*ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*). Paul expresses himself very clearly on this point, Tit. 3: 5, coll. v. 3. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Ephes. 2: 8. The reason, therefore, why he excludes obedience to the divine commandments as a ground of our forgiveness, or why he holds that obedience is not the meritorious cause of forgiveness, is that we do not in reality obey the divine law in such a manner, as to enable us to rely on the divine promise above mentioned. And yet God has declared, that he will show mercy to us; this must, therefore, be done in some other way, and by some other means; namely by faith. It is on this account, that he excludes the *ἔργα νόμου*, or our supposed obedience to the divine commandments, from faith in Christ and from the forgiveness and salvation to be attained through faith, Rom. 3: 20, et passim. But as to *ἔργα ἀγαθά*, i. e. the virtues performed from love to Christ, Paul would no more exclude them, than Christ and James did. On the contrary he derives them, as they did, from faith, and insists strenuously upon them, and in the very passages in which he denies merit to *ἔργα νόμου*, e. g. Rom. 2: 7—10. Ephes. 2: 10, sq. Cf. §§ 108, 123, ad finem.

Paul and James are therefore agreed in fact. And there is no difference in the meaning of the words *πίστις* and *δικαιοῦσθαι* as used by them, but solely in the use of the word *ἔργα*. Paul

speaks of the foolish mistake, by which one would obtain life and salvation from God, by his supposed fulfilment of the divine law, while in reality he does not keep the law. James speaks of the pious, unpretending exercise of virtue, which is the first fruit and the evidence of faith, and therefore rewarded by God. Paul and James, as well as Christ, disapprove of the former; while both of them, as well as Christ, require the latter, with great seriousness and earnestness.

B. *What Christ and the apostles teach as to showing faith by good works.* They are all agreed in saying, that an indolent and inactive faith (*νεκρά*, James 11.) is of no advantage, and is entirely contrary to its object. For faith is designed wholly for active life, and must be manifested and proved, so often as there is opportunity, by the practice of holiness. This is what James so well insists upon in the second chapter of his Epistle. His doctrine is, that every Christian must possess faith in God (the knowledge of God, and that trust in him, resulting from this knowledge); but that this faith must be exhibited in works (*fruits*, Chap. 111.). What good does it do for one to say, I know and honor God, and confide in him, if he does not prove this by his pious actions? If Abraham had professed faith with his mouth, but had not obeyed when God commanded him to offer up Isaac, would that have pleased God? No! He did not receive the divine approbation and blessing, until he proved in fact that he had right conceptions of God, and that he placed unlimited confidence in him. In the same way Christ shows, that man must be known by his works (*καρποί*), and prove by them that he truly fears God, Matt. 7: 16—24. John 14: 15. 15: 14. And Paul, too, teaches, that God will reward men for the uniform practice of virtue (*ὑπομενῇ ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ*), Rom. 2: 7; and that, while Christians are indebted for their salvation to the mere grace of God, and not their own works, they are yet placed by the divine commands under obligation to practise these *ἔργα ἀγαθά*, Ephes. 2: 8—10. Thus he calls the virtues *καρποὺς πνεύματος* (the fruits of a heart renovated by the influence of the gospel), Gal. 5: 22, 25. In Rom. 8: 1, 13, he says, that one is not a Christian, who has not *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*. Vid. other passages in Morus p. 212, Note.

The uniform doctrine of the Holy Scriptures is, therefore, briefly this: "faith is the condition of salvation. (Hence so high a val-

ue is placed upon it, from the beginning to the end of the Scriptures.) But this faith cannot exist unless the heart is truly renewed and made holy; and this inward renewal is evidenced by good actions or works. Now this faith, and the holiness inseparably connected with it, and the exhibition of it by good works, is rewarded by God. This faith and what is connected with it, is, therefore, the *condition* of salvation (*conditio salutis*), but not the meritorious cause (*causa meritoria*); for *salvation* is an *unmerited favor*." Vid. Rom. 3: 24, 25. 6: 22, sq. Cf. § 125.

§ 125. *Of the nature of Christian good works or virtues; the relation in which they stand to salvation; and their meritoriousness.*

I. The true nature of Christian good works.

Their worth or capability of being rewarded, (not their *merit*,) consists partly in their conformity to the rules of conduct which God has given to Christians (*materiale actionis*), James 2: 11; and partly in the *end* to which they are directed, and the *motive* by which they are performed (*formale*). An action, therefore, is not a *good work*, although it may be right and lawful in itself, when it results from impure and unworthy motives, such as vanity, ambition, the gratification of inclination, etc. The Christian performs *good works* only when he acts from thankful love to God and Christ, and in unconditional obedience to their requirements, in short from motives drawn from the Christian religion, Rom. 12: 2. 2 Cor. 5: 15. Phil. 1: 11. John 14: 15, 21, and almost the whole of the first epistle of John.

We can here distinguish three cases; viz.

(1) In acting, the Christian may be conscious of this motive, and act solely on account of it.

(2) But it is neither possible, nor requisite, that he should at all times, and in every action, be distinctly conscious of this motive. For one acquires, from long exercise in virtue as well as in

vice, a *habit* of action. And since this habit presupposes a high degree of perfection, the value of actions performed under the force of this principle is not less, but often greater. For they imply a prevailing feeling of piety and love to God.

(3) Filial obedience to God, or religious motives, are not always the single and only motives to good actions, even in Christians. Their own advantage, reward, fear of punishment, the maintenance of a good reputation, etc. influence them to action. These motives, in themselves, should not be entirely banished, as some rigorous moralists, who are ignorant of human nature, would do. For God makes use of these very means, to hold men to the observance of his laws. They may, therefore, be used by us as assistances. But it is clear that an action which results from such motives *merely*, cannot be called a pious Christian action, or a *good work*, although in itself it may be useful, commendable, and even acceptable to God, vid. Rom. 2: 14, 26, 27. Acts 10: 4, 34, 35. The teacher, therefore, should beware, in Christian education, of drawing the principal motive from ambition and selfishness. For these principles will exclude every good and religious feeling, and introduce manifold evil into the youthful heart.

In Christian good works, therefore, every thing depends upon the state of mind, the disposition (*πνεῦμα*, Gal. 5: 22), with which they are performed. That man only is capable of good works (in the Christian sense), who has a pure and prevailing love to God and Christ, and whose principle it is, to practise all known good and to avoid all known evil, because such is the will of God and of Christ. God and Christ estimate the worth of an action, therefore, not according to the external appearance, upon which men look, but according to the disposition of the heart, which men do not see. Hence an action may frequently appear to men to be trifling, insignificant, or even blamable, while in the sight of God it is commendable and of great price. Such was the act of Mary in anointing Jesus, which his disciples blamed, Mark xiv. Christ, however, called it a *good work*, because it was a pious deed, i. e. because it resulted from sincere and grateful love to him; and such actions only are, in his judgment, *good works*. Vid. Töllner, Ueber die Beschaffenheit eines guten Werkes, in his "Theol. Untersuch." Th. II.

Note. 1. Good works are required from every Christian, *so far as he is able*

to perform them, Gal. 5: 25. 1 John 2: 6. 3: 7. Cf. § 123. The last clause contains a necessary limitation. For sometimes he finds no opportunity, or is placed in circumstances unfavorable for exhibiting, by his outward actions, the pious dispositions concealed in his heart. Moreover, those just commencing a religious life, and who, though they have real faith, have it in a less degree (§ 124), cannot exhibit that perfect and mature fruit, which is expected from advanced and confirmed Christians. But God judges of the goodness of actions according to the inward disposition and the sincerity of the heart. In a good work, this rectitude of motive is indispensable. Ephes. 4: 20. 1 John 2: 6. We cannot, therefore, say that faith is *always* rich in virtues; for it *cannot* always be so. Nor will his unfruitfulness be charged against any one as a sin, unless he himself is to blame for it. In this matter, God is the only infallible judge.

Note 2. When the Bible speaks of the necessity of *Christian* good works, it refers only to *Christians*, and to what is required of them according to the Christian doctrine. No one who is destitute of the knowledge of Christianity, without his own fault, can be required to live according to its rules, or be punished merely because he does not. Nothing will be required of any one, which has not been given him. Christian actions, may indeed be more perfect and noble in themselves, than others; because they flow from more perfect, pure, and elevated motives. But the good actions of those who are not Christians, do not cease to be good and acceptable to God, because they do not flow from Christian motives. Cf. the example of the centurion Cornelius, Acts x., and the declaration of Paul, Rom. 2: 6—11. In the former passage (v. 35), Peter ascribes *καὶ ὁβρον θεοῦ*, to the heathen centurion Cornelius; and in the latter, Paul calls the actions of heathen *ἔργα ἀγαθὰ*; and both teach that truly religious actions in heathen, are acceptable to God, and will be rewarded by him. The doctrine of Augustine, therefore, *virtutes ethnica esse splendida vitia*, is false. He taught that all which man does *as man*, without supernatural and irresistible grace, is *sin*. Hence he affirmed, that the heathen were condemned, because they could *not but sin*; vid. § 121, II. [Cf. "Bib. Repos." Jan. 1833. Art. Augustine and Pelagius.—TR.]

II. The relation which exists between the good works of Christians and their salvation.

There was a controversy in the Lutheran church in the sixteenth century on the question, *Whether good works are essential to salvation*. Ge. Major, a theologian of Wittenberg, and some of the disciples of Melancthon, held the affirmative. Flacius and others, the negative. Nic. Amsdorf of Raumburg, went so far as to say (1559), that they stood in the way of salvation,—a horrible position, if it is understood to mean, that obedience to the divine law is damnable. But this was not his meaning. He only meant to affirm, that the opinion that good works could merit salvation, is dangerous

to the soul. And in this he was right ; but so was Major in his position.

The difficulty may be removed by considering in what the *salvation* of Christians consists.

(1) It is begun, the foundation of it is laid, in the forgiveness of sin, or justification in the narrower sense. This is the free gift of God, and cannot be merited by good works, § 113, II. But this blessing is forfeited by one who omits good works, and commits sin, vid. 1 John 3: 6. Gal. 5: 19. 1 Cor. 6: 9, 10. Good works, therefore, are necessary for the continuance (*conservatio*) of this benefit. They are, when they *can* be performed, the condition of pardon, though not the meritorious cause of it.

(2) Salvation consists in the divine rewards, or proofs of the divine favor ; partly those which are natural, such as quiet of soul, peace with God, etc. ; and partly *positive*, bestowed both in the present and future life, as we are taught by the Scriptures. These rewards cannot be merited by good works in themselves, any more than the forgiveness of sin. But faith, and the good works connected with it, are the conditions on which alone these rewards are obtained ; and the degree of reward is regulated, by the degree of zeal in holiness which is exhibited, Matt. 25: 20—29. 2 Cor. 9: 6. Gal. 6: 7, etc. For obedience to the divine law is as essential a part of Christian faith, as to trust in God through Christ, § 123. Good works are, therefore, always described in the Bible as the effects and fruits of Christian faith, James 2: 26, sq.

We may therefore justly say, as Major did, that good works are essential to the attainment of salvation, as a condition, and we may also say, as Flacius and Amsdorf did, that they are not to be regarded as meritorious, or the procuring cause of our salvation. Cf. F. T. Rühl, Werth der Behauptungen Jesu und seiner Apostel, Leipzig, 1791, 8vo. especially the 4th Essay, “Seligkeit beruht allein auf Glauben,” u. s. w. Also Storr, Commentar zum Brief an die Hebräer, Th. II.

III. History of opinions respecting the meritoriousness of good works.

God has determined and promised, to reward the good actions of men. But this reward is not something *earned* by men (§ 108, II.), which God is bound to pay them ; it is given to them of his free, undeserved goodness. Hence these rewards are called in the New

Testament, χάρις, δωρεά, ἔπαινος (approbation), δόξα, στέφανος, terms which imply gifts and undeserved rewards. These rewards are intended to excite men to love God more sincerely, and to yield a cheerful and willing obedience to the divine commands, notwithstanding the difficulties with which this obedience is attended.

But obvious as this doctrine is to sound and unprejudiced reason, the great mass of mankind, of all ages and religions, have regarded certain external actions as meritorious and propitiatory. This error, as far as it is theoretical, results from false notions respecting God, and our relations to him. This is the reason why it is so prevalent, in one form or another, among the Jews, the heathen, and Christians; vid. § 108, II. But this theoretical error would have been easily escaped or exploded, if it were not connected with the depraved inclinations of the human heart. Love to sin makes men quick in inventing theories, which will allow them to indulge in it at pleasure, and yet assure them of the favor of God. We shall here briefly exhibit the false opinions which have prevailed on this subject among Christians.

(1) Many Christians, (especially the converts from Judaism,) even in the times of the apostles, cherished the opinion, that their acts of supposed conformity to the law, such as alms-giving, sacrifices, ceremonies, circumcision, and obedience to other particular precepts of the ceremonial and moral law of Moses, were meritorious. They even believed, that the good works of their ancestors were imputed to them. Hence Paul shows in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, that man deserves nothing of God for his supposed obedience to the divine law; that the opinion of the meritoriousness of our own works, is in the highest degree injurious; and that God forgives and rewards us solely on account of faith, without any desert on our part (*δικαιοῦν δωρεὰν, διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ*).

But here again a mistake was made on the other side, and Paul was understood to speak lightly of the observance of the divine law. He himself complains, that he was thus misunderstood, Rom. 3: 8. 6: 15. Gal. 5: 13. The same thing has happened to Luther, Arndt, Spener, and other Christian teachers of ancient and modern times, who have followed in his footsteps. Even in the age of the Apostles, there were some false Christians, and even false teachers. They lived a sensual, disorderly life, and justified this on the ground, that *Christians are free from the Law*. Against such a sentiment

there is much said in the Epistles of John, Peter and Jude. Others believed, that an inactive faith would suffice, and that works are not important. They were content if they were only orthodox in head. James, in the second chapter of his Epistle, is strenuous in opposing this sentiment. He shows that true Christian faith cannot exist, unless it is exhibited by Christian virtues. Cf. the Essay above cited in "Scripta varii argumenti."

(2) Notwithstanding these clear instructions of the New Testament, these two mistakes, respecting the merit of works, and the sufficiency of an inoperative faith, have always prevailed among Christians. The mistake respecting the merit of works, was adopted into the whole system of the Latin church. This will now be shown from history.

A. During the dark ages, after monastic principles became prevalent in the Western church, the worship of God, piety, and holiness were supposed to consist almost wholly in *external rites*. They believed that God would be induced by certain external actions, to bestow favor on mankind. They thought they could merit his approbation, somewhat as the day-laborer earns his wages by toil. Much importance was attached to works of beneficence, to alms-giving and presents, especially to cloisters and churches. They thus kept to the sense in which ἔργα ἀγαθὰ is sometimes used in the New Testament, viz. *opera benefica*, stopping, however, with the outward action, and leaving the disposition of the heart out of account, vid. § 124, ad finem. They also insisted upon self-inflictions, fasts, and other external punishments, arbitrarily imposed; just as the Jews formerly did. They even relied, like the Jews again, upon the virtues of the saints, and upon *their treasure of good works*. These views led to great corruption in morals, and a wide remove from the genuine spirit and true nature of Christianity.

B. After the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the schoolmen, and especially Thomas Aquinas, began to admit these views into their theological systems, and to defend them by logical arguments. They reasoned (*a*) from the term μισθός, which is frequently used in the Bible to denote *wages earned*, as 1 Cor. 3: 8, where the Vulgate has *meritum*; and also from many of the old Latin fathers, who had said, MERERE hominem salutem, etc. But by such language, they meant nothing more than *consequi, impetrare*, in which sense *merere* is used by Cicero and other Latin writers. And in general

in all the ancient languages, and in the Hebrew and Greek, the terms which denote *wages*, *recompense*, are used for *reward* of any kind, whether deserved or not. The meaning in every case must be determined by the context. In the New Testament, what is called *μισθός* is also called *χάρις* and *δωρεά* in the same context. We are said to receive *μισθὸν δωρεάν*. Thomas Aquinas taught, that when man, of his own accord, performs benevolent actions, gives alms, endows churches, etc. ; God considers this as done to him, and sees fit (*æquum, congruum*) to *recompense* the act. This he called *meritum de congruo*. (b) Again, he appealed to the doctrine of Augustine *De gratia supernaturali spiritus sancti*. This grace produces good works in the regenerate, which therefore *merit* salvation, because they are derived from the Holy Spirit. He called this *meritum de condigno*. The unregenerate cannot perform any such meritorious works, because they do not possess this grace. He was followed in his opinions by other teachers. And in the sixteenth century this doctrine was confirmed by the council at Trent.

C. This false theory, so greatly injurious to morals, was vehemently opposed by the German Reformers of the sixteenth century. Luther especially argued against it from the principles contained in Paul's epistles to the Romans and Galatians, which were directed against similar mistakes made by the Jews. But, in the heat of the controversy, Luther frequently went to the other extreme, and sometimes expressed himself with too little precision and distinctness. He sometimes appeared not only to deny merit to those works which the monks regarded as meritorious, and to all self-righteous works (Paul's *works of the law*) ; but also to speak slightly of *Christian virtues*, and rather to depreciate than recommend them ; though this was far from his intention. But afterwards, when his doctrine was misapplied by some who appealed to his authority, he became more guarded, and expressed himself more definitely. Melancthon especially took pains to guard against these perversions in the Augsburg Confession (Art. iv.), in his Apology, and in his "Loci Theologici." After the death of Luther, Melancthon and some of his associates, endeavoured to analyse the subject still farther, and to obviate all mistake. But they were poorly rewarded for their pains, since they were charged with departing from Luther, and adopting the errors of the Romish Church. Hence much controversy arose in the Lu-

theran Church in the sixteenth century, which ran out for the most part into mere logomachy, as in the case of Major and Amsdorf. It was hoped that the Formula of Concord would put an end to this strife, Morus, p. 214. But the adherents of the Romish Church still appealed to the second Chapter of James in opposition to Luther. He and his associates did not know how to defend themselves against this argument, and did not sufficiently understand the difference between *ἔργα ἀγαθὰ* and the *ἔργα νόμου*, which were regarded as meritorious. This is the reason why he, and the authors of the "Magdeburg Centuries," and some other theologians, so spoke discreditably of this Epistle.

Note. The circumstances of the Christian teacher in our days are frequently such, that after the example of Christ and the apostles, he must sometimes insist more upon faith, as the ground of pardon and salvation, and sometimes more upon the fruits of faith, or pious Christian actions. He should take the former course, when he has to do either with sinners who are sorrowful and truly penitent on account of their sins, or with those who have a self-righteous disposition, and hope that they shall be forgiven and saved on account of their supposed obedience to the Law, and their virtuous conduct. Vid. Luke 23: 40, sq. 18: 9. Rom. 4: 5. Acts 16: 30. He must do this in order to show, that salvation depends entirely upon a disposition of sincere and unwavering confidence in God (i. e. upon *faith*); since God and Christ, who know the heart, have regard solely to the disposition. In this way one who is proud of his virtue, self-righteous and pharisaical, will learn wherein he is deficient.

He must take the latter course, that of recommending *good works* or the fruits of faith, when he deals with those who undervalue or neglect the pursuit of holiness, either through levity, indolence, or the love of sin; who persuade themselves that a mere external profession of faith will be sufficient; who say *Lord, Lord; but obey not his commandments*; and who pervert the doctrine of justification through faith, to excuse a life devoid of goodness, perhaps openly sinful. Such persons must be made to see, that their sentiments are false, and that there are some infallible signs by which it may be known whether a person possesses true faith; as a tree may be known by its fruits. These signs are pious actions, which are the invariable attendants of faith, and which the true believer will never fail to perform, whenever he has opportunity. Matt. 7: 16. 25: 31—46. 19: 21. Rom. 2: 6. 1 Tim. 6: 18. James 11.

§ 126. *Explanation of the terms which are used in the Scriptures to denote both the external profession of Christianity (fides externa) and internal moral improvement and sanctification.*

It is the general custom to treat of *repentance, conversion, renewal, regeneration, sanctification*, in separate and distinct articles (*loci*); but this was not the case anciently. Neither the ecclesiastical fathers, nor the schoolmen, treated these topics separately. It was not until the sixteenth century, that this method was adopted; and the chief object of this at first was, to explain more fully these scriptural terms, and obviate different errors relating to them. But afterwards the distinction was more finely drawn, these doctrines were more separated, and particular proof-texts were sought for each. But many of these distinctions are not to be found in the Bible. All of these terms denote the *improvement* of men, and imply the same divine agency; although sometimes the gradual progress and the different degrees of moral improvement are distinguished. The better plan is, therefore, to bring all these topics together, and to treat of them in one and the same Article, as indeed most theologians now do. So Morus, p. 220, sq. § 6. The case is the same with respect to *calling, illumination*, and similar expressions, which will be explained in Art. XII., *De operationibus gratiae*, § 130.

I. Scriptural idea of the words denoting *conversion* (ἐπιστροφή, ἐπιστρέφειν, by which the LXX. translate the Hebrew שׁוּבָה).

Ἐπιστρέφειν frequently stands alone, sometimes connected with ἐπὶ or πρὸς τὸν θεόν, *to turn to God*. This term is derived from the very frequent comparison of the actions and conduct of man with a way, and with walking in it; whence the religion itself which one adopts, is itself called הַדֶּרֶךְ. But this term is used in two different senses; viz.

(1) It denotes the *moral improvement* and *holiness* of men, when they repent of their sins and forsake them. In this sense is the term commonly used in theology, Ezek. 3: 19. Joel 2: 12, 13. Matt. 13: 15. Acts 3: 19. This turning is produced by God, or the Holy Spirit, by means of revealed truth. The same is expressed by the word μετανοεῖν, by which also the LXX. render the Heb.

שׁוּב. These two forms of expression are frequently interchanged as synonymous, as Acts 15: 3, coll. 11: 18. "The heart is *turned away* from the love of sin, and inclined to efforts after what is good and right, under the assistance of God and the Holy Spirit." Vid. 2 Cor. 7: 11. Jer. 3: 12, 13 (an exhortation to the Israelites to return to God, from whom they had departed).

(2) It denotes sometimes the external transition from a false religion to the true,—the renunciation of idolatry, Hos. 3: 5. Ezek. 14: 6. Hence it is applied in the New Testament (a) to *Gentiles* who enter into the external Christian community, Acts 20: 21. 26: 18. 1 Thess. 1: 9; (b) to Jews becoming Christians, Acts 9: 35. 14: 15. 2 Cor. 3: 16.

These two senses ought to be distinguished in the explanation of this term. For though conversion of the former kind is the object of the latter, yet it is not always attained. But sometimes the two meanings are connected together, because the first is the object of the second, and with many is actually attained. Thus when the Apostles preach conversion to Jews and Gentiles, they mean *both*. For neither Christ nor his apostles encouraged a merely external introduction into the Christian church. Still they require men to enter into the external Church, because there are the means of conversion found.

II. Scriptural idea of the words denoting Regeneration (*παλιγγενεσία*, γενναῖσθαι ἄνωθεν or δεύτερον, ἀναγενναῖσθαι. Also the synonymous terms ἀνακαίνωσις, ἀνανεοῦν, καὶνὸς ἄνθρωπος, καὶνὴ κτίσις, &c. &c.).

The word *παλιγγενεσία* denotes frequently any entire alteration of state, by which one is brought into an entirely new and reformed condition, or placed in a better situation. The change indicated by this term is, however, as Morus justly observes, in every case, *mutatio in melius*, p. 223, Note at the top. Vid. "Scripta Varii Argumenti," Num. VI. Thus Cicero (Att. IV. 6) calls his restoration from exile, *παλιγγενεσία*; and Josephus (Ant. XI. 3) calls the restoration of the Jewish land after the captivity *παλιγγενεσία πατριδος*. The Stoics spoke of *παλιγγενεσία τῶν ὅλων*. In Roman Law, the manumission of a slave was called his *regeneration*. In Matt. 19: 28, it denotes an introduction into a new and happy situation, whether the resurrection, or the establishment of the Messiah's kingdom be understood.

When the Israelites spoke of a person changing his religion, they used the phrases *birth, new birth*, etc. When a *Gentile* passed over to Judaism (became a proselyte), he was regarded by the Jews as *new born, a new man, a child* just beginning to live. As such he was received into their Church, and obtained civil rights. Even in the Old Testament, the term מְשֻׁבֵּי is used in reference to *proselytes*, Ps. 87: 5, coll. Is. XLIX. LI. LIV. This might be called *external regeneration*. The term was afterwards used by the Rabbins in a *moral* sense; since it became the duty of one who had been admitted into the Jewish Church, to live according to Jewish laws, and to have a better moral disposition. This is *internal, moral regeneration*. The term was used in both of these senses by the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles.

Now it was not the manner of Christ and the Apostles to invent new terms, but to borrow terms from the ancient Jewish phraseology, and transfer them to Christianity. Hence we find all these words used in the New Testament in three different senses; viz.

(1) To denote one's passing over *externally* from Judaism or heathenism to the Christian society, and making an external profession of the Christian, in opposition to the Jewish or a heathen religion, which the Christian renounces. Thus Paul says, Ephes. 2: 15, "Christ has united Jews and gentiles into one Church" (εἰς καὶνὸν ἄνθρωπον, which cannot here denote *internal* reformation, as this could not be predicated of all). Cf. James 1: 18. Thus Peter says, 1 Pet. 1: 3, "God hath brought us to the profession of Christianity (ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς), in order to enable us to obtain salvation." Paul frequently says of those whom he had induced to make profession of Christianity, that he had *begotten* them (γεννᾶν), Philem. v. 10. 1 Cor. 4: 15; and ὠδίνειν, Gal. 4: 19.

(2) To denote the *internal* or *moral renewal* of the heart and of the whole disposition of man. This is the object of one's becoming a Christian, to renounce the love of sin, and love what is good, and to practise it from motives of love to God and Christ. This state is effected in Christians by God, or the Holy Spirit, through faith in Christ. The *creation of a new heart* (reformed disposition) is mentioned in this sense, even in the Old Testament, Ezek. 36: 26—28. Ps. 51: 12. In other passages the term *circumcision of heart* is used, Deut. 10: 16; elsewhere a *new heart, a new spirit, a new mind*, which has God for its author, Ezek. 11: 19, 20. Ps. L. LI. Is. i, etc.

In this sense Paul speaks of putting on the *new man*, and putting off the *old man*, of a *new creature*, after the *image* of God, Ephes. 4: 22, 24, and Col. 3: 9, 10, and ἀνακαίνωσις νοός, Rom. 12: 2, and ἀνανεοῦσθαι τῷ πνεύματι, Ephes. 4: 23, sq. Here belong all the texts in John and elsewhere, which teach that man *must be born of* God, or the Holy Spirit, i. e. become his child, love him, in disposition and conduct resemble him, that he may be loved by God in return; for all which he is indebted to God or to the Holy Spirit, 1 John 3: 9. 5: 1. John 1: 12, 13. Cf. the remarks respecting *ἰοθεσία*, § 119, I. 1. These different terms, therefore, refer to one and the same thing.

(3) In many passages these two senses are combined; because internal regeneration is the object of external regeneration; exactly as in the case of ἐπιστρέφειν. Among other texts is John 3: 3, 5, “Whoever is not born of baptism and the Holy Spirit (i. e. does not consecrate himself by baptism to the profession of my religion, and does not become, through divine assistance, a *reformed man*,—a *child of God*, a friend of God, like him in moral character), cannot be considered a member of the Messiah’s kingdom (βασιλεία θεοῦ).” Hence baptism is called, Tit. 3: 5, λουτρὸν παλιγγενεσίας, because we are not only solemnly admitted by this rite into the Christian society, but are likewise thereby obligated, according to the precepts of Christ, to become reformed in character; and on this condition have all the rights and rewards of God’s children granted and assured to us. So the Rabbins expressed themselves with regard to the baptism of Proselytes. And for this reason the most ancient fathers, Ignatius and Justin, call baptism ἀναγέννησις.

III. Scriptural idea of the term μετάνοια.

This word is used by the Greeks to designate a change in a person’s opinions, aims, dispositions, with respect to particular things. Thus the phrase, εἰς μετάνοιαν ἄγειν signifies *to induce any one to alter his opinion*, and to adopt another. Polybius uses the word μετανοεῖν in relation to a general who designed to stake battle, but afterwards determined differently. Plato contrasts προνοεῖν (to use forecast), and μετανοεῖν (to reconsider when it is too late). In Heb. 12: 17, it is said that Esau could not obtain the alteration of his father’s opinion (μετάνοια). In the classical writers, however, this term

is not used to denote particularly an alteration in the *moral* state of the mind or heart. This use first prevailed among the Grecian Jews, and was derived by them from the Septuagint. The Hebrew *שׁוּב*, is commonly expressed in the Septuagint Version by *μετανοεῖν*, as Is. 30: 15, though sometimes also by *ἐπιστρέφειν*. The Hebrew *שׁוּב* is rendered in the same way, Jer. 4: 28. These significations run together; since we determine not to repeat that which causes us sorrow. Hence the words *μετανοεῖν* and *μεταμέλεσθαι* are connected as synonymous, 2 Cor. 7: 8, coll. Luke 17: 4. This word, accordingly, like *ἐπιστροφή* and other similar terms, is used in the New Testament, in a wider and a narrower sense; viz.

(1) It denotes the forsaking of a religion which one had formerly professed, and his professing a new (the Christian) religion; (because there is in this case a change of view and opinion with respect to religion;) Acts 20: 21, where it is said that *μετάνοια εἰς θεόν* is preached to Jews and to Gentiles, in connexion with *πίστις εἰς Χριστόν*. Thus Luke 24: 47, and other texts, vid. Morus, p. 222. In the same way as the return of the Israelites from idolatry to the true religion was called *μετάνοια*, could the conversion of Jews or Gentiles to Christianity be so called.

(2) It more commonly denotes a *moral* change. And (a) it expresses the entire moral renovation or conversion of men, in the widest sense; and (b) the commencement of this change, when one begins to abhor the evil which he loved, and to form the sincere purpose of forsaking it. It is frequently used in this narrower sense in the Holy Scriptures, and this is its most common use in theology, as will be farther shown, § 127. This change always presupposes an entire revolution in the views and feelings of the subject of it; he begins thenceforward to love and practise good, instead of evil. This was the great subject of the preaching of John the Baptist; *Μετανοεῖτε* was his continual theme, Matt. 3: 2, 11. Luke 3: 8. The same may be said of Christ, Mark 1: 15. It here denotes a radical alteration, or a change by which an entirely new direction is given to one's life and efforts. Hence the phrases which occur so frequently, *μετανοεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* or *ἔργων νεκρῶν*, Acts 8: 22. Heb. 6: 1. Hence, too, *μετανοεῖν* and *ἐπιστρέφειν* are interchanged as synonymous, Acts 3: 19, 26. Rom. 2: 4.

(3) The writers of the New Testament frequently connect the two meanings of the word *μετάνοια* together; since the object of

an external change of religion is always the improvement of the heart. Acts 11: 18, "God hath granted even to the heathen *μετάνοιαν εἰς ζωήν*. The ancient ecclesiastical fathers, even in the Latin Church, also connected with this word the idea of repentance and reformation in the moral sense; and Lactantius proposes well (Inst. Div. VI. 24), to render it by the word *resipiscentia*. But the word commonly employed in Latin theology was *pœnitentia*, by which the Vulgate renders *μετάνοια*; which is not indeed incorrect in itself, but often rather ambiguous, and sometimes quite inappropriate; cf. Morus p. 224, § 2. After the fourth century writers began to understand this word according to the *Latin etymology*, and to vary from the usage of the Bible. The influence of Augustine contributed to the wide diffusion of this error. He insisted upon the derivation of the word *pœnitentia* from *punio* or *poenio*; because man himself punishes his own sins, and therefore receives forgiveness. *Pœnitentia est quædam dolentis VINDICTA, semper PUNIENS in se, quod dolet commisisse*, De Pœnit. c. 8. He was followed by other Latin teachers, especially by Peter of Lombardy and other schoolmen. The unscriptural idea that *pœnitentia* is not only repentance for past sins, but punishment, self-inflicted, on account of them, has prevailed widely not only in the Romish, but also in the Protestant Church.

This sort of *pœnitentia* is expressed in the Roman Church by the German terms, *Busse* (*penance, punishment*, in the shape of a *fine* or *mult*), *Busse thun* (*to do penance*), *büssen* (*to atone*), the last of which terms expresses more clearly the false associated idea. Many Protestants have therefore wished, that when the error of the Romish Church implied in this term was abandoned, this term itself, which so easily leads into mistake, had also been given up. Christ has freed us from the punishment of sin, and an atonement *on our part* is not possible. Even when we *repent* (*μετανοεῖν*), i. e. *alter* and *reform*, we *make no atonement*, but we receive great blessings. Vid. the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, C. V. and VI. But there is no word in German, [and the same is true in English,] which answers fully to the Greek *μετάνοια*. And if the scriptural idea of this term is explained in the early catechetical instructions, the inaptness of the terms by which it is rendered, need not be so much regretted, since people in common life are not accustomed to take words in their etymological sense.

IV. Scriptural idea of terms denoting holiness or sanctity (*ἁγιωσύνη, ἁγιασμός, κ. τ. λ.* also *δσιότης, ὅσιος* Heb. *שֶׁטֶה*, with its derivatives.)

The words *ἅγιος, ἁγιάζειν, שֶׁטֶה* designate primarily, whatever is singled out, selected, or best in its kind; vid. Vol. I. § 29. It was first applied in the ancient languages to *external* excellencies and privileges; afterwards, to those of an *internal* and *moral* nature. Hence arose the twofold use of these terms in the Bible, which must not be overlooked; they denote *sanctitas externa*, and *interna*.

(1) All the Israelites are called by Moses *שֶׁטֶה*, and holiness is ascribed to them without respect to their moral conduct, but merely from the circumstance that they were (externally) separated from the gentiles, and (external) professors of the true religion. The same way of speaking became common in respect to Christians, who are frequently called in the New Testament *ἅγιοι, ἡγιασμένοι*, merely from the circumstance that they profess externally the Christian religion, and belong externally to the Christian community, and thus are distinguished from Jews and gentiles. Hence all who were received into the visible Christian Church, by baptism, were called *ἅγιοι, Christians*, without respect to their moral disposition, as appears from the Epistles to the Corinthians.

(2) These terms are also evidently used by the sacred writers in a *moral* sense. Lev. 19: 2, "Be ye holy, for I am holy." Cf. 1 Pet. 1: 14—16. So *ἁγιασμός*, in Rom. 6: 22, is the same as *δικαιοσύνη* in vs. 18, 19, *virtue, righteousness*; *ἁγιωσύνη*, 1 Thess. 3: 13, and *ἁγιάζειν*, 5: 23. *Ἀγιασμός*, in Heb. 12: 14, is that *without which no man shall see the Lord*. The same is true of *ὀσιος* and *δσιότης*, Ephes. 4: 24. Luke 1: 75, *δσιότης καὶ δικαιοσύνη*. It here denotes that blamelessness of feeling and conduct, which is required, according to the divine precepts, from a true worshipper of God, and especially from a Christian; and also the habitual abhorrence of sin and love of moral excellence. Cf. 1 John 3: 7, *δίκαιός ἐστι καθὼς ἐκεῖνος δίκαιός ἐστι*. Rom. 6: 18, *δουλεύειν δικαιοσύνη*, coll. v. 19, "He is dead to sin, and lives entirely for virtue." In this way, the Christian becomes like God, and loves him from similarity of disposition, and in return is loved by God; as a dutiful son who resembles his father, is loved by him. Man is destined for holiness, and the happiness proportionately connected with it, vid.

Vol. I. § 51, II. ; and when any one is admitted into the community of the Saints, (the Jews under the Old covenant, and Christians under the New,) his holiness is the great object aimed at. The Church is designed to be *schola sanctitatis*. Otherwise his admission into the Church, and his fellowship with the saints, will be of no advantage to him ; indeed his condemnation will be aggravated in consequence of these privileges. *Holiness* is, therefore, the evidence and result of *conversion*, or of *repentance* and *regeneration*. One who is destitute of holiness, or who is negligent in the pursuit of it, is not *converted*, or *born again*, or has not *repented*.—For an account of the nice distinctions and technical definitions of the words, *conversion*, *regeneration*, *repentance*, *renewal*, *sanctification*, which theologians formerly introduced into their systems, vid. Morus, p. 223. [Also cf. Hahn, S. 523, ff. Tr.]

§ 127. *Statement of the doctrine of moral reformation ; its commencement ; on putting off repentance ; and on late conversions.*

I. Scriptural doctrine respecting repentance and conversion ; inferences from it ; and an explanation of technical terms.

(1) Two things are justly considered as essential to the commencement of reformation ; viz. the knowledge of sin, as sin, and the sorrow of soul arising from it, or bitter penitence on account of sin and abhorrence for it. Christian repentance is therefore, a *lively* knowledge, agreeably to the precepts of the Gospel, of the sin which we have committed, as a great evil. This knowledge is called *lively*, when it is efficacious, and influences the will ; in opposition to a dead knowledge, which has no influence upon the determinations of the mind. These two things must belong to reformation of every kind, and to whatever object it relates ; for they are founded in the very nature of the human soul. Whenever a change takes place in human views and feelings, whether entire or partial, it is always effected by the same laws, and involves the same general feelings. In order that a man may renounce a particular vice, (suppose drunkenness,) his understanding must first apprehend it

as a fault, and must see its injurious consequences. The first effect is therefore produced upon the understanding, and next, through that, upon the will. The lively conception of the evil consequences of past transgression or of habitual vice, awakens sorrow for sin, aversion to it, and a determination henceforward to avoid it. But Christian reformation does not consist in the giving up of particular sins and vices, but in renouncing sinful dispositions and principles, in the turning of the heart from the love of sin to the love of goodness. Particular outbreakings of sin may be compared with particular symptoms of a dangerous disease: attempting to remove these, will be in vain, unless the disease itself is entirely cured. If this is done, these symptoms of course disappear. In the same way we should strive, not only to be rid of particular sins, but to be renewed in the whole temper of our souls.

The same things are essential to every kind of reformation; e. g. Jer. 3: 12, 13, where the Israelites are exhorted to renounce their idolatry; and 2 Cor. 7: 8—11, which describes the feelings produced among the Corinthians by the rebuke which Paul administered to them, on account of their indulgence to the incestuous person,—and these feelings were the cause of their reformation, or of their putting away the offence. Here *μετάνοια* is said expressly to consist mainly in *λύπη κατὰ θεόν*, *godly sorrow*, which was very beneficial to them after they became conscious of their guilt. Cf. Ezek. 18: 21, sq. Luke 3: 10—14.

Now since the nature and operations of the human soul are the same at all times, it is not to be wondered at, that the manner of moral reformation is described in the Old Testament as essentially the same as in the New. And, indeed, the *process* of reformation could not be different in the Old Testament and the New, since it depends upon the unaltered constitution of the human soul, of which God himself is the author. The experience of David (after his affair with Bathsheba) recorded in Ps. LI., is full of instruction on this point. It consists of the knowledge of his sin and desert of punishment, sorrow, repentance, desire of forgiveness, the earnest wish for reformation and for confirmed goodness; also of love, confidence, and sincere gratitude to God. Cf. Ps. xxxii.

The nature of reformation, and especially of its commencement, are clearly described by Christ in two parables.

(a) The parable of the pharisee and the publican, Luke 18:

9—14. The pharisee is very proud of his virtues and merits, and thinks no man is better than himself, and is fluent in praise of his own good works. The publican acknowledges his sins, is troubled and penitent. He utters the simple feeling of his heart in the few words, "God be merciful to me, a sinner." And Jesus decides, that the latter went down to his house forgiven by God; the other, not. Here, the man who believes that he shall obtain the grace of God on account of his own works or worthiness, through pride and selfish blindness remains ignorant of himself and his great imperfections, and does not see God as holy and just. He is not therefore inclined to embrace the doctrine of forgiveness through grace, without personal merit; and accordingly he is not forgiven. This mistake is called self-righteousness, from Rom. 10: 3. Cf. Dan. 9: 18. Is. 64: 6. This mistake is one of the most injurious and dangerous, because the man who makes it persuades himself that he does not need reformation.

(b) The excellent parable of the prodigal son, Luke xv. The object of this parable is two-fold. First, to show in what way a man comes to the knowledge of sin, and to the feeling of guilt; how he must humble himself, and acknowledge his unworthiness of the divine favors, and yet have confidence, and lay hold of, and embrace the undeserved forgiveness of God. Secondly; this parable shows how gracious and kind the feelings of God are, and how ready he is to forgive the repentant sinner. Vid. Luke 15: 7, 10. Cf. Töllner's Essays in his "Theol. Unters." Bd. I. Th. 2. S. 390, sq. "Busse und Glauben," also, "Ueber die Parabel vom verlorenen Sohn."

(2) *Sorrow for the sins we have committed*, (λύπη, 2 Cor. 7: 9, 10,) which is also an essential part of reformation, is called by theologians *contrition*, *brokenness of heart* (Germ. *Zerknirschung*). Our older theologians justly render and explain this term by the phrase *Reue und Leid* (penitence and sorrow). The term is taken from the Hebrew רָעָה רִיבָה and נִשְׁפָּרָה (lit. *wounded heart*), Ps. 34: 19. Is. 57: 19. Ps. 51: 19. Both of these terms are applied to a *desponding, contrite, troubled* mind, whatever the cause of the distress may be. Cf. Is. 61: 1, and other passages cited by Morus p. 218, n. 9. The lively knowledge of sin, as a great evil, necessarily involves unhappy feelings and sorrow (*dolor animi*, λύπη), Ps. 51: 19. Jer. 31: 19. Luke 18: 13. And since we are drawn

away to sin by the strength of our passions, and cold reason is far too weak to afford the necessary resistance; other feelings must be opposed to those which incline us to sin, in order to counteract their influence; for man is not merely a rational being, but is composed of sense and reason, (Germ. Vernünftig-sinnliches Wesen). Now it is a great object, and one of the chief advantages of religion, to excite and maintain these penitential feelings. Sorrow for sin is highly beneficial in its influence, and is essentially involved in true and radical reformation. Hence Paul, 2 Cor. 7: 9, calls this penitence and sorrow, *λύπην κατὰ θεόν*, *acceptable to God, agreeable to his will and purpose*; because it contributes to our salvation (*εἰς σωτηρίαν*). And because it does so, it is a repentance not to be repented of (*ἀμεταμέλητον*).

But this sorrow for sin is very different in degree both as to *strength* (*intensivé*) and *continuance* (*extensivé*). Men differ exceedingly from each other in respect to constitution, temperament, and the entire mental disposition. Accordingly their feelings, and the manner in which they express them, are very different. No general rule can, therefore, be prescribed for all, respecting the degree of sorrow which it is necessary to feel, and the manner in which it must be expressed. We have no definite measure of human feeling, —no *mathesis affectuum*. Let this, then, be the only rule by which we try ourselves and others: *Sorrow for sin is then only sufficiently great* (for the purpose of reformation), *when it produces in us a constant aversion to sin, remaining through our whole lives*. It implies the sincere wish: *would that I had not transgressed the divine commands*, and also the acknowledgment of the desert of punishment on account of such transgression. But while one is inclined from his very temperament to sorrow and despondency, or to violent outbreakings of feeling; another is naturally disposed to cheerfulness, is more considerate and reserved, and gives little vent to his emotions. Besides there are different degrees, both of actual sin and of inward corruption, in different men; and their feelings of sorrow will, of course, vary accordingly.

Sincerity of heart, is the great requisite here; Ps. 32: 2. It is on this only that God looks with approbation. The accurate recollection of each *particular* sin we have ever committed, is neither necessary nor possible. Still less are the *external, visible signs* of penitence and sorrow essential to reformation; unless they arise from the deep,

sincere sorrow of the heart. Whether the feelings of the heart shall be expressed by external signs, depends wholly upon the difference of men as to natural temperament and organization. As to tears, lamentations, and sighs,—they are of very little consequence in this matter. Provided the heart be renewed, whether it be with, or without tears, is a point of indifference. The tearless repentance of a man of a sedate cast of mind, may be more sincere and acceptable to God, than the penitence of a person of a more effeminate mould, which is attended with sighing and weeping, but which often passes soon away, and leaves no abiding effects. Cf. 124, I. II. We should beware however of considering persons to be hypocrites, because they make these violent demonstrations of feeling;—a rash decision, too often made! On this point we are liable to mistake, and religious teachers have often, from the earliest times, been in fault here. Many made too much of the term *contrition*, and undertook to lay down definite rules on this subject, and appealed to some examples and passages in the Bible, which are not, however, universally applicable; e. g. the repentance of David, Mary Magdalene, Peter, and the *repentance in sackcloth and ashes* mentioned in the Old Testament, which however, does not describe reformation of heart, but the public, external rites employed in case of pestilence and other great calamities. Such vehement expressions of feeling are not required of all men. The example of David, who spent three quarters of a year in trouble on account of his sins, is frequently mentioned here. But he had himself to blame for this; since he himself confesses, Ps. 32: 3, 4, that he endeavoured to *keep silence* respecting his sins, i. e. to exculpate himself before God, to palliate his guilt, and to avoid the necessity of humble confession and penitence. As soon as he acknowledged his sin, and repented of it, God forgave him, v. 5.

Christianity does not lay down any definite rule, or prescribe any artificial efforts, by which this moral change must be effected. It requires from each nothing but what is adapted to his nature. Peter *wept*, and considering his character and his crime, this was natural. The Publican only *sighed*. Zaccheus does not appear to have done either the one or the other. And yet the penitence and reformation of all, was acceptable in the sight of God.

According to the precepts of Christianity, this change must result in the suppression of the reigning desires of the flesh, and in re-

storing dominion to those principles of reason which are conformable to the will of God ; and thus renovating the whole man, and making him, before carnal (σαρκικός), to be spiritual (πνευματικός), obedient to the precepts of Christianity, and in a state prepared to enjoy the guidance and assistance of God, or the Holy Spirit. Cf. Rom. 7: 25. 8: 1, sq.

Theologians call the reformation of men who were before entirely rude and savage, *pœnitentiam primam*, or *magnam* ; that of those who are in a better moral condition, but still need reformation, *pœnitentiam stantium*, or *secundam*, or *quotidianam*. And all, even the greatest saints on earth, stand in need of this daily repentance, though in different degrees. None can justly consider themselves perfect. All must acknowledge themselves sinners, deficient and imperfect. So the Holy Scriptures require us to feel ; and everywhere insist upon sincere and unpretending humility, and condemn the opposite dispositions.

(3) Sorrow or penitence for sin, must flow from the *knowledge* of sin ; i. e. from a consciousness that we have acted contrary to the divine law, and therefore deserve divine punishments. Hence it follows, that we should impartially examine our actions according to the law of God. Now when one sees, that he has been ungrateful and disobedient, and rendered himself unworthy of the divine favor ; when, in view of this, he feels sorrow and sincere penitence, and begs God to pardon his sins, and avert deserved punishment ; this is called, *making confession of sin to God* (*confessio*). This is not, then, as some would have it, a particular part of repentance. It is the opposite of *concealing*, *exculpating*, *palliating* one's sins before God (refusing to acknowledge them as such, and to seek forgiveness for them). Prov. 28: 13, " He that covereth his sins shall not prosper ; but whoso confesseth and forsaketh them shall have mercy." So Christ represents it in the parable of the prodigal son, Luke xv. Vid. Ps. 32: 3—6. Dan. 9: 4. 1 John 1: 8, where *saying we have no sin*, is opposed to *ὁμολογεῖσθαι ἁμαρτίαν*, v. 9, to *acknowledge and repent of sin*.

The Bible says nothing of the necessity, which the Romish Church teaches, of making confession to men, as to *representatives* of God. It recommends, however, the practice of confessing our faults to experienced Christians, and of opening to them the state of our hearts, as conducive to vital religion ; cf. James 5: 16.

(4) Sorrow for sin, and hatred and abhorrence of it, are always founded on a previous knowledge of sin ; but they are produced in two ways ; viz.

(a) By contemplation of the divine *precepts* and the *penalty* threatened in the law against transgressors. The divine laws were given for our highest good. Every violation of them, both destroys the happiness flowing from obedience, and incurs the punishment annexed to disobedience. When the sinner seriously revolves such considerations as these, he must necessarily feel mingled emotions of shame, terror, anxiety on his own account, and abhorrence for sin itself. We find that Christ and the apostles made use of these considerations in order to awaken a salutary fear in the minds of their hearers ; vid. Matt. 3: 7, 10. Luke 3: 3, sq. Heb. 10 : 29, sq. This is called by the schoolmen and in the Romish Church, *attritio*, or as Thomas Aquinas has it, *contritio informis*, i. e. *imperfecta*, *inchoata* (*dolor de peccato e metu poenarum.*)

(b) By contemplation of the *divine promises*, contained in the gospel. When we consider, *on one side*, the undeserved love and kindness of God, exhibited in so many ways, and especially through Christ, and which has sought in every possible manner, to lead us to true happiness in this life and the life to come, and has invited and encouraged us by the greatest promises (John 3 : 16); and when we consider, *on the other side*, our own levity and negligence, our wilful rejection of the means of good offered us by God ; when we consider all this, we must be constrained to feel the deepest penitence and shame, abhorrence for sin, and love to God and Christ, who have done so much for us. These motives have a great and mighty efficacy in promoting radical reformation. Jesus and the Apostles use these motives more frequently than any others. Their whole heart, as it were, lives in them. Vid. John 3: 16. 21: 15, sq. 1 Pet. 4: 1—3. Tit. 2 : 10, 11. The schoolmen and the Romish Church call this *contritionem* (*dolorem de peccato e dilectione oriundum*). Thus this very consideration of the great blessings for which we are indebted to Christ, leads to faith in him. He who knows that much has been forgiven him, loves much, Luke 7: 47. Since Christ has done so much for us, and has even died for us, we are led to place our whole trust in him, and look to him for all our happiness, and to obey his commands from grateful love, John 3 : 5, 14—21. We see that by our sins we are rendered unhappy, that by our own

merit we cannot obtain the favor of God, not even by our best works. Hence we confide in Christ, and seek through faith in him to obtain forgiveness of God, ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῆναι, Gal. 3: 24. In this way we become *children of God*, (υἱοὶ θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ, v. 26,) *beloved of God*, and blessed by him.

Many of the schoolinen and theologians of the Romish Church, reject altogether the motives first mentioned, asserting that they are not at all promotive of our moral improvement. The Antinomians of the sixteenth century expressed themselves in a similar manner, with many others. It is true that this *attrition* may be so abused as to lead to a despair, which will absolutely prevent, instead of promoting reformation. But still when it is cautiously made use of, especially in the case of rude and uncultivated men, it produces a very good effect, and is therefore employed in the Old Testament, by John the Baptist, and Jesus himself with many classes of hearers. Some are entirely incapable of the tender emotions, to which the appeal is made in this second class of motives. Their heart must be broken and softened, before it can become susceptible of the motives of the gospel. There is in this respect the same difference even in adult persons, that there is between children, some of whom are ill-mannered and rude, and others, docile and well disposed. The wise teacher will employ different means with these different cases; and so must also the teacher of religion. Vid. Töllner's Essay (No. 1) "Busse und Glauben."

When one is reformed, the love of sin, now renounced, is succeeded in his mind by *holiness, diligence in duty*, or pious Christian dispositions and a holy Christian walk. Cf. § 126, IV. Hence some theologians of the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century, took *poenitentia* in so wide a sense, as to include *faith and diligence in good works*.

Morus, (pp. 216, 217, § 2,) has given a good summary statement of the different parts of reformation here separately considered. The *inward man* is principally regarded in Christian reformation. The object is not merely to restrain the gross outbreakings of sin, but to rectify the whole disposition and heart; so that the subject of it will henceforth act from entirely different motives and principles. The Holy Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, insist every where, that the νοῦς, καρδία, πνεῦμα, ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, must be renovated. The terms, *circumcision of the heart, new heart, reno-*

vation, regeneration, new creature, all express this truth. Vid. John 3: 1—21; also No. vi. in "*Scripta Varii Argumenti*," above cited. If any one expects to succeed, by attempting to amend externally, or in any other way, than by a radical change of heart, he will be disappointed; vid. No. I. 1.

II. *Delay of repentance ; and late conversion.*

This subject is treated more fully in Christian ethics.

(1) The *danger* and *evil* of delaying reformation. (a) The *danger* and *difficulties*. The longer one continues in sin, the more fixed becomes his habit of sinning, and of course, the more difficulty will he find in breaking loose from it. He will thus become more and more the slave of sin, and be constantly bound with stronger chains. The longer therefore reformation is deferred, the more difficult it becomes. Besides, external circumstances are not in our power. Many die suddenly; others lose the use of their reason, or in their last moments are entirely unfitted for the mental efforts which are requisite, for attending to the important concerns of religion; etc. (b) There must always be an *evil* and *injury* attending late reformations, however thorough and sincere they may be. God proportions the rewards he bestows, to the degree of zeal which one shows in goodness, and to the length of time during which he has exhibited it. Vid. § 125, II. One who has just commenced a virtuous course and has made but little advancement in it, cannot expect a great reward. In the future life, he must remain inferior to others, and thus suffer for his remissness and negligence.

(2) The opinions of theologians have always been very much divided on the question as to the *possibility* of late repentance, and the worth of it. Vid. the history of these opinions in Hegelmeyer's Diss. "*de sera poenitentia*," P. I. Tübingen, 1780.

First. Most hold, with truth, that late reformation is possible, and that God may pardon, (though with the limitations mentioned, No. 1,) even those who defer repentance to the last, if it is then thorough and sincere. They hold however, for the reasons above given, that such late conversions are very doubtful, and that great caution should be used in speaking confidently of the salvation of those who put off religion to the last, lest this should tend to confirm others, to their great injury, in their prevailing errors. It is unsafe for men to

pronounce any opinion in such a case. For there is no evidence of true faith, but the works of the life. None but God can look into the heart. But since God can look into the very soul; since he will forgive, without exception, all who sincerely repent of their sins, and ask forgiveness through Christ, in the way which he has prescribed (1 Tim. 2 : 4. 2 Pet. 3 : 9.) ; and since the grace of God is limited to no *time*, to no *terminum gratiae peremptorium* (§ 113. I. 3) ; there can be no doubt *in abstracto*, but that God will really forgive those who seek for pardon, though it may be late, if their desire be only sincere and earnest. He will bestow even upon such, that happiness and reward of which they are susceptible. The example of the malefactor on the cross, Luke 23 : 40—43, is justly referred to in behalf of this opinion. The Christian doctrine justifies us in promising pardon and mercy to all, even the greatest sinners, at all times, provided they will only accept these offers. To cut off, therefore, an unhappy dying man from all hope, and to thrust him into despair, is without scriptural warrant, and highly presumptuous and cruel.

Secondly. Others regard late repentance as impossible, and hold that one who has deferred it to the last cannot hope for pardon ; because, they say, late repentance never can be *true* or *sincere*, and this is a condition indispensable to forgiveness. They appeal to the example of many, who in prospect of death gave signs of repentance, but who, as soon as danger was past, became worse than before.

But (a) there are also examples of a different kind ;—examples of those, who, like the thief on the cross, became repentant and believing in circumstances of imminent danger, and who yet have afterwards manifested an unshaken fidelity. (b) Those who advocate this opinion often mistake the want of *perseverance* in faith, for the want of *sincerity* in it. (c) The examples mentioned do not prove, that late repentance is *never* sincere and thorough ; but only that it is not *always* so ; which indeed is true.

The great argument, however, which is used on this side is, that *conversion is not the work of a moment* (not *subitanea* or *instantanea*), but requires *time*, earnestness, zeal, practice. This is true from the very nature of the human mind. But this only proves the great difficulty, the uncertainty, and danger of such late conversions ; and not the entire impossibility of them. Many men, in whom the work of conversion is not completed, are still not entirely *evil*, and

destitute of all good. The seed of goodness frequently lies in their hearts; while its growth and fruitfulness are impeded and prevented by various internal and external hinderances. But this work may have been silently and unobservedly going on, in the midst of these difficulties. And now unexpectedly some external circumstance occurs, as a means of awakening. The person hears a moving exhortation, is reminded of some promise or threatening from the Bible, is placed in imminent danger, or in some such manner is aroused, and impelled to attend more earnestly to the concerns of his soul. These circumstances depend on divine providence, and God makes use of them as means for the conversion of men. This appears to have been the case with the malefactor on the cross. Probably there had been a long preparation in his mind, for the result to which he then came. The passage, Heb. 6: 4—6, *ἄδύνατον—παραισδόντας—ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετένοιαν*, has no relation to this point. This passage refers to those who persevere in apostasy and the rejection of religion. The phrase, *ἄδύνατον ἐστὶ*, means only, that it is *impossible for men*; cf. Matt. 19: 26.

Those theologians who differ so widely from the Bible as to hold, that the forgiveness of men depends *altogether* upon their holiness or obedience to the divine commandments, and not upon faith in Christ and his atonement, are indeed hard pressed in this point. If they would be consistent, they must deny salvation to those who delay repentance till just before the close of life, and who therefore do not exhibit the fruits of this change. So even Steinbart thought. The Holy Scriptures, on the contrary, teach that God forgives men on account of their faith in Jesus Christ; that holiness is the consequence of this faith, and that without this faith in Christ man is not able to live holy. Now if a man, whose reformation begins with faith, is prevented by death from exhibiting the fruits of this faith (which however, he would have exhibited had he lived longer); he cannot, on this account, be excluded by God from happiness; although his happiness will be less than that of others, who have pursued a long course of active virtue. Thus we might conclude *in abstracto*; the determination in particular given cases, must be left with God.

Note. The work of Noesselt, "Ueber den Werth der Moral und späten Besserung" (Halle, 1777, 8vo. Ausg. 2. 1783; especially s. 220, sq.), contains much on this subject which is excellent. This work was occasioned by the unsettled,

partial, and indefinite views contained in many works on this subject, especially in those which held up the opinion, that late repentance is impossible or of no avail; such, for example, as that of Saurin, "On the delay of conversion;" Edw. Harwood, "On the invalidity of repentance on the death bed;" and Steinbart, on the question, "What value can be allowed to sudden conversions, especially on the death bed; and what is it advisable publicly to teach on this subject?" Berlin, 1770, 8vo.

§ 128. *Remarks on the false opinions and perversions concerning the doctrine of repentance, which have been gradually adopted in the Christian Church.*

Most of these mistakes have arisen from false ideas, agreeing with the depraved inclinations of the human heart, respecting *forgiveness of sin, propitiating God, and the merit of good works*. Cf. § 108, and § 125, III.

I. Penance of the excommunicated.

The apostles and other ancient Christian teachers, held that it is the prerogative of God alone to forgive sin, and that men are bound to confess their sins to him, and to seek forgiveness from him. So taught Justin the Martyr (Apol. 2), and others. But even as early as the times of the Apostles the custom, which had before prevailed among the Jews, of excommunicating gross offenders from the church (*ἀποκοινωνός*), was adopted by Christians, and was indeed necessary *at that time*. The rites attending restoration to the Church became constantly more numerous and complex, during the second, third and fourth centuries. Those who were restored were compelled to perform *public penance* (*penitentia publica*). The excommunicated person (*lapsus*) was bound (1) to labor to convince the Church of the reality of his penitence and reformation. He appeared, therefore, in public in a mourning dress; he fasted, wept, and begged for prayers (*contritio*). (2) He was bound to make a public confession of sin, and to ask forgiveness of the Church; and this, in order to humble him and to warn others (*confessio*). (3) His undergoing these and other trials and punishments, imposed upon him as the condition of his being readmitted,

was called *satisfactio*; and he obtained *pacem*. Vid. Morini, *Tractatus de pœnitentiæ sacramento*. This was originally only Church discipline, and nobody pretended that it was connected with the forgiveness of sins by God, who looks not upon the outward man, but upon the heart. Indeed, Montanus in the second century, and Novatian in the third, though they were so rigorous in Church discipline that they were unwilling to readmit a person who had been once excluded, did not deny that he might obtain forgiveness from God.

II. Penance supposed the means of obtaining the forgiveness of God.

We find that the great body of Christians, since the second century, have entertained very erroneous apprehensions respecting this excommunication. Many believed (although the doctrine was not as yet formally sanctioned by the authority of the Church), that a person by being excommunicated from the Church is also excluded from communion with God. But they also held, that when the Church forgives a person and admits him again to their fellowship, God also forgives him and admits him to his favor. And this opinion was more dangerous in its tendency, than the former. The Church, and especially those who ruled over it, who had the most to say in this matter, came to be regarded, more and more as the representatives of God; vid. § 135, I. Hence great importance was attached to the external rite in the readmission of the excommunicated. The idea became prevalent, that God is influenced, and moved, as it were, to compassion, by fasting, weeping, kneeling, begging and sighing. In short, it was believed that a person could obtain forgiveness of God by the same external means, by which the favor and forgiveness of the Church and its rulers could be obtained. And the teachers of religion often contributed to the increase of such errors, by insisting injudiciously upon these external rites. Even Origen sometimes expressed himself in this unguarded manner; e. g. in Homil. 15 in Levit. After the fourth century, the service of God was made to consist more and more in mere outward ceremonies.

III. Auricular Confession.

When the Christian Church was much enlarged, the Grecian Church in the third century, and the Western Church in the third and fourth, commuted the public confession of the excommunicated, for private confession to be made to a Presbyter appointed for that purpose; vid. Sozom. IX. 35. This too was soon abolished in the Grecian Church; but it was retained in the Latin Church. Hence arose by degrees the practice of *auricular confession*, and then slowly, the whole system of public penance. At first the *lapsi* only were bound to confess their grosser offences to spiritual guides, before they could be reinstated and allowed to approach the Holy Supper. But in process of time, every Christian was required to confess to the clergy all his sins, even the least of them, before he could be admitted to the Lord's Table. The clergy and the monks confirmed the populace in the persuasion, to which it was itself predisposed, that confession to the priest was the same as confession to God; and that the priests gave absolution in God's stead.

This much abused principle, that confession must be made to spiritual teachers and the heads of the Church, is found very early, even in the third century; e. g. in the writings of Origen (Homil. in Levit.), and especially of the Latin fathers Cyprian, Hieronymus, and Augustine. They compared the Presbyter with a physician, who can not heal a disease if he is not made acquainted with it. In all these rites, there is much which is good, and which might be practised to great advantage, and, indeed, was so in the early Church. But afterwards, when the priesthood and laity had both very much degenerated, they were greatly perverted and misapplied.

IV. Penance imposed by the clergy.

At first the Church imposed the *satisfaction* to be made by offenders. This was now done by the ecclesiastic, to whom confession was made. The penalties imposed by him were now no longer considered merely as *satisfaction given to the Church*. It was believed, that by these same means, God is rendered propitious, and his judgments are averted. It was also believed that the teachers and ministers of the Church are the representatives of

God. These ministers were now frequently compared, as indeed they had been during the third century, with the Levitical priests, who, in God's stead, imposed punishments for the purpose of atoning for sin, such as prayers, fasts, almsgiving, and other rites and gifts, which were now looked upon as meritorious good works, § 125. The ecclesiastics and monks had *books of penance*, in which the penalties were assigned for each particular sin. Vid. Joh. Dalläus, *De pœnis et satisfactionibus humanis*, Amst. 1649.

V. The doctrine of Indulgences.

At last the doctrine of *indulgences* was introduced. This was destructive of all morality. The practices of *penance* and *confession*, which at least during the darker periods of the middle ages, maintained to some degree an external discipline and order, fell at once into neglect and disuse. For by means of indulgences, the people obtained remission of the penances, and freedom from the canonical or ecclesiastical punishments of sin, which were imposed by their father confessors. These indulgences were first granted by the Bishops, when an individual offered of his own accord to perform some good work, to give alms, to found charitable institutions, to build churches, etc. They were afterwards sold for mere *money*. After some time the Pope appropriated the trade in indulgences to himself, and during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, carried on a wide extended monopoly in this business. Indulgences could now be purchased even for *future* sins. It was the prevailing belief, that these indulgences deliver not only from canonical punishments, i. e. from those imposed by the laws of the visible church; but also from the divine punishments, since the Pope is the Vicar of God and of Christ. After the thirteenth century this practice was sustained by the doctrine, *de thesauro bonorum operum*, which the Church and especially the Pope, the Head of the Church, were supposed to hold at their disposal, § 125.—The abuses attending this practice gave occasion to the reformation in Germany and Switzerland in the sixteenth century.

VI. Scholastic system of penance.

These erroneous opinions which had gradually arisen, were brought into a formal scholastic system by the schoolmen, and es-

pecially by Peter of Lombardy in the twelfth, and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. The whole doctrine of the Bible respecting *moral reformation* and a *change of heart*, was thus changed into a matter of *external penance*. This became the prevailing system of the Romish Church, and all these principles of the schoolmen were sanctioned by the Council at Trent, Sess. 14.

The following are the main principles of the schoolmen ; viz.

(1) *Pœnitentia* is derived from *punio*, according to Augustine, and therefore denotes *the punishment of one's self*. Hence originally the German *Busse*, which signifies *punishment, atonement*, etc. vid. § 126, IV.

(2) Each particular sin must be atoned for by particular *satisfactions*.

(3) Therefore every Christian must confess all his sins to the Minister of the Church, as a *priest* and *judge*, placed in God's stead.

(4) Conversion, therefore, consists of three things ; viz. *contritio*, or *compunctio cordis*, *confessio oris* (to the priest in God's stead), and *satisfactio operis* (*satisfaction* rendered by performing the penances imposed). All this was borrowed from the ancient Ecclesiastical discipline. Vid. No. I. on the distinction between *attritio* and *contritio*. Cf. § 127, I. 3.

(5) This *satisfaction* or atonement must be made by prayer, alms, fasts, and other external rites and bodily chastisements. Accordingly Peter of Lombardy says, *Oratio dominica delet minima et quotidiana peccata. Sufficit oratio dominica cum elemosynis et jejuniis*. Vid. § 108.

(6) This *poena satisfactoria* which must, in the usual course, be endured, may be somewhat remitted, says Thomas Aquinas, by means of *indulgences*. But this principle was afterwards very much extended. Vid. No. V.

(7) One who is not absolved of his pardonable sins by rendering such satisfactions, goes at death into *purgatory*, where, in the midst of torments, he must make atonement for them. The doctrine *de purgatorio*, was propagated during the fourth century in the West, and universally prevailed from the ninth to the eleventh centuries. It was believed, however, that souls could be freed from purgatory, or, at least, that their continuance there could be shortened, by having masses said for their souls ; vid. § 150.

ARTICLE TWELFTH.

ON THE OPERATIONS OF GRACE ; OR THE DIVINE INSTITUTIONS FOR
PROMOTING REPENTANCE AND FAITH ; §§ 129—133, INCL.

§ 129. *Explanation of the terms GRACE, OPERATIONS OF GRACE, MEANS OF GRACE, and other phrases employed in theology on this subject ; and the connexion of this doctrine with the preceding.*

I. Connexion of this doctrine with the foregoing ; and the import of it.

The whole Christian doctrine is given by God to men in order to bring them to faith and repentance, and consequently to eternal happiness. For they are not capable of this happiness, until they perform the conditions described in Article Eleventh. But, as the Scriptures teach us, we are not at present in a condition to amend ourselves, and by our own powers to fulfil these conditions, *without some higher assistance and guidance of God*. This incompetency is owing to the power of sense, and its preponderance over reason, or, which is the same thing, to *natural depravity* ; vid. §§ 77—80. Now though man needs a moral change, his will, according to both Scripture and experience, being in a high degree depraved ; he is yet unable, without divine help and assistance, either to awaken within himself earnest desires after holiness, or to execute the good purposes he may form and persevere in them, or to perform the other conditions upon which his salvation depends. All the arrangements, therefore, which God has made, in order to produce in those who live in Christian lands faith in Christ and a change of heart,

and to secure their continuance, and thus to bring men to the enjoyment of the promised salvation, are called by the general name of *grace*, or the operations of divine grace (*operationes gratiæ*, Germ. *Gnadenwirkungen*).

II. The various names by which these operations are commonly designated in theology.

(1) *Gratia*. By this term is understood in theology, the divine operations or power (*assistance*), exerted in producing repentance or conversion. It is contrasted with *nature*, and by this is meant, the natural powers of man, which, on account of his depravity, are regarded as too weak and insufficient to effect this moral renovation, and therefore need to be elevated and strengthened by God. The state of one who is enlightened by Christian doctrine, and by a faithful use of it, under divine assistance, is renewed, is called a *state of grace* (*status gratiæ*). This is opposed to the *natural state* (*status naturæ*, or *naturalis*), by which is meant the state of one who is not as yet enlightened by the Christian doctrine or renovated by its influence, and has not yet experienced the assistance of God. Morus pp. 234, 235. Augustine first used the word *gratia*, to denote the supernatural agency of God in conversion. He held this agency to be, in reality, *miraculous*, and therefore *irresistible*; vid. § 132. This use of the term has since been retained in theology, even by those who have discarded the erroneous opinions of Augustine.

Χάρις is used in the Bible to denote, (a) *the undeserved divine favor towards men in general*; (b) *the result and proof of this favor*, in the particular blessings bestowed; and (c) *more especially the blessings for which we are indebted to Christ*, pardon, the forgiveness of sins, and all the Christian privileges connected with forgiveness. Hence *all the operations of God on the hearts of men*, in promoting repentance and holiness, are comprehended by the sacred writers under the term *χάρις*, as being the most distinguished favors; although these are not the only favors intended by this term in its scriptural usage, but the others now mentioned are also often designated by it; vid. § 88, II. Note.

The whole series of operations and means which God employs to bring men to the enjoyment of the blessedness procured by Christ, is called in theology, *œconomia gratiæ*, the *œconomy* or *dispensation of grace* (Germ. *Gnadenanstalt* or *Einrichtung*). Theologians dis-

tinguish here (α) *actus* or *operationes gratiæ*, i. e. the gracious, salutary influences (also called *auxilia gratiæ*), by which men are brought to salvation; and (β) the *media gratiæ*, i. e. the means which God employs in exerting these influences on the hearts of men; the means of repentance or holiness. These means are the *Word of God*,—the divine doctrine, especially that made known through Christ. The theologians of Tübingen have sometimes given the name *gratia applicatrix*, to these divine operations, because, through them, God applies to us the merit of Christ to be embraced by faith, i. e. he places us in a condition in which we actually realize the fruits of Christ's merits.

(2) These *operationes gratiæ*, are sometimes called the office of the Holy Spirit (*officium* or *munus Spiritus Sancti*, or better, his *opus*, *business*, *work*, cf. § 105, I. 2.); because the sanctifying divine influences are frequently ascribed in the Scriptures to the Holy Spirit. Some theologians have ascribed a *four-fold*, and others a *five-fold* office to the Spirit in renewing the heart of man; viz. *elenticum*, *didacticum*, *pædenticum*, *paracleticum*, and others, *epanorthoticum*. A different division is made by others. This form of the doctrine is derived from the passage, John 16: 7—15. But there the thing principally intended, is the instruction which the apostles should receive from the Holy Spirit, by which they themselves should be enabled to teach men, to exhort them to repentance, and to convince (*ἐλέγχειν*) them of their unbelief. This passage, then, does not speak of the renewing influences of the Holy Spirit on the hearts of *all* Christians. Though all these renewing influences are, beyond a question, ascribed every where in the Scriptures to God, and especially to the Holy Spirit. Vid. § 131.

Note. The various, and mostly fruitless, controversies which have prevailed among theologians, especially since the time of Augustine, respecting the manner in which the agency of God is exerted in renewing the heart of man, and likewise the various technical terms and fine distinctions which have been introduced, have rendered this Article one of the most difficult and involved in the whole system of Theology. These subtleties, however, should have no place in the religious instruction given to the unlearned Christian. It is sufficient for him to know, (1) that he owes his renewal, not to himself and his own powers; but (2) that it is the result of that powerful divine assistance, which God denies to none for this purpose; (3) that faith and repentance are not produced by an irresistible influence, but that man can resist them; (4) that in the case of those who enjoy the Word of God (revealed religion), the

saving change is effected by God, through this Word, as a means; and that (5) those, therefore, who enjoy the Word of God are to expect no divine assistance, entirely disconnected from it; though they may look for this assistance in connexion with the faithful use of the Word of God; and that, accordingly, (6) man must not be passive and supine in this work, but carefully use all the opportunities and means which divine grace affords him.

Erasmus remarked in his work, "*Contra librum Lutheri de servo arbitrio*," that it is not essential that one should be able to determine accurately and logically the manner in which grace operates on the heart, if he only inwardly experiences these renewing influences. Not every one who imagines that he understands the manner in which the divine agency is exerted, has himself, of necessity, actually experienced it; and the reverse. Nor is it either necessary or possible, in particular cases, to determine definitely how much man himself (*natura*) has contributed to his own improvement, and how much *grace* has done for him; provided he sincerely believes, that he owes his *entire* renewal to the unmerited divine compassion. Vid. Morus p. 229, note, and pp. 236, 237.

§ 130. *What are the operations of divine grace for promoting the repentance and salvation of those who live in Christian lands; and what means does God employ in exerting these influences on their hearts?*

I. In what the operations of divine grace consist; and in what order they follow.

We shall first exhibit this doctrine in the form in which it is commonly treated in theological systems, and then show, how it may be more simply and intelligibly represented.

(1) The common method in theological schools is, to describe these various divine operations by figurative terms drawn from the Bible, often using them, however, in a different sense from that in which they are there used; and then to treat particularly and separately of *calling*, *illumination*, *regeneration*, *union with God*, *sanctification* and *renovation*. The result of this has been, that these particular parts are conceived of as different and distinct, while in truth, they are most intimately connected; vid. § 126, in prin. Theologians make the following division of these influences, and suppose them to follow in this order. (a) Man is invited by the truths of the Christian religion to repent and accept the salvation

offered him (*vocatio*). (b) He now attains a proper, lively, and salutary knowledge of Christian truth (*illuminatio*). (c) When the understanding entertains just views, then the *will* is renewed. Good feelings and dispositions arise in place of sinful ones (*regeneratio*). (d) This work of illumination and regeneration, must be carried on by ever increasing divine influences; and thus progressive sanctification, or entire holiness will be effected; and the higher the degrees of divine influence, the more closely will man become united with God (*unio mystica*). The proper scriptural import of most of these terms was explained, § 126; and the *unio mystica* in § 119, I. 3. Cf. Morus p. 232. *Calling* and *illumination* still remain to be explained.

(a) *Illumination*. This word is commonly explained in theology in such a way as to render it applicable only to the true believer. It denotes that true and living knowledge of the doctrines of salvation, which has a powerful efficacy upon the *will*, which is not the case with the knowledge which unregenerate men possess. So that, as theologians explain it, *illuminare aliquem* is the same as, *cum effectu salutari docere aliquem*. Of such a kind indeed, must our knowledge be, in order to be salutary and saving; and to make it so, is the object of the divine influences. In the Bible, however, this term is differently used in a wider and narrower sense. *To enlighten*, φωτίζειν, נִהְיָאֵר, means (a) to *instruct, teach*. It is used by the LXX. as synonymous with διδάσκειν, κ. τ. λ. And human teachers are said to enlighten men, as well as God. Thus Eph. 1: 18, "The eyes of the understanding being enlightened," and 3: 9, φωτίζειν, and 2 Cor. 4: 6. Heb. 6: 4, φωτισμός. For *φῶς* is *intelligence, clear knowledge*, and the opposite, σκότος, is *ignorance*. Of the same import is the phrase, ἀνοίγειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, Acts 26: 18, etc. All this is the same as the phrase, δοῦναι γνῶσιν σωτηρίας, Luke 1: 77. (β) *Light* and *darkness* also signify *prosperity* and *adversity*. Hence, in the scriptural use, (γ) both meanings are sometimes united in these words, (in the widest sense,) —instruction and the happiness which results from it. Thus Christ is said φωτίζειν τὸν κόσμον, and to be φῶς κόσμου, a *teacher and benefactor* of the world, John 1: 4. 8: 12. In the Scriptures, therefore, illumination signifies, instruction in those truths which God gives to men for their salvation. It is always the end of this illumination, to influence the will and to promote holiness; but through

the fault of man, this end is not always attained. Those with respect to whom the design of God is attained, are savingly enlightened. But in a wider sense even the wicked may be said, according to the Scripture use of this term, to be *enlightened*, i. e. converted. Hence *φωτισθέντες* is frequently a general name of those who live in Christian lands, because they are better instructed, although they are not all savingly enlightened.

(b) *Calling, gracious calling.* Theologians understand by this term, the offer of the blessings purchased by Christ which is made to men, whether they accept the offer or not. This use of the term has its origin principally in some of the parables of Christ, in which he describes the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom, or Christian privileges, under the image of a great feast, to which many guests (*κεκλημένοι*) are invited, many of whom despise the invitation, and only a few accept it, as Matt. 22: 3, sq. Now some have undertaken to apply this beautiful figure employed by Christ, to all the cases in which *κλησεις, κλητοί, καλεῖν* occur in the apostolical writings, by which the greatest violence is done to these terms. In most of the passages of the New Testament, in which *καλεῖν* stands without any farther qualification, it signifies, not merely to *offer* Christian privileges to any one, but actually to impart them. It denotes admission into the Christian church, and the enjoyment of Christian rights. *Κλητοί* are those, who have not only received an invitation to become Christians, but are real Christians (such as are admitted); and *κλησεις* is, in general, that divine favor conferred on any one, by which God counts him worthy of the privileges of Christianity. It is therefore frequently a blessing bestowed only upon actual Christians. *Κλησεις* therefore frequently signifies the particular advantages which any one obtains by means of Christianity; vid. Rom. 1: 7. 2 Thess. 2: 14. 2 Pet. 1: 3. Ephes. 4: 4, *ἐλπίς κλήσεως*. Heb. 3: 1, *κλησεις ἐπουράνιος*, etc.; and when Christ says, Matt. 20: 14, many are *called* (enjoy the advantages of Christian instruction); few belong to the *chosen* (those who are truly good and acceptable to God).

But what is the origin of this use? From the ancient use of the words *קָרָא* and *καλεῖν*. They were used to denote *calling*, i. e. *accepting, receiving; designing or nominating any one to a particular service, employment, office, privilege, etc.* Hence it was said of priests and prophets whom God took into his service, that they

were *called*; and so of Abraham, whom he chose to be his peculiar friend; and of the Israelites, whom he received and selected from among others, as his own people; e. g. Is. 48: 12. The particular members of the Christian society to whom this benefit happened, are called *κλητοί*. Thus Paul uses the words *κλησεις* and *καλεῖν* of the external election of the Israelites to be the people of God, Rom. 11: 29, and 9: 11. This phraseology was now applied to Christians, denoting partly their external reception in the Christian community (Rom. 9: 24), and partly all the advantages and blessings which they receive through Christianity. We are able, therefore, according to Morus, to distinguish three different uses of the word *καλεῖν* in the New Testament, when it is used in reference to religion: viz. (a) *to admonish or counsel any one*, for his best good; (b) *to instruct him as to his welfare*, to point out to him and furnish him the means of attaining it (faith in Christ, which is active in good works); (c) *to offer and promise this good to any one*. So in the parables of Christ. When therefore God is said *to call* any one, the meaning is, in the theological sense, that he teaches him, or causes him to be instructed in the truths of salvation, that he may embrace them, and act accordingly, and that he promises him all the blessings and privileges connected with the Christian doctrine.

(2) The method best adapted to the nature of the subject, is, to divide all which God does to assist us in obtaining the blessings promised in the Gospel into three principal classes; viz.

FIRST. The first divine influences are intended to communicate to man the *knowledge* of the truths of the Christian religion, and of the blessedness purchased by Christ for mankind (*illuminatio*, in the wider sense). This must necessarily come first. For how can a man be disposed to desire or accept a divine favor, of which he knows nothing? Paul therefore says, very justly, Rom. 10: 14, "How should they serve God in whom they do not believe? And how should they believe in him of whom they know nothing (*οὐ οὐκ ἤκουσαν*)? And how should they know any thing of him, without being instructed?" By this instruction, man becomes acquainted with the divine decree (*predestinatio*), that the happiness promised through Christ is intended even for *him*, and that he must appropriate it to himself; that Christ has redeemed *him*, died for *him*; and that he, therefore, may obtain the forgiveness of sin, and eternal salvation, etc. In this way man is invited to receive

and obey the Christian doctrine, that his heart may be thus disposed; and this is called *vocatio*, in the widest sense.

This calling is sometimes said to be *universal*. If by this is meant, that the Christian religion and the blessedness attainable by it is actually offered to all, and that all have opportunity to become acquainted with it, and that those who do not know and receive it, can blame only themselves; the statement is false and contrary to historical fact. For the blessings of Christianity are not published, even to the present day, to all nations, to say nothing of all men; because God must know, that at present all are not prepared to receive these blessings; though doubtless he does not wholly neglect even such, but in a different way conducts them to all that happiness of which they are capable, and will doubtless continue to do so, throughout the future world. Vid. § 121, II. Cf. § 88, II.

In another sense, however, this gracious calling is truly and scripturally said to be universal; in the sense namely, (*a*) that all people and individuals have free access to the grace of God in Christ, as soon as they have opportunity to become acquainted with it; and (*b*) that every real Christian, without exception, may enjoy the whole sum of blessedness procured by Christ, by complying with the prescribed conditions (*πίστις καὶ μετάνοια*, Art. XI.).

SECOND. The next class of operations go to secure our actual enjoyment of the blessedness promised us and procured for us by Christ. These operations take effect when man no longer acts in opposition to the knowledge which his understanding has received; but faithfully complies with it, follows what he knows to be right, and allows his will to be governed by it; so that his knowledge is no longer dead, but living. It is in fact the same divine agency which enlightens the understanding, and renews the will. Whatever is done in the understanding has the renewal of the will for its object, and is for this end effected. This divine agency has for its aim the production of faith and repentance, the excitement of Christian dispositions, and the salutary consequences thence resulting; Rom. 5: 5, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, 14: 17, *δικαιοσύνη, εἰρήνη, χαρὰ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*. Tit. 3: 4—7. The *pouring out of the Holy Spirit* is, in this passage, producing and communicating the Christian temper of which God is the Author, and by which we become *κληρονομοὶ ζωῆς αἰωνίου*.

This is *calling* in the stricter sense, [or *effectual* calling,] and *regeneration* (*conversio transitiva*) in the theological sense ; § 126.

When any one feels a firm and lively conviction of the truths of salvation with which he is acquainted, God grants him power to subdue his sinful desires, and cheerfully to obey the divine precepts. Thus (*a*) the internal hindrances to faith and repentance, by which we are kept from the enjoyment of spiritual happiness, are removed ; and ignorance, error, prejudice, and the prevailing bias to sense, are weakened. Vid. Morus, p. 226, n. 1, where the texts of Scripture are cited. (*b*) On the contrary, man is led by God, to entertain better views ; is inclined to faith and repentance, and is brought into a state in which he is ready and able to repent and believe. Both of these particulars are comprised in the expression of Christ : *God draws* (*ἐλκύειν*) *men to believe in him* ; i. e. he convinces them, and renders them disposed to this duty, John 6: 44. Vid. Morus, p. 227, Not. 2.

THIRD. The third class of divine operations relates to the preservation of faith, and the continuance of the entire happy condition resulting from it. Faith is *saving* only on certain conditions. These are, its firmness, growth and increase, and the showing of it by good works, or Christian virtues ; vid. § 124, IV. This class comprehends therefore (*a*) those divine operations and institutions which tend to increase our knowledge of the great truths of salvation, and perfect our acquaintance with them. The state resulting from these influences is commonly called *illuminatio regentorum*. (*b*) Those influences by which the Christian is advanced in holiness and fitted for the practice of Christian virtue, so as to attain a habit of goodness (*renovatio* and *sanctificatio* in the theological sense ; § 126). Both of these influences are noticed 2 Thess. 2: 17, θεὸς —στηρίζαι ὑμᾶς ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ. The latter is mentioned 1 Thess. 5: 23, θεὸς—ἀγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὁλοτελεῖς ; cf. 3: 13.

Note. When the enlightening of the mind into the knowledge of the truths of salvation and the learning of these truths, is spoken of, it is only so far as these truths are *practical*, and stand in connexion with the plan of salvation (Art. XI.), and so have an influence on the holiness or moral improvement of men. These illuminating divine influences are not intended to convey learned theological science to the mind, or to teach the Holy Scriptures theoretically. All this must be done by each individual by his natural efforts. The divine influences are directed only to *moral* ends, producing faith and repentance, and renewing the heart. It is therefore possible for an unregenerate

and wicked man, who has not therefore experienced these renewing influences, to possess a fundamental theoretic knowledge of religion, which he may have acquired by his own diligence. And if he is a teacher, he may clearly explain to others the doctrines of the Bible, and convince them, and thus be the means of good. Cf. Phil. 1: 16—18. This good, however, will be very much prevented by the fact, that hearers give much more regard to the example, than to the doctrines of their teacher, and that what does not go from the heart, does not commonly reach the heart.—Again; these divine influences have different *degreess*, since the *capacity* for them is different in different men. Vid. § 124, III,

II. The *means* which God employs in producing these effects.

The doctrine of the Protestant church has always been, that God does not act *immediately* on the heart in conversion, or, in other words, that he does not produce ideas in the understanding and effects in the will, by his absolute divine power, without the employment of external means. This would be such an immediate illumination and conversion as fanatics contend for, who regard their own imaginations and thoughts as effects of the Holy Spirit. Morus, p. 231, Not. The doctrine of the Protestant church is, that God exerts these reforming influences *mediately*; and that the means which he employs with those who have the Holy Scriptures, is *the divine doctrine taught in them, especially the truths of Christianity*, in their full extent, comprising *law* and *gospel* (*precept* and *promise*). On this subject, cf. § 123, III. It is only through the medium of these truths, that these effects are produced, and not in a direct manner.

The sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are enumerated among the *means of grace*, and are so called. This is proper, if we remember, that these sacraments do not exert an influence through themselves alone, as external rites of religion; but only as connected with the word of God, or so far as the truths of the Christian religion are connected with them, are sensibly exhibited and impressively set forth by them, and so through their means are personally appropriated by men. Every thing here comes back to the word of God, or the revealed doctrines of Christianity, which is the medium through which God exerts his influence, even in the sacraments.

The fact that God exerts these influences in the conversion of men, through the doctrines of revelation, is established,

(1) By such passages of Scripture as expressly declare, that faith, repentance and holiness are excited and produced in the human heart by God, through the influence of Christian truth; as 2 Pet. 1: 3, "The divine power hath given us, by means of the Christian doctrine (ἐπίγνωσις), all the means which we need in order to live piously and godly." Rom. 10: 17, 18, ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς, cf. v. 14. James 1: 18, "God has renewed us λόγῳ ἀλήθειας." Connect with these all the texts in which the Christian doctrine is compared with seed sown by God, falling upon the human heart and bearing fruit, Luke 8: 11, sq. 1 Pet. 1: 23, σπορά. 1 John 3: 9, σπέρμα Ἀὐτοῦ μένει ἐν αὐτῷ. 1 Thess. 2: 13. 2 Tim. 3: 16. John 8: 31, 32.

(2) The texts which declare, that through this divine doctrine, Christians are brought to the enjoyment of blessedness, and are preserved in it. John 17: 17, 20. 2 Cor. 3: 6, πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ. 1 Tim. 4: 16, "If thou rightly teachest the Christian doctrine, σεαυτὸν σώσεις καὶ ἀκούοντάς σου." Ephes. 6: 13—17, where it is shown in figures, that by the right use of the Christian doctrine, one may advance far in all Christian virtues, and may secure himself against apostasy. 1 John 5: 4, "By your faith in the Son of God you overcome the world." James 1: 21, the Christian doctrine is called ἔμφυτος λόγος, i. e. the doctrine implanted in Christians, in which they are instructed; as Paul uses φυτεύειν, 1 Cor. 3: 6, sq., adding δυνάμενος σώσαι ψυχὰς ὑμῶν. Morus cites other passages, p. 225, § 1, not. 1.

Note. It has become common in theological schools to denominate the *divine doctrine*, the sum of which is contained in the Holy Scriptures, the *Word of God*, from a literal translation of מִן־הַכָּתוּבִים, ῥῆμα or λόγος θεοῦ or Χριστοῦ. This term denotes the declarations, oracles, revelations made in the Bible, and hence the *divine doctrine* or *instruction* in general, as Pss. cxix. civ. cv. etc. Thus in the New Testament, the Christian doctrine is denominated simply λόγος. In later times, it has become common to call the Bible itself, considered as a book, the *Word of God*; and many have ascribed a *divine* and *supernatural* power to the Bible as a book. In this way occasion has been given to the mistake, of ascribing to the book as such, what belongs to the *truths* or *doctrines* contained in it. This is never done in the Holy Scriptures themselves. There the *Word of God* is the divine doctrine itself, with which we are made acquainted by this book, but which can be efficacious without the book, as it was in the first ages of Christianity, before the writings composing the New Testament were written. For the power lies not in the book itself, but properly in the doctrine which is contained in the book. Vid. Toellner,

Ueber den Unterschied der heiligen Schrift und des Wortes Gottes, in his "Vermischten Aufsätzen," 2te Samml. S. 88, f.

§ 131. *How is the divine origin of these gracious renewing influences proved from the Holy Scriptures? and remarks in explanation of the scriptural phraseology on this subject.*

I. Scriptural proof of the divine origin of the influences of grace.

Many texts are frequently cited here, which do not belong to this subject; but which refer only to miraculous gifts, which the Apostles and some of the first Christians received; and not at all to the renewing influences which are imparted to *all* Christians. Such are 1 Cor. 15: 10. 2 Cor. 3: 18. Still there are many texts which relate directly to this subject, a few only of which will be here cited, under two principal classes.

(1) The texts which teach that God, or what is the same thing, the Holy Spirit, works by his power in the hearts of Christians, 1 Thess. 2: 13. Ephes. 1: 19. Rom. 8: 1—6. Hence the whole renewed and sanctified state of the true Christian is denominated *πνεῦμα* and *αἰσάνημα πνεύματος*, as in the passages cited; vid. § 123, II. 1, and § 124, II. Through this influence, the flesh or sense (*αἰσάνημα σαρκός, σάρξ*) loses its dominion over reason, and the will is renewed; all which results from God, or from the Holy Spirit, who dwells and works in the hearts of Christians.

Now in the same way as the influence of God or of the Holy Spirit (*ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖ πνεῦμα*) takes place in true Christians, the *ἐνέργεια τοῦ Σατανᾶ, σαρκός, κ. τ. λ.* works in unbelievers and sinners; e. g. Ephes. 2: 2, cf. 1: 19, 20. For as Satan is regarded and described as the Author of evil and wickedness in depraved and unbelieving men; so is God the Author of goodness and virtue in enlightened Christians. So Rom. 5: 5. Ephes. 4: 30, *λυπεῖν πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, to counteract by sin his salutary influences.

(2) The texts in which all the specific spiritual benefits which Christians enjoy, are ascribed to God, or to the Holy Spirit, as the author, or efficient cause. There is not one among all these benefits, which is not somewhere described as produced by divine influ-

ence. Thus (a) *instruction* in Christianity (illumination), John 6: 45, 65. Ephes. 1: 17, 18, "God gives us πνεῦμα σοφίας by the Christian doctrine;" 1 Thess. 4: 9. 1 Cor. 12: 3, 8. (b) *Conversion* and *faith*, and the entire sum of Christian blessedness (αλῆσις), Phil. 1: 6. Ephes. 1: 11. 2: 5, 10. 3: 16. Acts 16: 14. 2 Tim. 2: 25. (c) The *effects* and *consequences* of faith; such as *good intentions*, *readiness to good works*, and *skill* in doing them, Ephes. 3: 16. 2 Pet. 1: 3. 2 Thess. 2: 17. Rom. 15: 5. Indeed the very execution of our good purposes is represented as the work of the Spirit, 1 Cor. 1: 8. 1 Pet. 5: 10. Rom. 8: 13, 14. 9: 1. 14: 7. Phil. 2: 12, 13, "The Christian who is in earnest about his own salvation, should exhibit all diligence and zeal; and yet he should cast himself upon the divine guidance and assistance, since he can do nothing of himself. For it was God who had awakened in the Philippians (when Paul was among them) a serious *desire* for salvation, and who aided in the execution of this desire (although Paul was absent from them). And this he did ὑπὲρ εὐδοκίας, i. e. for all this the Philippians were indebted to the mere mercy of God, to his free, gracious will."

II. Remarks explanatory of the Scriptural phraseology on this subject.

(1) There are many passages in the Bible which, taken by themselves, *appear* to affirm an immediate influence of God in the renewal of men;—an influence, therefore, which is *miraculous* and *irresistible*, and involving an exertion of his bare omnipotence. And so there are passages, where, on the other hand, it seems to be taught, that God denies and withholds from men the means for their improvement, and renders them hard, obdurate, etc. In other passages, however, it is expressly said that God employs means, and that these are accessible to all men; vid. § 130, II. These influences are described, in these very passages, as *resistible*. It is distinctly taught, that man is not to be *compelled*; that he himself must not be inactive about his own moral welfare; that he is free to will and choose good or evil. Hence good and evil actions are ascribed to *man himself*, and considered as imputable to him. We find these two ways of representing this subject connected together in the same manner in the Old Testament, and in other ancient writings; e. g. those of the Arabians and Greeks; cf. the texts cited § 85,

II. 3. According to these, God puts good and evil, wisdom and folly into the hearts of men, and is the author both of their prosperity and their overthrow. And yet, according to these same writers, the good actions of men are rewarded by God, and their wicked actions punished by him, as their own actions ; whereas, if they came from God, they would not be imputable to those by whom they were performed.

(2) *Are not these two representations really contradictory ?*

Such they may appear to *us*, who are accustomed to different distinctions and expressions, from those which were formerly common, respecting divine influences, the freedom of the human will, and its relation to divine providence. Those especially who are scientifically educated, are apt to bring these subjects into a philosophical form, and to express them in scholastic terms. Hence in modern languages, we have appropriate expressions with regard to freedom, etc. even in common discourse. Such was not the case in ancient times. And for this reason, we frequently find difficulties and contradictions, where they saw none. On the one hand, the ancient world acknowledged with us, that God governs every thing, and that nothing can take place without his cooperation. On the other hand, they knew that the human will must at the same time remain free, because the actions of men would otherwise cease to be their own actions. If men were moved like machines, and wrought upon like statues, their actions could not be imputed to them. But in the ancient world, the means by which God acts were not always so carefully distinguished, as is common at present. And even when these means were known, they were more seldom mentioned. The sacred writers indeed well understood them, for they frequently mention them ; but not in every case distinctly. Thus it happens, that many things were generally described by the ancients as the immediate effects of divine power, which actually took place through the instrumentality of means which were either unknown to them, or which they left unmentioned. And so, many effects of the divine agency which have a miraculous aspect, were really produced by natural means. To those who are unacquainted with the ancient phraseology, the description given of those effects in the ancient manner of thinking and speaking, seems to imply, that God brought them to pass by an immediate and irresistible agency ; vid. § 70, Note ad fin.

Now what did Augustine and his followers do ? They took only

one class of these texts, and interpreted them as they would the language of accurate philosophers ; without paying any regard to the extreme simplicity of style in which the Bible was written. They drew conclusions and general doctrines from these texts, which were never drawn by the authors themselves from these premises ; and all this from ignorance of the ancient manner of thinking and speaking ; vid. § 85. Illiterate persons have generally understood this scriptural phraseology better than others.

From these passages, Augustine and his followers deduced the doctrine of the *irresistible grace of God*, as something which is miraculous in its nature, and which, according to his unconditional decree, he bestows upon some men and withholds from others. Without this grace, man could not recover himself to holiness ; because, since the fall, he possesses no freedom of will in spiritual things. Man can do *nothing* which will contribute to this end. He is entirely passive under these operations of grace. Augustine depended much on the passage, John 6: 44, "No man can come to me unless the Father draw him" (*de gratia irresistibili et particulari*). The meaning of this passage is, "No man can come to me unless the conviction of the great love of the Father (in giving me to the world from love to it) induces him, under divine guidance and co-operation, to come to me and believe on me."

Even Origen (*περὶ ἀρχῶν*, III. 19) noticed both these classes of texts, and said that they should not be separated, but taken together, that they might not contradict one another, and that *one* sense might be deduced from them both. And in fact, the two things, the earnest efforts of *man*, and the assistance of *God*, are connected in the Holy Scriptures. Morus therefore observes very justly, p. 225, § 1, that the following result may be deduced from the various texts of Scripture taken together : "God leads us, *by means of his truth*, to faith and repentance." Truth is the means which God employs for this end. So the symbols and the Protestant theologians. Vid. ubi supra, note 5.

(3) The following ideas, though variously modified, are found to have prevailed generally in the ancient world ; viz. that all life, activity, and motion throughout the universe, proceed from spirits or invisible beings. And even the extraordinary and unusual mental excitements, the talents, acquisitions, courage and magnanimity which appear among men, were derived from the inspiration of higher spirits, and viewed in connexion with them. They believed,

too, very generally, in evil spirits, to whose influences (under the divine permission) they ascribed the wicked purposes, the errors, faults, and calamities of men; cf. § 58, II. With this mode of representation the Holy Scriptures plainly agree throughout; vid. the Article on the Angels. They however take no part in the superstitious notions, which heathen antiquity, and even the great mass of the Jews, connected with this representation. From all these they keep aloof. But on the other hand, the Bible is equally far from agreeing with that modern mechanical philosophy, which tends to set aside the influence of spiritual beings, and as far as possible, that of God himself. According to the Bible, there are good and evil spirits, which in various ways operate on the earth and on man. But there is especially a *divine Spirit* (רוּחַ קָדוֹשׁ) in an eminent sense, which operates in and upon true Christians, as it did in the times of the Old Testament upon the Israelites. Christians are indebted to Christ for this Spirit, whence he is called πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, the *Paracletus*, the counsellor of the pious, whom Christ sends in his own stead from the Father, John 15: 16. As soon as any one believes in Christ, this divine Spirit begins to influence his heart, and as it were to *dwell with him*. And all the good which such an one now thinks or does,—his knowledge, his holiness and happiness, he owes solely to him. He it is whom Christ truly enlightens in his understanding and guides into all the truth. Nor can he accomplish any thing good, without *his* agency. He does not, however, exert his influence upon all in the same manner. He renews the heart and all the dispositions of every true Christian (dona spiritus sancti *ordinaria*); but upon some in the first Christian church he exerted a peculiar agency, endueing them with the gifts of teaching, of working miracles, etc. (dona *extraordinaria*). Cf. 1 Cor. 12: 4—11, also § 39, coll. § 19, II. and § 9, III. IV.

To the great bulk of mankind, who are unaccustomed to the arbitrary and mechanical philosophy of the Schools, and who are perverted by it, this simple, and truly animating representation, which is every where given in the New Testament, is more intelligible, clear and consoling, and has more influence on their heart, and is more conducive to their moral improvement, than all the philosophical and metaphysical reasonings on divine Providence and co-operation, how deep soever they may apparently be.

(4) The uniform doctrine of the Holy Scriptures is, therefore,

that God effects the moral change and renovation of the human heart, not *immediately*, but *mediately*, and that the means which he employs is the *Christian doctrine* in all its extent, its doctrines, precepts and promises. Vid. No. 2, ad finem. But the Bible also teaches, that the cause of the effect which is produced by this divine doctrine lies *not merely* in the power and weight of the arguments by which Christianity is proved, or of the truths which it exhibits; but *principally* in the power and agency of God, who, by means of this doctrine, acts in the souls of men. Theologians say: "*Divina efficientia a doctrina ipsa, ejusque vi et efficacia discernitur.*" This clearly appears from the passages before cited, especially from 1 Cor. 3: 6, 7. Phil. 2: 12, 13. 2 Thess. 2: 15—17. 1: 11. Ephes. 1: 16—20. 3: 16—20. 1 Pet. 1: 15. Acts 16: 14, and many of the discourses of Jesus, especially those recorded in John, e. g. 3: 13—17, etc.

This now entirely agrees with the promise of Christ, (*a*) that after his departure from the earth, he would support by his constant and special assistance all those who should believe on him, even to the end of life; and (*b*) that the Holy Spirit of God should always work among them, through the Christian doctrine. This the apostles every where repeat. And so they describe the whole moral renovation and perfection of man, as the work of God, or of the Holy Spirit; Ephes. 1: 19. James 1: 5, 18, where, however, this work is said to be accomplished λογῶ ἀληθείας, 3: 17, sq. Heb. 13: 20, 21.

When this doctrine is rightly understood, (i. e. in such a way, that human freedom, or the moral nature of man, is not violated,) sound reason cannot object to it. For it affirms no new revelations or irresistible influences. The manner however, in which this influence is exerted cannot be understood by reason, because the subject belongs to the sphere of things above sense. This we are taught by Christ and the Apostles. When Christ (John III.) had told Nicodemus, that the Holy Spirit effects a moral regeneration in men, the latter thought the doctrine incredible, and was unwilling to believe it. Christ replied (v. 8), that it would be unreasonable to consent to believe only what is directly perceived by the external senses, and the whole manner of whose existence and operation we could see, as it were, with our own eyes. He illustrates this by a comparison with the wind, which we cannot see and fol-

low with our eyes, but of whose actual existence we may be convinced by its effects; as, for example, by the sound which it makes. And such is the fact here. And there are a number of important passages of the same import, in the first epistle to the Corinthians, ch. i.—iii., and especially 2 : 14. Cf. Morus, p. 237. Here *ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος* is not the *natural man*, for which *φυσικός* would be the word; but the *carnal man*; i. e. (where objects of knowledge are spoken of) one who will acknowledge and receive in religious matters, no higher divine instruction and guidance, who will believe nothing but what he perceives by his external senses (*σαρκικός*), one who has no perception of the truths revealed by the Holy Spirit (*τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου*). No wonder, therefore, that he does not yield his assent to these truths, and that they even appear foolishness (*μωρία*) to him. For such doctrines require to be differently discerned from those which are merely of human discovery; they must be discerned *πνευματικῶς*. We reject human doctrines, or renounce them, when they do not instruct or satisfy us. But since God cannot err, the truths which he has revealed, and which we know from our own convictions to be such, may not be judged of by us in the same manner. We are not at liberty to oppose or renounce them, because they may chance to be displeasing to us, or because they may be hard and unintelligible.

(5) But these scriptural views of the agency of God in producing the moral renovation of man, when carefully examined, are by no means inconsistent with the philosophy of the day. They agree in all essential points with the doctrine which is confirmed by experience and reason, respecting the providence and agency of God. For (a) all *ability* and *power* which man possesses for perceiving the truth, and for choosing either good or evil, is derived solely from God. (b) But God must also concur by his agency in the use and exercise of these powers, and preserve them to us in the moment of action; vid. § 69. (c) We owe it to God, too, that we have opportunities to exert our faculties, and objects about which we may employ them. Through the divine ordering and government, we have teachers, and all the other internal and external assistances for acquiring knowledge of the truth, and for making progress in goodness. If we are deprived of these aids, we are not in a case either to understand the truth, to practise virtue, or to do any thing great and useful; vid. § 70. Every thing from without which con-

tributes to our moral good, is ordered by divine Providence and is employed by God for the promotion of his designs ; so that to him alone are we indebted not only for all temporal, but also for all *spiritual* good ; although by all this, our freedom of will is not in the least impaired ; vid. § 70, I. But being unable to fathom or comprehend the *manner* of the divine government, we cannot presume to determine positively *how* God can or must control us, and in what way he may, or may not, exert an agency in promoting our moral improvement. On this subject we must confine ourselves wholly to *experience*, and especially to the instructions of the Holy Scriptures, if we make them the ground of our knowledge. Nor must we renounce this doctrine because we cannot understand the internal *modus* of it.

§ 132. *A sketch of some of the principal theories respecting the operations of grace, and the freedom (or ability) of man in spiritual things ; and the controversies on this subject in the Christian Church.*

I. Opinions of the early Greek fathers.

In the earliest ages, shortly after the time of the Apostles, there was no controversy on this subject, as Augustine himself acknowledges. In the exhibition of this doctrine, most of the first teachers contented themselves with that simplicity, which prevails in the New Testament. They so express themselves, that while they affirm on one side, that man receives assistance (*auxilia*) from divine grace, they still allow to him on the other side *freedom* of action. Nothing was said from the first to the third century, about *irresistible* grace ; vid. § 79, in the history of the doctrine of original sin. So Irenæus says in many passages, “that God compels no man ; that we are free, and can choose good or evil.” Clement of Alexandria says, “that God indeed *guides*, but never *binds* our free wills ; and that hence *to believe* and *to obey* is in man’s power.” In the third century, Origen expressed his opinion still more definitely, than the Fathers who had preceded him. In his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, (L. III. c. 1.) he says, we are indebted for faith to God alone. He gave us

the means of faith. From him come both the faculties which man has of doing right, and the preservation of these faculties. But the use of these faculties bestowed upon us, depends upon ourselves. When therefore in some passages of the New Testament the improvement of man is ascribed solely to God, and in others to man himself, there is no contradiction. For even that which depends upon our own free will, cannot take place without the divine assistance; and God does not work in us, without our own cooperation. For he does not bind the free human will. With these sentiments, Athanasius, Basilus the Great, Chrysostom, and other fathers of the Greek Church perfectly agree.

[Note. The early Greek Fathers were led to insist thus strongly upon *αὐτεξούσιον, ἐλευθερίαν, προαίρεσιν* (*the self-determination, freedom of the will*), by standing in immediate conflict with the views of man prevailing throughout the heathen world, and especially among the contemporary Gnostic sects. Before Christianity was promulgated, it had become almost universal to regard man, as acting under the same necessity to which material nature is subjected. Evil was supposed either to belong to matter, and to be inherent in the human organization, or to result from an irresistible fate and necessity. Thus the free and accountable agency of man was theoretically obscured; and practically also, as far as the image of God, which is never wholly effaced, can be obscured by theoretic error and moral corruption.

The publication of Christianity cast new light upon the condition and relations of man. While by revealing a remedy, it implied his helplessness and need; on the other hand by offering pardon, it implied his *guilt and exposure to punishment*, and by appealing to the divine portion in man, it awakened him from his apathy as to moral obligation and effort. The whole nature of the Christian remedy, consisting not of magical or physical influences, which would have been requisite had man been under a natural necessity of sinning, but of moral means, calling our moral faculties into exercise, contained an implied contradiction to the Pagan and Manichean philosophy, and struck at the root of every view, which derives evil from a necessity of nature, rather than from the perverted use of our moral powers.

From these considerations it may be explained, that the early Greek Fathers should have insisted so disproportionately upon the freedom of the human will, though they by no means went into the Pelagian excess of ascribing to it an independency on divine grace. Had they been placed in as immediate contact with the Stoical or Pharisaical doctrine of human self-sufficiency, as with the Pagan and Gnostic idea of natural necessity, they would doubtless have given to man's inability and dependence on God, that place which human freedom and power now hold in their system.

As it was, the excess to which the Greek Fathers carried this point, laid the foundation for the divergency between the Eastern and Western Churches, which will appear in the sequel of this sketch.

With regard to the anthropological views of the Greek Fathers of this period, cf. Neander, Kirchengeschichte, B. I. Abth. III. SS. 1049—1060. Tr.]

II. Opinions of the early Latin Fathers ; and the doctrine of Pelagius.

We find that most of the ancient Latin fathers agreed with this simple doctrine of the Greek Church. So Hilary, of the fourth century ; nor were any objections made to him, before the time of Augustine, near the beginning of the fifth century. We find, however, in Africa, even before the time of Augustine, some traces of the peculiar expressions and sentiments which were afterwards formed by him into a system, which he held in opposition to that of Pelagius. Tertullian, who in the rest of his system does not differ from the Greeks, opposes *gratiam divinam* to *natura*, and says that the *vis gratiae* is *potentior natura* (the natural powers of men), De Anima, c. 21. He, however, allows to man *liberi arbitrii potestatem*. Cyprian, in the third century, comes still nearer to the opinions of Augustine. And indeed there must have been many in Africa before and at the time of Augustine, who held the essentials of his system.

This induced Pelagius, (who was a native of Britain, but who was extensively read in the works of the Greek fathers,) in the beginning of the fifth century, to analyse and collate the doctrines of the Greek Fathers, and especially of Origen, and to draw consequences from them, which they themselves had not authorized. He taught that three things should be distinguished in man, the *posse*, *velle*, and *agere*. For the *faculty* or *power* to do good, men are indebted to God alone (*gratiae*), who had granted it to human nature. *To will* and *to act* depends upon man himself. Still men are so assisted by the grace of God, that their willing and acting is facilitated. But the means which God makes use of in affording his aid are *doctrina* and *revelatio*. He made this last point more prominent than any of the teachers who had preceded him ; and this was well. But in other points he deviated from the doctrine of the Bible ; viz. (*a*) by denying *natural depravity* ; (*b*) by deriving our ability to do good, solely or principally from the power with which our nature was originally endowed by God ; (*c*) and by allowing to God no real instrumentality in the conversion and sanctification of men. According to this system, God works only by means of the Christian doctrine, i. e. he is the author of this doctrine, which contains more powerful motives than any other.

Against this system Augustine contended. In Africa, Councils were held in opposition to Pelagius, in which his doctrine was condemned. The Christians of the Eastern Church, of Palestine and elsewhere, did not, however, assent to this decision; and the same is true of many in the Latin Churches beyond the bounds of Africa, and at first even of the Roman Bishop himself. This was owing, partly to the extravagant zeal of Augustine, and to the mixture of many erroneous opinions in his system; and partly to the guarded and ambiguous phraseology of Pelagius, by which he concealed his departures from the scriptural doctrine. But at length Augustine succeeded so far in his efforts, that the doctrine of Pelagius was condemned, and the condemnation confirmed by the Emperor. And thus the theory of Augustine obtained the predominance, at least in the West.

III. Augustine's doctrine respecting grace.

(1) He held that human nature is so depraved (§ 79), that it no longer possesses freedom of will in spiritual things (*carere libero arbitrio in spiritualibus*); i. e. is unable to understand *spiritual things* (the truths of salvation contained in the Scriptures), or to act conformably with them, without the divine instructions contained in the Scriptures, and the gracious assistance of God; although he may possess freedom in natural things (*liberum arbitrium habere in naturalibus*); i. e. he may learn God from nature and reason, and fulfil many of his duties. The Bible, too, teaches that the wicked come at length to such a habit of sinning, that they become the slaves of sin, John 8: 32, 36. Rom. 7: 23, and that they can be delivered from this slavery, only by faith in Jesus Christ, and by divine assistance. Since now Augustine was led by opposition to Pelagius to exaggerate the doctrine of natural depravity (vid. §§ 79, 80); he represented the assistance afforded by God in the improvement of man, as truly *compulsory*, and of such a nature as to infringe upon human freedom. The ancient fathers, on the other hand, held to τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, understanding by this term, or the term *liberum arbitrium* (which Tertullian first borrowed from a term in Roman Law), the power of man to choose *good* or *evil* freely and without *compulsion*. This view was universally held in the East; and in the West, too, before the Pelagian controversies.

(2) Augustine made a careful distinction between *nature* and

grace; vid. § 129, II., and Morus p. 234, Not. 2. Grace alone can renew man; he can do nothing for this end by the powers of mere nature. And it is true, in a certain sense, according to the Bible, that *man alone cannot deliver himself; that by his own unaided powers, he cannot renew himself*. But Augustine went further than this, and the additions which he made are not scriptural. Man, he said, can do nothing which will at all contribute to his spiritual recovery. He is like a lump of clay, or a statue, without life or activity. Hence, he denied virtue and salvation to the heathen, and to all who are not enlightened by grace; vid. § 121.

(3) This divine grace, which alone is able to renew the heart, is described by Augustine as *efficax* and *sufficiens*, i. e. alone sufficient to overcome the power of sin, (in which Augustine, was right,) and also as *irresistibilis*. For he conceived grace to be the direct operation of divine omnipotence, acting in a miraculous manner, *qua voluntatem hominum indeclinabili vi ad bona trahat*.

(4) Augustine made a threefold division of grace, founded on the doctrine, which he held in opposition to Pelagius, that *to will, to be able, and to perform*, depend solely on divine grace; viz. (a) *gratia excitans* or *incipiens*, that grace which renders the human will inclined to faith, excites good emotions, and produces the beginnings of faith. Other names given to this incipient grace are, *præveniens, pulsans, trahens, vocans, præparans*. (b) *Operans* or *efficiens*, that grace which imparts faith, and new spiritual powers for the performance of duty. God produces good desires and determinations in man by the truths of the Christian religion. (c) *Cooperans, perficiens, or assistans*, that by which the believer is assisted, after his conversion, so that he will be able to perform good works, and to persevere in faith.

Augustine differed from all the theologians who had preceded him, in teaching that *grace anticipated the human will* (*prævenire voluntatem*). This may be understood in a very just and scriptural sense. But Augustine meant by it nothing less, than that the first good desires and determinations to amend, are miraculously produced, or infused into the heart by divine grace. Whereas the earlier theologians had uniformly taught, that God gives man, in the use of means, opportunity to repent, and that he guides and assists in this work by his own agency; but that man himself must be active, and must form the resolution to repent, and have a disposi-

tion to do so ; in which case divine mercy will come to his relief (*quod voluntas hominum præveniat auxilia gratiæ*). To this view, however, Augustine could not consent, because he denied all power to the human will. In this work, man, in his view, is entirely *passive*. But many of his followers in the West differed from him in this particular, and adhered to the more ancient representation. Afterwards they were frequently numbered with the Semi-Pelagians, and in the sixth century their doctrine was condemned.

(5) With respect to the manner in which saving grace operates, Augustine believed, that in the case of those who enjoy revelation, grace commonly acts by means of the *word*, or the divine doctrine, but sometimes *directly* ; because God is not confined to the use of means. On this point there was great logomachy. Real conversions, even in such extraordinary cases as that of Paul, are effected by the *Word of God*, and the believing reception of it ; although the circumstances under which the word is brought home to the heart, may be extraordinary.

(6) Augustine connected all these doctrines with his theory respecting the *unconditional decree of God* ; respecting which vid. Vol. I. § 32. He taught, that the anticipating and efficient grace of God depend not at all upon man and his worthiness (susceptibility), but solely on the decree of God. God, according to his own will, elected some, from all eternity, from the whole mass of mankind, in order to make them vessels of mercy (susceptible of his grace) ; while from others he withholds this renovating grace, that they may be vessels of wrath. He imparts, indeed, to all the *anticipating grace* ; but *efficient grace* only to a *few*, viz. the elect. Of this procedure none can complain ; for God is not bound to bestow his grace upon any. Thus the efficacy (*efficacia*) of grace on the heart is made by him to depend on the unconditional decree of God (*ab electione Dei*), and also the opposition (*resistentia*) of men,—the latter on the *decretum reprobationis*. For God does not will to exert the whole power of his grace upon the heart of those who prove reprobate. *Why* he does not, we are unable to determine. This is one of the unfathomable mysteries of the divine decrees. Such doctrines as these are distinctly expressed in many of the writings of Augustine ; as in his work *De predestinatione Sanctorum*. He is not however at all times consistent with himself ; and feeling how hard his doctrine is, sometimes expresses himself less

severely. [For a more complete view of the system of Augustine, cf. the Jan. No. of Bib. Repository, for 1833. Art. Augustine and Pelagius.]

IV. Controversies on particular points in the Augustinian system.

The system of Augustine respecting grace was, taken as a whole, made fundamental in the Western Church in the ages succeeding his. Some adopted it entire, others only in part; most, however, dissented from it in some particulars, and lowered it down, so to speak. They retained many of his terms, but employed them in a more just and scriptural sense. Others, on the contrary, adopted the system of Pelagius, or endeavoured to compose a new system by combining his opinions with those of Augustine. The principal points on which a difference of opinion existed in the Latin Church were the following: viz.

(1) The doctrine of *predestination*. Although Augustine believed in unconditional decrees, this doctrine never became universal in the Latin Church. Most of the members of this Church until the ninth century, held only to those passages in his works, in which he expressed himself with less rigor. But in the ninth century, when Gottschalk began to advocate unconditional decrees strenuously, a vehement controversy arose; vid. § 32, Note. His principal opponents were Rabanus Maurus, Hinkmar, and others, who justly derived predestination from God's foreknowledge of the free actions of men. In this opinion they had many followers; though a large number still adopted the theory of Augustine, after moderating and modifying it in various ways. To this party, Peter of Lombardy and other schoolmen belonged. Luther and Melancthon, (as well as Calvin and Beza,) were at first strong Augustinians; but they afterwards abandoned his doctrine of predestination; while Calvin and Beza still adhered to it, and made it a doctrine of their Church; vid. the sections above cited. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the most violent controversies on this subject raged in the Romish Church, between the Jansenists, who were zealous Augustinians, and the Jesuits in the Netherlands and France. The latter agreed very nearly in sentiment with Rabanus, and had many supporters.

(2) The doctrine of *the freedom of the human will* and its rela-

tion to the operations of grace. On this subject, there are three principal systems.

First. The Augustinian, which allows to man no freedom of will in spiritual things, according to the statement above made; No. III. The strenuous adherents of Augustine above named, entirely agreed with him in this particular; and the doctrine of the entire inability of man in spiritual things, in the sense of Augustine, was zealously advocated by the Dominicans, who in this followed Thomas Aquinas. Out of this arose the violent controversy which prevailed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries *de auxiliis gratiæ*, between the Dominicans and Netherland theologians on the one side, and the Jesuits and their adherents on the other, and afterwards, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, between the Jesuits and Jansenists. Luther with Carlstadt, and some others of his coadjutors, belonged at first to this high party. The former defended this doctrine in his book *De servo arbitrio*, against Erasmus. Afterwards however his views became very much more moderate, and he retained but little more of the doctrine of Augustine than the terms in which it was expressed. He was followed by a large number of the theologians of his Church.

Secondly. The scholastic system. Most of the schoolmen endeavoured to moderate the theory of Augustine. They taught that grace is indeed powerful and efficacious, but that man is not compelled by it, and can resist it. The assent of the human will must *accompany* grace, without which it is inefficacious. They allowed, therefore, the freedom of the will in a certain sense. They held, that the will of man can either follow or resist grace; while still they admitted that grace has a certain influence in the renovation of man, not indeed miraculous, but yet acting physically in connexion with the divine word. They were followed afterwards in the Romish Church by the great body of the Jesuits, who, on this account, were involved in much controversy with the Dominicans, Jansenists and others, who were strict Augustinians, and by whom they were accused of inclining to Pelagianism. At the time of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, this theory prevailed far and wide in the Romish Church, and was defended by Eck and Erasmus against Luther. It was adopted by Melancthon, and expressly avowed by him after the death of Luther, and by the theologians of his school in the sixteenth century. Others, however would not

swerve from the earlier system of Luther; though the difference which now existed between the two parties was more in words, than in reality. This doctrine was called by the latter *synergism*, and its advocates *Synergists*, because they taught that the operations of grace are accompanied by the action of the human will. The principal advocate of this synergism was Victorin Strigel, and its principal opponent Flaccius. Since that period the opinions on both sides have assumed a much more moderate shape, and a great deal of logomachy has ceased. But there still remains a difference of opinion on this point, in the Protestant as well as in the Catholic Church.

Thirdly. The system of Pelagius. Many think that this system is better than any other, to remove the contradiction between human freedom and the influences of grace. Pelagius entirely denies any physical influence of grace, and any alteration of the will effected by means of it. God, indeed, operates on men, but merely through the (natural) power of the truths of religion, of which he is the Author. Man has ability both to understand these truths and live according to them, and also ability to sin. And this is the freedom of will, essential to man. God causes the renovation of the heart, but *merely* through the influence of Christian doctrine, inasmuch as this doctrine, of which God is the author, contains more powerful motives to improvement than any human systems. Vid. the estimate, No. II., ad fin. Many modern theologians have received this system entirely, and some have undertaken to interpret the common ecclesiastical formulas and the Augustinian phraseology in conformity with it. Respecting these controversies and systems, vid. the works of Vossius, Sirmond, Mauguin, Serry, Norisius; also the works of Semler, Walch (*Ketzergeschichte*), Rösler (*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*), and others. [Cf. Neander, *Kirchengesch.* B. II. Abth. III. Bretschneider, B. II. S. 606.—TR.]

V. Later history of this doctrine.

Since the seventeenth and especially since the eighteenth century, many theologians of the Protestant Church have laboured to cast light on the doctrine of the operations of grace and the efficacy of the divine word, and to exhibit this doctrine in a manner correspondent with the principles of modern philosophy. Some have de-

clared themselves decidedly in favor of the Pelagian system. Others have adopted it only in part, or while they have held it, have disguised their belief by using the terms of the Augustinian or scholastic theory, in an entirely different sense from what belongs to them, in reality denying physical influence. In this point, however, the Protestant church is agreed, that the Holy Spirit does not act *immediately*, but *mediately*, through the word, § 130, II. So clearly do the Symbols teach, Morus p. 231, n. 1. Still there is a great diversity of opinion on the question about the manner in which the Holy Spirit acts through the word, and on the question whether these operations may be denominated *supernatural* and in *what sense*. On these points there are two principal theories prevalent in the Protestant Church.

(1) Many hold, that although grace operates through the word, there is still, connected with the word, a special power of the Holy Spirit, in enlightening and converting men. This power, however, is never exerted *without*, but always in connexion with the word. *Conjunctum cum usu doctrinæ auxilium Dei, quod ille fert utentibus ea*, Morus p. 228, Note. The greater part, though not all of the early Protestant and Lutheran theologians, were of this opinion. So Melancthon. Some gave such a turn to this doctrine, that they were suspected of fanaticism. This was the case with Herm. Rathmann, a Lutheran preacher in Dantzic, who affirmed in his work, "*Guadenreich Christi*," 1621, that man is so depraved that the word of God can by itself exert no power on his heart, unless the almighty power of the Holy Spirit is connected with it. Upon this a great controversy arose in the seventeenth century. Some, too, of the party of the Pietists, in the eighteenth century, expressed themselves so vaguely on this point, that they were suspected of fanaticism. But in fact, neither their opinions, nor that of Rathmann can properly be called *fanatical*. Fanatics and enthusiasts believe in an illumination and renovation of man effected *immediately* by God, without the use of the word, or the truths of the Holy Scriptures, of which consequently they speak with disregard. So e.g. the Quakers. Vid. Morus p. 231, § 5, for a brief view of their system.

Many modern theologians have entirely departed from these views, vid. No. 2; while on the other hand, many have adhered to the more ancient theory, and defended it against all attacks. E. g.

C. A. Bertling, *Vorstellung was die lutherische Kirche von der Kraft der heiligen Schrift lehre*, Dantzig, 1756, 4to. The author of the "Freundschaftliche Unterredungen über die Wirkungen der Gnade," 2te Ausg. 4. Thl. Halle, 1774, 8vo. Also the "Briefe über die Wirkungen der Gnade," by the same author, which is the best work in favor of this theory. Gottl. Christ. Storr, "De Spiritus Sancti in mentibus nostris efficientia, et de momento ejus doctrinæ," Tübingen, 1777, 4to. Cf. Gehe, *Diss. inaug. de argumento quod pro divinitate religionis Christianæ ab experientia ducitur*, Göttingen, 1796.

This theory, however little it may accord with the prevailing principles of modern philosophy, is strongly supported by many passages of Scripture, § 130, § 131, II. 4.

(2) Others, on the contrary, hold that the divine and *supernatural* (though they do not like to make use of this word) power of the *word of God*, by which man is converted, is not to be looked for *in connexion* with the word, but as belonging to the word itself. They thus consider the power by which man is renewed and made holy, to be in no sense a *physical*, but rather a *logico-moral* power. This opinion, which is fundamentally Pelagian, was ingeniously defended in the seventeenth century by Claud Pajon, a reformed theologian of Orleans; it led, however, to much controversy. This opinion was first fully exhibited in the Lutheran Church, after the eighteenth century, by Joh. Ernest. Schubert, in his "Unterricht von der Kraft der heiligen Schrift," Helmstädt, 1753, 4to. It was against this work that Bertling wrote; cf. No. 1. It was afterwards defended by Spalding, "Ueber den Werth der Gefühle in Christenthum," and by Eberhard, "Apologie des Sokrates," Thl. I. III. The most copious and learned work on this subject is, Junkheim, "Von dem Uebernaturlichen in den Gnadenwirkungen," Erlangen, 1775, 8vo. This theory has been adopted by most modern theologians of the Protestant Church, and essentially even by Morus. They frequently employ, indeed, the ancient phraseology and formulas, but in a different sense from that in which they were originally used, a sense which is considered by them more rational, i. e. more conformed to the philosophical system adopted by these modern theologians. We shall now give a brief historical account and illustration of this theory, which at present is the most popular and current among Protestant theologians; adding, however, a *critique* as we pass along.

§ 133. *Exhibition of the modern theory respecting the divinity of the operations of grace, and the power of the word of God.**

I. How does God act in promoting the moral improvement and perfection of men : and in what consists the divinity of the operations of grace ?

(1) God does not act in such a way, as to infringe upon the free will of man, or to interfere with the use of his powers ; vid. Phil. 2: 12, 13. Consequently God does not act on man *immediately*, producing ideas in their souls without the preaching or reading of the Scriptures, or influencing their will in any other way than by the understanding. Did God operate in any other way than through the understanding, he would operate *miraculously* and *irresistibly*. And the practice of virtue under such an influence, would have no internal worth : it would be compelled, and consequently incapable of reward. But experience teaches, that the work of reformation and holiness is not effected violently and at once, but by degrees ; which could not be the case, if God acted irresistibly and miraculously. Experience teaches, too, that man can resist ; and so the Bible says expressly, Matt. 23: 37. Heb. 3: 8, sq. John 7: 17. Acts 7: 51. We find, also, that the moral reformation of man cannot take place without earnest and zealous effort, (the working out of salvation with fear and trembling, Phil. 11.,) or the vigorous exercise of one's own powers ; and that man must be any thing, rather than passive and inactive in this matter. The Bible teaches the same thing, and so requires of men that they should reform, change their heart, Acts 2: 38. 8: 22. It exhorts them to increase in knowledge and virtue, Ephes. 2: 10. Tit. 2: 17. 1 Pet. 2: 1, 2, sq. And for what purpose has God given to man the direct revelation of his will, if it is not to be used and employed by God himself in promoting the salvation of men ? Hence all genuine Protestant theologians, on whatever other points they may differ are agreed in this.

(2) The divinity in the operations of grace consists,

* How far I assent to this theory, either on scriptural or other grounds, will appear from the previous sections. Where I agree with it entirely, I shall state it as my opinion ; wherever it appears to me erroneous, i. e. not demonstrable from the Bible, I shall give it as the opinion of others.

(a) *In the doctrine revealed by God.* For by means of this, faith is excited and preserved in men. This doctrine could not have been discovered by man, without a divine revelation ; and God is the author of all the effects which result from it. In the same way we properly ascribe to a discourse or to a great writer, all the beneficial effects which may result from his discovery or writings ; and regard him as the author of these effects. All this is true ; but this is not all which the Bible teaches on this subject. The Bible teaches, that besides this, there is an agency of God, connected with divine truth, and accompanying it ; or that there is connected with the divine word an operation of God on the hearts of men, having for its end their improvement and holiness ; vid. § 131, II. 4.

(b) *In the wise and beneficent external institutions which God has established,* by which man is led to the knowledge of the truth, and his heart is prepared and inclined to receive it. Who can fail to recognize the divine hand in these external circumstances, by which so powerful an influence is exerted upon us ; and which are often entirely beyond our own control ? How much does the moral culture and improvement of men depend on birth, parentage, early instruction, education, society, example, natural powers, adversity or prosperity ! Vid. § 131, II. 4. These circumstances are frequently mentioned in the Bible, Rom. 2: 4, sq. Hence it follows that God has made wise arrangements for the good of man, which may properly be called *grace*, inasmuch as they are proofs of his undeserved goodness. It follows also, that God withholds his assistance from none, and that the work of moral renovation is effected in a manner entirely adapted to our moral nature, not forcibly, irresistibly, instantaneously, but gradually ; vid. § 126, sq.

Now, so far as the end which God has in view in wisely ordering these circumstances and appointing these means, is attained, i. e. when man does not himself resist their influence, this grace may be called *efficacious*. Still it is exerted in such a way, that no one is *compelled*. Grace never acts *irresistibly*. The renewal of man is effected by God through the Christian doctrine, the influence of which can be resisted, because it acts on the will through the understanding ; and the will is not *necessarily* determined, but only rendered disposed to determine itself for a particular object. In the physical world the law of *sufficient reason* and of necessity prevails ; in the moral world, the law of *freedom*. God, therefore, who himself has given this law,

will not act in contradiction to it. Frequently, however, one cannot prevent the good impressions and emotions which arise on hearing or reading the truths of the Christian religion ; just as he is unable to prevent the sensations or ideas which external objects produce in his mind, through the senses. This observation, which is founded on the nature of the human soul, gave rise to the position which was taken in the controversies between the Jansenists and Jesuits ; *gratiam non esse irresistibilem, sed inevitabilem*. For although man cannot prevent in every case good impressions and emotions, he is able to prevent the consequences of them in actual reformation.

II. In what manner does God operate on the heart of man through the word, in promoting his moral improvement.

On this point theologians are divided.

(1) The natural power of truth acts first on the human understanding. The Christian doctrine makes us acquainted with God, with his feelings towards us, and with what he requires of us. It delivers us from ignorance and prejudice. For all this we are indebted to God. God gave us these instructions, that they might have an effect upon us ; i. e. that they might act powerfully on the will, and excite in us good feelings and resolutions. Thus the consideration of the divine promises revealed in Christianity, tends to lead our minds to repose confidence in God. The consideration, too, of these promises, and the examination of our conduct by the divine precepts, produces sorrow and repentance. These precepts and promises, which the Christian religion makes known, are adapted to produce zeal for virtue or holiness. At first our powers for goodness are weak ; but by exercise they increase in strength and become confirmed ; vid. Art. XI. All this takes place according to the natural laws of the human mind ; but the effect produced does not cease, on this account, to be the work of God.

(2) But the New Testament always ascribes to the Christian religion a greater power and efficacy in rendering men virtuous and happy, than to any truth ever discovered or taught by man, or supported merely by arguments of human wisdom. Thus Paul says, Rom. 1: 16, *εὐαγγέλιον Χριστοῦ* is *δύναμις θεοῦ εἰς σωτήριαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*. In 1 Cor. i. and ii. he shows that the Gospel

had produced greater effects, than any human system ever did or could produce, although exhibited in the most eloquent, forcible, and convincing manner. Cf. John 6: 63, and John III. Experience and history confirm this. Philosophers and moralists, who depend upon the internal strength and validity of their systems derived from human wisdom, have never been able to accomplish such great and wonderful results as the Christian religion has produced, although exhibited without eloquence or human wisdom. What merely human teacher of morals could ever boast of so great and remarkable an effect from his instructions, as we read of in Acts 2: 37, and 8: 27—38. And whence is all this? Some have thought it to be owing to the *divine authority* on which the Christian doctrine is published. This authority they say, exerts more influence on one *who acknowledges it*, and removes doubts and difficulties more easily, than the most convincing arguments and the most eloquent address, which depend on nothing more than mere human authority. But why have not other religions, which have also been published on *divine authority*, produced these same effects? This *divine authority* cannot, therefore, be the *only* ground of the difference. With this must be connected the *internal* excellence of the religion itself, and the salutary nature of its doctrines. These two taken together, constitute the whole cause, so far at least as it is *externally* visible, of the facts under consideration. But even these do not satisfactorily account for all the effects produced by the Christian doctrine; they are not assigned by the Holy Scriptures as the principal cause from which these effects are explicable. The Scriptures teach, that the cause of these great effects does not lie merely in the power and weight of the doctrines of Christianity, and the evidence by which they are supported, *but principally in the almighty power and influence of God*, who through the Christian doctrine works in the souls of men; vid. § 131, II. 4. This efficacy of the divine doctrine is called in theology, *the power (vis, efficacia) of the divine word*.

(3) *Inferences drawn from the preceding statement.*

(a) The power of the word of God, or the agency of the Holy Spirit, is not *physical*, but *logico-moral*; i. e. the Holy Spirit acts upon the human soul in a manner conformed to our rational and moral nature. This influence is founded in the knowledge of the truths of Christianity, and of the motives contained in it, by which the human will is *drawn*, but not *compelled*. To this is added on the part of man, the firm conviction of the divine origin and

authority of this doctrine, and of the divine superintendence by which its effect on him is increased. Power to convince and reform is imparted to, and connected with, the Christian doctrine, in the same way as power to germinate and grow, is given to seed, and power to heal, to medicine.

This last statement is, in itself, true and scriptural, cf. Mark 4: 28. But it is not inconsistent with the other equally scriptural view of the influence of God on the heart of man. For he does not act on us, otherwise than by means of the Christian doctrine, and consequently not in a compulsory and irresistible manner, *but in a manner conformed to the moral nature of man*, although the internal *modus* of his agency may be inexplicable to us. And who can explain the internal *modus* of the effects produced by God in the natural world? John 3: 8. Vid. § 131, II. 4. To believe, therefore, that there is an *influxum* (*vim physicam*, or as others express it more guardedly, *physico-analogam*), is, according to what has now been said, not *contrary* to Scripture, but conformed to it.

(b) But however powerful the operation of the divine word, and of God, by means of his word, may be, man himself must not, in the mean time, be inactive and sluggish, Phil. 2: 12, 13. For the effect of the divine influence on the heart of any one, depends on his making a right use and proper application of the divine doctrine, and on his whole conduct in regard to these divine influences. If he disregards these influences, and neglects to improve them in the proper manner, he can no more be benefited by them, than one can be satisfied and nourished without the use of food. Such is the uniform representation of the Bible. Vid. Mark 4: 20, sq. Luke 8: 15, *Κατέχειν λόγον ἐν καρδίᾳ καλῇ καὶ ἀγαθῇ*, *to embrace and obey the truth with an upright and sincere heart*.

(c) Theologians call the operations of grace *supernatural*. By this they cannot mean to denote a direct, and of course irresistible, agency of God in the soul of man, or any thing properly *miraculous*. This term cannot, therefore, be taken here in that strict sense, in which philosophers use it. According to the Pelagian theory, these influences can be so called, only because they are exerted through the divine doctrine which is *supernaturally revealed* (in respect, therefore, to the *means* by which they are exerted); and hence are more efficacious, than mere unassisted reason could be. Thus we call *supernatural* knowledge, that for which we are indebted-

ed to divine revelation, and *natural*, that to which we can attain through our own reflection. According to the theory of the ancient theologians, which is more accordant with the Holy Scriptures, with Christ and the apostles, these influences are also called supernatural, *because they cannot be explained by any of the known laws of nature*; John 3: 8. 1 Cor. 1: 2. Vid. § 131, II. 4. In respect to the manner in which the influences of grace are exerted on the human soul,—a manner entirely suited to its moral nature,—the operations of grace may, indeed, be denominated *natural*, as they are by Eberhard, in his “Apologie des Socrates.”

(d) Theologians distinguish between *nature* and *grace*. In this they follow Augustine, vid. § 132, II. But they have differed very much in determining what are the *motus gratiæ*, and what the *motus naturæ*, and how they can be distinguished. The common opinion has been, that the doings of the unconverted, even their virtues, flow from their nature, and therefore, according to Augustine, are not pleasing to God, or capable of reward. Of the actions of the regenerate only, can it be said, that they are acceptable in his sight, and flow from the influences of grace. Vid. Spener, Vom Unterschied der Natur und Gnade, Erfurt, 1715. But there are difficulties attending this opinion, § 125. To determine the *marks*, by which nature and grace may be distinguished, the matter can be stated as follows: every thing which we owe to the right use of the Christian doctrine, and to the agency of God through his truth, is the effect of *grace*; and every thing in us which has not its origin or foundation in the use of the divine truth, is the effect of *nature*. If then we can ascertain how much we owe to our being instructed in divine truth, and to the influences of God by its means, we may also know how much we owe to *grace*. Proceeding in this way, we do not treat *nature* (or that essential constitution which God has given to man), with contemptuous disregard; nor are we compelled, in denying *grace* to the heathen, to deny decidedly, that they had any virtue, or can attain to salvation.

Note. In popular religious instruction, the teacher should confine himself to such clear and scriptural points, as Morus has exhibited (pp. 236, 237, Note 4), illustrating these by the Bible and experience, and setting aside all learned theological disputes and scholastic terms.

(1) God has endued man with reason and conscience. By the aid of these principles, man is enabled to learn much respecting the nature and will

of God, and to act conformably to this correct knowledge, Rom. 1: 19, 20. 2: 14, 15, sq.

(2) But the Holy Scriptures give us a far more perfect knowledge of God and of our duty. The revealed religion contained in them has much which is peculiarly excellent, and which is not taught in natural religion. And, according to the testimony of the Scriptures, God has promised his special assistance, support and guidance to those who possess them, and obey the precepts contained in them. And this promise is confirmed by experience; Rom. 1. 11. We ought therefore thankfully to receive, and faithfully to obey, the instruction contained in the Holy Scriptures.

(3) No one can understand, discern, or receive with approbation the instructions of the Holy Scriptures, unless he is *taught* the truths contained in them. Nor can any one obey these instructions, unless the hindrances which stand in the way of his reception of them, in his understanding and will, are removed, 1 Cor. 2: 14.

(4) To be delivered through divine instruction and assistance, from our ignorance, our mistakes, prejudices, and from our evil passions, is a great and invaluable benefit; and we owe this benefit to none but God and the Holy Spirit; vid. the texts cited, § 130.

(5) There are, and always will be, great difficulties and hindrances, both within and without, by which our ascent to the truths of revelation will be weakened, and our progress in holiness retarded; and these difficulties and hindrances cannot be overcome and removed, without the constant assistance and support of God, John 5: 44. 8: 43, sq. Ephes. 4: 18, and other passages, vid. §§ 130, 131.

(6) We need therefore, in commencing and continuing a life of piety, the help, support and guidance of God. We ourselves, however, must not in the mean time be inactive, but must conscientiously employ the means which God has given us, and faithfully obey the instructions and directions contained in the Bible, always remembering, that we owe these means of improvement and virtue to God only, and that without him we can do nothing; Phil. 2: 12, 13.

[Note. The opinions of the Lutheran theologians since the time of our author, have been equally diversified as when he wrote, and perhaps more so. This is the less strange, as it is now a conceded point, that their own established standards are at variance among themselves on the doctrine of the operations of grace; cf. Vol. 1. § 32, Note. Henke, Eckermann, and Wegscheider follow out the positions of Morus, Junkheim, Michaelis, Döderlein and others, to the full Pelagian extreme, and make the grace of God in conversion to be only that general agency, by which he has endued man with rational powers, written the law upon his heart, instituted Christianity and caused it to be promulgated, and by which, in his providential arrangements,

he gives to every man opportunity and excitement to repentance. Ammon also (Summa, § 132, 133), makes the renewing grace of God to consist *procuratione institutionis salutaris, excitatione per exempla virtutis illustria, paupertate, calamitatibus, admonitionibus amicorum et inimicorum*.

All these writers agree in making the operations of grace merely external, in the way of moral influence, and in denying an immediate agency of God upon the human mind. In this, their system is stamped with one of the most essential features of Pelagianism: cf. Neander's development of the Pelagian system in Part III. of the 2d Vol. of his Church Hist.

There is another class who are distinguished from the former by admitting an immediate divine agency in the moral kingdom, though they differ among themselves as to the relation of this influence to the agency of man, especially at the commencement of the life of faith. Bretschneider contends strenuously for an immediate divine influence as indispensable to conversion. At the same time, he supposes it to depend upon the character and state of the individual who is the subject of this influence, whether grace *alone* produces faith in him, or whether he himself contributes any thing towards it. The operations of grace, accordingly, are not uniform, but as various as the states in which it finds man, from untutored barbarism, to the highest degree of illumination and refinement enjoyed in Christian lands. Nearly the same views are expressed by Reinhard in his Theology.

Neander and Tholuck, as will be obvious to any attentive reader of their works, hold prominently, that even in faith there is a divine element,—that it can by no means result from the unaided efforts of man; that besides the general influence of Christianity, there is an internal influence of the Spirit of God,—a drawing of the Heavenly Father;—but that man also is active in this work; and that it is an unwarrantable assumption to undertake to settle immoveable limits to these two conspiring agencies, or to solve the mystery belonging to the secret operations of grace.

Again; Schleiermacher, Marheinecke, and others belonging to the more appropriately philosophical school of Theologians, have restored the entire system of Augustine as to immediate and efficacious grace, and the absolute and unqualified dependence of man upon God for the very commencement of faith.—With regard to this class, it is remarkable, that while Augustine and Calvin rested the proof of this doctrine mainly upon scriptural authority, these have been led to adopt and now maintain it, on grounds purely philosophical. The weight of the names of such writers, has raised the Augustinian and Calvinistic theory of grace far above the contempt and reproach, with which it was heretofore treated by the great body of Lutheran Theologians.

A few extracts, under distinct heads, will show something of the manner in which this doctrine is treated by writers of this class, and how much importance is attached by them to the idea, that the divine influences are *immediate*, and not merely moral and external. Our extracts are drawn from two of the more lucid and popular writers. The statements of Schleiermacher and others of the same School upon this subject, though still more decisive on the point in question, are so intimately interwoven with the whole of their system,

and receive so much colouring from it, as to require more explanation to render them perfectly intelligible, than the present limits will allow.

That such an influence is *to be desired*, is affirmed by Reinhard in the following passage from the 4th Vol. of his "Moral," S. 129. "When one considers the innate depravity of which man is conscious,—the weakness of his moral powers hence resulting,—the innumerable perversions to which those constitutional feelings and propensities which are in themselves good, are liable, the disordered states which arise from these perversions, and which more or less hinder a true moral developement,—in fine, the many external causes which nourish and strengthen depravity, and render genuine reformation exceedingly difficult;—when one who is in earnest in the work of improvement considers all this, he must feel the wish arise, that God would lighten this arduous work, and come in aid of his efforts."

Objections having often been made to the *possibility* of such influences, by Reinmarus, Lessing and others, on the ground that violence would thus be done to the intellectual and moral nature of man, Bretschneider thus replies: "That God has power to act inwardly on the souls of men, and to awaken ideas in their minds, cannot be denied. As the Creator of spirits he knows their nature, and how he can operate upon them; and as almighty, he must be able to produce in his creatures any effect which he desires. Does any one deny this power to God, he erects between him and the spiritual world an insurmountable wall of partition; and in order to be consistent, must deny that God is the Governor of the world in general, any more than he is of the spiritual world. The possibility of an inward agency of God upon the world of spirits cannot therefore be denied, although the manner in which this agency is exerted is inscrutable; which indeed is true as to the manner of all the divine operations.' * * With what truth now is it presupposed that these influences must hamper the free agency of the mind, and reduce the subject of them to a mere machine? Does not the very nature of the case require that Reason, the recipient, should *actively* receive, retain, and appropriate that which is given it? Does not the teacher often, in giving instruction to the child, suddenly interrupt the course of his thoughts, and put him on an entirely new train of ideas? But are the laws of mind in the child violated by this interruption?—The teacher, it is said, makes use of words. But cannot God, by an *adloquium internum* cause new thoughts in the souls of men? Or are words the only possible way by which a Spirit can impart his light to other spirits, and teach them." Dogmatik, B. I. S. 129, ff.

But an immediate influence of this kind is not only *desirable* and *possible*, but also highly *probable*. Here again Bretschneider remarks: "As God stands in connexion with the material world, and by his most full and perfect life continually operates upon it; he must also stand in constant connexion with the moral world; otherwise there could be no moral government." Dogmatik, B. II. S. 600. This *probability* drawn from the cooperation of God in the material world, is stated still more strongly by Reinhard. If there is an immediate concurrence and agency of God in the material world, as generally conceded by German philosophers and theologians, such an agency is much

more to be expected in the moral world, since this is a far more congenial sphere for divine operations. "In the material sphere, the connexion between natural causes and effects is obvious to the senses, and must, therefore, be principally regarded by us, although even here the Scriptures commonly mention only the highest and last cause, which is God. But in the kingdom of freedom, there is no such mechanical connexion between cause and effect, but an unimpeded intercommunion of beings freely acting; here, therefore, there can be no reason why we, with the Scriptures, should not conceive of an immediate influence, since such an influence is far more adapted than one which is mediate, to the sphere of which we are now speaking." Moral, B. IV. S. 258.

But while these writers contend for the fact of immediate divine influences in promoting the renewal of men, they are careful to guard against the perversion of this doctrine by enthusiasts and fanatics. "The *reality* of these influences," says Bretschneider, "cannot be proved from experience. The influences of grace as such, cannot be distinguished in consciousness from others; because our consciousness informs us only of the effect, and not of its origin; takes note only of the change itself, which passes within us, but is unable to feel whether it comes from God. * * As the agency of God in the material world always appears to us as natural, and in the effects produced we never discern the supernatural cause; so his agency in the moral world will always appear to us as natural, and conformed to the laws of psychology, and we are unable in our consciousness to distinguish him as the acting cause." Dogmatik, B. II. S. 600. Cf. Reinhard's "Moral," B. IV. S. 264.

In this manner do these writers contend for the fact of immediate divine influences, by arguments derived from the need of man, the perfections of God, and the analogy of his agency in the material universe; and at the same time guard against the perversions of this salutary opinion by enthusiasts who, in the words of Tucker, "think they can see the flashes of illumination, and feel the floods of inspiration poured on them directly from the divine hand, and who undertake to give an exact history of all his motions from the very day and hour when he first touched their hearts."

It may be remarked here, that Kant conceded the possibility of immediate operations of grace for the conversion of man, but denied that they could be either proved or disproved from philosophy. The belief in such influences he held to be useful in awakening the hope, that God would do for us, what we ourselves might be unable to accomplish in the work of our moral renovation.—TR.]

APPENDIX.

Of Prayer as a means of grace.

The doctrine respecting *prayer* is commonly treated in systematic theology, in connexion with the doctrine of the operations of grace. But as the full discussion of this subject belongs rather to Christian ethics, than to theology, it has by some theologians been either wholly omitted or only cursorily noticed in their systems. On this subject, we shall make here only the following remarks. The prayer of Christians is a means of grace included under Christian doctrine, and not to be separated from it. For the influence of prayer is not to be derived from the mere act of those who pray. It stands in connexion with the power of the religious truths, to which prayer relates.

(1) Statement of the philosophical theory respecting prayer.

The following is the theory respecting prayer which has been adopted in modern times, especially in the eighteenth century, by Mosheim and Morus, and which is held by many philosophical and theological moralists. One who institutes a merely philosophical examination of prayer, and passes by all the positive promises to the supplicant contained in the Holy Scriptures, and especially in the Christian system, will yet allow, if he understands the nature of man, a great *moral* influence to prayer. For it is the means of reminding us of the great truths of religion, and of impressing these truths deeply on our hearts. It excites, moreover, a sure and grateful confidence in God and his promises, and a longing desire after the enjoyment of the blessings which he has promised. It is therefore, in itself, of a most beneficial tendency, and has an indescribable influence in promoting moral improvement and in purifying the heart. A man is not prepared for the blessings which the Christian doctrine promises, and is not capable of free, moral improvement, unless he acknowledges God as the author of them, and has a lively perception of these benefits, and an earnest desire to obtain them. Now from this desire after divine blessings, springs the wish, directed to God, that he would bestow them upon us; and this is the inward prayer of the heart. If these feelings are strong and vivid, it is common and natural to us, to express them in *words* and in the form of an address to God, whom we conceive to be present

with us, and acquainted with our thoughts and wishes. (The *verbal* expression is, however, by no means essential to prayer. A soul directed to God is all which is requisite.) By the very act of prayer, this vividness of conception is very much heightened, and in this way our desires and our longings are cherished and strengthened by prayer itself. In this exercise God is made, as it were, present with us; and while we are engaged in this duty, we feel as we are accustomed to feel in direct intercourse with a person who is near at hand, listening to us, and who by our words and requests is rendered favorable towards us and becomes intimate with us. To the philosopher, all this may appear illusion and imagination; but if he looks at experience, which on this subject is worth more than all speculation, he will find that this aid is indispensable to any one who means to make religion a matter of serious and lasting interest. Experience shows that good thoughts, purposes, and resolutions, unaccompanied by prayer, amount to nothing, because they leave the heart cold, and the mind unaffected.

(2) *Examination of this view of prayer.*

It is true that prayer, considered merely as a means of improvement, has great moral advantages; i. e. that it has a great effect on our moral improvement, that it withholds from evil, tranquillizes the soul, and is in every way promotive of the interests of morality and sincere religion. But it is also true, that it would cease to produce these results which are expected from it, if we should content ourselves with this theory of our philosophical moralists, and did not confidently hope to obtain the blessings for which we ask. One who considers the often-repeated assurances, "he that asks, shall receive," etc. as delusive, and not serious or sincere, will find that he wants an inward impulse to prayer. He can exercise no earnest desires, no real confidence, and no hearty gratitude. It is not our business to inquire *how* God can hear and answer our supplications, without infringing upon his immutability, or altering the established course of nature. We are to be satisfied with knowing, that he can do more than we understand, and that he can and will do every thing which he has promised. Such considerations, connected with *personal experience*, are enough to secure us against every doubt. Neither Christ, nor the other early teachers of morals, nor the prophets of the Old Testament, ever made use of the motives to prayer, so often used at the present day, derived merely from its *moral ad-*

vantages. Their great motive to prayer, is, *that it will be heard*, upon which they could depend as confidently, as the child does upon its father, when it requests what is needful for it. This is the great motive by which prayer should be inculcated on the common people and the young; otherwise they easily get the erroneous impression, that prayer, as such, is of no advantage, and in reality useless, since it is not heard. On this account, Jesus and the other teachers of morals and religion in ancient times, did wisely, both in omitting to mention the motives to prayer derived from its moral uses, and in inculcating it on the simple ground, *that it is heard*; without philosophizing upon the question, *in what way it has an influence.* And certainly Christians do well, in holding fast to the doctrine of Jesus and of the Holy Scriptures. Cf. Cramer, *Die Lehre vom Gebet, nach Offenbarung und Vernunft untersucht*, u. s. w., Keil und Hamburg, 1786, 8vo; and Nitzsch, *Diss. inaugural., Ratio qua Christus usus est in commendando precandi officio*, Viteberg. 1790; also, “*Nonnulla ad historiam de usu religiosa precationis morali pertinentia*,” by the same author and published at the same place, 1790, 4to.

Two points deserve particular consideration in this connexion.

(a) The feeling that prayer is necessary, is absolutely universal. The history of all nations who have had any religion, shows that prayer is every where recognized as an auxiliary to piety, which is indispensable and founded in our very nature. Experience, too, teaches that those religions which inculcate frequent prayer, and insist upon it, as a duty of the first importance, are the most practical, and can enumerate among their followers more examples of men eminently religious and virtuous, than other religions, which make prayer of less importance, and at most prescribe certain public prayers and set formulas. Next to the Jewish and Christian religion, the Mohammedan has exerted the most influence on the heart, because it so strenuously inculcates prayer. This religion next to the Jewish and Christian, has had the greatest number of truly religious professors and devout worshippers of God. [Cf. the work of Tholuck on *Ssuffismus*, or the doctrine of the *Ssuffis*,—a Mahomedan sect in Persia. Tr.]

(b) Christ makes it the special duty of his followers to *supplicate God in his name*, and promises to them a sure audience, which he would, as it were, procure for them, John 14: 13. 16: 23, 24.

This duty is inculcated by the Apostles upon *all Christians*. The sentiment of many passages taken together is this : pray with reference to Christ and his work, consequently in belief or sure confidence in him, and in his promises. In prayer we must be deeply convinced, that he is the author of our salvation, that even now he is mindful of our interests, and makes the things for which we ask his own, and intercedes with God to hear our requests. In this respect he is represented as our *Paracletus* and *advocate* with God, 1 John 2: 1. But the blessings which Christianity promises to us are not temporal but spiritual. Desire to obtain these, is always conformable to the divine will ; and as far as they are concerned, the hearing of prayer is certain.

ARTICLE THIRTEENTH.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY OR CHURCH.

{ The common order is to treat, first of the Sacraments, and then of the Church ; but the reverse order is in many respects more natural and proper ; for both of these parts of divine service have a principal relation to the Church. By Baptism we are solemnly initiated into the Church ; and by the Lord's Supper, the members of the Church solemnly renew and perpetuate the remembrance of Jesus Christ, and of the blessings which he has bestowed upon the human race.

§ 134. *What is meant by the Christian Church ; its object ; its names ; and the divisions of the Church common in Theology.*

I. Idea of the Christian Church ; its object ; and an explanation of its Scriptural names.

The *Christian Church*, in the widest sense, may be defined to be, *the whole number of those who agree in worshipping God according to the doctrine of Jesus Christ*. In this wider sense, it agrees with the word *Christendom*.—Its object is, *to maintain and perpetuate the Christian doctrine, and by means of ordinances and exercises observed in common, to promote the practice of it*. Such is the great body of mankind, that without some common duties, and some external ordinances, the Christian Religion could scarcely be maintained among them ; certainly it could not be kept from totally degenerating. The government and preservation of the Church are everywhere properly ascribed to Christ, as its head. The same

Scriptural principles are therefore, applicable here, which were above laid down in the doctrine respecting the kingdom of Christ, § 98.

The Scriptural names of Church are,

(1) *Ἐκκλησία*. This term is used by the Greeks to denote an assembly of men, called together on the authority of the magistracy; from *ἐκκαλέω*, *evoco, convoco*; e. g. Acts 19: 32, 39. The Hebrew *קָהָל* is used in the same way, especially in the books of Moses, and is commonly translated in the Septuagint by *ἐκκλησία*. The same is true of the Hebrew *קְהָל*. The term *קְהָל* (*קהל*), denoted secondarily all those who belonged to the Jewish people, and professed the Jewish religion. Christians took the word from the Jews, and like them used *ἐκκλησία* to denote, (a) particular societies of Christians in particular cities or provinces, e. g. *ἐκκλησία ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις*, κ. τ. λ. Acts 8: 1; (b) the religious *assemblies* of these societies, and the *places* in which they met; e. g. 1 Cor. 11: 18. 14: 19, 23, etc.; (c) the whole sum of those who profess the Christian religion, wherever they may be; e. g. 1 Cor. 12: 28. Matt. 16: 18, sq.

(2) *Συναγωγή* and *ἐπισυναγωγή* and these, too, are used by the Septuagint to render the words *קָהָל* and *קְהָל*. But they were employed by the Grecian Jews about the time of Christ, to denote their places of prayer or *oratories*, and the congregations connected with them; vid. Vitranga, de Synagoga Vetere. And so we find them used in the New Testament, to denote the religious assemblies of Christians, and the places where they held them; e. g. Heb. 10: 25. James 2: 2. These terms, however, were never used, like the preceding, to denote the whole of Christendom.

(3) There were also various figurative names employed. E. g. *Βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν* or *τοῦ θεοῦ*. So frequently in the discourses of Christ, vid. § 99, I. But this term denotes not simply the Christian Religion and Church; it comprehends all to whom belong the rights, duties, and the entire blessedness of the pious followers of Christ, in this life and the life to come; e. g. John 3: 3. Matt. 5: 3.—*Σῶμα Χριστοῦ* (of which he is the *κεφαλή*),—a figurative expression used to denote the intimate connexion between believers and Christ, and to impress upon them the duties of mutual harmony and brotherly love; Rom. 12: 5. He is the Head, we the members, Eph. 1: 22, also ch. iv. and v.—*Ναὸς θεοῦ*, 1 Cor. 3: 16, 17,—used to describe the dignity and holiness of Christians,

and the inviolableness of their rights.—*Οἶκος θεοῦ*, 1 Pet. 4: 17, sq. — Besides these, all the terms used to designate the Israelites as the peculiar and favorite people of God, are transferred to Christians in the New Testament, e. g. *λαὸς περιούσιος*, Tit. 2: 14; *λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν* (*περιποιήσεως*), 1 Pet. 2: 9; *ἐκλεκτοί*, κ. τ. λ. The Israelites were *the ancient people of God* (under the *παλαιὰ διαθήκη*), in opposition to the *new people of God* (under the *καινὴ διαθήκη*). And this ancient people is always regarded as the stock, from which the new sprung, Rom. 11: 17, sq. Acts 15: 16. And on this very account, Paul earnestly warns Christians, in the passage cited, against despising or undervaluing the Jews.

II. Divisions of the Church.

(1) Into *universal* and *particular*. The Church universal comprehends within itself all who profess the Christian doctrine, No. I. But since all Christians cannot agree respecting doctrines and forms of worship, it is natural that those who do agree in these respects should enter into a more intimate connexion. Hence have arisen particular churches, differing according to place and time, doctrine, forms, etc. Hence the division of the Church into the Eastern, Western, Roman, African, Papal, Lutheran, Calvinistic, etc.—Again; these particular Churches are subdivided into *Ecclesiæ singulares*, by which are understood the separate communions belonging to one particular Church, since even these often differ according to time and place, and even with respect to doctrines and usages. Thus we have the Lutheran Church in Saxony, Brandenburg, Sweden; the Reformed Church in England and Switzerland; etc.

(2) Into the *true Church*, and *false Churches*, and their subdivisions. This division must be retained *in abstracto*, although it should be applied very cautiously *in concreto*, or to particular cases. We may see in general, that that Christian Church deserves eminently the name of the true Church, in which there is an entire agreement with the doctrine of Jesus and the Apostles. The more it obeys Christ in every thing which he has commanded, the more worthy is it of this name, Eph. 5: 23, 24. But there has never been a Church, respecting all whose members this could be said; nor was there any such, even during the times of the Apostles, as we see from their writings; there has never been a particular

Church, wholly free from errors and deviations from the doctrine of Jesus. Christ himself declares, that in his Church on earth, there will always be error and truth, good and evil mingled together; vid. § 135, II. It is therefore better to say, that is the true Church, or more properly, has the most truth, in which there is found a nearer agreement with the doctrine of Jesus and the Apostles, than in other Churches.

On this subject, the opinions of Christians are so divided, that it is impossible to give any *general characteristic marks* of the true Church, which would be approved by all. The definition of the true Church will always depend upon the individual belief and conviction of every Christian; and each one regards that Church as true, which is most accordant with his own views.—The following principles, however, may be of some practical importance.

(a) No one Church is in the exclusive possession of the truth. There are in every Church, faults, defects, and errors; and so it was at the time of the Apostles, and so it is in all human societies and institutions.

(b) Nor is there, on the other hand, any Christian Church which is wholly wanting in the truth, or which does not profess many useful and important truths, although mixed more or less with error. We cannot in this matter judge of the particular members of a Church from the established and received doctrines of their Church, without doing the greatest injustice. In this respect, wrong is often done. For experience teaches, that there are often good Christians in a Church which professes many errors, and which has a bad constitution; and on the contrary, that there are often connected with very excellent Church-establishments, those who are unworthy of the Christian name.—These observations have given occasion to the division of the Church into *pure* and *impure*, according as more or less errors or false principles are embraced. We also speak of a *corrupt* Church, by which is meant particularly a Church in which false *moral* principles, exerting an injurious influence upon the life and Christian walk, are mingled with Christian doctrine. It remains therefore true, that the separate Christian communions are of different value and excellence, according to their greater or less purity in doctrine, and according to the greater or less adaptedness of their external polity and forms to promote moral improvement. It cannot, therefore, be in itself an indifferent matter to which of these

one belongs. No one, however, should desire to make his own individual conviction the unconditional rule for all others, and despise and condemn those who do not agree with himself.

(c) If there is no Church in which the system of doctrine, the regulations, forms of worship, etc. are perfect and incapable of improvement; it follows, that improvements may and ought to be made in them, whenever and wherever there is a necessity for it, and that it is an entirely false maxim, to adhere invariably to what is ancient, and never to alter. It does not belong, however, to any particular member, not even to a public teacher, to urge his supposed improvements upon the Church. And correct as is the principle *de reformatione ecclesiæ*, in the abstract, its practical application is attended with very great difficulties.

(d) To unite externally all the different Churches, is not practicable; and even if it could be done, would occasion more injury than benefit. And notwithstanding all the difference as to opinion and form in religious matters, mutual love and toleration may still exist. This is proved by the History of the Church in ancient and modern times.

(3) The Church is divided into *visible* and *invisible*. This division is entirely rejected in several of the new systems, e. g. in those of Gruner, Döderlein, and others. They seem, however, to have taken offence merely at the terms. These are, indeed, new, and have come into use since the Reformation. But the thing itself which is intended by these terms is well supported, and is as ancient as the Christian Church itself, and was acknowledged as true by Christ and the Apostles and the whole early Church. These terms came into use in the following way: Luther denied that the Romish Church, according to the doctrine and polity which it then professed, is the true Church. It was then asked, *Where then was the true Church before him?* To which he answered, that it was *invisible*, i. e. before the Reformation those Christians had constituted the true Church and held the pure doctrine, who, without regarding the authority and commandment of men, had followed the Scriptures according to their own views, had lived piously, and kept themselves free from the errors of the public Religion; and such persons there always had been, even at the most corrupt periods, although they had not always been known. It was from this just

observation, that this division arose. Cf. Confess. August. Art. VII. and VIII., and Apol. A. C.

Protestants understand by the *Invisible Church*, true Christians, who not only know the precepts of Christ, but from the heart obey them, Matt. 7: 21. This Church is not always clearly seen; indeed, to speak justly, it is known only to God, Col. 3: 3; while from the eyes of men, who judge only according to the external appearance, it is wholly concealed. On the contrary, the *Visible Church* consists of all who by profession belong externally to the Church, i. e. attend public worship, partake of the sacraments, etc.; for wherever the Christian doctrine is proclaimed, and the rites prescribed by it are observed, there the Visible Church is. Not every one, therefore, who belongs to the Visible Church, even if it be one of the best, does on this account belong also to the Invisible Church. For in the Visible Church, there are often wicked men and hypocrites. This is not, then, a division *generis in species*, but *eadem res diverso respectu*. The same is true with respect to other societies, e. g. the Republic of the learned.

There are not wanting passages in the New Testament in which this distinction is plainly made, although it is not expressed in this manner. For, first, the word *ἐκκλησία* in many texts denotes the whole number who make an outward profession of Christianity, without having any reference to their inward state; e. g. 1 Cor. 1: 2, etc.; vid. No. I. But secondly, in other passages such predicates are given to the Church, as do not apply to all who profess Christ, but only to that better and nobler part, which is called the invisible Church; e. g. Eph. 5: 27, *ἀγία, ἄμωμος, μὴ ἔχουσα σπιλον ἢ ῥυτίδα*, etc. Here belongs the remarkable passage, Mark 9: 38—40, where the disciples of Jesus would not acknowledge a person to be a genuine follower of Christ, because he did not belong to their society,—their external church, and was not, as it were, enrolled as belonging to their corporation; on which point Christ sets them right. Cf. Matt. 15: 22, sq. That in the visible Church (*βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*) the evil and the good are mingled together, and cannot be externally separated without injury to the whole, is taught by Christ in the excellent Parable, Matt. 13: 24—30. The wicked are compared with the tares, although they belong to the external, visible Church; but the good, who belong both to the visible and invisible Church, are compared with the wheat. Cf. the text, Matt. 7: 21, above cited.

Note. Christ regards all who from the heart believe in him (the members of the invisible Church), as a present which God has given him, and so calls them; and upon them, he says, he bestows eternal life; vid. John 6: 37. 17: 2, 6. The better, pious part of mankind are spoken of as belonging to God,—they are his children; and this his possession he gives over to the charge of Christ, to lead them to eternal life. This is a great and heart-affecting idea; and if such a thought had been found in Plato or Xenophon, there would have been no end of praising it. But in the Holy Scriptures it is less regarded.

(4) The Church is divided again into *militant* and *triumphant*. By the Church *militant* is meant, Christians in the present life, so far as they have to contend with many internal and external sufferings, adversities, and persecutions. By the Church *triumphant* is meant, the society of Christians in Heaven, so far as they are freed from all these trials, and enjoy the most perfect rest and blessedness. The *Church*, however, is here used in the narrower sense, for the *invisible Church* and its members. This division was taken principally from the text, Rev. 12: 7, sq., though this is rather a description of the rest to which the Church will be restored here upon the earth, after long persecutions and calamities. It is also derived from those passages in which the dangerous and toilsome life of Christians, is compared with a strife and conflict, which will soon be over; e. g. 2 Tim. 4: 7. Here too must be mentioned the text, Heb. 12: 22, 23, where the noble thought is exhibited, that we compose but one society with the host of blessed angels and the company of the saints now rewarded in Heaven (τετελειωμένων δικαίων), of whom Jesus is the Head; and that, when we have completed our course here below, we shall join this upper society, in our native land.

Note. Among the writings of the older Protestant theologians, in which this division, and the other topics introduced in this section are treated very thoroughly, that of Jo. Musæus, *De Ecclesia* (Jenæ, 1675), deserves particular mention.

§ 135. *Attributes of the Christian Church; the ecclesiastical terms commonly employed to designate them, and their signification.*

It has been common, in imitation of the ancient Confessions, to predicate of the true Church the four attributes *una, sancta, cathol-*

ica, apostolica. In the Apostolic Symbol it is called, *a holy Christian Church, the society of the saints*; in the Nicene Symbol, *one only, holy, Christian, Apostolic Church.* Most of these terms are taken from the New Testament, though they are there used in a different sense from that in which they are employed in the later ecclesiastical phraseology. And this difference should be carefully noted. It must be remarked in general, that all these attributes properly apply only to the *Invisible Church*, although many of them may be predicated also of the *Visible Church*, when rightly explained.—The doctrine of the *perpetuity* of the Church may be most conveniently considered in connexion with these.

I. Unity of the Church.

This predicate has an entirely different meaning in the New Testament, from that which it bears in the common ecclesiastical phraseology. Its two significations will therefore be separately considered.

(1) When the unity of the Church is spoken of in the New Testament, it is a *moral* unity which is intended. The import of this term is, that all who worship God according to the doctrine of Jesus, should regard themselves as members of one society, and as such should exercise mutual brotherly love; that notwithstanding all differences of birth, condition, knowledge, opinions, and forms, they should still constitute but *one Church* or religious society, worshipping one and the same Lord, even Christ, and partaking in common of the blessings promised to his followers. That there should be such a union among his followers, was the last will, the testament of Christ; John 13: 34, coll. 15: 1, sq. And in order to this, it is not essential that there should be a full and entire agreement of opinion on every particular doctrine. Christians, though differing as to their mode of thinking, their particular opinions and forms, and though divided into particular communions, ought to regard themselves as constituting still but one Church, and so to live together in unity of spirit. This is the true spirit of Christianity; it infuses feelings of toleration. And the more one has of the mind of Christ, the more tolerant will he be to others; and especially, because he knows, that not only his Lord, but his brethren, see much in him which requires forbearance; vid. Tit. 3: 3—5.

This unity of the Church is mentioned in those passages in the New Testament, in which warnings are given against disturbers of the peace and against controversies; and in those also in which it is taught, that it is the design of Christianity to remove all distinction between Jew and Gentile, and to unite all nations in a common religion; respecting which vid. § 118, II.

The principal proof-texts here are John 17: 20, *ἵνα πάντες ἐν ὁσίν* John 10: 16, “one fold, one shepherd;” and Eph. 4: 3—6, and v. 13, *ἐνότης πνεύματος*, because all worship one God and one Christ, have one baptism and one doctrine. The *ἐνότης πίστεως* in v. 13, is one and the same Christian doctrine, professed alike by Jews and Gentiles who believe in Christ, who ought therefore to love each other as brethren. Gal. 3: 28, *πάντες εἰς ἐν Χριστῷ*. Rom. 12: 5, *πολλοὶ ἐν σῶμά ἐσμεν*, coll. v. 13, and ch. 10: 17. 1 Cor. 1: 12, 13. 8: 6. The true spiritual unity of Christians is, therefore, placed by Christ himself in this, that they believe in the only true God, and in Jesus, as the Saviour of the world; that they love him, and from love to him, obey his commandments, and especially that they love one another. By this only can the true disciples of Christ be known:—not by external names and forms; but by faith, working by love,—the love of Christ and our neighbour.

(2) But there gradually arose, after the second and third centuries, an entirely different conception of the unity of the Church. It first originated among the Fathers in the West, in consequence of their transferring to Christianity certain incorrect Jewish ideas, which were disapproved by Jesus and his apostles, and which had the most injurious results. The unity of the Church was placed by them, in an entire external agreement as to those doctrines and forms which were handed down from the times of the Apostles, through the churches founded by them, and in the external connexion and fellowship of the particular societies founded upon this agreement.

The most ancient passages relating to this subject are found in Irenæus (I. 10), Tertullian (*de pæscript. hæret. c. 20, ad finem*), and Cyprian (in his Book, “*de unitate ecclesiæ*”). The object contemplated in this external connexion of Churches was at first very good; it was designed by this means to set bounds to the ever encroaching corruption in doctrine and life, and to remove false teachers. But when the rulers of the Churches no longer possessed

the genuine spirit of Jesus, then, through these principles and the consequences derived from them, the hierarchy was gradually established ; and intolerance, and the spirit of persecution and anathematizing, became very prevalent. Even the papal hierarchy rests entirely upon these principles, and originated from them. The principal Bishops now established a kind of College or secret society ; and this *unity of the Church* was made dependent, first upon many heads, then upon *one visible* Head of the Church. And whoever ventured to dissent from the doctrine or the ordinances of the principal Bishops, who held together and governed their Churches, was excluded from Church-fellowship and declared a heretic. Even Cyprian derived the one true Church in the West from Peter, because he taught at Rome, and because the Church there was the mother of most of the Churches in the West. The Bishops regarded themselves therefore as the successors of the Apostles, and as the representatives of God and of Christ ; and whoever was excluded by them from Church-fellowship, was excluded by God himself ; and it was early believed and taught, that he was at the same time excluded from salvation. Vid. § 123, II.—Hence even Cyprian states in his book the principle, *extra ecclesiam illam unicam et veram [externam or visibilem] non dari salutem*,—a principle from which so many false doctrines were afterwards deduced ; vid. § 121, II.

Upon these supports does the whole false system of the hierarchy in the Romish Church depend. Vid. Henke, *De unitate ecclesiæ*, in his “*Opuscula*.” But there is no such *Societas Christiana*, nor ought there, according to the design of Jesus, to be any which shall resemble civil societies ; for this leads to a hierarchy, and all the evil consequences which flow from the collision of secular and spiritual power.

Protestants have never had properly *one Church*, but *churches*, (*ecclesias*). Such at least is the language employed in the Augsburg Confession, Art. VII., and in the other public instruments, even in the Peace of Westphalia ; and it is in this that Protestantism is distinguished from consolidated Popedom.—The Roman Catholic idea of the Church is vindicated in a very subtle and plausible manner in the work, “*Idea biblica Ecclesiæ Dei*,” by Franc. Oberthür, Vol. I. Salzburg, 1790, 8vo. Vol. II. 1799. He proceeds on the definition : *Quod sit ecclesia schola quædam, quam Deus exere-*

rit, nutriendæ ac promovendæ internæ religionis causa, in which, however, there does not seem to be any thing insidious.

II. The sanctity of the Church.

This is twofold; viz.,

(1) *External*; and this is predicated of the Church, so far as it is distinguished from other religious societies (e. g. Jewish or Gentile) by the superior excellence of its religious principles. In this wider sense, even the Jews are in the Old Testament often denominated *holy*; and taken in this sense, the visible Christian Church may justly be called *holy*; for it is not the moral character of the members which is designated by the term in this wider sense. And so all Christians, even those who are such merely by external profession, are often denominated *ἅγιοι* in the New Testament; vid. § 126, IV., also 1 Pet. 2: 9.

(2) *Internal or moral*. The whole object of the establishment of the Church, and the instruction communicated in Christian doctrine, is, to bring the members of the Church, under divine guidance, to this internal holiness. This is said by Paul in the passage cited, Eph. 5: 26, 27, coll. Tit. 2: 14. But this object is not actually attained in respect to all who belong to the external visible Church, but only in those who belong to the invisible Church. It can, therefore, be truly said only of the invisible Church, that it is *holy*, in this internal, moral sense.

Many have been led, by confounding these different meanings, and by misunderstanding those passages in which it is made the duty of every Christian to be holy, to adopt the principle, that even the external or visible Church must be a society consisting only of renewed persons or saints, and that a Church which tolerates within itself unholy or unregenerate persons cannot be a true Church, and so is to be excluded from Christian fellowship. It was on these principles that the Novatians proceeded in the third century, and the Donatists in the fourth and fifth. And they were still more frequently maintained by the Anabaptists and other fanatical sects in the sixteenth century. The same principles have been revived in still more modern times by the Quakers, and many other fanatics and separatists.

But they do not consider, that in all external human societies,

good and evil must be mixed, and that often the Omniscient only can discern and distinguish the hypocrites, who are much more injurious than the openly vicious. And so Christ pronounced, that the external Church could never be pure from evil, and that the tares and the wheat must be suffered to grow together; Matt. 13: 3, sq. vs. 24—31, 47—50; and so too, he himself endured Judas[†] among his apostles. Too great severity often terrifies the good, and keeps them at a distance; and wicked ancestors often have descendants who are good and useful members of the Church, but who would not have been so, if their ancestors had been excluded. The external visible Church cannot, therefore, be a society consisting of pious Christians only; it is rather a *nursery* (*seminarium*), designed to raise up many for the invisible kingdom.

Still however, it is always right and certainly according to the spirit of Christ, for like-minded Christians to associate together, and to establish among themselves institutions which they may deem promotive of piety, or even to form smaller societies in which they will permit those only to participate who have a like object and possess similar dispositions with themselves, excluding all others;—the *ecclesiolæ in ecclesia* of which Spener spoke. They should beware, however, against running in this way into spiritual pride, against holding themselves to be better than others, and against regarding those who do not join them, and are not enrolled among them, as worse Christians than themselves. It does not belong to the government to interdict such associations, if they do not disturb civil peace and order, any more than to forbid and hinder other private associations of citizens for other lawful objects. The reasons for and against these associations are canvassed in Burkhardt's "Geschichte der Methodisten," Nürnberg, 1795, S. 123, f.—The History of the Church teaches that these smaller associations have had, upon the whole, a highly beneficial effect. In times of ignorance and unbelief, they have been the depositories of uncorrupted Christianity. Without the Waldenses, the Wickliffites, and the Hussites, the Reformation would never have taken place.

III. The Catholic and Apostolic Church.

A different idea is attached to the term *Catholic* in modern times, and especially in the Protestant Church, from that which au-

ciently belonged to it. *Catholic* is now used in its etymological sense, and is synonymous with *universal*. And the Church is said to be universal, because all, in the whole earth, who profess Christ, belong to it, and because Christianity is not merely a national religion, or the religion of a country, but one which may be professed by all men without distinction. The Church is called *apostolical*, because the members of it profess to adopt the doctrine taught by the apostles, and contained in their writings; according to Eph. 2: 20, "built upon the foundation of the Apostles." But anciently *καθολικός* was synonymous with *ὁρθόδοξος*, and *fides catholica* was the same as *fides orthodoxa*, which was the faith held in opposition to heretics; because it was supposed that the true faith, which accords with the will of Christ and the Apostles, must be the universal faith of all Christians, and be found in all the Churches established by the Apostles. Hence *Ecclesia Catholica* is that *quæ habet fidem sive veritatem Catholicam*, i. e. the right and pure doctrine and constitution, in opposition to those Churches which have not the pure apostolic doctrine, but belong to the heretics. They proceeded on the principle, that there is only one true Church (vid. No. I.), and in order to establish and maintain this, the principal Churches and their Bishops throughout the Roman Empire (*καθ' ὅλην οἰκουμένην*) had gradually formed a separate Church union. Whatever agreed with this was *καθολικόν*, otherwise *αἰρετικόν*. The genuine apostolic doctrine was supposed, however, to be found in those Churches which the Apostles themselves had founded. To these Churches, and to the doctrine handed down in them from the times of the Apostles, the appeal was, therefore, made in the controversies in which the Catholic fathers were engaged with the heretics; and it was by this appeal, an appeal to *tradition*, that they confuted them; vid. Vol. I. Introduction, § 7, III. But the whole body of Christian Churches professing the orthodox doctrine handed down in the apostolic Churches, were called the *Catholic, Orthodox, or Apostolic Church*, because they all agreed in the doctrines and regulations prescribed by the Apostles to the Churches founded by them, e. g. by Peter to the Church at Rome, by Paul to that at Ephesus, etc. The earliest passages relating to this subject are found in Irenæus, Adv. Hæres L. III. and especially in Tertullian, De præscript. hæres. c. 20, 21. It is there said, for example, *Tot ac tantæ ecclesiæ, una est; illa ab Apostolis primæ, ex qua omnes. Sic omnes primæ, et omnes*

apostolicæ dum una ; omnes probant unitatem, etc. Vid. the Essay of Henke before cited.

Note. The infallibility of the Church was not believed during the first centuries. Between the period of the Nicene Council in the fourth century, and Gregory the VII. many traces of this opinion appear. From Gregory VII. until the Western Schism in the fourteenth century, it was placed mostly in the infallibility of the Pope. From that period until the Council at Trent, the idea prevailed, that only the Church collected in general, Council is infallible. Since that period, the opinions of Catholic theologians have been divided on this point. Some (the genuine Romanists) make the Pope the subject of this infallibility ; other, (and among these even Febronius) suppose the Œcumenical Councils alone infallible ; others still (and principally the French theologians since the middle of the seventeenth century) attribute infallibility only to the Church dispersed at large. At present this doctrine is wholly abandoned by some of the more liberal Catholic theologians. Vid. the excellent book (written by a Catholic), entitled, *Kritische Geschichte der kirchlichen Unfehlbarkeit, zur Beförderung einer freyern Prüfung des Katholicismus*, Frankf. a. M. 1792, 8vo. Cf. also the very learned and liberal work, entitled "Thomas Freykirch, oder Freymüthige Untersuchung von einem katholischen Gottesgelehrten über die Unfehlbarkeit der katholischen Kirche, 1r. B. Frankf. und Leipzig, 1792, 8vo.

IV. The perpetuity of the Church.

Christ himself teaches with the greatest assurance, that the religious society and constitution founded by him will never cease, but be perpetual. *All the powers of decay and destruction shall not get advantage over it, πύλαι ἄδου* (where all which perishes or is destroyed upon the earth is collected) *οὐ κατισχύουσιν αὐτῆς*, Matt. 16: 18.—It is the doctrine of the New Testament, that Christ, as the Ruler of the Church, is now actively employed in Heaven for its good, and that he will continue until the end of the world, to support and enlarge it ; vid. Matt. 28: 20. 1 Cor. 15: 25 ; coll. Ephes. 4: 16, and § 98, respecting the kingdom of Christ. This, however, is not to be so understood as to imply, that the particular forms of doctrine which prevail at any particular time, and the particular Church communions originating from them, will be of perpetual duration. Changes must necessarily here take place. The history of the Church teaches, that one mode of Church polity succeeds another, and that yet, however great these changes may be, Christianity still survives. External constitutions and æconomies resemble the scaffolding, which aid in the construction of the building, but are not the building itself. They may be taken down and

broken to pieces, when they have answered their purposes, and the building will then proceed in a different way. That this is so, is proved by the history of the Church. It has been, however, a common mistake for the members of certain particular churches, e. g. the Catholic, Lutheran, and others, to suppose, that if their particular constitution should cease, the whole Christian Church, and Christianity itself would perish. So most in *all* the separate communions still think, and always have thought; and yet the Christian doctrine and Church have hitherto been perpetuated, notwithstanding the greatest revolutions in states and in ecclesiastical politics; and this beyond a doubt would still be the case, even if the particular Churches and establishments now existing should perish. The spirit and essential nature of Christianity may remain, however much its external form may be altered.—Christianity, however, is not so connected with any one place or nation, that it must necessarily be perpetuated there; nor has any one Church a promise, that its descendants shall be Christians. We know from the history of the Church, that where Christianity was once most flourishing, it has since been expelled, either by superstition or unbelief; and it has thence travelled to other regions which were formerly sunk in the deepest night of ignorance. Let the reader call to mind the former flourishing condition of the Eastern Churches, and then compare with it their present state. Every Church should make the use of this fact, which is suggested in Rev. 2: 5.

§ 136. *Of the Head of the Christian Church; and of the institutions established to maintain and extend it, especially through the office of public teaching.*

I. The Head of the Church.

The only true Head and supreme Lord of the Christian Church, is Jesus Christ, according to the uniform doctrine of Christ himself and the Apostles; vid. Morus p. 278, § 2. Those who profess his doctrine are brethren, and as such have equal rights; vid. Matt. 23:

8. Hence he is called *ὁ ποιμήν, ἀρχιποιμήν, κ. τ. λ.* John 10: 12. 1 Pet. 5: 4. Heb. 13: 20; and *μεγαλὴ ἐκκλησίας*, Ephes. 1: 22. 4: 15. Col. 2: 10. Nor is he called by these titles merely in a figurative sense, but because, in his exalted state, he exercises unwearied and watchful care over men, and especially over his Church and its members; vid. § 98, respecting the kingdom of Christ.

Christ therefore by no means wished, that his apostles should exercise a lordly dominion over other Christians, Luke 22: 24; and they never assumed such authority, but expressly protested against it, vid. 1 Pet. 5: 1—3. 1 Cor. 5: 6, sq. Nor was it his will that *one* of the apostles, or his successors, should possess supremacy and magisterial power over the Church, like what is asserted in the Romish Church respecting Peter and his successors, of which there is not a trace in the New Testament or in the first centuries, as appears from Church history. The text, Matt. 16: 18, *upon this rock I will build my Church*, relates indeed to Peter and his merits in diffusing the Christian faith. For history teaches, that he really laid the first foundation of the *great building of the house of God*, after the departure of Christ, both from the Jews, Acts 11., and from the Gentiles, Acts x.,—a building which is firmly based (built on a rock), and which will endure until the end of the world; whence he is always preeminent among the apostles. But nothing is said in this passage respecting his own supreme and judicial power over the Church, or that of his successors. Peter is here spoken of as a disciple, and not as a ruler and governour. Morus explains this passage very well (p. 284, sq. n. 3).

It is therefore justly affirmed in the Protestant Church, that Christ has constituted no *visible head* of the whole Church, who is to hold his place upon the earth, and to act and make decrees as his representative and in his name.

It is quite another question, *Whether the Christian Church has not the right to commit to some one the charge and government of its external public concerns?* This right the Church certainly has; and if good order is to be preserved, it must be exercised; because all the members of the Church cannot take part in its government. Thus it was in the Apostolic Church. But the one, or the many, who are appointed to this duty, and who constitute an *ecclesiam repræsentativam*, possess this preeminence not *jure divino*, but *humano*. They ought not therefore to give out their decretals as

divine, and in the name of God. Their enactments are merely human, and ought to have no more than human authority; they may be altered, improved, etc.

Since, moreover, in every well organized society there must be subordination, no good reason can be given why this should not be introduced among the officers and teachers of the Christian Church, and why one should not have more authority than another. In this way, at a very early period, a great preeminence over the other occidental Bishops was ascribed to the Roman Bishops, and he was called the Head of the (occidental) Church, while as yet there was no absolute dominion or magisterial power over the Church allowed him. But for a farther account of this matter, we must refer to Canon Law and Church History.

II. The office of teaching in the Church.

Every Christian has the right, and indeed is under obligation, to do all in his power to maintain and promote Christian knowledge and feeling; vid. Rom. 15: 14. Gal. 6: 1. Eph. 5: 19. 6: 4. 1 Thess. 5: 14. But since all Christians have not the time, talents, or other qualifications requisite for this work, some were set apart by Christ, whose appropriate business and calling it should be, *to teach* and *counsel* those committed to their charge; and these were to be the instruments, through whom he designed that his doctrine should be maintained and transmitted, and the practice of it promoted. Paul therefore derives the institution of the different kinds of officers and teachers in the Church, directly from God and Christ; and says, that each received a different office and employment, according to his talents and gifts; 1 Cor. 12: 28. Eph. 4: 11, 12; and in the latter passage he says, that this arrangement was made for the perfection and edification of the Christian Church (*πρὸς καταρτισμὸν—εἰς οἰκοδομὴν σώματος Χριστοῦ*). They are hence called *ὑπηρέτας* and *διάκονοι θεοῦ* and *Χριστοῦ*,—those who stand in the service of God and Christ, and are employed by them as instruments. They are also called *fellow-workers with God* (*συνεργοί*), 1 Cor. 3: 9.

The Christian office of teaching was therefore appointed by Jesus Christ himself, as an institution designed for the maintenance and spread of the gospel through all ages. And he had the right to do this, as being commissioned and authorized by God himself, to be the founder and head of his Church. No one of his followers

can therefore consistently undervalue this institution, or wilfully withdraw himself, on any pretence, from the assemblies of Christians for the purpose of religious instruction. Matt. 28: 18—20. Eph. 4: 11, sq. Heb. 10: 25.—But it is necessary, in order to obviate various abuses and mistakes, that we should here more particularly illustrate some points relating to the office of teaching.

(1) The *Apostles* were set apart, as public teachers and as founders of Christian Churches, *directly* by Christ himself; and they again, as ambassadors for Christ, appointed a perpetual office of teaching, and the public assembling of Christians for worship, and other institutions, calculated to impart strength and perpetuity to the Church. Cf. the first chapters of the Acts of the Apostles. Cf. also Spalding, Vom Werth und Nutzen des Predigtamts, 2te Ausg. Berlin, 1773, 8vo.

The teachers in the Apostolic Church are divided into *ordinary* and *extraordinary*. Among the latter are included the *Apostles* themselves, the *evangelists* (who were missionaries and assistants of the Apostles), and in general all who were not appointed as permanent teachers over particular churches, but who were employed in extending Christianity, and in founding new Churches. Among the former,—the ordinary and permanent officers and teachers of each particular Church, were ἐπίσκοποι, πρεσβύτεροι, ποιμένες, διδάσκαλοι (of which the general name is ἡγούμενοι, *officers, rulers of the Church*, Heb. 13: 7, 17, 24). Some of these had more to do with the external concerns of the Church (*presbyteri regentes, ποιμένες*), and others were more especially employed in instruction (*presbyteri docentes, διδάσκαλοι*). But for a more particular account of this matter we must refer to Church History.

These officers and teachers were not appointed immediately by Christ himself; and in the first Church they were not always appointed in the same way and by the same persons; certainly no rule was given respecting this point which should be binding in all places and at all times. The apostles never imposed teachers upon any Church, but left to the Churches the enjoyment of the right belonging to them of choosing their own teachers. This right of choosing their officers was sometimes exercised by the Churches, e. g. Acts 6: 2, 3, 5. 2 Cor. 8: 19; and sometimes they left it to the Apostles, or persons commissioned by them, to whom was commit-

ted the care of the public affairs of the Church, e. g. 2 Tim. 2: 2. Tit. 1: 5, sq.

But all these teachers and overseers, appointed either by the Churches or their rulers and representatives, were regarded in the New Testament as appointed by God, or the Holy Ghost, or Christ, e. g. Acts 20: 28. Col. 4: 17; because their consecration took place on his authority, and according to his will. It is common to denominate the naming and consecration of any one to the office of teaching, his *calling* (*vocatio*), because קָרָא and καλεῖν are used in the Scriptures with respect to the designation of prophets and other teachers, and the divine commissions entrusted to them. And this calling, even in application to the teachers of religion at the present day, may be denominated *divine*, so far as it is accordant with the divine will, and with the order which God has established; in the same way as the institution of government is called divine, Rom. 13: 1. At the present time, however, this calling is never *immediately* from God. And every teacher may be sure, that he has a *divine* call, (i. e. one in accordance with the divine will,) when in a regular manner he has received a commission to his office from those who have the right to induct him, and after careful examination, in the presence of God, has found that he can hope to discharge its duties with the divine approbation. The characteristics of a teacher who is acceptable to God and to Christ, are briefly enumerated, 1 Tim. 3: 2—7. 2 Tim. 2: 24. Tit. 1: 5—9. 1 Pet. 5: 2, sq.; and by these each one may examine himself.

That a teacher of religion should be solemnly consecrated to his office, or ordained, is a regulation which is indeed useful, both to the teacher himself and to the Church; but, in itself considered, it is not a matter *juris divini*; it is no where expressly commanded by God, and contributes nothing, considered as an external ceremony, to efficiency and activity in the sacred office. Luther himself pronounced ordination not to be necessary, and said that a rightful calling is sufficient to make any one a rightful teacher, and this is the consecration of God. And this is very true; for the right to teach does not properly depend upon ordination, but upon vocation. On Protestant principles, the ordination of a teacher is nothing else than a public approval and confirmation of his calling to the office of teaching; so that thenceforward he may begin his work, and enjoy his rights; Morus, p. 282, n. 3.

The act which is now called *ordination*, and which is still retained in the Protestant Church, is something very different from *ordination* according to the use of the ancient Church, and the old ecclesiastical Latinity. *Ordinatio* was there the same as *χειροτομία*, and was taken from military life among the Romans, like the word *ordines*. For Christians were called *milites Christi*. It was therefore synonymous with *constitutio*, *constituere ad munus publicum*, and was the same with *vocare*. But afterwards they made a separate order of the clergy, and allowed them entirely peculiar privileges, and an ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and then called them —*ordo*, in the same sense in which the Roman senate is called *ordo*, *ordo senatorius*, with which it was compared; and when any one was received into this order by special consecration, he was said *ordinari*.

The right of ordaining, according to Protestant principles, is not confined to particular persons, e. g. bishops; but it can be performed by any one who is commissioned to do it by the Church, or by their functionaries and representatives.—*The imposition of hands* in the induction of teachers into office is mentioned, e. g. 1 Tim. 4: 14. Acts 13: 3; and is a ceremony borrowed from the Jewish Church, where it was practised with regard to all to whom any office was given, to whom any thing was promised, or for whom any blessing was implored from God, as a sign of blessing, invocation, etc.,—*symbolum collationis*.

There is one practice in the Protestant Church with reference to this subject, which is a real remnant of popery; viz. that an ordained person may still teach and administer the sacraments, even when he no longer properly fills an office as a teacher of religion; as if ordination put a *character indelebilis* upon a person; while the truth is, that the permission and the right to discharge these duties depend upon a person's vocation to the sacred office, and not upon his ordination. In this respect, therefore, the practice of the Protestant Church is inconsistent with its theory, and many evil consequences are the result.

(2) *Of the rights of Christian teachers.*

First; as to the rights of teachers, they have, merely as teachers, no other than to instruct and counsel that part of the Church entrusted to their care, to perform the services of public worship, and in return to expect their maintenance from the Church; 1 Pet.

5: 2, 3. Acts 20: 28. 1 Cor. 9: 6—14. The Church and the government may, however, if they see it to be best, confer still other rights, privileges, and immunities upon teachers.

Note. As to the manner in which the Church shall be governed, and by what sort of persons, and how instruction shall be provided for, there are no precepts given in the Bible. Properly all Christians have a right to teach,—every father his own family; and even to administer the sacraments, as even Tertullian truly observes. There is, therefore, truly a *jus laicorum sacerdotalis*, as Grotius, Salmasius, Böhmer, and Spener have maintained. Even among the Jews, the teachers of the people were not priests, but laymen; and any one who had proper qualifications, might teach in the synagogue or in the temple. Among the ancient Israelites, the prophets were commonly not from the order of the priesthood, but for the most part from other tribes, classes and orders of the people. But for the sake of good order, the business of teaching and of performing the services of public worship, must necessarily be entrusted to some particular persons; otherwise irregularities and abuses are inevitable; as may be seen from the example of some sects which allow every one to teach, 1 Cor. xii.

Secondly. It was not long, however, before other rights and privileges were conferred upon the teachers of the Christian Church; partly such as had belonged to the *Jewish Priests* (with whom Christian teachers were compared), and even to the *heathen priests* within the Roman Empire; and partly such as were given to the extraordinary teachers in the first Christian Church, and especially to the Apostles. To these extraordinary teachers, Christ promised extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, and many of their peculiar privileges and rights were founded upon these gifts, and could not be claimed by their successors, to whom these gifts were not imparted.

Among these is especially the *office or the power of the keys* (*potestas clavium*). This includes the power of forgiving or not forgiving sins, like what is common in the Protestant Church at Confessions, or at the preparation for the Lord's Supper; (against which there is nothing to be objected, if it is understood that this absolution is not *collativa*, but merely *declarativa* or *hypothetica*;) and also plenipotentary power, either to exclude any one from Church fellowship, or to receive him again; so that the entire administration of Church discipline is called *officium clavium*; vid. Morus, pp. 286—288.

But with regard to this, there are more mistakes than one, which need to be answered.

(a) In all the passages of the New Testament which are appealed to in behalf of the power of the keys, the Apostles only—the *extraordinary* teachers of the Church, are spoken of.

(b) In the passages Matt. 16: 19 and 18: 18, nothing is said about forgiving or not forgiving sins, but about *binding* and *loosing*, which in such a connexion always mean, in the Syriac, Chaldaic, and the Rabbinical writers, to *forbid* and to *allow*; cf. Lightfoot and Wetstein on these texts. The meaning is: “You, as my ambassadors, shall have power in the Christian Church (κλειῖς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν) to make regulations and to give precepts,—to allow and to forbid; and God will approve these your appointments, and they shall be regarded by men as if they were from God.” For the Apostles had special gifts of the Spirit, and were the ambassadors of God and of Christ. The doctrine of the Apostles should therefore be to all Christians, the rule of what they should do, and what they should leave undone. The same is taught in other words, Matt. 18: 18. This is somewhat differently explained by Morus, pp. 284, 287.

(c) In John 20: 23, Christ gives to his Apostles, as ambassadors of God, full power to forgive sins, or to withhold forgiveness. The reason of this is to be found in the gifts of the Spirit promised, v. 22. The Apostles did not indeed become omniscient and infallible by the possession of these extraordinary gifts; but they received power to free men from certain evils, which were regarded as punishments of sin, especially from sicknesses; and it is this power which seems to be here spoken of, and therefore not so much *de remissione peccatorum* VERBALI (as theologians call it), as *de remissione reali*. Thus the healing of the lame man, Matt. 9: 6, is derived from the power which the Messiah possessed of forgiving sins.

(d) The right to receive any one into the fellowship of the Church, or to exclude him from it, did not belong to the apostles or to other teachers exclusively. Nor did the apostles ever exercise it, or claim it for themselves; but they left the exercise of it to the Churches; vid. 1 Cor. 5: 13. 2 Cor. 2: 6—10. That the Church not only have the right, but are under obligation, to provide for the support of their doctrine and constitution, and to see to it that nothing is done contrary to them, is indeed unquestionable. And this

is the foundation of Christian discipline, i. e. of all those public regulations and appointments, by which the Christian doctrine and constitution, and a correspondent demeanour in the members of the Church, are promoted and preserved. And this is according to Scripture. But respecting the manner in which Christian Churches shall administer this discipline, no general rules are given. This must depend upon the situation and circumstances of each particular Church. The Church may allow this right to be exercised by some particular persons, e. g. by its teachers; but these in such a case do not possess this right in and of themselves, but in the name of the Church and as its representatives. In the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, there is a particular Chapter on *the power of the Church*, as exercised through its *teachers*. But many Protestant teachers are dissatisfied with having their power limited to mere teaching and counselling.—It is moreover a maxim in the Protestant Church, that Church discipline should not have the form and effect of civil punishments; vid. Morus, p. 285, § 8.

If therefore the phrase *the power of the keys*, is to be retained, and this power is to be considered as belonging to the office of teaching, it must be understood to denote, the right and duty of the teacher earnestly to exhibit before the impenitent and unconverted the consequences of their sins,—the divine punishments; to admonish them, to counsel and exhort them to repentance; and on the contrary, to comfort and console the penitent, and to convince them, with reasons drawn from the Christian System, of the mercy of God, and the forgiveness of their sins. This right is derived from the very object of their office, and cannot be denied. Cf. the texts relating to this subject, as cited by Morus, p. 283, n. 2, and p. 287, no. 2.—And to these points are the rights and duties of teachers limited, according to the principles of the Protestant Church.

Note 1. The more extended investigation of the doctrines of Church government, of the primacy, of the rights of the Church and its teachers, the relation of the Church to the State, etc. which were formerly introduced into the theological systems, belong rather to Canon law or to Church History. It will be sufficient here to make this one additional remark, that the uniting of persons in an ecclesiastical society, produces no alterations in their lawful civil and domestic relations; vid. 1 Cor. 7: 20—24. The Church is not a society which is opposed to the State; it rather contributes to advance the good ends of civil society. Hence the members of the Church are always directed

to yield the most perfect obedience to the Government; vid. Luke 20: 25. Rom. 13: 1. 1 Pet. 2: 13—17. The true Christian should not indeed conform to the world (the great body of unrenewed men), and ought to keep himself unspotted from the world; still he should not, of his own accord, relinquish his worldly station and calling, so far as it is not sinful.

[Note 2. On the general subject of this Article, cf. Hahn, S. 613, ff. Ne-
ander, Kircheng. I. B. 1 Abth. S. 346. Bretschneider, B. II. S. 785, ff.—Tr.]

ARTICLE FOURTEENTH.

OF THE TWO SACRAMENTS, BAPTISM AND THE LORD'S SUPPER.

§ 137. *Of the sacraments in general.*

I. Different uses of the term, *sacramentum*.

(1) *In the earliest times of the Church.* Even Tertullian employed the term *sacramentum* with reference to Baptism and the Lord's Supper (*sacramentum aquæ et eucharistæ*), and many of the Latin teachers after him. But neither Tertullian nor the other ancient fathers employ it exclusively with reference to these; but they were accustomed also to apply it to other things, to such especially as they elsewhere called *mysteria*. Hence we find that in Tertullian the terms *mysterium* and *sacramentum* are used to denote, the whole Christian Religion and its particular doctrines. The doctrine of the Trinity, of the Incarnation of Christ, etc. are called alternately *mysterium* and *sacramentum*. The same is true of all the rites and ceremonies practised by Christians, so far as they are the types of spiritual things, and have a special significancy, or a secret sense, or are kept private.

But from whence is this use of SACRAMENTUM derived? Not from the ancient Latin significations of this word, according to which it denotes the military oath, or a sum of money deposited; but from the ancient Latin Versions of the Bible, e. g. the Vulgate. In these the Greek *μυστήριον* is frequently rendered by the word *sacramentum*. And since this Greek term was used respecting all

secret and unknown things, and designated the higher religious truths, the secret sense of a thing, etc. (vid. Introduction, § 6); the term *sacramentum* was employed in ecclesiastical Latin in all these senses. And it was adopted the more willingly by the Fathers, because they were accustomed to compare the doctrines and rites of Christianity with the doctrines and ceremonies of the pagan mysteries, in order to secure for them a higher regard and authority among the heathen. The texts of the Vulgate on which this use is founded are the following; viz. Dan. 2: 18, 30, where Nebuchadnezzar's unknown dream is called *sacramentum*. Tob. 12: 6, 7. B. of Wisdom 2: 22. Ephes. 3: 3, 9, where it stands for the Christian System, and its particular doctrines. Eph. 5: 32. Rev. 1: 20. 17: 7, etc. The fathers now called every thing standing in any relation to religion *sacramentum*, and extended it especially to all religious rites which have a secret sense or any thing symbolical, and which are the external and sensible signs of certain spiritual things not cognizable by the senses. Respecting the meaning of this term, cf. G. J. Vossius, Disp. XX. de Baptismo, Amst. 1648. Gesner, Thesaur. Lat. h. v. Windorf, Index Latin. Tertull. T. VI. p. 500.—The primary sense, therefore, of the term *sacramentum*, is, as Morus justly observes, *sacrum signum* or *significatio rei sacræ*.

(2) The rites of Baptism and the Lord's Supper have always been justly regarded in the Christian Church, as the most important acts of religious service, and as possessing a peculiar, mystical efficacy. But to many other usages which have gradually become prevalent in the Church, and which were not instituted by Christ himself, a great significance and efficacy was attributed; and they were supposed to contain deep religious mysteries. To all these, the term *sacramentum* was applied, in the sense in which it was used by Augustine; viz. *Sacramentum est visibile signum rei sacræ, sive rei divinæ invisibilis*. In this way, all the rites of the Church might be reckoned as belonging to the sacraments, and this was actually done.

Now after the twelfth century, the schoolmen began to contend about the number of the sacraments, and at length most of them settled upon *seven* (as a sacred number), which they regarded as the most important and efficacious, and to which, by way of eminence, they gave the name *sacramenta*. These were first distinctly stated by Peter of Lombardy in the twelfth century, as *Baptism, the Lord's*

Supper, Confirmation (confirmatio catecumenorum), Ordination, Extreme Unction, Auricular Confession (sacramentum pœnitentiæ) and Wedlock. He was followed in this by most of the teachers in the Romish Church, and they endeavoured to support their opinion even from the Bible. This doctrine was not, however, publicly acknowledged until the Council at Trent, in the sixteenth century. It must be acknowledged that this selection does not reflect much credit upon the sagacity of the one who made it; and it proved the occasion of a great accumulation of ceremonies, and confirmed the people in the delusion, that Christianity consists essentially in ecclesiastical rites, and that those invented by men have equal authority with Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which depend upon divine appointment, and possess equal power and efficacy.

(3) These perversions induced the Protestant theologians of the sixteenth century, especially those of the Lutheran Church, to use the word *sacramentum* in a more limited sense, than that in which it had been previously taken, and so to determine its meaning that it should no more include all the rites which had been formerly denominated *sacramenta*, but merely Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Hence the doctrine of *seven* sacraments was publicly established in the Romish Church by the Council at Trent, in opposition to the Protestants; and it was there maintained, that all the seven were instituted by Christ, and were sacraments in the same sense with Baptism and the Lord's Supper. It is however expressly said in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession by Melancthon, that nothing depends upon the use of the *word* or upon the *number*, if the thing itself is only rightly understood, and human institutions are not made of equal authority with those of God. *Nemo vir prudens de nomine et numero rixabitur*; cf. Morus, p. 276, § 5.

The Lutheran theologians have adhered closely to the use of this word in the narrower sense adopted in the sixteenth century. But the Reformed theologians have often used it in the wider sense, after the ancient manner; e. g. they frequently call the Levitical ceremonies, and all the types of the Old Testament, *sacraments*. Many among the Catholics (Bellarmin and more lately Oberthür) have expressly allowed, that Baptism and the Lord's Supper are the most general and important of the sacraments, and that they therefore approached the Protestants more nearly, than the Council at Trent. Oberthür (in his *Idea bibl. eccles. Dei*, Vol. II.) confesses,

that Christ expressly and immediately appointed only two sacraments, but insists that he conferred upon the Church and the Priesthood the power to add others. The assertion made by some, that Baptism and the Lord's Supper are even in the New Testament denominated *μυστήρια*, is without foundation. For the *οἰκονόμος μυστηρίων θεοῦ* (1 Cor. 4: 1), is one who teaches the doctrines which God has revealed to men, and of which they were before ignorant; vid. chap. 2: 7.

II. Developement of the idea which is connected in the Lutheran Church with the term *sacrament*; and the marks by which sacraments are distinguished from other ceremonies.

(1) By the word *sacraments* is understood in the Lutheran Church, *those religious rites and ceremonies which God himself has instituted in the Holy Scriptures, by which certain spiritual blessings are represented and actually communicated*. Luther defined a sacrament, in this narrower sense, as follows: *it is an observance appointed by God, in which one makes use of a visible thing, which has the divine word of command and of promise*; cf. Morus p. 274, § 2, n. 1.

The essential characteristics of a sacrament are therefore the following: viz.

(a) Sacraments are external religious acts.

(b) They are among those acts which are *positively* instituted, i. e. they are such as stand in no essential connexion, from their internal nature, with religion and the welfare of men (like *prayer*, for example). And all the religious acts which have these two characteristics, are called *ceremonies*.

(c) They are instituted and appointed by God himself.

(d) They serve not only to *exhibit* or *represent to the senses* the spiritual blessings which flow from God and Christ, but actually to *communicate them*.

In every sacrament, therefore, there are two parts;—the visible thing (*materia* or *res terrestris*), which affects the senses, as the bread, wine, and water;—and the invisible thing (*res* or *materia cælestis*), which is typified and imparted by the external sign. But respecting the manner in which the sacraments exert their power and produce their effect, Protestant theologians have not agreed; nor have even the Lutheran theologians agreed among themselves.

In this point, however, they coincide, that the sacraments do not exert a *mechanical* or *miraculous* power, as some Catholics and enthusiasts have maintained; for in that case they must act irresistibly; but some of them contend, that they have a *physical* power, or a power analogous to physical (*physico-analogam vim*); while others say, that they have merely a *moral* effect. It is the same here, as in the controversy respecting the power and efficacy of the divine Word. These religious services stand in the most intimate connexion with the *essential doctrines of the Christian System*, and they can in themselves produce no effect upon those who have no knowledge of these doctrines, or no conviction of their truth, i.e. no *faith*. The truths of religion which are herein represented, and which should be deduced from these ceremonies, produce their effect in the same way (or rather the Holy Ghost produces through them an effect in the same way) upon the heart of man, as they are accustomed in other cases to do, when they are heard, read, etc.; only in these sacraments they are not taught by words, but in different ways are rendered obvious to the senses. All which has been before said respecting the operations of grace through the Word of God, § 129, sq. is therefore equally applicable to this subject; cf. especially with reference to the Biblical doctrine, § 131. Melancthon therefore well observed in the Augsburg Confession, Art. VII., that Augustine truly said, *sacramentum esse verbum visibile*; for, he adds, *ritus oculis accipitur (ut moveat corda), et est quasi pictura verbi, idem significans quod verbum*. Now in the same way in which God exerts his power through the word, when it is heard or read, in the very same way does he act through the Word (the *truth*), when in other ways and by external rites it is represented to the senses.

(2) *Inferences from this representation of the Lutheran theologians.* From this limitation of the idea of *sacramentum*, it follows, that only Baptism and the Lord's Supper can properly be regarded as sacraments. For the characteristics of the sacraments have been so settled, that they can all apply only to these two; and other ceremonies are excluded from the number. By these distinctions are excluded,

(a) The five other sacraments of the Romish Church, because the third and fourth of the characteristics above mentioned do not belong to them; or at least one or the other of these two character-

istics is wanting. Morus shows this particularly with regard to each one of the five Romish sacraments, p. 275, § 4, in the Note.

(b) The washing of feet (*pedilavium*), which was regarded by some as a religious rite appointed for all the members of the Christian Church in all ages, because Christ washed his disciples feet (John 13: 5), and because it appears from 1 Tim. 5: 10, that this rite was practised in the first Christian Church. But this act was *symbolical*, and Christ designed by it to inculcate upon his disciples, after the oriental manner, the duty of Christian love, condescension and readiness to serve others; vid. v. 12, sq. It was never appointed by the apostles as a rule for all Christians, in all ages. By degrees, as customs altered, and another mode of thinking prevailed, it fell into disuse in most of the Western Churches. Still it was long retained in the Eastern Churches, and in some of them is common to this day. Even in the West, it has been revived by some of the smaller churches, e. g. by a part of the Mennonites: and it is now practised by some, though not all, belonging to the society of United Brethren. They, however, do not insist, that it is an essential Christian rite, which must be observed by all Christians, and which should again be introduced into all Christian Churches, after it has now fallen into disuse; but they leave every one to his own judgment respecting it.

(c) The Jewish religious rites, such as offerings, sacrifices, etc. For Paul says, that they did not effect the forgiveness of sin before God, although they were instituted by him, Heb. 9: 9. 10: 11. So far as they *typified* spiritual blessings (vid. § 90, III. 7), they might be called sacraments in the old sense.

(d) Especially have Circumcision and the Passover been considered as sacraments, and called by way of distinction *sacramenta Veteris Testamenti*, and compared with Baptism and the Lord's Supper. But many modern theologians have decided, that they can not be called sacraments in the sense of the Lutheran Church. For although they were commanded by God, they were attended by no promise of spiritual blessings. Circumcision related merely to external good, the possession of Canaan, the posterity of Abraham, etc., Gen. xvii., and not to the forgiveness of sins, etc. On the contrary, it is assigned as the object of Baptism, the initiatory rite of the Christian religion, to promote the *circumcision of the heart*, or moral improvement; vid. Col. 2: 11, 12. The Passover was in-

stituted merely to commemorate the deliverance of the Jews from Egypt. Still, although it is not declared in the Scriptures, that Baptism and the Lord's Supper have come into the place of Circumcision and the Passover : yet both of the latter may be regarded as sacraments, so far as they typified spiritual blessings. For it was expressly said to Abraham at his Circumcision, that the great promises made to him and his posterity should be fulfilled, (Gen. 17: 21,) and among these were *spiritual* blessings. And all the offerings and festivals of the Jewish Religion, and especially these two, which were the most solemn, are said in the New Testament to have a figurative sense ; vid. 1 Cor. 5: 7. John 19: 36, and § 90. Cf. Heilmann, *De finienda justa sacramentorum notione*, in his "Opuscula," Th. I. S. 433.

III. The object of Christ in instituting these two sacraments.

(1) The utility and necessity of religious rites may be inferred from the constitution of our nature. Man is not a mere spirit, but a being composed of reason and sense. And on this account there must be something in Religion which will appeal to his senses, excite and sustain his devotion, and strengthen his zeal in piety. The sensible representation of the truths of Religion often makes a stronger impression upon men, as experience shows, than mere instruction ; because their feelings are apt to be more strongly excited by any thing which appeals to the senses, than by that which addresses simply the understanding. Hence our religious services cannot be merely spiritual. Even ceremonies of human appointment have a great effect, and far more those which have divine authority, and, like Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are accompanied with special promises.

Religious rites in general contribute much also to the support of Religion itself ; since by their means, the solemn and public profession of religion is renewed, and even children are from their youth up accustomed to them, and are bound to their observance. A religion without external religious rites, and without the aids of sensible exhibitions of its truths, would be as liable to become obsolete, as the different systems of philosophy. The truth of this remark is confirmed by the history of the Church. In the Oriental Church, Christianity was indeed very early disfigured by many false

doctrines; but the profession of Christ, and the essentials of his religion, still continued, until Mohammed and his adherents succeeded in abolishing Christian worship, together with Baptism and the Lord's Supper. It is, therefore, very necessary, that these religious rites should be maintained. And the opponents of Christianity proceed very wisely, when they endeavour to bring them into disuse and contempt. For the doctrines to which they relate, must soon share the same fate.

(2) But it is equally important, on the other hand, that Religion should not be overloaded with external rites, and that they should be as few as possible. For when they are multiplied, their effect is weakened, and they are soon regarded with indifference and contempt. This is proved by the example of all Religions, and even of the Christian Religion, when it has been burdened with ceremonies. Christ endeavoured by his doctrine to withdraw men more and more from what is external and sensible, and to promote internal, spiritual worship, as an affair of the heart; cf. John 4: 23, 24. Hence he appointed but few ceremonies. An additional reason for this was, that at the time when Christianity was founded, the religious ceremonial both of the Jews and of the heathen nations, was looked upon with coldness, or even with contempt, by the more cultivated and thinking part of the public, on account of the great multiplicity of its rites, and the superstition with which it was attended. Even a great portion of the religious Jews at that time, felt the burden of the Jewish Ceremonial Law to be very oppressive; cf. Acts 15: 10. Matt. 23: 4. A new religious Institution, therefore, prescribing but few, simple, and easy rites, would on this very account commend itself to the Jews and the Heathen; cf. Matt. 9: 14—17.

Considered in this respect, these two sacraments of Christ have great advantages. They are natural, simple, and *universally applicable*. They are therefore peculiarly appropriate to an institution, which is designed to be universal. It is otherwise with the Jewish ritual, which is not adapted to all men, countries, and times. Indeed it was not designed by God for all men, but only for a particular period, and that for a limited time. Christ, however, has not forbidden the introduction of other religious usages. For an increase of them may often be indispensable to the maintenance of

united religious worship. But he has left this to the discretion of his Church, which may appoint and modify them according to circumstances. Those, however, which Christ has instituted should serve as models and patterns, in point of simplicity, for all other Christian ceremonies.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN BAPTISM.

§ 138. *Names, institution, and origin of Christian Baptism; with observations on John the Baptist and the Jewish Baptism of Proselytes*

I. Names of Baptism in the Bible.

(1) *Τὸ βάπτισμα*, from *βαπτίζειν*, which properly signifies *to immerse*, (like the Germ. *taufen*,) *to dip in*, *to wash* (by immersion). In the Syriac and Chaldaic (which Christ used), this is denoted by the words, *ܬܒܝܠ, ܬܒܝܠܐ, ܬܒܝܠ* (Buxtorf, *Lex. Chald.* p. 849, 850). Hence the washing of vessels with water is called *βάπτισμοι*, Mark 7: 4. And instead of *νίψονται* in v. 3 of the same chap. we have in v. 4, *βαπτίσονται* so also of the washing of hands, Luke 11: 38, sq. (In the New Testament the form *ὁ βαπτισμός* is never used for the *religious rite* of Baptism, either of John or of Christ; but always *τὸ βάπτισμα*.) Hence it is often used tropically, (a) For what flows, or is communicated, to any one in full measure; as in Latin, *perfundere, imbucere*, etc.; e. g. Acts 1: 5. (b) For severe sufferings which befall any one; e. g. Matt. 20: 22, 23; for these are often compared with waves which overflow any one; Ps. 69: 2, 3. So among the Latins, *fluctus miseriæ, mergi malis*. Hence martyrdom is called by the Ancients, *baptisma sanguinis*. In the Classics, e. g. in Plato, a drunken person is said to be *βαπτισθεὶς, vino imbutus, mersus*.

(2) *Καθαρισμός*, John 3: 25; because by washing, purification is effected, and Baptism represents purification from sins, and is designed to promote this end in the one who is baptized. Hence Josephus (XVIII. 7) employs *ἐκκαθαίρειν* in respect to the baptism

of John. Perhaps too 2 Peter 1: 9 (καθαρισμὸς τῶν πάλαι ἁμαρτωῶν, coll. Eph. 5: 26) belongs in this connexion.

(3) *Τὸ ὕδωρ*, because Baptism was administered with water, John 3: 5, coll. Acts 10: 47. Ephes, 5: 26, sq.

(4) Among the Church Fathers one of the oldest names was *φωτισμός*, from the instruction which the subject of this rite received in connexion with his Baptism, as Justin the Martyr (Apol. I. 61) explains it. The Syriac too, translates, *τοὺς ἅπαξ φωτισθέντας* (Heb. 6: 4), *those once baptized*; which version Michaelis follows, though it is a doubtful rendering. Baptism is moreover called by the Church Fathers, *σφραγίς*, *sigillum* (*character Christiani*), *χάρις*, *χάρισμα*, *ἔνδυμα ἀγαθαρσίας*, &c. &c.

II. Institution of Baptism, and the principal texts relating to it.

Jesus, even during his life upon the earth, required those who wished to become his disciples to be baptized by his Apostles; John 3: 22, coll. v. 5 of the same chap. and Chap. 4: 1, 2. But at that time none but Jews were received into his Church and baptized; as was the case also with John, in his Baptism. Shortly before his Ascension to heaven he first gave the commission to his Apostles, to admit *all* (πάντα ἔθνη) into the Christian Church, and to baptize them without distinction; Matt. 28: 18—20, cf. Mark 16: 15, 16. They were to be made disciples of Jesus Christ, or professors of his religion (μαθητεύειν), in a two-fold manner; viz. by *baptism* and by *instruction*. They were to be baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; i. e. by baptism they were to be obligated to accept and obey the doctrine, which acknowledges and receives Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Whoever, therefore, is baptized, declares by this rite that he acknowledges Father, Son, and Spirit for his God, that he will obey his laws, and that he expects protection and blessing from him; and God, on the other hand, promises and grants to him, the enjoyment of all the benefits which the Gospel of Christ enjoins upon us to expect from the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; for a more full explanation of this formula, vid. Vol. I. § 35, I. and Morus, p. 275, § 2, 3. It is the opinion of some, that Christ did not design in this passage so much to prescribe a precise formula; in which case he would rather have said "Baptize ye and say, *I baptize thee in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*," but that he merely intended to teach what

is the meaning and object of this rite. That this command of Christ was obeyed by the Apostles, may be seen from the Acts and Epistles. The other important passages concerning the object, design, and effect of baptism, e. g. John 3: 5. Tit. 3: 5. Acts. 22: 16. Gal. 3: 27. Rom. 6: 3, 4. Ephes. 5: 26. 1 Pet. 3: 21, etc., will be explained in the following Sections.

III. Origin of Christian Baptism; the Baptism of John, and the Jewish Baptism of Proselytes.

(1) John baptized before Christ appeared publicly as a teacher, and Christ even suffered himself to be baptized by him. The Baptism of John is described, equally with the baptism of Christ, as a divine institution, and as performed under divine authority; John 1: 33 (God sent him to baptize), and Luke 7: 30, where it is called a divine institution (*βουλὴ θεοῦ*), and Matt. 21: 25, sq.

(2) But although this is a divine institution, we must still seek among the prevailing practices and expectations of the Israelites, the more immediate reason why just this, and no other form of initiation was then introduced by John and Christ. From the passage John 1: 25, it is manifest that the Jews (the Sanhedrim, and the Pharisees) expected that the Messiah and his herald Elias, would baptize; cf. Lightfoot on this text. And so, many even among the learned (the Pharisees and Saducees) suffered themselves to be baptized by John (Matt. 3: 7); which probably would not have been the case, if Baptism had been to them a strange and unheard of thing. The Israelites, like many other nations, had different forms of lustration, and washings with water, which were clearly prescribed by their Law, by means of which they sanctified, consecrated, and cleansed themselves from impurities; vid. Wetstein on Matt. 3: 6. As now the Messiah was to bring about a general reformation, and to establish a new constitution, into which every one must be solemnly initiated, and to which he must be consecrated; as, moreover, it was the universal expectation, according to the Prophets, that he would cleanse men from their sins, which was exactly typified by the washings in the Levitical Law; it does not seem unnatural, that just this form of initiation should have been expected by the Jews, and should in fact have been chosen by John and Christ, according to divine appointment.

If now the *baptism of proselytes* was customary among the Jews

at or before the time of Christ, many things could be explained still more clearly from this circumstance. The 'Talmud and its interpreters relate, that the Proselytes, as well circumcised as uncircumcised, were initiated by baptism into the worship of the one true God, and that this was a symbol of purification from sin, and of the renunciation of heathenism; and that they were then considered as *born again*;—exactly the expression used by Christ (John III.) and by Paul (Tit. III.) respecting Christian baptism; vid. § 126, II. The Talmudists make this practice very ancient, and place it as far back as the time of Moses, and even farther (which probably is going too far, as their way is). The oldest passage respecting a religious cleansing, or sort of baptism, occurs in Jacob's history (Gen. 35: 2), when he puts away the idols in his house, and builds an altar to Jehovah. This passage may certainly have induced the Israelites to adopt this custom. So much is certain, that as early as the second century Proselyte Baptism must have been very customary; since in the dissertations of Epictetus (II. 9) published by Arrian, *βεβαμμένος* signifies a Jewish proselyte, and *παραβαπτισθείς*, one who had not sincerely embraced Judaism. Others, however, are inclined to think, that *Christians* are here meant, and that Epictetus confounded them with the Jews.—For these reasons Dantz firmly maintained, that the baptism of proselytes was, as it were, the prelude of the baptism of John and of Christ; and he is followed by Michaelis, Less, and others; cf. his treatise *de antiquitate baptismi initiationis Israel*. in Meuschen's *N. T. e Talmude illustrato*, p. 133, f. and Wetstein on Matt. 3: 6.

There is much for, and much against the opinion, that Proselyte Baptism was customary in the first century, and even earlier. (a) *Against*. There is not found even to the present time, one distinct evidence of it in any writer, before, at, or shortly after the time of Christ; not in Philo,—not in Josephus, even when he speaks of the conversion of the Idumeans, under John Hyrkan, to Judaism (XIII. 9), where he simply mentions circumcision;—not even in the Chaldaic paraphrases. Zeltner firmly opposes to Dantz this stubborn silence of the writers near the age of Christ. (b) *In favor*. The unanimous testimony of all the Rabbins;—the universality of this practice among the Jews of the second century, since it can scarcely be thought, that they would have borrowed it from the Christians, who were so hated and despised by them;—the

striking similarity of the Jewish expressions concerning the baptism of proselytes, with those which occur in the New Testament respecting the Christian rite (*regeneratio*);—also the circumstance, that Josephus, in his account of John the Baptist, does not express the least surprize at this practice, as a new and unwonted ceremony. This last argument, however, is invalidated by the remark, that it is known to have been expected, that the precursor of the Messiah would baptize. Besides, it appears that the baptism of John, did excite among the Jews some degree of surprize. This is seen from the question, *why baptizest thou then?* and from his being called *the Baptist*.—Ziegler has lately maintained, with very probable reasons, that the antiquity of the Jewish baptism of proselytes, ascends beyond the origin of Christianity; cf. his Theological Essays, Part. II. (Göttingen, 1804,) Num. 3, “Concerning the baptism of John, as the unaltered application of the Jewish baptism of proselytes, and concerning the baptism of Christ, as the continuation of that of John.” But although much may be advanced in support of this opinion, it cannot be relied upon with certainty, since it is entirely destitute of clear contemporary evidence.

IV. Was the baptism of John different from Christian Baptism?

Many Theologians of the Romish Church formerly maintained, that there is a difference;—but Protestants usually take the opposite side; although some, especially the more modern, have again adopted the former opinion. The following observations may serve to settle the matter.

(1) *The object of John's baptism was the same with that of Christian*; and from this it may be at once concluded, that it did not differ essentially from the latter. John exhorted the persons baptized by him to repentance (*μετάνοια*) and to faith in the Messiah who was shortly to appear, and made these duties obligatory upon them by this rite; Matt. 3: 11. Luke iii. Mark i. John 1. Acts 2: 38. And as soon as Jesus publicly appeared, John asserted in the most forcible manner, that he was the Messiah, and so required of all whom he had then or before baptized, that they should believe in Jesus as the Messiah. Now in Christian baptism, repentance and faith in Jesus as the Messiah, are likewise the principal things which are required on the part of the subjects of this rite.

(2) The *practice* of the first Christian Church confirms the point, that the baptism of John was considered essentially the same with Christian Baptism. For those who acknowledged that they had professed, by the baptism of John, to believe in Jesus as the Christ, and who in consequence of this had become in fact his disciples and had believed in him, were not, in a single instance, baptized again into Christ; because this was considered as having been already done. Hence we do not find, that any apostle, or any other disciple of Jesus, was the second time baptized; not even that Apollos mentioned in Acts 18: 25, because he had before believed in Jesus as Christ, although he had received only the baptism of John.

(3) But all those disciples of John, who had not before acknowledged this truth, and had received the baptism of John or his successors in an entirely different signification, were properly considered at the time of the Apostles as not being baptized, or as wrongly baptized; and all such were therefore required to be baptized expressly into Christ as the Messiah. This was the case with the Jews, who, according to Acts 2: 41, were baptized into Jesus, among whom were many whom John had baptized, but who had not then recognized Jesus as the Messiah, and had even taken part in his crucifixion. This was likewise the case with those persons, whom Paul (Acts 19: 1—5) permitted to be baptized at Ephesus, although they had already received the baptism of John. There is in this place, nothing that needs to be artificially explained. The meaning is: ‘That when they heard from Paul, that it was essential to Baptism, that one should believe in Jesus as the Lord and Christ (which they hitherto had not done, since the disciples of John who baptized them, had said nothing to them about it); they were then willing to suffer themselves, to be solemnly obligated by baptism to the acknowledgment of Jesus;’ vid. Bengel’s *Gnomon* ad h. l. and Semler, *Diss. ad Acts 19: 1, sq.* This was the more necessary at that time, as many of the disciples of John had entirely separated themselves from the Christians. These false disciples of John still continued to practise John’s baptism into the approaching Messiah, but denied that *Jesus* was the Messiah. Even to the present day, there are remnants of this sect in Syria and Arabia; vid. Norberg, *Von der Religion und Sprache der Zabier*, and Walch, *De Sabæis*, in the *Comment. Soc. Gott. 1780 and 1781.* There is

much directed against the false disciples of John in the accounts given by the Evangelists respecting John the Baptist. Vid. Storr, Ueber den Zweck der evang. Gesch. und der Briefe Johannis, Tübingen, 1786, 8vo; 2d ed. 1809.—There is nothing therefore in the passages Acts II. and XIX. which favors the doctrine, that those who had been baptized by John were required to be rebaptized, in order to admission into the Church of Christ.

§ 139. *How and by whom baptism is to be administered; and respecting the optional and unessential things attending the observance of this rite.*

I. Concerning immersion, affusion, and sprinkling with water.

(1) It is certain that in Christian baptism, as in the baptism of John, only water was used by Christ and his Apostles; vid. John 3: 5. Ephes. 5: 26. But after baptism, in itself considered and simply as an *opus operatum*, came to be regarded as essential to salvation, the question was started, Whether, in the want of water, baptism could be performed with any other material, e. g. wine, milk, or sand? The question must be answered in the negative, since to do this would be contrary to the institution of Christ. For any one to be prevented necessarily from being baptized, does not subject him to condemnation; but only the wilful and criminal refusal of this rite.

(2) *Immersion* is peculiarly agreeable to the institution of Christ, and to the practice of the apostolical church, and so even John baptized, and Immersion remained common for a long time after; except that in the third century, or perhaps earlier, the baptism of the sick (*baptisma clinicorum*) was performed by sprinkling or affusion. Still some would not acknowledge this to be true baptism, and controversy arose concerning it,—so unheard of was it at that time, to baptize by simple affusion. Cyprian first defended baptism by sprinkling, when necessity called for it; but cautiously and with much limitation. By degrees, however, this mode of baptism became more customary, probably because it was found more convenient; especial-

ly was this the case after the seventh century, and in the Western Church ; but it did not become universal until the commencement of the fourteenth century. Yet Thomas Aquinas had approved and promoted this innovation, more than a hundred years before. In the Greek and Eastern Church they still held to immersion. It would have been better, to have adhered generally to the ancient practice, as even Luther and Calvin allowed ; vid. Storr, Doct. Christ. Pars theoret. p. 291.—If it is asked, however, if immersion is so essential, that one who has been only sprinkled, is not to be considered as properly a baptized person ; it may be answered, No ! Nothing more is essential to the external part of baptism, than that water be used (Acts 10: 47. John 3: 5), and that the subject, by the solemn use of this rite, be consecrated to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and be pledged to obey the Christian doctrine, Matt. 28: 19. The washing with water is considered as the symbol of the purification of sins ; and this can be signified as well by affusion as by immersion. Hence, even in affusion, the external significancy of the rite is retained. And this is the reason, why many in the Western Church, and even in the Protestant Church, have contended that this rite should be administered, not *per adspersionem*, but *per largiorem aquæ affusionem*.

(3) There is no command given concerning the question, whether immersion or affusion should be performed only once, or more than once ;—this therefore is, in itself, optional. In the Greek church we find the *three-fold* immersion earlier and more prevalent, than in the Latin ; whence the Greeks objected to the Latins. Basiliius and Hieronymus say, that this was practised in conformity with an ancient tradition ; and if it was not common in the first Church, perhaps the controversies with the Antitrinitarians in the third century might have given the first occasion for it. In the African church it was already common in the times of Tertullian and Cyprian, and in the Apostolical Constitutions it was so ordained. At the fourth Church Council at Toledo, in the year 633, this three-fold immersion was first established by ecclesiastical authority in the Latin Church, in opposition to the Arians.

(4) It is also optional, whether the head, the forehead, or the breast, be wet with the water ; and in this respect the one who administers this sacrament must govern himself according to the usages of his own particular Church.

II. On the use of Formulas in baptism.

The formulas used in administering baptism have always been very different. In the Greek Church it is still common to say, as formerly, *Baptizetur hic* or *hæc* (*servus* or *serva Dei*) *in nomine*, etc. In the Latin Church the subject is addressed, *I baptize thee in the name*, etc. The formula adopted by some of baptizing in the name “*of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost*,” is liable to be misunderstood; as it might be interpreted to mean, that there are three Gods. It has appeared strange to some, that we find in the New Testament no passage from which it plainly appears, that the words used Matt. xxviii. *in the name of the Father*, etc. were used in the Apostolical Church. For we always find only, *εἰς Χριστόν* or *Ἰησοῦν*,—*εἰς ὄνομα Κυρίου* or *Ἰησοῦ*, e. g. Rom. 6: 3. Gal. 3: 27. Acts 2: 38. 10: 48. 19: 5. The opinions on this subject are not unanimous. (1) We might say with some, that although the formula in Matt. xxviii. were not used in the Apostolical Church, but it was merely said, *in the name of Jesus*, i. e. into the profession of Christ and his doctrine; yet this was entirely the same with the other; because it comprehended the profession of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, since whoever was baptized into Jesus, by this act professed his belief in the *whole* doctrine of Christ, and therefore in that which he taught concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Basilus endeavoured to explain the thing in this way. (2) Others, (and among the rest, Facundus Hermianensis, De tribus capit. I. 3,) are of opinion, that it does not follow from these places, that they did not fully employ the prescribed formulas in baptism; but that *Christian* baptism was so named in distinction from the baptism of John, and from the Jewish proselyte baptism, since one who had received this proselyte baptism, or had wrongly understood that of John, was not baptized into Christ. This can be reconciled very well, at least with Acts 19: 5, and with some other places; vid. § 138, II. But in addition to these, there is a third reason. (3) In the ancient Christian Church, immediately after the time of the Apostles, the words prescribed by Christ at the establishment of this rite, were certainly used (Just. M. Ap. 1. 80). It may therefore be rightly inferred, that it was the same at the time of the Apostles; and that it is right and proper to continue in this use. It is not however forbidden, to unite with

this, other formulas which are suitable, and which serve to explain the design of this rite, and to excite pious feelings. The teacher will of course govern himself in this matter according to the circumstances, the constitution, and usages of the particular Church to which he may belong.

III. By whom is Baptism to be administered ?

In ordinary cases, certainly, by the teachers of religion ; for it is their appropriate business and calling, to lead disciples to Christ (*μαθητεύειν*), and this duty is also committed to them by the Church and government. We find, therefore, that baptism in the apostolical Church was always administered by the Teachers ; vid. John 4: 2. Acts 10: 48. 1 Cor. 1: 16. But although this *μαθητεύειν* is the appropriate business of Teachers, still they have no exclusive right to it, as this is nowhere given to them in the New Testament. But in case of necessity, and when no teachers can be obtained, baptism may be administered by any Christian, and is valid if it is performed according to the institution of Christ ; vid. § 136, II. 2. This has been the doctrine and practice which has universally prevailed in the Church.

IV. How far a knowledge of Christian doctrines is essential in the subjects of Baptism.

This knowledge must certainly be presupposed in adults, before they can be baptized. For how could they solemnly profess, as they do in Baptism, to believe, and pledge themselves to obey a doctrine, respecting which they were wholly ignorant ? We find therefore, even in the writings of the New Testament, that the candidates for Baptism were previously instructed. But this instruction was by no means particular ; it was confined to the main, fundamental truths of Christianity,—the doctrine of *One* God,—the principal articles respecting Christ,—that he is the Messiah, and that through him we receive forgiveness from God ;—also concerning the Holy Spirit promised to Christians, and the indispensable necessity of repentance and holiness :—these are the principal truths in which the candidates for Baptism were briefly instructed. When they were sufficiently acquainted with these truths and had professed them from the heart, they were allowed baptism, and received afterwards more complete instruction both in these, and the other

Christian doctrines ; cf. Acts 2: 41. 8: 12, 36, sq. 9: 17, 18. 10: 34—48, where in the words of Peter, we have an example of the instruction commonly given before baptism ; cf. Heb. 6: 1, sq. In the great addition of new converts in the first period of Christianity, this preparatory instruction could not possibly be very long or particular, especially as the teachers of religion were yet few. Accordingly the confessions of faith to be made in baptism were at first very short and simple ; such for example, was the *Symbolum Apostolicum*, so called ; but this was gradually enlarged by the addition of new distinctions, by which the Orthodox endeavoured to distinguish themselves from heretics. The instruction of catecumens and the time of probation preceding baptism, were by degrees increased and prolonged ; and for this, there was good reason. For as the number of Christian proselytes constantly increased, and multitudes were pressing into the Church, greater caution became necessary in admitting them. This led to the appointment of fixed periods for the probation of new converts before baptism.

V. Usages incidental to Baptism, but not essential to its validity.

Many of these are very ancient, but they may all be dispensed with, without affecting the validity of Christian baptism, because they are not commanded by Christ. In Christian Archæology and Church history, they are more fully exhibited, than they can be here. We mention only some of those which are still common among us.

(1) The sign of the cross appears to have been first introduced in connexion with baptism in the fourth century, and is intended to be a solemn memorial of the death of Christ, Rom. 6: 3.

(2) The imposition of a name ; this was also done in connexion with Jewish circumcisions.

(3) The laying on of hands, as a symbol of the communication of the Holy Ghost, or of the gift of sanctification, which in this way is solemnly sought of God for the subject of baptism, and promised to him. This is mentioned even by Tertullian.

(4) Sponsors at baptism. Tertullian (de bapt. ch. 18) mentions these as being present at the baptism of Children ; but they were also concerned in the performance of this rite for adult persons ; just as sponsors were called in at the rite of circumcision among

the Jews. Such only, however, as belong to the Christian Church can be employed for this service; heathens, Jews, Mahommedans, and others who are not members of the Christian Church, may be present at the rite, but not as valid sponsors.

(5) The subjects of baptism must renounce Satan. This denoted originally an entire renunciation on their part of heathenism and of heathen superstitions, and also of the entire disposition which had before prevailed within them, as far as it was opposed to Christianity.

(6) Exorcism. The first traces of this practice appear in Africa, in the third century, as we learn from Cyprian's letter, although a foundation for it was laid as early as the second century. It had its rise in various opinions, in a great measure superstitious, respecting the physical agency of the Devil upon men; and in the idea, the evil spirits may be driven off by the use of formulas, and certain charmed words. It was at first practised only at the baptism of heathen, who were regarded as persons possessed by the Devil; but it came afterwards to be employed at the baptism of the children of Christian parents. Vid. Kraft, *Ausführliche Historie des Exorcismus*, Hamburg, 1750. Concerning the other usages in baptism, vid. besides the ancient Authors (e. g. Vosii *Disertatt.* cf. § 137, I. 1), Calixtus, *Diss. de antiq. ritibus bapt.* Helmstädt, 1650; Næsselt's historical investigation and illustration of the usages common in baptism, published in the weekly "Anzeiger" at Halle, 1764, Num. 28—32.

Note. The rite of Exorcism, has been properly abandoned in most places in the Protestant church. Although it is well explained in the Lutheran church, as a confession of the natural corruption of indwelling sin and of redemption from it, and in various other ways; still it is calculated to promote superstition and serious error in the community at large; and, what is most important, to excite contempt among the lightly disposed. Morus gives the same opinion (p. 257, no. 3).

It may be remarked in general, that some of the usages common in many places at Infant baptism, are not at all suitable to children, and have been transferred, without much judgment, to their baptism, from that of adult persons. Among these inappropriate services we may place the *Confession of faith*, and the renunciation of the Devil. Instead of these, it would be more appropriate and profitable to have a sincere prayer, in which the new member of the Christian church should be commended to the care and blessing of God; and at the same time a feeling exhortation to parents and other spectators, in which they should be impressively reminded of the duties which they owe as

Christians to their children, and those entrusted to their watchful care. Much depends in things of this nature upon the teacher, who, even where the rites are not exactly suitable, can obviate mistake and remove ignorance, by proper explanations. Even the best formulary in baptism will affect spectators but little, if they see that the teacher uses it without any emotion, and repeats it with a heartless voice and manner. The teacher needs to be on his guard against performing the duties of his office, especially those which frequently recur, as the Lord's Supper and Baptism, in a merely mechanical way. When he performs religious services with a cold heart, it cannot be expected that others present should engage in them with warm devotion. A teacher who discharges his duties in this manner, must lose in the good opinion of his hearers; and the blame is his own, if he at last becomes contemptible in their view.

§ 140. *Object, uses, and effects of Christian Baptism.*

The uses and effects of baptism are divided, as in the sacraments in general, into *internal* and *external*.

I. External advantages and effects of baptism.

By means of this rite we are received as members of the visible Christian society, and consequently become partakers of all the privileges belonging to Christians. It is, therefore, considered in this light, the solemn initiatory rite of admission into the Christian Church (*sacramentum initiationis*). This is mentioned expressly in the New Testament as the design and object of baptism. As soon as a person was baptized, he was considered as a member of the Church (ἅγιος, μαθητής, πιστεύων), Acts 2: 41, 44, and entitled to all the rights of other Christians. 1 Cor. 12: 13, "Whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν," i. e. we are united by baptism into one Church, and have, as members of it, equal rights; vid. vs. 12, 27. Whence Paul says, Ephes. 4: 4, 5, there is ἓν βάπτισμα (one common baptism), and ἓν σῶμα (one church), and μία ἐλπίς of Christians; and Gal. 3: 27, "As many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ," i. e. are Christians, belong to the school of Christ, and are therefore obligated to confess him for your Lord and Master, to obey him and to follow his example.

II. The internal advantages and effects of Baptism.

(1) In the old ecclesiastical writers we find many extravagant and unscriptural assertions respecting the effect of Baptism, especially in the instructions which they gave to catechumens and new converts; e. g. in Gregory of Nazianzen, Cyrill of Jerusalem, and even earlier in Irenæus and Tertullian. Cyrill of Alexandria went so far as to say, that the water became changed (*μεταστοιχειοῦσθαι*), by the divine power of the Holy Spirit, into an entirely different element. All this, indeed, admits of being explained according to Scripture; but it is still apparent that Christians began very early to attribute to baptism a magical efficacy, by which it produces its effect through its own inherent virtue, and independently of the use of the word of God; and by which it acts, not only upon the soul, but upon the body also. Hence they made use of it in order to heal sicknesses, to banish evil Spirits, etc. During the middle ages, these superstitious notions prevailed more and more, and were even adopted by the schoolmen into their systems. We find, e. g. in Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine that a *character indelibilis* is acquired in baptism,—an opinion which Augustine had before held; also the scholastic doctrine, that by baptism native depravity is so far done away, that only *concupiscentia* remains, and that even this loses the form of sin. Protestants have in every way endeavoured to separate the scriptural doctrine from these superstitious notions; yet there are not wanting incautious expressions on this subject, even among some Protestant Theologians.

(2) In the New Testament this magical effect is nowhere ascribed to baptism, as if faith were imparted to man by baptism, without his being himself active in obtaining it; as if he received, through this external rite, the forgiveness of sins, readiness in good works, and eternal salvation. Neither has Luther taught such a doctrine. On an adult person, who has no knowledge of the Word of God or of the Christian doctrine, baptism can have no efficacy, simply as an *opus operatum*. Its effect on adults depends on their being instructed in the divine Word, and the connexion of baptism with this instruction. To this divine Word, and the divine efficacy connected with it (§§ 130, 131), does the power properly belong to renew the heart of man, and to make it susceptible of the benefits and privi-

leges which Christianity promises ; and not the mere external rite of baptism. This we are distinctly taught in the Holy Scriptures. So Peter (Acts 2: 38) exhorts his hearers to suffer themselves to be baptized εἰς ἄφῃσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, but he expressly requires, as an essential condition, the μετανοεῖν (which is effected by God through the use of Christian doctrine) ; and it is the same in the baptism of John, Mark 1: 4, sq. So Acts 22: 16, Paul was called upon to be baptized and to be washed from his sins ; but the condition was ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου. Several texts relating to this point should be here more particularly considered.

(a) John 3: 5, “Whoever is not born of water and of the Spirit, cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven,” i. e. whoever does not take upon himself the obligation to live in an entirely altered and renewed temper of mind, which is effected through baptism by the aid of the Holy Spirit, has no part in the saving blessings of Christ’s spiritual kingdom (forgiveness of sins and eternal blessedness) ; vid. § 126, II.

(b) Titus 3: 5, where Paul means to say, God had bestowed salvation upon them (ἔσωσεν), by leading them to embrace Christianity. We become participators in these Christian blessings in a two-fold way ; *first*, διὰ λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας ; so baptism is called as far as one *externally* receives it, and especially as far as he is engaged by means of it, to lead a new life, and receives strength for this end : *secondly*, καὶ διὰ ἀνακαινώσεως Πνεύματος ἁγίου, i. e. through that entire change and renovation of heart which we owe to the Holy Spirit. This renewal he effects through the Christian doctrine, §§ 130, 131. The meaning is : ‘the renovation of our hearts which is effected by the Holy Spirit, is bestowed upon us by the free and undeserved grace of God. He assists us to obtain this blessing by means of Christian baptism, in which we become obligated to lead a new life, and receive strength so to do, and also by the entire renewal of our hearts, which we owe to his Spirit.’

(c) 1 Peter 3: 21. It is said concerning baptism, that it delivers or frees us from the punishment of our sins (σώζει) ; not however as an *external washing* ; but inasmuch as we pledge ourselves in this rite, and are assisted by it, to maintain a good conscience, and inasmuch as it is the means by which we receive and appropriate to ourselves the gracious promise of the forgiveness of sins through Christ ; which is elsewhere called μετάνοια, ἁγιωσύνη.

The scriptural doctrine of the internal advantages and effects of baptism may be embraced in the following points.

FIRST. When we are received by baptism into the number of the followers of Jesus Christ, we sacredly bind ourselves to believe his doctrine in its whole extent, its commands, and its promises ; to embrace it as true, and therefore punctually to obey it in all parts, to live pious and godly lives, according to his precepts, and to imitate his example. For he only who does this, is worthy of the name of a Christian, and can lay claim to the blessedness promised to believers ; vid. 1 John 2: 4. 3: 3. Peter calls this, in his first Epistle, ch. 3: 21, *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς θεόν*, and makes this one object of baptism. *Ἐπερώτημα* is properly *stipulatio*, and so denotes any solemn obligation which one assumes (before God). Hence the meaning here is : ‘ by baptism we take upon ourselves the sacred obligation, in the presence of God, to maintain a good conscience, to be watchful against sin, and to strive after holiness.’ The passage Rom. 6: 3, 4, sq. teaches the same thing, coll. Col. 2: 12, 13, “ We are, like Christ, buried as dead persons by baptism ; and should arise, like him, to a new life,” i. e. by baptism we obtain the assurance of the pardon of sin on account of the death of Christ ; and so, when we are baptized, take upon ourselves the obligation to die to sin in a spiritual manner, as Christ died and was buried bodily, etc. The image is here taken from baptized persons as they were *immersed* (*buried*), and as they *emerged* (*rose again*) ; so it was understood by Chrysostom. Since immersion has been disused, the full significance of this comparison is no longer perceived. So then by baptism we *profess* to receive Christ as our *teacher*, *Saviour*, and *Lord*, i. e. we thus bind ourselves to embrace and obey his doctrine, confidently to trust his promises, to expect from him all our spiritual blessedness, and to render him a dutiful obedience. This is what is meant in the New Testament by being *baptized in the name of Christ* ; vid. Morus p. 246, § 4. But since now all these blessings which we owe to Jesus as Messiah, or Saviour and Lord, are blessings which God bestows,—blessings which, according to the Christian doctrine, are derived from *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Spirit* ; so in baptism we bind ourselves to believe in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as our God, to look for our salvation from them, and to acknowledge and adore them, as the only authors of it. Hence the command of Jesus to baptize in the name of the Father,

Son, and Holy Spirit, is designed to express the religious connexion in which we stand to them, and our duty to pay them religious homage.

SECONDLY. Through baptism we receive the assurance, that the divine blessings which the Christian doctrine promises, concern even *us*, and that even *we* may participate in them; or, in other words, these blessings are by this rite particularly applied to our own personal state, and we learn in faith to appropriate them to ourselves. As any one, on being formally admitted as a citizen of a town, in taking the oath of citizenship, and in going through the other rites of initiation, receives the confident assurance that he has now a title to all the rites and privileges of citizenship; so it is with the Christian in Baptism. It is the same, in this view, with baptism as with circumcision. This Paul calls (Rom. 4: 11) a σημεῖον and σφραγὶδα for Abraham and his posterity, i. e. a token of assurance and a proof that God was favorably disposed towards him, and justified him on account of his faith. So Baptism is to every one the token of assurance, that he may partake in all those spiritual blessings which Christianity promises. Whoever, therefore, is baptized, receives the assurance that his sins are forgiven him for the sake of Christ, that God, for the sake of Christ, looks upon him with favor and regards him as a child, and that he, in faithful obedience to the commands of Jesus, (and by enjoying the constant aid of the Holy Spirit which is promised,) may securely expect eternal blessedness; Acts 2: 38. Gal. 3: 27. Mark 16: 16. Hence Peter, in his first Epistle, ch. 3: 21, compares the water of baptism to the water of the deluge, (as the Jews also called their washings and purifications, spiritual floods; ἀντίτυπος, *image, likeness*). Even as the pious at the time of the deluge (v. 20), were *bodily* delivered; so are those who are baptized with water, *spiritually* delivered from sin, and its penalty.

Conclusions from the foregoing, and some remarks designed to illustrate certain theological distinctions and terminologies respecting baptism.

(a) It is justly maintained, that baptism tends to awaken, enlarge and confirm our faith, and that by means of it, we receive power and impulse for a new spiritual life. This effect is produced in regard to both the objects which belong to Christian faith, the *law* and the *gospel*. Still this is not wrought through any miraculous or magical influence of baptism, or of the Holy Spirit in baptism; for,

(b) This effect of baptism depends upon the Word of God united with baptism; or the divine truths of Christianity, and the divine power inherent in, and connected with them. Cf. Ephes. 5: 26, "Christ purifies and sanctifies the members of the Church in baptism through the Word," i. e. the whole gospel system in its full extent, its *precepts* and *promises*. The latter are made to us in baptism; and at the same time we pledge ourselves to obey the former, and receive strength so to do. The means, therefore, by which baptism produces these effects, or rather God through baptism, is the Word. It is the same in the Lord's Supper. It is accordingly rightly said, that "God, or the Holy Spirit, operates in baptism upon the hearts of men;" excites good feelings, resolutions, etc. namely *through the Word*. Hence the effect of baptism is properly an effect which God produces through his Word, or through the contents of the Christian doctrine, which is visibly set forth, represented and appropriated to us in baptism, for the sake of making a stronger impression upon our heart. Baptism may be thus called, *verbum Dei visibile*; vid. § 137, II. In the same manner, therefore, as God operates upon our hearts, through the Word and in the use of it, when we hear or read it; does he also operate in this visible presentation of the same truth, by the external rites of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. And so we may apply to this subject all which is said in the twelfth Article respecting the operations of grace,—both in the statement of the biblical doctrine (§§ 130, 131), and of the different theories of Theologians in the succeeding sections. But this effect is not *miraculous*, not *magical*, not *irresistible*, but suited to our moral nature.

(c) According to the ancient scholastic division, two things must be considered in baptism, *materia* (better *res*) *terrestris*, that which strikes the senses externally,—*the water*; and *materia cœlestis*, the invisible thing which is represented by the visible sign, and conveyed through it. This is the Holy Spirit, and his power and agency; or more definitely, it is that which, in baptism, is effected in us by God, or by the Holy Spirit, through the divine Word.

Note. Augustine expresses himself very justly concerning the efficacy and power of baptism (De bapt. I. 13, 15), "It has indeed the power to effect regeneration (change of heart) in men; but it does nothing for man's salvation, if there is in him any *hindrance* (*obstaculum*.)" Luther too follows him in this, and says very appropriately and justly, especially in his large Catechism,

“that the divine Word and instruction must not be separated from baptism, and that without the former, and faith in it, the water is nothing but water, and can in nowise benefit the subject.” Vid. Morus, p. 250. n. 4.

(d) Baptism is frequently represented as a *covenant*, which is established between God and men; hence the expression, *to stand in his covenant of baptism*, and others of the same kind. This name is derived from *circumcision*, and the covenant of God with Abraham established by it; also from 1 Peter 3: 21, where ἐπερώ-*τημα* is translated *covenant* by Luther. Cf. Heb. 8: 10, sq. The thing intended by this name is true, if it is rightly understood: God solemnly promises to men, in baptism, the enjoyment of all the blessings, which are promised in the Christian doctrine; and man solemnly binds himself in the same rite, to yield obedience to God and the Christian doctrine; and in order to this, receives strength and assistance from God. Any one, therefore, who has not broken this engagement, or forfeited this gracious assistance which is promised, stands still in the covenant of baptism. For baptism is the testimony, the assurance of pardon,—the pledge and proof of this and all other Christian blessings.

§ 141. *Of the necessity of baptism, and whether it may be repeated.*

I. The necessity of baptism.

(1) An internal and absolute necessity of baptism cannot be affirmed. For the water of baptism, in and of itself, and the rite itself, as an external act, have no power to renew or save men. This effect depends solely upon the agency of God, through the Christian doctrine, united with baptism. Since, then, it is one of the *positive* rites established by Christ, and has no internal or essential efficacy, it is no otherwise necessary, than because it has been commanded (*necessitas præcepti*). But Christ has commanded, that all who would be his disciples should be baptized. Any one, therefore, who acknowledges Jesus Christ as a divine Messenger, and regards his authority, is under obligation to obey this precept. Christ brought

a charge against the Pharisees (Luke 7: 30), that they had rejected the divine appointment (*βουλή θεοῦ*) concerning the baptism of John. He required baptism of Nicodemus (John 3: 3, 5, 7), and commanded the apostles to baptize all whom they would make his disciples (Matt. xxviii. Mark xvi).

It would be false, however, to assert, that baptism is absolutely essential *to each and every man* in order to salvation. Theologians, therefore, hold with truth, that if a man is deprived of baptism without any fault of his own, his salvation is not endangered by this omission. Even that familiar passage, Mark 16: 16, "Whoever believes and is baptized, is saved, but he that believes not, is punished," is not against, but in favor of this view. For punishment is here threatened only to the unbelieving, who wilfully reject Christian truth; and not to those who, without, their own fault, remain unbaptized; hence *βαπτισθεῖς* is not repeated in the second member. For an unbeliever should not be baptized; and even if he should be, it could do him no good. Just so it is, in John iii. where *γέννησις ἐκ πνεύματος* is represented as the principal thing (vs. 6—8); and the *γέννησις ἐκ ὕδατος*, as useful only so far as it tends to promote the former.

(2) *Sketch of the history of this doctrine.* The most opposite opinions have prevailed, from the earliest times, respecting the necessity of baptism.

(a) Already in the second century some denied, that baptism is necessary for every Christian, and that it is the will of Christ, that each and every one should be baptized. They maintained, that those who have otherwise sufficient faith, have no need of baptism. Of these Tertullian speaks (De bapt. ch. 12—14). Some Socinians agreed with these, and maintained that baptism is not properly applied to such as are born of Christian parents; but that it is an external rite of initiation, by which those of other religions are to be introduced into the Christian Church;—an opinion to which many who are of a Pelagian way of thinking assent. It is true, indeed, that there is an entire want of express testimony and evidence from the apostolical age, concerning the baptism of those born of Christian parents. This inquiry has been lately revived; and Teller (Excurs. I. on Burnet, "De fide et officiis") is of the opinion, that those descended of Christian parents were not baptized, but were considered as born within the lap of the Church.

That this, however, was done, is implied in the whole design of baptism, as expressed by Jesus and the Apostles, § 140; and may also be concluded from the analogy of circumcision, and the uniform practice of the ancient Church after the apostolical times. There is a work in which, with a boldness not to be found elsewhere, the entire needlessness of baptism is maintained, its establishment by Christ denied, and the whole thing given out as an invention of Peter, for the sake of making himself pleasing to the Jews; it is entitled, "Die Taufe der Christen, ein ehrwürdiger Gebrauch, und kein Gesetz Christi," published 1774. The author was C. C. Reiche. An answer to this was written by J. E. Troschel, "Die Wassertaufe ein Gesetz Christi," Berlin, 1774.

(b) Among the old Catholic fathers in the Christian Church, there always prevailed very high ideas respecting the necessity and advantages of baptism. They were accustomed, however, to defer baptism as long as possible (*procrastinare*); and this is recommended even by Tertullian (De bapt. c. 18); and many would not be baptized until just before their death; e.g. Constantine the Great. They supposed that baptism removes, in a kind of miraculous way, all the sins previously committed; while, on the other hand, the sins committed subsequently to baptism, could be forgiven only with great difficulty, or not at all. And so they imagined, that one baptized shortly before death, or one who dies a martyr, (for martyrdom, in their view, has the same efficacy,) goes out of the world as a man without sin, and is saved. They therefore delayed very much the baptism of new converts, and prevented them from the enjoyment of this sacrament, entirely contrary to the appointment and meaning of the Apostles, who baptized new converts immediately, and often many thousands in one day, respecting whose conduct and integrity, they could not possibly have been thoroughly informed before; Acts 2: 41. 16: 15, 33. coll. Acts 8: 13. Vid. Baumgarten, De procrastinatione baptismi apud veteres, Halle, 1747.

(c) When now the position, *extra ecclesiam visibilem non dari salutem*, with all its consequences, became more and more prevalent, especially after the time of Augustine, and in the Western church (vid. § 128, II. and 135, I.), they began to maintain the doctrine of the absolute necessity of baptism in order to salvation; because baptism is the appointed rite of initiation or reception into the

Church ; and they gave out, that whoever is not baptized, and so is not a member of the visible Church, could not become partaker of eternal happiness. So Augustine had before judged not only respecting the heathen, and the children of heathen parents, but also the children of Christian parents, who die before baptism. He was followed by the schoolmen. After this time they began very much to hasten the baptism of children ; and now, for the first time, the so called *baptism of necessity*, (administered when a child was thought in danger of dying,) became common. It happened also not unfrequently, that the children of unchristian parents (e. g. of Jews), were forcibly baptized against their own and their parent's will, on the ground that they were thus put into the way of salvation : of this we find many examples in earlier times. That this is contrary to the sense and spirit of the Holy Scriptures, may be seen from this, that circumcision was appointed on the eighth day, and one who died before, was not considered, on this account, as shut out from the people of God.

II. Is Christian baptism to be repeated ?

(1) The doctrine now prevalent in the Church is entirely just, that baptism is not to be repeated, when one passes over from one *Christian* sect, or particular Communion, to another. For,

(a) Baptism, considered as an external religious rite, is the rite of initiation and solemn reception into the *Christian Church in general*. The subject of baptism pledges himself to the profession and to the obedience of the doctrine of Jesus, in general ; and not to any one particular church. No one of these particular Communions, (such as they have always been,) is in exclusive possession of the truth (vid. § 134, II. 2) ; but in this all agree, that they hold themselves pledged to profess the pure Christian doctrine, (i. e. what they, according to their views, understand as such). Every sect binds its own baptized to this ; and hence it is, in this view, the same thing, wherever and by whomsoever one is baptized. And Paul taught the same thing, when he said, 1 Cor. 1: 12, sq. that one is not pledged by baptism to any man or to any sect, but to the profession of Christ.

(b) The power or efficacy of baptism depends not upon the sect, or the man, by whom it is administered ; man can neither increase nor diminish this efficacy ; vid. 1 Cor. 1: 12.

(c) We find no example during the times of Christ or the Apostles, to prove that proper Christian baptism was ever repeated; although we find some examples, even at that time, of great sinners and of persons excommunicated.

(d) We do not even find that the baptism of John was repeated, (although, at the present time, the Sabæans in the east yearly repeat it); and the same is true of Jewish proselyte baptism. The examples Acts II. and XIX. do not bear upon this point; vid. § 138, IV.

(e) Finally, the uniform phraseology of the Holy Scriptures teaches clearly the same thing, since it is always said concerning Christians who were received into the Church, *that they had been baptized* (*baptizatos esse*), because it took place once for all; not merely *that they were baptized* (*baptizari*); Rom. 6: 31. Gal. 3: 27. It is a thing which had been performed. It is different with the Lord's Supper; this is a rite to be repeated; 1 Cor. 11: 25, sq. Therefore, only when an essential mistake has been committed (when e. g. any thing belonging to the essentials of baptism, as the use of water, or proper instruction concerning the object of this rite, has been neglected or altered, or if it has been administered by one, not a Christian; vid. Acts II. and XIX. § 138, IV.); in such cases only must it be renewed, as baptism then ceases to be true Christian baptism.

(2) The opinions respecting repeating baptism were different, even in the ancient Christian Church. Already in the second century, they were accustomed in Africa (as appears from Tertullian. De pudic. c. 19. De bapt. c. 15.), to rebaptize heretics, and the same was done in many provinces of the East. This was not the case, on the other hand, in Rome, and in the other European Churches; here they simply laid hands upon those who were restored, when they were received back, and appealed for this to the apostolic tradition, that whoever has been baptized according to the command of Christ, is rightly baptized, although it may have been done even by a heretic. In the third century there arose a vehement controversy on this point between Stephanus, Bishop of Rome, and the African party, whose usage Cyprian zealously defended. But they could not agree, and each party still adhered to its previous usage. These opinions, however, were abandoned by degrees in the African Church, as in most others; they were however revived in the fourth century by the Donatists, and other fanatics of the succeeding century, who would acknowledge no baptism

as valid which was administered by a heretic, or any teacher who did not stand in fellowship with them. The same opinion was revived by the enthusiastic sect known by the name of *Anabaptists*, in the sixteenth century. They, however, altered their theory afterwards to this, that they merely rejected infant baptism, and admitted only adult persons to baptism; and this is still the doctrine of the Mennonites and the other Anabaptists; hence they rebaptize those who were baptized in infancy, because infant baptism is not regarded by them as valid, and those baptized in this way only, are considered by them as not baptized. They therefore reject the name of *Anabaptists* (*Wiedertaüfer*). The opinions of all Anabaptists of ancient and modern times, flow partly from unjust ideas of the power and efficacy of baptism, and partly from erroneous opinions respecting the Church. It is true, indeed, that many who have denied that baptism should be repeated, have held these same erroneous opinions; but they would not admit the consequences which naturally result from them.

(a) The Africans of the second and third centuries held this point in common with their opponents, that forgiveness of sin and eternal happiness are obtained by means of baptism, and the Holy Ghost by means of the laying on of the hands of the Bishop; and indeed both imagined, that a sort of magic or miraculous influence belongs to these rites; vid. § 139, IV. The Africans concluded now, that as heretics do not hold the true Christian doctrine, they are not to be considered as Christians, and consequently, that their baptism is not Christian baptism, and that they, therefore, like unchristian persons, are not susceptible of the Holy Ghost.

(b) The Donatists, now, maintained plainly and decidedly, that the Church can consist only of holy and pious persons, and that this genuine Christian Church could be found only among themselves; vid. 135, II. Wherefore they rebaptized all who came over to their sect. For they maintained, that the *gratia baptismi* does not exist among heretics, that the ordination of teachers out of their own communion is invalid, that others have not the Holy Ghost, and can not, therefore, baptize in a valid manner. In short it was their opinion, that the efficacy of the ordinances depends on the worthiness of him who administers them.

(c) The Anabaptists of the sixteenth century proceeded from the same position, that the Church is a community of mere saints

and regenerated persons. They and their followers therefore rejected infant baptism, as it could not be known as yet concerning children, whether they would live pious or ungodly lives; nor could children promise the Church, that they would live righteously. Adults only, in their view, might therefore be baptized. Cf. the work written by an Anabaptist, entitled "Ueber die moralischen Zwecke und Verpflichtungen der Taufe," which, aside from this point, contains much which is good; translated from the English, Leipzig, 1775—8. Vid. also D. A. J. Stark, *Geschichte der Taufe und der Taufgesinnten*, Leipzig, 1789, 8vo.

[Note. On the general subject of Baptism, cf. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, B. II. S. 672, ff. Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, S. 556, § 122, ff. The literature of this doctrine is here very fully exhibited. For the early history of this doctrine, cf. Neander, *K. Gesch. B. I. Abth. II. S. 533—63*; also B. II. Abth. II. S. 682, ff.; for the more recent history, cf. Plank, *Gesch. der protest. Lehrb.*, B. V. Th. 1.—TR.]

§ 142. *Of the Baptism of Infants.*

Many of the ancients and moderns have disapproved of Infant baptism. It was first expressly dissuaded by Tertullian (*De bapt. c. 18*), although he does not entirely reject it, as it was at that time in common use. But it was also quite common then to *delay* baptism; and those who approved of this, could not at the same time approve of infant baptism; vid. § 141, I. Infant baptism was also rejected by the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, and their followers, for reasons mentioned in § 141, ad finem. Mich. Servetus too, in the sixteenth century, would have no one baptized under thirty years of age. There is no decisive example of this practice in the New Testament; for it may be objected against those passages, where the baptism of whole families is mentioned, viz. Acts 19: 42, 48. 16: 15, 33. 1 Cor. 1: 16, that it is doubtful whether there were any children in these families, and if there were, whether they were then baptized. From the passage, Matt. 28: 19, it does not necessarily follow, that Christ commanded Infant bap-

tism; (the *μαθητεύειν* is neither for nor against;) nor does this follow any more from John 3: 5, and Mark 10: 14, 16. There is, therefore, no express command for Infant baptism found in the New Testament; as Morus (p. 215. § 12) justly concedes. Infant baptism has been often defended on very unsatisfactory *à priori* grounds; e. g. the necessity of it has been contended for, in order that children may obtain by it the faith which is necessary to salvation, etc. It is sufficient to show (1) That Infant baptism was not forbidden by Christ, and is not opposed to his will and the principles of his religion, but entirely suited to both. (2) That it was *probably* practised even in the apostolic church. (3) That it is not without advantages.

I. Proofs of the lawfulness and antiquity of Infant baptism.

(1) That Infant baptism, considered as a solemn rite of initiation into the Church, cannot be opposed to the design and will of Christ, may be concluded from his own declaration, Matt. 10: 14, “Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, *τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.*” This is indeed no command for infant baptism; but if children may and ought to have a share in the Christian Church, and in all Christian privileges (*βασιλεία θεοῦ*); it cannot be improper to introduce them into the Christian Church by this solemn rite of initiation. Indeed if it is according to the design of Christ, that children should have a share in the rites and privileges of Christians, from their earliest youth up, it must also be agreeable to his will, solemnly to introduce them, by this rite of initiation, into the nursery of his people; cf. 1 Cor. 7: 14.

(2) Christian baptism is so far similar to circumcision, as that the one was the rite of initiation into the ancient Church, the other, into the new; § 137, II. ad finem, and Morus p. 253, note. But Christian baptism represents and imparts far greater spiritual benefits, than circumcision. Now we know, that the sons of Jews and Proselytes, according to divine command, were circumcised on the eighth day, when they certainly had as yet no idea of the intent and meaning of this religious rite. According to this analogy, children among Christians may be baptized, even during those years, when they cannot as yet understand any thing of the design of the rite, or make any profession of their faith. At least, this analogy must have been very clear to the first Christians, and

to the Apostles, who themselves were Jews. When therefore in the times of the Apostles, a whole family was baptized, would not the children be baptized too? And did not Paul say without limitation, that *all* were baptized, at a time when there were those grown up in the Christian society, who were born of Christian parents? Vid. 1 Cor. i. and xii. and Gal. iii. Again, were it entirely decided, that Jewish proselyte baptism was common during the life of Christ, this circumstance would establish the position still more. For the children of Proselytes were also baptized. But even if proselyte baptism was not introduced until the end of the second or beginning of the third century, and was then adopted in imitation of Christian baptism; even in this case, it might still be concluded, that at that time the baptism of infants must have been common among Christians.

(3) The most decisive reason is the following: Christ did not indeed ordain infant baptism expressly; but if, in his command to baptize *all*, he had wished children to be excepted, he must have expressly said this; Matt. xxviii. Since the first disciples of Christ, as native Jews, never doubted that children were to be introduced into the Israelitish Church by circumcision; it was natural that they should include children also in baptism, if Christ did not expressly forbid it. Had he therefore wished that this should not be done, he would have said so in definite terms.

(4) That infant baptism was very common shortly after the times of the Apostles, both in the Eastern and Western churches, admits of no doubt, if all the historical data are compared; vid. Morus p. 251, not. ad § 10. Some have endeavoured to find evidence for this practice even in the writings of Justin the Martyr and Irenæus; but they are not sufficiently decisive on this point.* The most weighty evidence that can be produced, from the oldest church fathers, and from church history, is the following; viz.

(a) From Tertullian (De bapt. c. 18), it is clearly seen, that already in his time the baptism of infants was very customary in Africa and elsewhere; although he himself does not speak favorably of this practice.

(b) In the time of Cyprian, in the third century, there arose a

* [The evidence from Irenæus is thought valid and incontrovertible by Neander; vid. K. Gesch. B. II. Abth. II .S. 549, 550.—Tr.]

controversy concerning the day when the child should be baptized, whether before the eighth day. But there is no question on the point, whether children ought to be baptized; in this they were all unanimously agreed.

(c) Augustine calls infant baptism *apostolica traditio*, and says, *totam ecclesiam id traditum tenere*.

(d) But far more important is the testimony of a much earlier, and therefore more valuable witness; viz. Origen, of the third century, who says, in his Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. VI., that the Church had received this as a tradition from the Apostles (*παράδοσις ἀποστολική*). Here it might indeed be objected, that the church fathers appeal much too freely to apostolic tradition, for the sake of giving to their own opinions and to the appointments of the Church, the more authority. But if infant baptism was not practised in the oldest Church, it is hardly conceivable, how it should have become so general a short time after, and this too without any controversy or contradiction. When Origen was born, about the year 185, it was universally prevalent in the Christian church, and he was, as he says himself, a baptized child. If it was not customary at the time of the Apostles, we must suppose that afterwards single individuals or churches began to baptize children. But in those times in which they adhered so strictly, even in the smallest trifles, to ancient usage, such an innovation could not possibly have taken place, without great excitement, controversy, contradiction, and without occasioning many councils. These effects were produced by some very insignificant matters; but we cannot find the least trace of opposition to the first practice of infant baptism. There can then be no time mentioned, in which the baptism of infants was first introduced after the death of the Apostles. Therefore it must have existed from the beginning. Neither Tertullian nor Pelagius knew of a later origin of it, when the former censured it, and the latter denied that it is necessary to procure the forgiveness of sins for children. For the history of infant baptism and its opponents, vid. Guil. Wall, *Historia baptismi infantum*, and John Walch, *Historia pædobaptismi*, Sæc. IV. priorum, Jenæ, 1739.

II. The uses and effects of infant baptism.

Although children at the time of their baptism know nothing respecting this rite, and are not capable of any notion of it, and can

make no profession (and these are the principal objections on the other side); still it does not follow, that infant baptism is without advantages; any more than that Jewish circumcision was. It has two-fold advantages.

(1) *For the children themselves.* The advantages to them are both *present* and *future*.

(a) The present effect, as far as it appears clearly to *us*, is principally this, that by this means they are admitted into the nursery of the church, and, even while children, enjoy its rights and privileges, as far as they are capable of so doing. This is sufficient; and there is no need of adopting the doctrine about a *children's faith*, so far at least as that implies any thing which can exist without comprehension, and capability of using the understanding; vid. § 121, II., and Morus p. 249. In the general position, that just as *far* as they have subjective capacity, and as *soon* as they have this, God will work in them that which is good, for their salvation, there is not only nothing unreasonable, but it is altogether rational and scriptural. It is also certain, that we cannot surely tell how soon, or in what way and by what means, this subjective capacity may be shown and developed.

(b) As soon as their mental powers begin to unfold themselves in some degree, children are capable of an obvious *inward, moral* effect of baptism, or of God in and through baptism. In the Christian instruction imparted to them, they must, therefore, be continually referred to this event; it must be shown them that *they* too have obtained by baptism, a share in all the great and divine blessings and promises which are given to Christians, and that they are solemnly obligated by baptism, through God's assistance and guidance, to fulfil all the conditions on which Christians receive these great promises. In the youthful age, this means is exceedingly efficacious, in exciting pious reflections; and it operates upon the whole succeeding life. It is on this account, (as Morus well observes,) a very suitable and commendable practice in the Protestant church, that the children, before they approach the Lord's Table for the first time, are thoroughly instructed in the doctrinal and practical truths of Christianity, to the acceptance and obedience of which they are obligated by baptism. This is called the *Confirmation* (of the covenant of baptism). It has upon many, as experience teaches, the most salutary efficacy through their whole life; and it is the duty of

the evangelical teacher, to lay out all his strength upon this instruction, and to make it, as far as he can, appropriate and practical. And if in some the advantages of it do not appear immediately, still in late years they are often seen. The good seed sown in the heart often lies a long time concealed, before it comes up.—Baptism cannot indeed exert any *compulsion* upon children, any more than when one is enrolled, as a child, to a Canonry, or as an academic citizen. They must act according to their own conscientious conviction, choice, and determination, after they come to the exercise of their understanding.

(2) *For the parents, relatives, or guardians of the children.* To these, too, is the baptism of infants eminently useful in many respects; and it may be said, that this advantage alone is a sufficient reason for instituting infant baptism. For (a) the assurance is given by this rite to parents, in a solemn and impressive manner, that the great privileges and promises bestowed upon Christians, will be imparted to their children also; and thus religious feelings, pious thoughts and resolutions, are awakened and promoted in them. (b) By this rite, they are engaged and encouraged to educate their children in a Christian manner, in order that their children may receive the privileges bestowed upon them, and attain one day to the actual exercise and enjoyment of them. These duties should be urged upon parents by the Christian teacher, especially at the time when their children are baptized; and he may find instruction respecting the manner in which this should be done, in the passages above cited. Respecting the *usages* properly connected with Infant Baptism, vid. § 139, ad finem.

CHAPTER SECOND.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

§ 143. *Of the names of the Lord's Supper; and the occasion and object of its institution.*

I. Names of the Lord's Supper.

(1) *The scriptural names.* (a) *Κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*, the festival which Christ appointed, and which is held in his honor, and is commemorative of him, 1 Cor. 11: 20. Hence the common appellations, *the Lord's Supper*, *cæna domini*, or *sacra cæna*, because it was instituted at supper time. Entirely synonymous with this, is the phrase (b) *Τράπεζα Κυρίου*, 1 Cor. 10: 21, where we also find the name *ποτήριον Κυρίου*. With these the term *κλᾶσις τοῦ ἄγτου*, Acts 2: 42, is frequently mentioned. But this seems rather to apply to the *feasts of love* (Agapæ), after which the sacrament of the Supper was frequently, though not always, administered in the primitive Church; cf. v. 46, *μεταλαμβάνειν τροφῆς*. The term *δωρεὰ ἐπουρανίου*, Heb. 6: 4, is rendered by Michaelis *heavenly manna*, and applied to the Lord's Supper. This term seems, however, to denote more generally the unmerited divine favors conferred upon the primitive Christians.

(2) *The ecclesiastical names of this sacrament.* These are very many; some of the principal are the following.

(a) *Κοινωνία*, *communio*,—a festival *in common*. This name is borrowed from 1 Cor. 10: 16, where however it denotes the profes-

sion which Christians make, by partaking *in common* of the Supper, of their interest in Christ, of the saving efficacy of his death for them, and their own actual enjoyment of its consequences.

(b) *Εὐχαριστία* and *εὐλογία* (for these terms are synonymous). This sacrament is so called, because it is designed to promote a *thankful* remembrance of Christ, and of the divine favors bestowed upon us, through him. He himself commenced the Supper by a *prayer of thanks*, which has always been justly retained in administering this ordinance. The appellation *eucharistia* (*eucharist*) was used even by Ignatius, Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian. [This name seems also to be of scriptural origin, and to be taken from the phrase *ποιήριον εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλόγουμεν*, used by Paul.—Tr.]

(c) *Σύναξις*, *σύναξις ἅγια*. This signifies primarily a *collection*; then, a *collection for celebrating the Lord's Supper*, and finally, the *Lord's Supper itself*. This name was probably taken from 1 Cor. 11: 18, 20, *συνερχομένων ὑμῶν*.

(d) *Λειτουργία*, [primarily *ministerium*], then, *the sacrament of the Supper*, as the principal act of religious service, especially on account of the *sacrifice* of Christ which is there commemorated, since *λειτουργία* signifies, by way of eminence, that part of religious service which consists in *sacrifice*.

(e) *Μυστήριον*, *cæna mystica* and *missa*,—so this sacrament was called, because the catechumens were excluded from it, and none who were not Christians could be present when it was administered. They were sent away by the Deacons with the words, *Ite, missa est* (*ecclesia*). *Missa* signifies properly *dismissio catechumenorum et poenitentium*.

(f) There are other names which were taken from *sacrifices*, and the *offering* of sacrifices; e. g. *προσφορά*, *oblatio*, *θυσία*, *θυσία ἀναίμακτος*, *altare*, *sacramentum altaris*, etc. Many such names are found in the ancient liturgies; vid. Morus, p. 271, not. 2. Christ instituted the Supper chiefly in commemoration of his *death*, or his offering up of himself for man; and he employs in doing this, the terms borrowed from sacrifices. Now it was customary for the Christians who had most possessions, to bring food and drink to their love-festivals, and from the remnants of these *gifts* (*προσφορά*), they held the Supper in commemoration of the sacrifice of Christ. This gave the first occasion for comparing this sacrament with an *offering*; and this was done the more willingly by Chris-

tians, as it was often objected against them by Jews and heathens, that they had no sacrifices. And by degrees they became accustomed to regard the Lord's Supper, not merely as a festival in memory of the sacrifice of Christ, but as an actual repetition of this sacrifice,—an idea which gave rise afterwards to the grossest errors. The first traces of these opinions are found in Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, and still more in Cyprian, Augustine, and others. Vid. Ernesti in "*Antimuratorius*," in his "*Opusc. Theol.*" p. 80; and with respect to these ecclesiastical names in general, Casaubon, *Exerc. in Baron.*—Ex. 16, p. 445.

II. Texts relating to the Lord's Supper, and the occasion and object of its institution.

(1) The institution of the Supper is described in the following texts; viz. Matt. 26: 26—28. Mark 14: 22—24. Luke 22: 19, 20. Luke is more full and distinct in his narrative, than the others; in John, there is nothing said respecting it, since he presupposed it, as already well known. Paul, however, gives an account of the institution of the Supper, and agrees most nearly with Luke, 1 Cor. 11: 23—25. He is speaking of the disorders which had crept into the Corinthian Church in their observance of the *Agapæ*, and of the Lord's Supper in connexion with them; and takes this opportunity, to discourse at large (in the entire passage from v. 17th to 34th) respecting the design and the efficacy of the sacrament of the Supper, and the proper mode of celebrating it. Cf. 1 Cor. 10: 16, 17. Theologians are not agreed among themselves, whether the passage, John 6: 50, sq., where Christ speaks of the eating of his flesh and drinking his blood, relates to this sacrament; vid. Morus p. 269, n. D. As the Reformed theologians often appealed to this passage in behalf of their theory, the Lutherans (e. g. even Ernesti) would not allow, that it could be used to explain the language in which the Supper was instituted. So much is certain, that nothing is said in this passage itself respecting the Lord's Supper, since this was not yet instituted. But the terms here used have a striking resemblance with those employed at the institution of the Supper; and since this discourse of Jesus produced at the time a great sensation, on account of its remarkable phraseology, it can hardly be supposed that his disciples would forget it, or that it should not have occurred to their minds when terms so similar were employed at the institution of the

Supper. They doubtless could explain many things in this whole transaction, from their recollections of this discourse. This will appear the more probable, if we consider that these words of Jesus recorded by John (ch. vi.), were spoken shortly before the Passover (v. 4),—that the images employed by him were taken from the custom of eating the flesh of the victims at the festivals attending the sacrifices, and especially at the Passover, the most solemn of them all,—and that it was exactly at the Passover, that the Supper was instituted by Christ. But allowing that these words may be used to illustrate those employed by Christ on the latter occasion, the Lutheran opinion is not invalidated. For every Lutheran will allow, that it was a great object in the establishment of the Lord's Supper, to remind us, in an impressive manner, of the body of Jesus offered, and his blood shed for us, and to exhibit and convey to us the great blessings which we owe to him. Now in John *σῶξ* and *αἷμα Χριστοῦ* plainly denote the doctrine of Jesus, so far as he offered up his body, and shed his blood for the good of man; vid. John 6: 51, 63. *To eat and drink* of this body and blood, is the same as *πιστεύειν εἰς Χριστὸν ἐσταυρώμενον*, vid. vs. 47, 50, 51, 56. What food and drink are to the body, as contributing to its nourishment and vigor, the same is a living faith in this doctrine to the soul,—*spiritual nourishment, pabulum animi*. This language then is to be understood to denote, “the truth of Christ's sacrifice or Atonement, and the inward experience of its benefits.” And this was the very object of the Lord's Supper, viz. to preserve the memory of the death of Christ, visibly to set it forth, and to convey its benefits to those who partake of this sacrament. It cannot therefore be denied, that the passage in John (so far as it is figurative and symbolical), serves to illustrate the language in which the Lord's Supper was instituted, and indeed the whole nature of this ordinance. Cf. especially, Storr, *Doctrinæ Christianæ pars theoretica*, p. 314, seq.

(2) *What was the occasion of Christ's instituting this festival? What was the immediate cause of his doing it?* He was accustomed to take occasion from the circumstances by which he was surrounded, to give instruction; and at the Passover, every thing was symbolical, and the father of the family, (the character which Christ now sustained among his disciples,) referred every thing back to the events in the life of the ancestors of the Jewish nation. It seems

now, that this Jewish Passover gave the first occasion to Christ for instituting his Supper.

(a) Christ abolished the ancient dispensation (*παλαιὰν διαθήκην*); consequently all the Jewish festivals, sacrifices, and the solemnities connected with them, were set aside, and among these the Passover, one of the principal festivals of the Jewish Church. This was done, as we are taught everywhere in the New Testament, by the death of Christ. Still it could not be denied, that this and other Jewish festivals had many advantages, and that they tended to keep alive a sense of the divine benefits, and to awaken pious feelings, vid. § 137, III. 1. Besides, it was altogether customary, both among the Jews and the heathen nations, to have sacrificial festivals, standing in immediate connexion with religion; hence Paul objects to it, that Christians, who drink from the cup of the Lord, and eat at the table of the Lord, should drink from the cup, and eat from the table of idols, 1 Cor. 10: 15—21. Still it cannot be properly said, that the common sacrificial festivals among the Jews and heathen, furnished Christ the principal or only inducement to institute his Supper, as was asserted by Cudworth in his work, “*De vera notione sacræ cænæ*,” which is found in his “*Systema Intellectuale*,” accompanied by Mosheim’s remarks,—an opinion to which Warburton and others have acceded. It is also false to assert, that the Lord’s Supper is properly a *sacrificial festival*, like the Jewish Passover, although it is a *cæna religiosa* or *sacra*, and although it may be compared, and is in fact compared by Paul (1 Cor. x.), with these festivals. Vid. Morus p. 261, Not. and p. 271, not. 2. It is more just to say, that Christ merely took occasion from the Jewish sacrificial festivals, and especially from the Passover, all of which were now abolished, to institute this festival, to maintain among his followers the memory of his offering up of himself.—But in entire conformity with the spirit of his religion, and of all his other institutions, he left it undetermined, at what times it should be held, and how often it should be repeated. He simply said, *Do this, as oft as ye do it, in remembrance of me*, 1 Cor. 11: 25.

(b) The Passover was designed to commemorate the rescue of the Israelites from Egypt, and their deliverance from many afflictions; and was to be repeated by their descendants, as an occasion for thankful remembrance of the divine favors; vid. Ex. 13: 9, coll. 12: 26, 27. It took its name from this circumstance, viz. *פסח*,

feast of deliverance or rescue. In the same way was the Christian festival designed to promote the grateful remembrance of Christ, on account of the deliverance from sin and its punishment, and all the other spiritual blessings which we owe to him, and it was to be repeated, εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν, Luke 22: 19. 1 Cor. 11: 24, 26. Hence Paul says, 1 Cor. 5: 7, τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐτύθη, Χριστός. He does not, indeed, here mean the Lord's Supper itself; but still it is very easy to see from this passage, the intimate connexion of these ideas. The words, however, by which the Supper was instituted, *This is my body*, etc. cannot be explained from the formula used at the celebration of the Passover, *This is the bread of suffering which our fathers ate*, etc. For this formula was not adopted until after the destruction of the second temple, neither can it be found in the Talmud, as Schöttgen has shown (Hor. Talmud. ad Matt. 26: 26), and also Deyling (Obs. Miscell. P. I. Exerc. IV. p. 221). The words of Christ on this occasion are rather to be compared with the Mosaic formula employed at the solemn sanctioning of the Law, at which time sacrifices were also offered, Ex. 24: 8, *Behold the blood of the covenant, which the Lord hath made with you*; cf. Morus, p. 260, n. 2.

(c) Christ did not institute his Supper during the continuance of the Passover, but after it was finished, in order to give his new ordinance an additional solemnity from its connexion with the Passover, and at the same time to make it entirely distinct from the latter. This example was so far imitated by the ancient Christians, that while they celebrated the sacrament of the Supper in connexion with the *Agapæ* or *feasts of love*, they yet observed it as a separate festival, after the former was ended. At the social festivals of the Jews, at the Passover, etc. a cup was passed round, over which thanks were said, while the cup was drank to the praise of God,—a custom which we find in other ancient nations; cf. Ps. 116: 13. 1 Chron. 16: 1, sq. also the ποτήριον δαιμονίων, 1 Cor. 10: 21.—It was with this ceremony that Christ concluded the Passover, Luke 22: 17. And now, after they had eaten (ἐσθιόντων αὐτῶν, according to Matthew and Mark, or μετὰ τὸ δεῖπναι, according to Luke and Paul), he again offered a prayer of thanks, as was customary at the commencement of a festival (εὐχαριστήσας), in order to distinguish this ordinance from the one which had preceded, and then distributed the bread and passed round the cup, the second time. He took

the materials for this sacrament from what remained of bread and wine (as the ordinary drink of the table), after they had eaten. And this was entirely conformed to his design, that the rite commemorative of him should be as simple as possible, and such that it could be often observed, and in any place, without much trouble or difficulty. In this respect the Lord's Supper differs widely from the Jewish Passover, where every thing was complicated, and circumstantially arranged; vid. Ex. 12: 3, sq.

Note. Christ recommended the observance of the Supper, not merely to the apostles, but to all Christians; vid. Morus p. 259, § 1, ad finem. Nor was it his meaning, that they should merely sometimes remember him at their ordinary social meals, and while they partook of the bread and wine on the table, think of his death. On the contrary, the apostles understood the words, *do this in remembrance of me*, to relate to all Christians; and they distinguished this festival from all other social festivals, and introduced the observance of it into all the Christian Churches. This appears especially from 1 Cor. 11: 23, 24, coll. 10: 16, where it is also described as an ordinance of Christ, and indeed as one, which Paul himself, as well as the other Apostles, had received immediately from Christ. It is said expressly, v. 26, that this ordinance should be observed until the end of the world (*ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ ὁ Κύριος*). The Supper was designed to be a perpetual Sermon on the death of Christ, until he shall come again, to bring his followers into the kingdom of the blessed; and every one who partakes of it, is supposed hereby to profess, that he believes Christ died *even for him*. There have always, however, been some who have supposed that this institution is needless, or that the precept to observe it does not extend to all Christians: the Pauliciani, e. g. supposed that *bread* and *wine* are here figurative terms, denoting the doctrines of Christ, which nourish the soul. So the Socinians, and several fanatical sects.

(3) *More particular explanation of the object of Christ in instituting the sacrament of the Supper.*

(a) *The chief object of Christ.* From what has been already said, it appears, that this festival was designed to be in commemoration of Christ,—of all the blessings for which we are indebted to him, and especially of his death, from which these other benefits all proceed. This is evident from the very words in which this ordinance was established, *σῶμα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον*, (or as Paul has it, *κλώμενον*, שִׁבְרָה, *ludere, vulnerare*, to which the *breaking* of the bread alludes,) and *αἷμα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* (or *περὶ πολλῶν*, according to Mark and Luke,) *ἐκχυνόμενον*, *εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*. Christ often repeated these words during the eating and drinking of the Supper, and interchanged them with others of the same import. And hence

we may account for the different phraseology recorded by the different Evangelists. The same thing is evident from the express declaration of Paul, 1 Cor. 11: 26, "So often as ye partake of this festival, you profess yourselves among the number of those who believe, that Christ suffered death for their sakes" (θάνατον Κυρίου καταγγέλετε); cf. 1 Cor. 10: 16, and also the fine paraphrase of this passage given by Morus, p. 259, § 3, n. 1.

But this needs more particular explanation. On the day of Christ's death, the ancient Mosaic dispensation ceased, and the new covenant, or the new dispensation instituted by God through Christ for the salvation of men, commenced. The memorable event of that day, which had such vast consequences, he and his apostles celebrated by this festival, and he commanded them to continue to observe it in future time. It is therefore the uniform doctrine of the apostles, that the new dispensation of God (καινή διαθήκη) began with the death of Christ, and was thereby solemnly consecrated; cf. the texts cited § 118, II. 1. Hence Paul says, Heb. 9: 14, 15, that even as Judaism was inaugurated by sacrifices; so was Christianity also, by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. And now as Moses, Ex. 24: 8, calls the blood of the sacrifice by which the Mosaic laws and the whole Mosaic institute were consecrated and received a solemn sanction, *the blood of the Covenant*; so does Christ, with a most indisputable reference to this expression, denominate his death,—his blood which he shed, *the blood of the new Covenant*; and the words τὸ αἷμα καινῆς διαθήκης, (or as Luke and Paul plainly have it, τὸ ποτήριον (ἔστι) ἡ καινή διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἵματι μου,) are to be regarded as explanatory of the words τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ σῶμά μου, τὸ αἷμά μου.

The meaning therefore is, "ye celebrate, while ye eat this bread and drink this wine, the memory of my body offered up, and of my blood shed for you; by which the new Covenant, the new dispensation for the good of the world, whose founder I am, is consecrated." The sacrament of the Supper is, therefore, a significant Sermon on the death of Jesus, and requires, in order to a proper celebration of it, a personal experience of the benefits of this death.

Christ says, "drink ye *all* of it; for it is my blood." By this he means, that they should so divide the wine among themselves, that each should receive a portion of it. He himself did not partake of the sacramental bread and wine; for his body was not offered, nor his blood shed, for his own sake; and those only for whom this

was done, should eat and drink of it. The $\tau \omicron \tilde{\upsilon} \tau \acute{o} \epsilon \sigma \tau \iota \sigma \tilde{\omega} \mu \alpha$ and $\alpha \tilde{\iota} \mu \alpha$ refers, therefore, principally to the *act* itself, like the following $\tau \omicron \tilde{\upsilon} \tau \omicron \pi \omicron \lambda \epsilon \iota \tau \epsilon$, i. e. this act (which you shall hereafter repeat) shall serve to impress your minds with the great importance of my body offered up for the good of men, and of my blood shed for their sake, and shall remind you of all the salutary consequences flowing from my death, and shall convey these benefits to you personally. It is not, therefore, the then present and living body of Jesus which is here spoken of; but the body which was sacrificed, i. e. Christ, so far as he died for us. This is illustrated by the formula used by Moses respecting the Passover, Ex. 12: 11, 27, $\text{הָאֵלֹהִים} \text{פָּסַח$, i. e. by this act you solemnly commemorate the deliverance from Egypt. And as the Passover was appointed and first celebrated shortly before this deliverance; so was the sacrament of the Supper instituted and celebrated just before the death of Christ: and as the former was to be repeated in commemoration of the great event, on account of which it was first instituted, and for the sake of awakening grateful and religious feelings; so it was also with the latter. This analogy seems to have been perfectly understood by the Apostles, and hence they do not inquire of Christ, as they were accustomed to do in other cases.

(b) But in connexion with this principal object, Christ had also others in view, all of which however are related to this, and depend upon it. Especially does it appear to have been an object with Christ in this ordinance, to make plain, and impressively to recommend to his disciples, that great precept of his religion, *Love one another, as I also have loved you*, 1 Cor. 10: 17. 12: 13. He designed, that by this symbol his disciples should mutually pledge their cordial love. It is a thing well known by old experience, that friendships are founded, cherished, and sustained by social festivals. Of this fact, many of the ancient legislators and the founders of religions, availed themselves, in the appointment of festivals; and this was also done by Moses. In many of the Oriental nations, therefore, the guest who had but once eaten with them, even if it had been only bread and salt, and who had drunken with them, was considered as a pledged and inalterable friend; and it was in this way, that the league of friendship and of mutual service was contracted.

This noble custom was now made more general, and as it were consecrated, by religion, or the association of religious ideas. All

the followers of Christ were to unite in this celebration, and to hold this festival in common, and without any distinction, in memory of their great benefactor and Saviour. For the followers of Christ were required to love each other as brethren, and this *for Christ's sake*, i. e. because it is the will and the command of Christ, their common Lord. Vid. Joh. Gottlob Worb, Ueber die Bundes-und Freundschaftssymbole der Morgenländer, Sorau, 1792, 8vo.

But we must remember, in connexion with this, the uniform doctrine of the New Testament, that Christ, in his exalted state, is as near to all his followers, at all periods, even until the end of the world (Matt. 28: 20), and that he equally guides and supports them, as when he was with his disciples, by his visible presence, upon the earth; vid. § 98. He was visibly present when he first held this festival with his disciples then living, and he then took the lead. But while he commands all his followers to continue to observe this rite until his visible return, he gives them the assurance, that they stand equally under his inspection, and enjoy equally his care, with those who lived with him while he was upon the earth. Theologians say truly, *Christus præsentiam suam suis in sacra cæna declarat* ADSPECTABILI pignore. So certainly as they see the bread and the wine, even so certain should it be to them, that he still lives, and that he is especially near to them, as he was formerly to his disciples while upon earth.

Note. From what has now been said, it appears, (a) that the theory of the substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental symbols, is not essential, or is not to be looked upon as the great point in this doctrine, and that it cannot be decisively proved from the words of Christ. The Reformed theologians take *εἶναι* here in the sense of *signifying, showing forth*, —a sense in which it is indeed often used; e. g. Sept. Gen. 41: 26, 27. Gal. 4: 24. Rev. 1: 20. Christ himself uses *ἐστίν* in a similar connexion, instead of *σημαίνει*, John 15: 1. The objections to this explanation which are of any weight, may be seen in Storr's "Doctrina Christiana," p. 305, sq. Cf. also § 146. This particular theory ought never to have been made an Article of faith, but rather to have been placed among theological problems; vid. § 146.

It also appears from the foregoing, that we are not to suppose in the sacrament, any actual offering up of the body of Christ, repeated every time the sacrament is observed. This false idea became gradually prevalent in the Romish Church; vid. No. I. of this section, ad finem. This sacrament may indeed be called, as it is by the fathers, a *sacrifice*, but only in a figurative sense. For Christ offered up himself once for all, Heb. 9: 25—28; and the Lord's Supper is the means of appropriating to each one the benefits of this one sacrifice.

It is taught, however, by the Romish Church, that the priest offers to God, as a literal atoneing sacrifice, both for the dead and the living, the sacramental symbols, which become, by consecration and transubstantiation, the real body and blood of Christ. From this doctrine respecting *Masses*, many other false ideas have originated.

§ 144. *Of the distinction between what is essential and unessential in the celebration of the ordinance of the Supper.*

Some things pertaining to this ordinance are *essential*, i. e. of such a nature, that without them the whole act would not be the true Lord's Supper; others are *unessential* or *contingent*. The latter depend upon the circumstances of time, place, society, etc.; and with regard to these things, we feel ourselves justified in deviating even from that which was done on the first institution of the Supper, since these are regarded as indifferent matters, Christ having given no express precepts respecting them. Thus all agree, that the *time of the day* in which it is observed is unessential, although Christ observed it in the evening; the same as to the posture at table, whether *sitting* or *lying*; and with respect to the place, whether it be a public or a private house; and other things of the same kind.

But on some points opinions are divided. In the Protestant Church the use of the *bread* and *wine* (*materia* or *res terrestres, elementa, symbola*), is reckoned among the essential things; and the use of them too in such a way, that each of the elements shall be *separately* (*separatim*) taken. Protestants too contend, that none but real Christians may partake of the Lord's Supper. Other things are regarded by them as unessential. These points will now be briefly considered, and illustrated by some historical observations.

I. The use of bread and wine in the Lord's Supper.

(1) With regard to the *nature* of the bread to be employed in this sacrament, the opinions of theologians have been diverse.

(a) It has been asked, whether the bread should be *leavened* or *unleavened*, or whether this is a *point of indifference*. In the Pro-

testant Church, the latter opinion is maintained, and justly, since Christ left no precept respecting this point. So much is beyond doubt, that at the institution of the Supper, Christ made use of *unleavened* bread, because no other was brought into the house during the celebration of the Jewish Passover, still less was any other kind eaten. We have indeed no express information respecting the custom of the primitive Christians in this respect; but from all circumstances it appears, that they regarded it as a matter of indifference, whether leavened or unleavened bread is employed. They came together almost daily to partake of the Supper; and they carried with them the bread and wine for this festival. In this case, they took the bread which was used at common meals, and this was leavened bread. Ephiphanius (Hær. 30) notices it as something peculiar in the Ebionites, that once in the year, at the time of the Passover, they celebrated the Lord's Supper with unleavened bread. It was customary at a subsequent period in the Oriental Church, to make use of leavened bread; yet not always and in all places. In the Western Church, on the contrary, unleavened bread was more commonly (though not always) employed; and Rabanus Maurus, in the ninth century, declares this to be an apostolical tradition in the Romish Church. There was, however, at this time no *law* upon the subject, either in the Eastern or Western Church. But in the eleventh century, a controversy arose on this point between the two Churches, as the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, reproached the Western Church for the use of unleavened bread, and made it heresy. After this period it was contended in the Romish Church, that no other than unleavened bread should be used, and this was so established by many papal decretals. The opposite ground was taken by the Greek Church, and is still maintained at the present day. Vid. Joh. Gottfried Herrmann, *Historia concertationum de pane azymo et fermentato in coena Domini*, Leipzig, 1737, 8vo.

(b) Another thing which must be considered unessential, is the *breaking* of the bread, which was done at the first institution of the Supper, according to the custom of the Jews, who baked the bread thin, and were accustomed therefore to break, instead of cutting it. We see, however, from 1 Cor. 11: 24 (coll. 10: 17, *εἰς ἄκρον*, from which pieces were *broken off*), that this custom was retained in the primitive Christian Church, and was regarded as emblematical of

the wounding and breaking of the body of Jesus. It would have been better, therefore, to have retained this custom afterwards, for the same reason that the custom of immersion is preferable in performing the rite of baptism. Luther at first declared in favor of the breaking of bread, though he afterwards altered his opinion. It has been customary in the Romish Church, especially since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, to cut the host or holy wafer in a peculiar way, so as to represent upon it the crucified Saviour, and to make the pieces more and more small, that no one might receive too much of this costly food.

(2) In respect to the *wine*, it has been commonly supposed, that Christ used such, in the institution of the Supper, as was mingled with water. For it was very customary with the orientalists, to drink mingled wine *at table*, and one was regarded as quite intemperate, who drank *pure wine* (*merum*). Still this is very uncertain, since water and wine were frequently drunk separately at table. In the ancient Church, however, the custom prevailed in most places, of mingling water with the sacramental wine. It was also determined how much wine should be taken; though this was variously settled. Diverse allegorical significations were given to the mingling of these two elements. E. g. it was said, that the wine is the symbol of the *soul* of Christ, and the water of the *people* who are united with him; etc. Such allegorizing is seen even in the writings of Cyprian. Clement III. expressly enacted in the twelfth century, that the wine should be mingled with water. This was not insisted upon by Luther, on account of the superstition connected with it. The *color* of the wine is also indifferent, nor is it certain, that Christ used the red wine.

(3) In order to the right celebration of the Lord's Supper, neither the bread nor the wine must be taken without the other, but both must be used (*communio sub utraque specie*); though one separately from the other (*separatim*).

(a) As to the latter point, it is probable from the institution of the Supper by Christ, that he distributed each of the elements *separately* to his disciples. But we find that in some of the Oriental churches, an exception was made in behalf of some sick persons, and that bread merely dipt in wine was given them. The same thing was done in the West, especially during the tenth century; where in some places, the bread only was consecrated, and then

dipt in the wine, and so given to the Communicants,—a practice which was justly condemned.

(b) It is also a well founded opinion, that the cup should not be withholden from any who partake of this sacrament; vid. Morus p. 272, n. 3. From 1 Cor. 11: 26. 10: 16, 21, it appears undeniably, that in the Apostolic Church all Christians partook both of the bread and the wine. And this was the practice throughout the whole Christian Church during the ten first centuries. The Manicheans, who abstained wholly from wine, did not use it even at the Lord's Supper; but they were strongly opposed by the teachers of all other parties, e. g. Hieronymus, Leo the great, etc. Particularly important is a decree of Pope Gelasius I. of the fifth century, against some sectarians who used only bread in the celebration of the Supper. He calls their practice *grande sacrilegium*, and is very strong in his opposition to it.

But when the doctrine of transubstantiation began to prevail in the West, especially after the eleventh century, the schoolmen suggested the question, whether considering that the bread is changed into the body of Christ, the blood is not also there, and so, whether it is not enough to partake merely of the bread? This question was answered in the affirmative; and it was suggested as an additional reason in behalf of this opinion, that drink may be easily spilt, and that it is more difficult to lose any portion of the bread. This ground was taken even in the twelfth century by Hugo of St. Victor and Peter of Lombardy, and in the thirteenth century was defended with great zeal by Thomas Aquinas. Some churches in the West began, therefore, to introduce the custom of withholding the cup from the laity, and giving it only to the clergy. The first examples of this occurred in some English churches about the middle of the twelfth century. The scarcity and dearth of wine in northern Europe during this period, may have furnished an additional motive for this practice. It was not until the thirteenth century, that these examples were followed in France and Italy. Still this observance did not become universal either in this or the following century, although it was becoming more and more prevalent in the Churches in the West. This doctrine *de communione sub una* was zealously opposed by Wickliff and Huss and their adherents; and this led the Council at Costnitz, 1415, wholly to interdict the use of the cup by the laity. It was established by that Council, "that in each of the two

elements, the whole body of Christ is truly contained." This doctrine has been maintained in the Romish Church ever since this period ; although many theologians, and even some of the Popes, have objected to it. Luther and Zuingli adopted the principles of Wickliff and Huss, and introduced again the general use of the cup into their Churches ; and hence the decisions of the Council at Costnitz, were re-enacted by Council at Trent in the sixteenth century. Besides the older works of Leo Allatius, Schmid, Calixtus, on this subject, cf. Spittler, *Geschichte des Kelch's im Abendmahl*, Lemgo, 1780, 8vo.

II. By whom should the Lord's Supper be observed ? who should administer it ? and may it be celebrated in the private dwellings of Christians :

These questions come under the general inquiry respecting what is essential and not essential in the observance of the Lord's Supper.

(1) None but actual members of the Christian Church can take part in the Lord's Supper ; those who are not Christians are excluded from it. On this point there has been an universal agreement. For by this rite, we profess our interest in the Christian Church, and our belief in Christ ; vid. 1 Cor. 10: 17. 11: 26. The passage Heb. 13: 20, seems also to belong in this connexion. Every actual member of the Church may, therefore, be admitted to the enjoyment of this ordinance, without distinction of regenerate and unregenerate persons (though this is denied by some). This is evident from the fact, that it is the object of the Supper to make an *external* profession of Christian faith ; vid. § 145, I. ; and because it may be, and is designed to be, a means of promoting a change of heart, and often produces this effect. As unregenerate persons are not excluded from hearing the divine word ; neither should they be from partaking of this sacrament. Nor do we find that persons who gave no evidence of a regenerate mind, and who were yet members of the visible Church, were excluded from the sacrament in the primitive Christian Church ; although such persons were advised to abstain from the sacrament, so long as their hearts were not in a proper frame, still it was left to their own consciences. Since therefore a mixed multitude of good and evil must be allowed in the visible Church ; it is the same as to the Lord's Supper. Christ himself admitted Judas to the first celebration of this ordinance ; and thus

taught us our duty with regard to this subject. Many have indeed denied that Judas, the betrayer of Christ, partook of this sacrament with the other disciples ; but from Luke 22: 20—22, the fact appears too plain to be denied. This is admitted even by Augustine on the third Psalm. This fact is important ; since many conscientious Christians, and even teachers, have had great doubts as to uniting with unconverted men in this ordinance, and have become separatists.

In respect to children, however, it is maintained, that they are excluded from partaking of the Lord's Supper. It was common in Africa in Cyprian's time, i. e. in the third century, to give the sacramental elements even to children ; and this custom was gradually introduced into other Churches. But in the twelfth century this practice fell into disuse in the West, although in the East it continues to the present day. The passage John 6: 53, is appealed to in behalf of this practice. Vid. Peter Zorn, *Historia eucharistiæ infantium*, Berlin, 1736, 8vo. It cannot be said, that the exclusion of children is expressly commanded by Christ ; because there is nothing about this subject in the New Testament, nor do we read that in the apostolic Church they were excluded from the sacrament. (The children of the Israelites were not excluded from the feast of the Passover.) Yet as children were not admitted during the first centuries of the Christian Church, (except in Africa, in the third century,) we judge that they cannot have been admitted in the apostolic Church ; for in that case, this practice would not certainly have been disused in all the churches. The cause of the exclusion of children, is plainly, that they cannot as yet understand the importance of the transaction, and must be unable to distinguish this religious festival from a common meal ; 1 Cor. 11: 29. It would thus become to them a merely formal and customary thing, and make no salutary impression.

(2) *By whom should the Lord's Supper be administered?* As the administration of the other religious rites of the Church is entrusted to the teachers of Religion ; it is proper and according to good order, that this also should be administered by them. This however, is by no means their right *exclusively* and necessarily, but only *ordinis et decori causa*, as Morus well observes, p. 272, ad fin. In extreme cases, therefore, where no regular teachers can be obtained, this sacrament may be administered by other Christians, to

whom this duty is committed by the Church; vid. § 136, II. 2; § 139, III. This has been uniformly maintained by Luther and other Protestant theologians. In the ancient Christian Church, it was as regularly administered by the teachers, as baptism. Justin the Martyr (Apol. I. 85, sq.) says, that the *προεστώτες* consecrated and distributed the elements; and Tertullian (De cor. mil.) says, *nec de aliorum manu quam PRÆSIDENTIUM sumimus*.

(3) The question has been asked, Whether *private communions* (e. g. in the case of sick persons) may be permitted, and whether they accord with the objects of the Lord's Supper? This has been denied by some modern writers, particularly by Less in his "Praktische Dogmatik," and by Schulze of Neustadt, "Ueber die Krankencommunion," 1794. Cf. the work "Ueber die Krankencommunion, mit besonderer Hinsicht auf ihren Missbrauch und ihre Schädlichkeit," Leipzig, 1803, 8vo; in which, however, the practice is not wholly rejected. These writers have been led to make their objections, by seeing the frequent abuse of private communions, by knowing that they are frequently resorted to from pride, or from some superstitious ideas with regard to their efficacy. Hence they have been led to maintain, that it is essential in order to a right celebration of the Lord's Supper, that it should be held in common by the mixed society of Christians constituting a church, and that Private Communions cannot be regarded as constituting the Lord's Supper.

This opinion, however, has been justly rejected by many theologians; e. g. by Dœderlein. The following reasons have been urged against it; viz.

(a) It is doubtless true, that in the Apostolic Church, the Lord's Supper was commonly and regularly celebrated in the *public* assemblies of Christians; 1 Cor. 11: 20—34. And this must always remain the rule, from which there can be no exception in respect to those Christians, who are able to attend the public meetings, but who refuse so to do, either from pride or self-will. There may, however, be an exception made in behalf of Christians, who are necessarily detained from attending on the public ordinances of divine service; e. g. in the case of sick persons. And it would be, as Morus well remarks, inconsistent with the rule of love, which is one of the chief commands of Christ, if sick persons should be prevented from partaking of the Lord's Supper in their own houses.

(b) A *public place* cannot be made essential to the proper observance of the Lord's Supper, for it was held at its first institution in a private house; nor is the number of Christians present at all important, since it was first celebrated only by a select few of the five hundred disciples of Christ then living; but every thing depends upon the feelings and character of the communicants. The Christian who in this act commemorates the death of Jesus, professes his relation to the Church, and forms pious resolves and purposes, —he truly celebrates the Lord's Supper, whether he performs this act in public or private.

(c) Even in a private dwelling, a profession may be made, by this act of faith in the death of Christ, before the teacher and others present; 1 Cor. xi.; and persons not present still learn, that such a profession has been made. This object of the Lord's Supper is therefore attained, even by the private celebration of it. There was a regulation among the Bohemian Brethren in the the fifteenth century (about the year 1461), that when a sick person desired the Lord's Supper, other members of the Church should partake of it with him, *in order that it might be a true Communion*;—an example which is worthy of imitation! And even among us this might be done without great notoriety, by admitting the near relations, acquaintances, or friends of the sick person, or those occupying the same house; and they, too, might perhaps receive a salutary impression from such a celebration of this ordinance. The assertion of Less, that private communions were unheard of in earlier Christian antiquity, is not true. Justin the Martyr says (Apol. 2), "that the Deacons first distributed bread and wine to those present, and then carried it to the absent."

III. Unessential rites in the administration of the Supper.

It is important that the Lord's Supper, so far as it is an *external rite*, should be so administered, as to distinguish it from common and ordinary repasts, as a special festival in commemoration of Christ. This is called by Paul, 2 Cor. 11: 19, *διακρίνειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου*. This may indeed be done without any external ceremonies; and it cannot therefore be said, that such external rites and usages are essential to the ordinance. Still it is wise and adapted to promote the ends for which the Supper was instituted, to employ such external solemnities, as will remind the communicants of

the great object of this festival, and give it an obvious and marked distinction from other meals. Here, however, caution must be used, lest superstition should be encouraged by the introduction of these ceremonies, and they should be supposed to possess some special power.

Christ distinguished this ordinance from the Passover which immediately preceded, by offering up a prayer of thanks (ἐυχαριστήσας or εὐλογήσας), which was probably one of the brief thanksgivings common among the Jews, as neither of the Evangelists have thought necessary to record the words. He then stated briefly the object of this ordinance. In both of these particulars, the example of Christ is properly followed in the administration of the Supper. It is customary to offer thanks to God, briefly to state the object of this ordinance, and thus solemnly set apart the bread and wine to this sacred use; vid. 1 Cor. 10: 16, ποτήριον εὐλογίας, ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν, i. e. the wine in the cup, which we consecrate to this use by the prayer of thanks. It is also said elsewhere respecting those who thank God for the enjoyment of other food, that they partake of it μετ' εὐλογίας, 1 Tim. 4: 5. Luke 9: 16.

This solemn opening of the Supper with prayer and reference to the command of Jesus, is called *Consecration*, and is proper and according to the will of Christ. *Consecration*, therefore, in the Lord's Supper consists properly in a solemn reference to the object of the Supper, and in the devout prayer accompanying this; and not in the repetition of the words, *this is my body and this is my blood*. These words are uttered merely in order to make the nature and object of the ordinance then to be celebrated properly understood; so our symbolical books uniformly teach. Hence these words were frequently repeated by Christ during the celebration of the ordinance, and were used alternately with other expressions. This Consecration is not to be supposed to possess any magical or miraculous power. Nothing like this was attributed to this rite by the older Church fathers, who used *consecrare* as synonymous with ἀγιάζειν and *sanctificare*, to set apart from a common, and consecrate to a sacred use. By degrees, however, a magical effect was attributed to consecration, and it was supposed to possess a peculiar power. This was the case even with Augustine. And when afterwards the doctrine of transubstantiation prevailed in the Romish Church, it was supposed that the change in the elements was effected by pro-

nouncing over them the blessing, and especially the words of Christ, *this is my body*, etc.

Besides this, there are various other contingent and arbitrary usages, some of which are good, and adapted to promote the ends of this ordinance, and others are extremely liable to become perverted into means of superstition. More full information on this point may be obtained from Christian Antiquities. Many of the rites introduced by the Romish Church have been retained in the Lutheran Church, such as the singing of the words of consecration, the marking of the bread and wine with the cross, the holding a cloth beneath, etc. These and other usages originated for the most part in the doctrine of transubstantiation, and the extravagant opinions respecting the external holiness of the symbols resulting from this doctrine. They admit, however, of a good explanation; and where they are customary, and must be retained, they ought to be so explained by the religious teacher. *Marking with the cross*, e. g. should remind us, that this ordinance is held in commemoration of Christ crucified; etc.

§ 145. *Of the uses and the efficacy of the Lord's Supper; and inferences from these.*

We must here presuppose much of what was said, § 140, respecting Baptism. The uses and efficacy of the Lord's Supper, as of Baptism, are twofold; viz. *external* and *internal*, and may be easily deduced from the design of this ordinance as stated, § 143.

I. External uses and efficacy.

By celebrating the Lord's Supper, a person publicly professes himself to be a member of the external Christian Church, and as such receives and holds all the rights belonging to Christians, to the enjoyment of which he is introduced by baptism. For Christ enjoined this sacred duty only upon his followers. Every one, therefore, who partakes of the Lord's Supper, by so doing professes,

that he is a real member of the external Church, that he believes in Christ, and yields him reverence. Hence Paul says, 1 Cor. 10: 16, that bread and wine are *κοινωνία αἵματος καὶ σώματος Χριστοῦ*. Paul here, and in this whole passage, teaches, that the symbols (bread and wine) stand in the most intimate connexion with the body of Christ slain on the Cross for our sins, and are the means by which we become partakers of the benefits of this death, and testify our interest in them. The meaning is: Whoever celebrates the Lord's Supper becomes partaker of the body and blood of Christ, and professes the same; or, by this ordinance he gives it to be understood, that he believes in Christ, and especially that he believes, that Christ offered up his body and shed his blood for him; and he thus becomes partaker of the benefits of this sacrifice. The terms, *κοινωνοὶ θυσιαστηρίου*, spoken of those offering sacrifice, v. 18, of the same chapter; also *κοινωνοὶ δαιμονίων*, v. 20, are used in the same way, and are explained v. 21, by the phrase *μετέχειν τραπέζης Κυρίου καὶ δαιμονίων*. The opposite of this is seen v. 14, "flee idolatry," have no fellowship with idolaters! and v. 17, "while we all eat of one and the same bread (a portion of which is broken for each), we profess to be all members of one body," i. e. of one Church. The same is taught by the passage 1 Cor. 11: 26, "for as often as ye partake of the Lord's Supper, *τὸν θάνατον Κυρίου καταγγέλλετε*," i. e. you thus profess yourselves to be of the number of those, who believe that Christ died for the salvation of man.

II. Internal uses and efficacy.

(1) With regard to the effects of the Lord's Supper, as well as of Baptism, there were various mistakes, even among the earlier fathers; vid. § 140, II. The opinion is very ancient, that the Holy Spirit so unites himself with the symbols when they are consecrated, that they are transmuted (*μεταστοιχειοῦσθαι, trans-elementari*) into an entirely different element, become the body and blood of Christ, and possess a power and efficacy, which cannot be expected from mere bread and wine. These thoughts occur even in the Apostolic Constitutions, in Irenæus, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basilus the Great, Ambrosius, and others. It was on this account, that the invocation (*ἐπίκλησις*) of the Holy Spirit was introduced in many places before the holding of the Supper; vid. Morus p. 202,

n. 2, 6. They say also, that the bread and wine, through the invocation of the name of Christ, and by the power of the same, are sanctified, so that they no more continue what they were, but receive a special spiritual and divine power. So say, e. g. Theodotus, (as quoted by Clemens of Alexandria,) Tertullian, and others. Hence we often find in the ancient liturgies, both oriental and occidental, frequent invocations of the Holy Spirit of God and of Christ, in which they were entreated to unite themselves with the bread and wine, and to communicate to them this power.

At a very early period, therefore, a kind of magical and miraculous effect was ascribed to this ordinance, and it was supposed that as an external act it has a mechanical agency, not only upon the *soul*, for the remission of guilt and punishment, but also upon the *body*. It is very often said by some of the fathers after the fourth century, in conformity with this latter opinion, that this sacrament has power to heal the sick, to secure one against magical arts and the assaults of the Devil, and even to effect the salvation of the souls of those who are dead. Hence originated the *missæ pro defunctis*, and innumerable other superstitious opinions and practices, which fruitfully multiplied, especially in the Western Church, during the dark ages, and which were then brought by the schoolmen into a formal system.

(2) This magical or mechanical efficacy is never ascribed in the New Testament to the Lord's Supper. The opinion that man obtains faith, remission of sin, and new spiritual power, merely by the external celebration of this ordinance, as an *opus operatum*, and by an external participation in the sacramental symbols, without being himself active in repentance and faith, receives no countenance from the sacred writers. The same is true respecting baptism and the other means of grace. The efficacy of the Lord's Supper upon the human heart, stands in intimate connexion with the divine Word, and with the power inherent in the truths of the Christian doctrine. Without the knowledge and the proper use of the Word of God, this ordinance, in itself considered, and as an external rite, has no efficacy. And so the effect which the Lord's Supper has upon the human heart, is not magical, miraculous, and irresistible, but in accordance with our moral nature; exactly as we have represented it to be with baptism, § 140, coll. Art. XII. § 133.

It is therefore truly said, that the Holy Spirit acts upon the

hearts of men through the Supper, or through the bread and wine, and that he, by this means, produces faith and pious dispositions. But he produces this effect through the Word, or through the truths of Christianity, exhibited before us and presented to us in this ordinance. The effect of the Lord's Supper is, therefore, an effect which is produced by God and Christ, through his Word, or the truths of his doctrine, and the use of the same. In the sacrament of the Supper, the most important truths of Christianity, which we commonly only hear or read, are visibly set before us, made cognizable to the senses, and exhibited in such a way as powerfully to move the feelings, and make an indelible impression on the memory. Hence this sacrament is justly called *verbum Dei* VISIBLE. Some of the most weighty doctrines of Religion, which are commonly taught us by *audible words*, through the outward ear, are here inculcated by *external visible signs and actions*.

Among the doctrines more especially exhibited in the Lord's Supper, is the doctrine of the redemption of man by the death of Christ, and the universal love of God shining forth from this event (Rom. 8: 32. John 3: 16), and all the duties both to Christ and our fellow men, which result from it. The contemplation and application of these important truths, to which we are excited by the Lord's Supper, awaken in the hearts of pious Christians the deepest love and gratitude to God and Christ, and a readiness to comply cordially with their requirements. And it is only when we possess this disposition and this temper of mind, that we are truly susceptible of the influences of divine grace through the Word, §§ 130, 131; it is then only that we can expect to enjoy that special presence and aid of Christ, which he has promised at his Supper; vid. § 143, ad finem. These are the things, which, according to the Scriptures, are essential to the proper efficacy of the Lord's Supper; and we need not trouble ourselves with inquiries respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the symbols.—Hence it appears that the internal efficacy of the Lord's Supper, or of the Word of God through the Supper, is two-fold.

FIRST. This ordinance is the means of exciting and strengthening the *faith* of one who worthily celebrates it, so far as he refers to the divine promises, and stands firm in the conviction of their certain fulfilment; vid. § 123. For we are reminded by this ordinance,

(a) Of the *death* of Christ. He instituted this ordinance on the day of his death, and the breaking of the bread and pouring out of the wine, represent the violence done to his body, and the shedding of his blood; vid. § 144, I. 1.

(b) Of the *causes* and the salutary results of his death,—the founding of a new dispensation, the forgiveness of sins, and our title to everlasting happiness; vid. Heb. 8: 6, sq.

(c) Of the special guidance and assistance which Christ has promised to his disciples until the end of the world; vid. § 143, ad finem.

(d) Any one who from the heart believes these great truths of Christianity, obtains, in the Lord's Supper, the personal appropriation of these benefits procured through Christ's death, i. e. he receives in the Lord's Supper the most solemn assurance and pledge, that Christ shed his blood *for him* and *on his account*, and that *he therefore may participate in all the salutary results of his death*.

This is the *κοινωνία αἵματος* and *σώματος Χριστοῦ*, 1 Cor. 10: 16, or the spiritual enjoyment of the body and blood of Christ. It should be as certain to us, as that we see the bread and wine, that Christ died for us, and that he still cares for us, as he did formerly for his disciples while he was upon the earth, and still promotes our eternal welfare. This is the true, inward enjoyment, which may be experienced at the table of the Lord.

SECONDLY. In this way does this ordinance contribute to maintain and promote piety among believers. The contemplation of the death of Christ, of its causes, and the great and beneficial results which flow from it, fills our hearts with gratitude and love to God and Christ, and makes us disposed and ready to obey his precepts. In this frame we are prepared to enjoy those divine influences upon our hearts, and that assistance of Christ, which it is promised we shall enjoy at the Lord's Supper.

Again; Christ inculcates the love of God and the love of our neighbour, as the two great precepts of his doctrine. Of both these duties we are reminded by this sacred rite, and derive from it new motives to perform them. All Christians, without distinction, are required to participate in this rite;—high and low, rich and poor, to eat in common of one bread, and drink of one cup. As followers of Jesus, they are all brethren, and all equal, and mutually bound to live in peace, friendship, and brotherly love. All share equally in

the rights which Christ purchased for them. Christ is the Lord and Master of them all, and is the same yesterday, to day, and forever. Cf. 1 Cor. 10: 17. 12: 13, "For whether we be Jews or Greeks, bond or free, we are all baptized into one body, and made to drink into one Spirit (*ἐποτίσθημεν*)," i. e. we partake of one festival, so that we compose but one Church (*εἰς ἓν σῶμα*), and are mutually obligated to cherish the most cordial brotherly love and harmony of feeling, *ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματος*. Cf. 1 Cor. 6: 17. Eph. 4: 3, 4.—It was one object even of the Mosaic sacrificial feasts, to bind more strongly the band of friendship and brotherly love among the Israelites. But here we have *κρείττονες ἐπαγγελίαι*. Vid. § 143, I. 3.

From these remarks respecting the object and efficacy of the Lord's Supper, several important *practical consequences* may be derived.

(1) Whoever partakes of the Lord's Supper, takes upon himself the sacred obligation, to live in all respects conformably to the rule given in the Gospel, and there made the condition of enjoying the salutary consequences of the atoning death of Jesus. Theologians therefore say, that in enjoying the Lord's Supper, a covenant is made with God; since man engages, on his side, to yield obedience to the divine precepts, and God, on his part, promises, assures, and actually imparts to men his benefits; as it is in baptism, § 140, *ad finem*.

(2) Since the uses and the effects of the Lord's Supper are not magical, miraculous, or irresistible, but entirely adapted to the moral nature of man; he only can derive the proper benefits from this rite, who falls in with the moral order above mentioned. Therefore,

(3) Whoever devoutly contemplates the great truths of salvation represented and made present to us in the Lord's Supper, and suffers himself to be excited by these means to feelings of lively gratitude to God, to diligence in the pursuit of holiness, and to a truly Christian temper in all respects; he fulfils, on his part, the design of this rite. It follows from this, of course, that this festival in commemoration of the death of Christ, can be properly celebrated only in the exercise of a grateful heart, and of pious reverence.

But on the other side, the communicant must endeavour to remove from his mind all *superstitious fear* and *scrupulous anxiety* about this ordinance. These fears are often cherished by the in-

cautious expressions which religious teachers sometimes use ; and even by theologians has this rite been called *TREMENDUM MYSTERIUM*. Reverence and love for God do, indeed, go together ; and in *this sense* such representations are proper. But anxiety and slavish fear are inconsistent with love. 1 John 4: 18, *φόβος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ*. The celebration of this festival should rather be a cheerful occasion ; and it should promote pious and thankful joy, since it brings to our mind an event so fraught with happy consequences for us.

What Paul says on this subject, 1 Cor. 11: 27—29 and 34, is very true, but often misunderstood. He speaks here of the external conduct of the communicants, so far as it indicates his internal disposition or state of heart. Many of the Corinthians partook of the Lord's Supper, without thinking at all of its great object. They did not regard it as a religious rite ; but rather as a common meal (*μὴ διακρίνοντες σῶμα Κυρίου*, v. 29). They permitted themselves those disorders and excesses, in which many think it right to indulge at common meals,—quarrels, gluttony, drunkenness, etc. ; vs. 17—22. This is called by Paul *ἀναξίως ἔσθιεν καὶ πίνευ*, i. e. *indecore, in an unbecoming, improper manner*, so as to shew by one's conduct an irreligious disposition, an indifference with regard to this important rite, and a contempt for it. Paul pronounces this to be in the highest degree *wrong* and therefore *deserving of punishment*, *ἔνοχος ἔσται σώματος καὶ αἵματος Κυρίου*, v. 27 ; i. e. *worthy of punishment on account of the body and blood of Christ undervalued by him ;* and v. 29 (coll. v. 34) *χοίμα ἐαυτοῦ ἔσθιει καὶ πίνει*, he draws upon himself divine judgments, on account of his improper observance of this ordinance.

(4) The observance of the Lord's Supper does not require, therefore, in the pious Christian, any severe and anxious *preparation* ; he may partake of it at any time with advantage, as he may at any time die happily. And the unconverted man has no other exercises and preparations to go through, than those which in general he must go through, in order to his conversion (*μετάνοια*). It is with reason, however, that Paul makes it the duty of every Christian, carefully to examine his feelings and his conduct, before approaching the table of Christ. 1 Cor. 11: 28, *δοκιμαζέτω ἄνθρωπος ἐαυτὸν, καὶ οὕτως* (i. e. after he has examined himself) *ἐκ τοῦ ἁγίου ἔσθιέτω*, cf. v. 31. The meaning is : ' let him examine himself to see,

whether he approaches the Lord's Supper with pious feelings, really designing to do what this action implies,' viz. make a profession of the death of Christ in the fullest sense of this term.

Note. Times for *Confession*, or rather for *preparation* for the Lord's Supper, may and should be employed for the purpose of this personal self-examination. These occasions should also be improved for the purpose of showing the evils which result from a thoughtless partaking of the sacramental Supper; according to 1 Cor. xi. It must not, however, be said, that every unconverted man receives the Lord's Supper to his own eternal condemnation. This is not a scriptural doctrine; vid. 1 Cor. 11: 32. Nor does it belong to the teacher, to exclude any one from this ordinance, because he regards him as unconverted, even supposing him to have power so to do; vid. § 144, II. It is his duty, however, to warn such a person, and represent to him his case, as Paul does, 1 Cor. xi.

(5) *How often should the Lord's Supper be celebrated?* Christ gave no definite precepts on this point, and this was very wise. Every thing mechanical, confined to a particular time or a particular place, is contrary to the spirit of Christianity. Christ has therefore left it for every Christian to determine, according to his conscientious conviction and judgment, how often he will freely repeat this solemn observance. And thus in this respect also, does this Christian ordinance differ from the passover and other religious ceremonies of the Israelites. It is to be expected of every sincere Christian, that finding how salutary these communion seasons are in their influence upon him, he will welcome their return, and wish them to be often repeated. But to the question, *how often*, no answer, from the nature of the case, can be given, which will apply to every individual. In the early Christian Church, they were accustomed to celebrate the Lord's Supper almost *daily*. But the too frequent repetition of this ordinance, will be apt to produce coldness and indifference with regard to it. This perhaps had been the case in Corinth; cf. 1 Cor. 11: 20—30. The zeal with which this ordinance was first observed gradually abated, and for this reason, among others, that but few good fruits were seen to result from it. At the time of Chrysostom and Augustine, the observance of the Supper had become far less frequent. Between the sixth and eighth centuries it was customary, especially in the Western Church, for every Christian to commune at least three times during the year; and this was even established as a rule by many ec-

clesiastical Councils. In the Protestant Church, no laws have been passed on this subject ; and this is as it should be.

§ 146. *The various opinions and forms of doctrine respecting the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper, historically explained ; and also a Critique respecting them.*

I. History of opinions respecting the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper.

(1) It may be remarked in general, that the opinions of the ancients on this subject, from the first establishment of the Christian Church until the eighth century, were very diverse. After the eighth century, there were some controversies respecting the *mode and manner* of this presence of Christ ; and in the thirteenth century, one of the many theories on this subject was established as orthodox. The Church fathers in the first centuries agreed on many points relating to this matter, and on other points differed, without however, mutually casting upon each other the reproach of heterodoxy.

The first germs of the Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Calvinistic theories are found already in their writings ; but it was not until a later period, that they were developed, and new consequences deduced from them. We cannot, therefore, conclude, when we meet with expressions in the ancient fathers which sound like those which are used in our own times, that they adopted the *whole theory* of one or the other modern party. Their ideas are so vague, their expressions so indefinite and unsettled, that each of the dissenting parties in modern times, may frequently discover passages, even in the same father, which seem to favor its own particular theory.

In the sixteenth century, when the Catholics, Lutherans, and the Reformed theologians were in controversy with each other on this point, each party collected passages from the fathers, in order to show the antiquity of its own theory ; thus Melancthon in opposi-

tion to Oecolampadius, and the latter against the former. In the seventeenth century, many controversial books passed back and forth between the learned Roman Catholic theologians of France and the Reformed theologians of France and the Netherlands, in which Nicole, Arnaud, and others, endeavoured to prove on one side the antiquity of the doctrine of transubstantiation; and Albertinus, Claude, Blondell, Laroque, and others, attempted on the other side to secure the authority of the ancients in behalf of the doctrine of the Reformed Church. Ernesti also, in his *Antimuratorius* (Opus. Theol. p. 1, sq.), has collected many passages from the ancients in behalf of the Lutheran theory, and in opposition to *transubstantiation*, etc; also in his "Brevis repetitio et assertio sententiæ Lutheranæ de præsentia corporis et sanguinis Christi in sacra cœna," (Opus. Theol. p. 135, sq.), which is one of the most important modern works on the Lutheran side. It was called forth by Heumann's "Proof that the doctrine of the Reformed Church respecting the Lord's Supper is correct and true," Eisleben, 1764.—It is a very easy matter, however, for any one to find his own ideas expressed in the vague and indefinite phraseology of the fathers. The testimony of the sacred writers in favor of the essential part of the doctrine of the Lutheran Church has been exhibited partly by Ernesti, and partly by Storr, in a very plain and lucid, though brief manner, in his "Doctrinæ Christianæ pars theoretica," p. 305—318.

[The later works of most value on this department of historical theology, are Phil. Marheinecke, *Sanctorum Patrum de præsentia Christi in cœna Domini, sententia triplex*, Heidelberg, 1811, 4to.—Neander, *Kirch. Geschichte*, B. I. Abth. II. S. 577—596. Abth. III. S. 1084.—B. II. Abth. II. S. 697—712. Abth. III. S. 1394. Cf. Gieseler, B. I. § 96. B. II. §§ 15, 17.—A full account of the literature of this doctrine, in all periods, may be found in Hahn's *Lehrbuch*, S. 570, ff.; also in Bretschneider's *Syst. Entw.* S. 728, ff.—Tr.]

(2) *Sketch of the History of this doctrine from the second to the ninth century.*

(a) The fathers of the second century proceeded on the principle, which is in itself true, that the Lord's Supper must be considered as entirely different from an ordinary repast. Justin the Martyr says (Apol. I. 66), οὐ κοινὸς ἄρτος, οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα. They however entertained, even at that early period, many ideas respect-

ing this ordinance, which have no scriptural authority. Neither in the writings of the Apostles, nor in the words of Christ, is there any trace of the opinion, that a certain supernatural and divine power is imparted, in a miraculous and magical way, to the symbols, and that in this manner the Lord's Supper exerts an agency upon men. But this opinion, (which resembles that entertained by many respecting the water in baptism,) is found very frequently in the writings of Justin, Irenæus (iv. 34), Clemens of Alexandria, and other fathers even of the second and third centuries; and it is entirely in accordance with the spirit and taste of that age, which beheld everywhere something magical and mysterious, and could not be contented unless it found something surpassing comprehension. In order to express their opinion, that the bread and wine are *changed* by the divine power, or by the Holy Spirit, and thus obtain a new virtue and efficacy, totally different from that which naturally belongs to them, they used the terms μεταβάλλεσθαι, μεταβολή, μεταμορφοῦσθαι, μεταστοιχειοῦσθαι, μεταστοιχείωσις, μεταποίησις.

Still they did not suppose any such change in the elements, that they cease to be bread and wine; i. e. they did not believe in *transubstantiation*, in the proper sense of the term: neither does the Grecian Church, which employs these terms, especially μεταβολή, but still opposes the doctrine of the Romish Church. Some of the fathers understood these terms in a perfectly just sense, and meant only to say, that the bread and wine cease, by consecration, to be *common* bread and wine.

(b) Again; it was maintained, that the *Word of God* (λόγος θεοῦ) is added to the bread and wine, thus ennobled and endowed with divine power. If by the Word of God is meant the *Christian doctrine*, it is very true that the efficacy of the Lord's Supper is connected with it, and depends upon it; vid. § 145. So it was understood by many of the ancient fathers, e. g. Irenæus. But some of them understood by ὁ λόγος, *the divine nature of Christ*. And from the fact that this Logos was united with the man Jesus and his human body, they were led to the idea, that after the same manner he is united with the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper. And they endeavoured to illustrate this union of Christ with the sacramental bread and wine, from the union of the two natures in his person.

In this comparison which was made by Justin the Martyr, we

find the true origin of the doctrine concerning the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the elements on his Table; vid. Mornis p. 263, n. 4. According to this view, Christ is present in a supernatural way in the symbols, and in an entirely different manner from that in which, according to his promise, he is everywhere present with his disciples, until the end of the world.

(c) After this period, the idea became more and more current, that communicants, in partaking of the visible bread and wine, also partake of the invisible body and blood of Christ. Especially did this idea prevail after the fourth century. Thus e.g. Gregory of Nyssa affirms, "that as the body of Christ, by his union with the Logos, was so changed and transformed, as to become participator in his divine glory; so also the sacramental bread εἰς σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον μεταποιεῖται." Chrysostom and Cyrill of Jerusalem also say, that we must believe the divine declaration, that we receive the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, although this may seem to be opposed to the evidence of our senses.

But although this doctrine seems to approach very nearly to transubstantiation, these fathers did not yet teach that there is any change of the elements, by which they lose their own nature, and cease to be bread and wine; on the contrary, they often taught in other passages, that the elements retain their own natural properties, that when partaken of by us they become assimilated to the nature of our bodies, that in the Supper we do not receive the *natural* body of Christ, but only the significant signs of it, that we ought not to stop short with the mere sign, but to turn our thoughts to that which is signified and imparted by it. There are many passages of this import in the writings of Origen, of Augustine, Theodoret, and others.

But in subsequent periods, the conceptions which prevailed on this subject, even in the Grecian Church, became more and more gross and sensual; as appears from the writings of John of Damascus in the eighth century, and others. Still the opinion, that the consecrated bread and wine *lose their substance* was not received in the Greek Church; nor is it known among them to the present day, although they employ the term μεταβολή to denote the change. Vid. Kiesling, Hist. concertationum Græcor. et. Latinor. de transubst. Leip. 1754.

(3) *History of this doctrine from the ninth to the sixteenth century in the Western Church.*

It is known from Beda Venerabilis, that during the eighth century, there were violent contests in the Western Church respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper, and on the question, *how* the elements are changed. And even at that time, they began to give various explanations of the passages found in the writings of the earlier Latin and Greek fathers on this subject. After the ninth century, the tone and taste which began to prevail made it certain, that of different theories on any theological point, that which is the most gross and material would gain the predominance.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the following opinion, first distinctly advocated by Paschasius Radbertus, a Monk at Corvey, in the ninth century, should have received so general approbation; viz. "that after the Consecration of the bread and wine, nothing but their *form* remains, their substance being wholly changed, so that they are no longer bread and wine, but the body and blood of Christ. Their form continues, that no one may take offence at seeing Christians eating human flesh and blood."

This doctrine was not, indeed, current at that time; for it caused much commotion, and was strongly opposed by the Monk Ratramnus and John Scotus Erigena, and many others. They did not deny the *presence* of the body and blood of Christ; but they taught that this *conversio* or *immutatio* of the bread and wine, is not of a *carnal*, but a *spiritual* nature; that these elements are not transmuted into the real body and blood of Christ, but are *signs* or *symbols* of them. In many points they approximated to the opinion of the Reformed theologians.

As yet the Councils and Popes had determined nothing on this subject. In the meanwhile, the doctrine of Paschasius became more and more general, during the tenth and eleventh centuries. When therefore, Berengarius of Tours, in the eleventh century, attacked this doctrine, he was strongly resisted, and obliged to take back his opinion. He denied any transmutation of the elements; but maintained, that the bread and wine are more than mere *symbols*, and that the body and blood of Christ are really present in the Lord's Supper. In short, he took a middle course between Paschasius and Scotus, and came very near, in the main points of his doctrine, to the Lutheran hypothesis. Vid. Lessing's Work, Berengarius von Tours, Braunschweig, 1770, 4to.

After the twelfth century, the theory of Paschasius was farther developed by the schoolmen, and carried out into its results. Even Peter of Lombardy, in the twelfth century, declared himself in behalf of this opinion, although he still speaks somewhat doubtfully respecting it. The inventor of the word *transubstantiatio* is supposed to be Hildebert, Bishop of Mans, in the eleventh century. Before him, however, the phrase *commutatio panis in substantiam Christi* had been used by Fulbert, Bishop of Chartres. This term became current in the twelfth century, through the influence of Peter of Blois. It was not, however, until the thirteenth century, that this dogma became universally prevalent in the Romish Church. At the IV. *Concilium Lateranense*, 1215, under Pope Innocent III., it was established as the doctrine of the Church, and confirmed by the Council at Trent, in the sixteenth century, in opposition to the Protestants. According to this doctrine, this transmutation is produced by the *sacerdotal consecration*. Vid. Calixtus, *De transubstantiatione*, Helmstädt, 1675.

(4) *Principal opinions respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, among the Protestant theologians since the Reformation.*

There were three forms of doctrine on this subject, which for many centuries had prevailed in the Western Church; viz. (a) the theory of *transubstantiation*, advanced by Paschasius Radbertus, which afterwards became the prevailing doctrine of the Church; (b) the theory, that the bread and wine are *merely symbols* of the body and blood of Christ, advocated principally by Joh. Scotus Eriгена; (c) a theory which takes a middle course between the other two, maintaining that the body and blood of Christ are actually present in the sacramental elements, but without any transmutation of their substance; supported by Berengarius in the eleventh century. These theories continued, though under various modifications, after the sixteenth century, and were designated by the characteristic words, *transubstantiatio*, *figura*, *unio*. The Greek Church still adhered to its old word *μεταβολή*.

Both the German and Swiss reformers were agreed in rejecting the doctrine of transubstantiation, as wholly unfounded. In this too they were agreed, that the body and blood of Christ are really present in the sacramental elements, and are imparted to the communicant, when he partakes of the bread and wine; since Christ is

near to all whom he counts his own, imparts himself to them, counsels and guides them.

But in explaining the manner of this presence, they differed from each other. Luther had a great attachment to many of the scholastic opinions and distinctions, and at first entertained a very high idea of clerical power and the preeminence of the Priesthood. He therefore retained the doctrine of the schoolmen *de præsentia reali et substantiali*, in such a way, however, as to exclude transubstantiation. His doctrine at first was, that “*in, with, and under (in, cum, and sub,* terms which he took from Bernhard) the consecrated bread and wine, the true and *essential* body and blood of Christ are imparted to the communicant, and are received by him; although in a manner inexplicable by us, and altogether mysterious.” He held, therefore, that the body of Christ, which in its very essence is present in the sacred symbols, is received by the communicant, not *spiritually* merely, but (and here is the point of difference between him and the Swiss Reformers) *realiter et substantialiter*; so that both believing and unbelieving communicants, partake of the real, substantial body and blood of Christ;—the former to their salvation, the latter to their condemnation. The bread and wine are visibly and naturally received; the body and blood of Christ, invisibly and supernaturally; and this is the *unio sacramentalis*, such as takes place only in this sacrament. In one passage he explains this *unio sacramentalis* by the image of heated iron; and in employing this illustration, borders close upon the error of *Consubstantiation*. He says also, that what the bread and wine do or suffer, the same is done or suffered by the body and blood of Christ,—they are broken, distributed, poured out, etc. By degrees, however, he abandoned these views, and was content with affirming the *real presence* of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, and with an indefinite *manducatione orali*.

The doctrine of the Swiss theologians, on the contrary, as exhibited by Calvin, who in some respects modified the view of Zuingle, was this: “the body and blood of Christ are not, *as to their substance*, present in the sacramental elements, but only *as to power and effect*; they are *vere et efficaciter* represented under the bread and wine; *dari non substantiam corporis Christi in sacra cæna, sed omnia quæ in suo corpore nobis beneficia præstitit.*” Accordingly the body and blood of Christ are not present *in space*, and are

not *orally* received by communicants, but *spiritually*, with a kind of *manducatio spiritualis*. Zuingli, however, maintained that the bread and wine are *mere* symbols of the body and blood of Christ, and seemed wholly to reject the idea of his real presence in these symbols. Many of the Reformed theologians did not therefore at first assent to Calvin's doctrine, and many even subsequently adhered to that of Zuingli.

Calvin, then, designed to take a middle course between Luther and Zuingli. Luther appealed to the words in which this rite was instituted, especially to *ἐστί*. He referred also to the divine omnipotence, by which the body of Christ might be made substantially present in many places at once; cf. Morus p. 266, § 8. This was wholly denied by the Swiss theologians, as being contradictory. They contended, also, that there is no occasion or use for this substantial presence and communication of the body and blood of Christ; since it cannot contribute to make one more virtuous, pious, or holy. With regard to *ἐστί* they remarked, that according to common use even in the New Testament, it often means *to signify, show forth*; vid. § 143; and the subject here requires, that it should be so understood, since otherwise Christ is made to say what is untrue.

Luther, however, adhered to his opinion, especially after it became the subject of controversy. Melancthon was more calm and impartial, and wished to promote peace between the two parties. He therefore took the ground, especially after Luther's death, that it is better merely to affirm the *presence* and *agency* of Christ in the sacred symbols, without attempting minutely to define and limit the manner of this presence. He was not favorable either to the *præsentia corporalis Christi*, or to the *manducatio oralis*, but only affirmed *præsentiam realem et efficacem Christi in sacra cæna*. He therefore chose a middle way between Luther and Zuingli, and very nearly agreed with Calvin, who also pursued this middle course.

Many of the more moderate Lutheran theologians agreed with Melancthon, and seemed with him to incline to the side of Calvin. On the other hand the zealots for the Lutheran theory insisted upon all the distinctions which Luther adopted, and even on some points went farther than Luther himself. But in the electorate of Saxony the party of Melancthon became more and more numerous, and af-

ter his death, the dreadful Crypto-Calvinistic controversies and persecutions broke out (A. D. 1571).

These and other controversies and disorders in the Lutheran Church, and the necessity of doing something to establish the Lutheran form of doctrine, led to the adoption of the *Formula of Concord*, in the year 1577, which was then made a standard of faith, and adopted as an authorized symbol. In this, the most minute boundary lines are drawn between the theories of the Lutheran and the Reformed church, by applying the new distinctions introduced into the doctrine of the union of the two natures in Christ, and the *communicatio idiomatum*; vid. § 103, II. and § 104. The Lutheran theologians of that period, especially Andreä, Chemnitz, and their followers, endeavoured to show, by the theory of the intimate union of the two natures in Christ, and the *communicatio idiomatum* resulting from it, how Christ, as God-man, might be everywhere present, even as to his bodily nature, and that therefore he might be present at the sacrament of the Supper, and might unite himself with the elements, and through them with the communicants, and thus act upon them. This doctrine was called *ubiquitatem corporis Christi*, and the advocates of it were named contemptuously by their opponents *Ubiquitistæ*. The manner of the union of the body of Christ with the bread and wine, was declared to be a mystery (*mysterium unionis sacramentalis*). And on this account the framers of the *Formula of Concord* would not decide positively of what nature it is, but only negatively, what it is not. It is not a *personal union*, as it is explained to be by many of the older fathers, vid. No. 2; nor is it *consubstantiatio*; still less is it a union in which a change of the substance is effected (*transubstantiatio*); nor is it a union in which the body and blood of Christ are included in the bread and wine (*impanatio*); but of an entirely different nature from any of these mentioned, and one which exists only in this sacrament, and therefore called *sacramentalis*. Cf. Plank, *Geschichte des protestantischen Lehrbegriffs bis zur Einführung der Concordienformel*.

But these fine distinctions established in the *Formula of Concord*, were never universally adopted in the Lutheran Church. And especially in those places where this Formula had no symbolic authority, were its subtleties rejected. Many of the Lutheran theologians are more inclined to the moderate theory of Melancthon, or

rather have approximated towards it. Morus truly remarks (p. 268, n. A.), that the whole theory established in the *Formula of Concord* respecting the omnipresence of the *human* nature of Christ, from the union of natures in his person, is *justo subtilior*.

II. Critical remarks on these different hypotheses.

(1) All the different theories here stated are attended with difficulties. Transubstantiation contradicts the testimony of our senses, and has no scriptural authority, since these symbols are called in the Scriptures *bread* and *wine*, and are therefore supposed to have the substance of bread and wine.

With regard to Luther's theory, there is the difficulty abovementioned, that there appears to be no object or use in the substantial or corporeal presence of Christ; though this objection in itself is by no means decisive, since there are many things whose utility we cannot understand, which are yet useful. But besides this, there are other objections to the Lutheran theory. If the substantial body and blood of Christ are present in the sacramental elements, and are received by the communicants, how it might be asked,

(a) Could Christ, at the institution of the Supper, give his real body to his disciples, to be eaten by them, and his real blood to be drunken by them, while they saw this body before their eyes, and he, yet alive, sat with them at table?

(b) How can the body of Christ be present, as to its very substance, in more than one place at the same time? and what object is answered by such a supposition? The conclusions deduced from the doctrine of the union of natures, afford no satisfactory answer to these questions.

(c) How can the theory of the substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ, and of their being eaten and drunken by communicants, be reconciled with the words in which this supper was instituted? For Christ did not speak of his body then living upon the earth, which they saw before their eyes, and of the blood flowing in it; still less of his glorified body in heaven; but of his body slain on the cross (*ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον*), and of his blood there shed (*αἷμα ἐκχυνόμενον*). If therefore the substantial and corporeal presence of Christ were meant, it must be the substance of that martyred body and of that perishable blood. But in this case we

cannot understand, how either of these can be still present, and imparted to communicants.

Difficulties of this nature induced Melancthon, as has been before remarked, to modify the Lutheran doctrine, and to adopt a theory less repulsive. But the theory of Calvin, though it appears to be so easy and natural, is also attended with difficulties. For even he admits of the presence of the body and blood of Christ, only not as to their substance; but according to his view, believers alone receive the body and blood of Christ. But as soon as I admit that the body of Christ is present to believers only, this cannot be reconciled with 1 Cor. 11: 27, 29, as the opponents of Calvin have always remarked.

The better way, therefore, in exhibiting either the Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrine, is, to avoid these subtleties, and merely take the general position, *that Christ, as man and as the Son of God, may exert his agency, may act, wherever, and in whatever manner he pleases.* He therefore may exert his power at his Table, as well as elsewhere. This is perfectly scriptural (vid. § 98, and § 143, ad finem); and it is also the sense and spirit of the Protestant theory. And *this* doctrine respecting the *nearness* of Christ, his *assistance*, and *strengthening influence*, in his present exalted state, secures eminently that proper inward enjoyment, which Lutheran and Reformed Christians, and even Catholics, with all their diversity of speculation on this point, may have alike in the Lord's Supper. Christ, when he was about to leave the world, no more to be seen by his followers with the mortal eye, left them this Supper, as a visible pledge of his presence, his protection, and love.

(2) There are some theologians who think, that the whole doctrine respecting the presence of Christ is destitute of proof, and is derived merely from the misunderstanding of the passage 1 Cor. xi., and from the false interpretation of it given by the fathers. Their hypotheses, it is said, have not been sufficiently examined; but have been too credulously admitted, and other theories have been built upon them, after they had been previously assumed as true. This opinion might be called the *Pelagian* theory; not because it can be shown, that it was held by Pelagius himself; but because it has been usually adopted by those who are of the Pelagian way of thinking respecting the influences of grace; on this subject, vid. Art. XII. They contend, that in partaking of the Lord's Supper we are

merely reminded of Christ, especially of his body offered and his blood shed on our account. According to this view, his body and his blood, while we thus commemorate his death, are present to our thoughts, in the same figurative way, as the body of a deceased friend or benefactor may be present to our minds, when we are thinking of him. This view is contrary to the New Testament; for it comes to nothing more than a mere remembrance of Christ, and an assistance from him, improperly so called; vid. § 98.

They go on to say, that Paul, indeed, in 1 Cor. 11: 27, 29, uses the words *σῶμα καὶ αἷμα Χριστοῦ* with reference to this ordinance; but that he does not affirm, that the communicant eats the body or drinks the blood of Christ, but merely the bread and wine, v. 28; and that although the ancient Christians sometimes spoke as if the body and blood of Christ were really received by communicants (as was very natural, in accordance with John vi.); yet the same is true here, which was spoken by Cicero (Nat. Deor. III. 16), *Cum fruges CEREREM, vinum LIBERUM dicimus* (panem, corpus Christi, vinum, sanguinem Christi), *genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato; sed quem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum (corpus Christi) credat esse?*

The difficulties in the way of this Pelagian theory, which leaves the Lord's Supper a mere ceremony, are stated by Morus p. 267, not. 5. He shows very clearly, that this theory is not in the spirit of the other Christian ordinances. Cf. Storr on this Article in his System. The attempts of many modern writers, who have discussed this point, (those e. g. cited by Morus p. 266, § 7, in the Note,) come to the same thing. For to many of them, the doctrine of the nearness of Christ and his assistance, i. e. of his uninterrupted activity in behalf of his followers, is extremely repugnant, because they do not see how they can reconcile it with their philosophical hypotheses, which however are wholly baseless. But this doctrine is clearly taught in the Holy Scriptures, and is one of the fundamental truths of apostolical antiquity.

(3) Many moderate Protestant theologians are now of opinion, that nothing was plainly and definitely settled by Jesus and the Apostles respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, and that this doctrine cannot therefore be regarded as essential, but rather as problematical. Formerly this doctrine relating merely to the manner of this

presence, was regarded as a fundamental article of faith. Hence each of the contending parties adhered zealously to its own theory, regarding it as the only scriptural one, and looking upon all who thought differently as heretics. This was the cause of that unhappy and lasting division which took place in the sixteenth century between two churches, which agreed on fundamental doctrines, and which ought mutually to have tolerated their disagreement on this particular point. So judged Melancthon, and disapproved of the violent controversies of his age. Even in his learned writings, he passed briefly over topics of this nature, and assigns as the reason of his not going more deeply into them, "*ut a quæstionibus illis juventutem abducerem.*"

Speculations respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ, have not the least influence upon the nature or the efficacy of the Lord's Supper. What the Christian needs to know is, the object and the uses of this rite, and to act accordingly : vid. § 145. He must, therefore, believe from the heart, that Christ died for him ; that now in his exalted state, he is still active in providing for his welfare ; and that hence it becomes him to approach the Lord's Table with feelings of the deepest reverence and most grateful love to God and to Christ. Upon this every thing depends, and this makes the ordinance truly edifying and comforting in its influence. These benefits may be derived from this ordinance by all Christians ; and to all who have true faith, or who allow this ordinance to have its proper effect in awakening attention to the great truths which it exhibits, it is a powerful, divinely appointed means of grace, whatever theory respecting it they may adopt,—the Lutheran, Calvinistic, or even the Roman Catholic transubstantiation, gross as this error is.

It is obvious, then, that all subtle speculation respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ, should have no place in popular instruction, but should be confined to learned and scientific theology. In the present state of things, however, these disputed points cannot be *wholly* omitted in public teaching. But the wise teacher will skilfully show, that he does not regard these as the principal points in this doctrine, according to the views just given ; in such a way, however, that even the weak will not be offended. It will be best for teachers, in the practical exhibition of the theory of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, to pro-

ceed on the principle before laid down; viz. "that Christ, in his present state of exaltation, as God and man, can exert his power when and where he pleases; and that, as he has promised to grant his presence, his gracious nearness and assistance to his true followers till the end of the world, they may rejoice in the belief, that it will be especially vouchsafed to them during this solemn festival in commemoration of him." This principle is wholly scriptural.

ARTICLE FIFTEENTH.

ON DEATH, AND THE CONTINUANCE AND DESTINY OF MEN AFTER DEATH; OR THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE LAST THINGS.

§ 147. *Of Death.*

I. Different descriptions and names of death.

(1) No logical definition of death has been generally agreed upon. This point was much contested in the seventeenth century by the Cartesian and other theologians and philosophers. Since death can be regarded in various points of view, the descriptions of it must necessarily vary. If we consider the state of a dead man, as it strikes the senses, death is the cessation of natural life. If we consider the cause of death, we may place it, in that permanent and entire cessation of the feeling and motion of the body, which results from the destruction of the body. Among theologians, death is commonly said to consist in the separation of soul and body, implying that the soul still exists, when the body perishes. Among the ecclesiastical fathers, Tertullian (*De anima*, c. 27) gives this definition, *Mors,—disjunctio corporis animæque; vita,—conjunctio corporis animæque*. Cicero (*Tusc.* 1.) defines death, *discessus animi a corpore*. The passage, Heb. 4: 12, is sometimes cited on this subject, but has nothing to do with it. Death does not consist in this separation, but this separation is the consequence of death. As soon as the body loses feeling and motion, it is henceforth useless to the soul, which is therefore separated from it.

(2) Scriptural representations, names, and modes of speech respecting death.

(a) One of the most common in the Old Testament is, *to return to the dust* or *to the earth*. Hence the phrase, *the dust of death*. It is founded on the description, Gen. 2: 7, and 3: 19, and has been explained in §§ 52, 75. The phraseology denotes the dissolution and destruction of the *body*. Hence the sentiment in Eccles. 12: 7, "The body returns to the earth, the spirit to God."

(b) A withdrawing, exhalation, or removal of the breath of life; vid. Ps. 104: 29. Hence the common terms, ἀφῆκε, παρῆδωκε τὸ πνεῦμα, *reddidit animam*, ἐξέπνευσεν, *exspiravit*, etc.

(c) A removal from the body, a being absent from the body, a departure from it, etc. This description is founded on the comparison of the body with a tent or lodgement in which the soul dwells during this life. Death destroys this tent or house, and commands us to travel on; vid. Job 4: 21. Is. 38: 12. Ps. 52: 7, where see my Notes. Whence Paul says, 2 Cor. 5: 1, the ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκηνώματος will be destroyed; and Peter calls death ἀπόθελσις τοῦ σκηνώματος, 2 Pet. 1: 13, 14. Classical writers speak of the soul in the same manner, as κατασκηνοῦν ἐν τῷ σώματι. They call the body σκῆνος. So Hippocrates and Aeschines. 2 Cor. 5: 8, 9, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.

(d) Paul likewise uses the term ἐκδύεσθαι in reference to death, 2 Cor. 5: 3, 4; because the body is represented as the garment of the soul, as Plato calls it. The soul, therefore, as long as it is in the body is clothed; and as soon as it is disembodied, is naked.

(e) The terms which denote *sleep*, are applied frequently in the Bible, as everywhere else, to death; Ps. 76: 7. Jer. 51: 39. John 11: 13, et sq. Nor is this language used exclusively for the death of the pious, as some pretend, though this is its prevailing use. Homer calls *sleep* and *death* twin brothers, Iliad XVI. 672. The terms also which signify, *to lie down*, *to rest* (e. g. נָשָׁא, *occumbere*) also denote death.

(f) Death is frequently compared with, and named from, a *departure*, a *going away*. Hence the verba *eundi*, *abeundi*, *discedendi*, signify, *to die*; Job 10: 21. Ps. 39: 4. The case is the same with ὑπάγω and πορεύομαι in the New Testament; Matt. 26: 24, and even among the classics. In this connexion we may mention the terms ἀναλβεῖν and ἀνάλυσις, Phil. 1: 23. 2 Tim. 4: 6, which do not mean *dissolution*, but *discessus*. Cf. Luke 12: 36. Vid. Wetstein on Phil. I.

Note. We have before remarked, in the Article respecting *Sin*, that death, when personified, is described as a ruler and tyrant, having vast power and a great kingdom, over which he reigns. But the ancients also represented it under some figures, which are not common among us. We represent it as a man with a scythe, or as a skeleton, etc. But the Jews before the exile frequently represented death as a hunter, who lays *snare*s for men; Ps. 18: 5, 6. 91: 3. After the exile they represented him as a man, or sometimes as an angel (the angel of death), with a cup of poison which he reaches to men. From this representation appears to have arisen the phrase, which occurs in the New Testament, *to taste death*, Matt. 16: 28. Heb. 2: 9; which, however, in common speech, signifies merely *to die*, without reminding one of the origin of the phrase. The case is the same with the phrase *to see death*, Ps. 89: 49. Luke 2: 26.

II. Scriptural senses of the words *death* and *to die*; and the theological distinctions to which they have given rise.

(1) Death frequently denotes the *end*, or the *destruction* of every thing. It is therefore applied to countries and cities which perish. The inhabitants of them are compared with dead men. The restoration of them, is compared with resurrection from the dead. So Is. 26: 19, 20. Ezek. 3: 7, sq.

(2) Hence arise the figurative modes of speech, *to be dead to any thing*, as to the law, to sin, etc.; Gal. 2: 19. Rom. 6: 2, 5, etc.

(3) But this term is used with great frequency in a *moral* sense; e. g. *to be dead to all goodness*, *to be dead to sin*; i. e. to be disqualified for all goodness by the sin reigning within us, Ephes. 2: 1, 5. 5: 14. Likewise the opposite, *to live*, *to be alive for goodness*, i. e. to be active in virtue and capable of performing it. (*Mors et vita spiritualis et moralis*.)

(4) Death is conceived to be the substance and sum of all misery; and the punishment of death as the severest punishment. Accordingly death denotes, (a) every unhappy condition in which human beings are placed, as to body and soul. The opposite *life* denotes *welfare*, *prosperity*, Ezek. 18: 32, 33: 11. Rom. 7: 10, 13. (b) *Punishments*, as the unhappy consequences of the transgression of the law. In this sense מוֹת is frequently used in Syriac and Chaldee, and death in the New Testament; Rom. 1: 32. 1 John 3: 14. James 5: 20. (c) The Jews called the punishments of the lost in hell, *the second death*, i. e. the death of the soul, which follows that of the body. Traces of this use are found in Philo, in the Chaldaic

paraphrases of the Old Testament, and very frequently among the Rabbins. In this sense is ὁ δεύτερος θάνατος used in Rev. 2: 11. 20: 6, 14. 21: 8. Vid. Wetstein on Rev. 11. So too ὄλεθρος, ἀπώλεια, κ. τ. λ.

From these various senses of the word death, theologians have taken occasion to introduce the division of death into *temporal* or *bodily*, *spiritual* (by which is meant a state of sin and incapacity for virtue), and *eternal* (the punishments of eternity). The latter is what is otherwise called the *second death*, *mors secunda*, *cujus nulla est finis*, as Augustine remarks. Vid. § 79, No. 2. The Bible, too, gives the name of death (*mors spiritualis*) to the state of sin, inasmuch as it is (a) an *unhappy* state, and (b) a state which incapacitates sinners for all goodness. Hence sinners are said, Ephes. 2: 5. Col. 2: 13, to be νεκροὶ ἐν παραπτώμασι, partly because they are unhappy in consequence of sin (vid. the opposite), and partly because they are dead to all goodness, or are incapacitated for it. Hence, too, those sinners who are secure, ignorant, and regardless of the misery and danger of their situation, are said to *sleep* or to *dream*, Jude v. 8. (ἐννύπιαζόμενοι).

III. The universality or unavoidableness of death ; also a consideration of the question, whether death is the punishment of sin, and how far it is so.

(1) Death is *universal* and *inevitable*. None in the present state are excepted. This is the uniform declaration of Scripture, Ps. 49: 8—12. 89: 49. Rom. 5: 12. 1 Cor. 15: 22. Heb. 9: 27. Christ himself was not excepted from this general lot of mortality (though he submitted to it of his own accord), John 10: 17, 18 ; since Paul declares, Heb. 2: 14, sq., that he became man, that he might be able to die for our good.

Some exceptions to this general lot are mentioned in Scripture. (a) In ancient times, Enoch, of whom it was said, Gen. 5: 24, that God *took him*, because he led a pious life. Some of the fathers incorrectly understood this passage to mean, that *he died*. Cf. Heb. 11: 5. Elias is another exception, 2 Kings 2: 11. Similar narratives are found among the Greeks and Romans ; from which we learn, that it was a common notion among the ancient people, that men who were especially beloved by the Deity, were removed from earth to heaven alive, or after their death. (b) In future times. Those who are alive at the day of judgment, according to Paul, 1 Cor. 15:

51, coll. 1 Thess. 4: 15, shall not die (*κοιμηθήσονται*), but shall be changed (*ἀλλαγῇσονται*), i. e. their body, without previous dissolution (death), shall be ennobled by a simple renovation or change; since this mortal body is incapable of the enjoyment of heavenly blessedness; vs. 50, 53, 54, coll. 2 Cor. 5: 2—4, *ἐπενδύσασθαι οὐκίτηριον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* (to be clothed).

(2) The mortality of the human body is expressly derived in the record of Moses, Gen. 2: 17, also chap. III., from the taste of the forbidden fruit or of the poisonous tree. It was by this means, that our first parents themselves became mortal, and thus propagated their disordered and dying bodies to all their posterity; vid. §§ 74, 75, 78. The universality and unavoidableness of death, is therefore, according to the Scriptures, the result and consequence of the transgression of the first parents of the human race. And so in all cases, the Bible derives death from the sin of the first man; Rom. 5: 12, “Through one man came sin into the world, and death by sin, and so death became universal among men (*εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους δι-ἤλθε*).” 1 Cor. 15: 21.

Here the question is thrown out, *whether the death of the posterity of Adam is to be regarded as the punishment of his sin?* To this the answer commonly given by theologians is, that with regard to the wicked, death is to be regarded in the light of a punishment, but not with regard to the pious, but that to them, on the contrary it is a benefit. Since as the latter are, by means of death, translated into a more happy condition, it must be looked upon as a benefit, as far as they are concerned; and so the Scripture represents it; vid. § 148. Still (a) death does not cease to be a great evil, *in itself considered*, to the whole human race, and even to the pious. Hence Paul denominates it *ὁ ἐχθρός*, 1 Cor. 15: 26; and considers it one of the calamities befalling our race, with regard to which even the pious man cannot be indifferent. He says expressly, 2 Cor. 5: 4, that even to the Christian it is no pleasant thing to be *unclothed*, i. e. stripped of his body by death; but that he would rather be *clothed upon*, i. e. be invested with his heavenly body immediately, without the intervention of death. (b) When it is said, that death, in the posterity of Adam, is the punishment which they must undergo on account of his transgression, the term *punishment* is used in that general sense in which it is employed in common life, and often in the Scriptures. But if it be taken in the strict philosophical

sense (in which punishment always presupposes *personal* guilt), death can be properly called the punishment of sin only in reference to our first parents themselves; with regard to others, it is indeed the *consequence* and *result* of the sin of our first parents, but not properly its *punishment*; vid. § 76, III. § 78, III. 3, etc. This was remarked by many of the Church fathers, especially before the time of Augustine; and they therefore objected to calling the death of the posterity of Adam, the punishment of sin; vid. § 79, No. 1, 2. (c) When it is said of Christ, that he frees or redeems men from (bodily) death, the meaning is, that men owe it to him, in general, that the terrors of death are mitigated with regard to those who believe on him; and in particular, that our bodies are restored at the resurrection; cf. John 11: 25, 26. This is what is meant by the *redemptio a morte corporali per Christum*, § 120, coll. § 111, II. 1. From the necessity itself of dying, we could not be freed, unless God should produce an entirely new race of men. Cf. Cotta, *Theses theologicæ de novissimis, speciatim de morte naturali*, Tübingen, 1762. [Also the treatise of Dr. Wm. Bates, "On the four last things," and particularly on Death, Chap. III. and IV. TR.]

§ 148. *Of the Christian doctrine of the continuance of the human soul, and its state after death.*

It is the doctrine of Christ, that the life of man is not bounded by this earthly state, but that, although he does not exist solely for the future, his life extends into eternity. The general doctrine of the Bible respecting the destination of man, as a rational and moral being, has been already exhibited in the Article on the Creation of man, § 51, II.; and it was there shown to be, holiness, and temporal and eternal happiness, standing in the most intimate connexion with it. The superiority of our knowledge of the state of man after death, in comparison with that possessed by the ancient world, is not to be ascribed so much to the progress of science, as to the work of Christ, and the influence of the Christian doctrine. Those

who lived before Christ were not indeed wholly destitute of knowledge respecting this important truth; indeed, many heathens, both before and after the time of Christ, suggested very important arguments in behalf of immortality; still they were unable to attain to any thing more than a high degree of probability on this subject; vid. § 149. Every impartial man must concede, that Christ has high claims to gratitude for what he has done in relation to this subject, even if he does not allow, that he has disclosed any thing new with regard to the future state of man.

(1) He has connected this truth most intimately with the other practical truths of religion, and referred all the rest to this, in such a manner as no teacher before him ever did. And now, any one who acknowledges the divine authority of Christ and of the Christian religion, obtains a satisfactory *certainty* respecting this doctrine, which at best can be rendered only highly *probable* by the light of nature. And from believing this doctrine, all religion comes to possess for him a new interest; and he finds in it the greatest consolation in sufferings and hardships of all kinds,—the most effectual encouragement to holiness, and the greatest dissuasive from sin.

Note. The strongest philosophical proofs in behalf of immortality are derived from the impossibility of reconciling the destruction of the whole man, with the object of his existence, and with the divine attributes; vid. § 149. But a satisfactory certainty on this subject, and a conviction of the truth of immortality raised above all doubt, cannot be attained in this way. For the simple fact, that we, by our reason, cannot reconcile any two things, does not prove that they are irreconcilable; nor can we conclude as to the reality of any thing, merely from the fact, that it is to be wished for by us. Cf. Seneca, who says, Ep. 102, *Philosophi rem hanc gratissimam PROMITTUNT, magis quam PROBANT.*

(2) By the plain instruction which Christ has given respecting this subject, and the obvious reasons he has adduced for it, he has made it universally intelligible, and in a very high degree comprehensible, even by the great mass of mankind. He has done this especially, by the connexion in which he has placed it with the history of his own person, by which every thing is rendered more obvious, and receives a greater and more lively interest; vid. § 120. Hence the remark of Paul, 2 Tim. 1: 10, is very true, that Christ by his doctrine has taken away the power of death, so that it is no more to be feared; he has made us certain of blessedness, and for the first

time placed the doctrine of eternal life (ζωὴ καὶ ἀφθαρσία) in a clear light (φάνισας). Cf. Einiges, Ueber das Verdienst der christlichen Religion um die Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Flensburg und Leipzig, 1788, 8vo.

The following are the chief points of Christian instruction respecting the life of the soul after death.

I. Scripture proof of immortality, and what is implied in it.

In death, the *body* only dies; but the soul survives the body, and lives on uninterruptedly, and is immortal. Here belongs the text, Matt. 10: 28, where Christ says, that tyrants and persecutors have power only over the body, and can kill that only; but have no power to kill the soul, over which God alone has rule and power. Again, Luke 16: 19, the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, vs. 22, 23, sq. Luke 20: 38, "God is not a God of the dead, but of the living." Also many passages in John, in which Jesus promises an immortality, and that too of blessedness, to his true followers; and assures them, that in death their souls shall not perish; e. g. John 5: 24. 8: 51. ch. xi. 12: 24—26. 14: 2, 3, where he says, that in his Father's house there are many mansions, and that he was going to prepare a place for them, and to bring them thither unto himself (by death); cf. the promise given to the malefactor on the cross, Luke 23: 43.

But he always connects this doctrine with that respecting his own person. He it is to whom we are indebted for this truth; without him we should not have had it. He is the purchaser and the giver of life, and of a blessed immortality; whoever believes in him, although he may die, yet lives; John 11: 25, 26. With this, the doctrine of the Apostles agrees; vid. 2 Cor. 5: 1—10. 2 Tim. 1: 10. 1 Thess. 4: 13, seq. Phil. 1: 23. 1 Pet. 4: 6, departed Christians (νεκροί) are regarded by men as evil-doers, and as miserable persons, who have been justly persecuted and punished; but their spirit is introduced by God into a happy life; so Matt. 10: 28.

It pertains essentially to the immortality of the soul, that our *self-consciousness* will remain, and that we shall then have the conviction, that our state after death is the consequence of the life that now is; as the Parable, Luke 16: 22, seq. plainly shows; cf. Luke 20: 27, and John 8: 56, Ἀβραάμ—εἶδὲ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, καὶ

ἐχάσθη. Cf. also 2 Cor. 5: 8, 9, and the other texts cited by Morus, § 2, not.

The doctrine respecting the *sleep of the soul*, does not agree with the declarations of Christ, and is directly opposed to them. Some have maintained, that the soul after death remains, for a time at least, in a state of insensibility and unconsciousness, which they compare with sleep; vid. § 150, where some of the texts to which they appeal are examined. They suppose that it is first awakened from this sleep at the last day, when it is reunited to the body. The state in which they suppose the soul to be in the mean time is called, *lethargus*, and those who hold this doctrine are called *ὑπνο-ψυχισταί*, and those who wholly deny the immortality of the soul, *ψυχοπαννυχισταί*. They support their doctrine in part by an appeal to some figurative representations in the Holy Scriptures respecting the kingdom of the dead, by which it is set forth as the land of silence, darkness, and forgetfulness; and in part by the common experience, that our souls do not feel and receive sensations except through the body, and the organs of sense, and that, when the brain is injured, consciousness and memory often wholly disappear. To this it is justly objected, that it is impossible to conclude, without the greatest fallacy, merely from the present constitution of man, in which soul and body are intimately connected, how it will be hereafter, when the soul and body shall have been entirely separated.

Christ and the Apostles held no principles, that could lead to the doctrine of the sleep of the soul. They rather regarded the earthly body which we inherit, as the nearest spring and source of human depravity, and of the sins arising from it, and of all consequent pain and misery; vid. § 77, II. According to this doctrine, we obtain by death a release from many sufferings; the disembodied spirit can exert its energies more freely than before, and enters upon a far greater and wider sphere of action. Cf. Rom. 8: 23, ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος, Rom. 7: 5, 18, 23, 24, σῶμα θανάτου, 1 John 3: 2.—Vigilantius, in the fifth century, was accused, though unjustly, by Hieronymus of holding this opinion respecting the sleep of the soul. In the twelfth century it was condemned by Innocent III. In the sixteenth century it was advocated again by some Anabaptists and Socinians, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by Christopher Artobe, John Heyn, and others.

II. The connexion of the life to come with the present.

On this point, Christ and the apostles teach,

(1) That the life after death is an immediate continuation of the present life. The soul is not altered in death, but takes along its dispositions, its habits, and whole tendency, into the future world. The life to come, taken in connexion with the present, make together one whole, even as manhood is only the continuation of youth. Morus justly observes, *tenore continuo necti finem vitæ et initia futuræ sortis*.

(2) That the life to come is to be regarded as the *consequence* of the present, since the consequences of all our present dispositions, inclinations, and actions, continue there. Death determines the destiny of men in the future world. It is here that man lays the foundation either for his future happiness or misery; this is the state of probation, that of retribution. All this is taught in the New Testament, sometimes literally, and at other times figuratively; e. g. it is sometimes represented under the image of *sowing and reaping, a contest and the crowning*, etc. Vid. Luke 16: 25. Heb. 9: 27. Rom. 2: 5—12. 2 Cor. 4: 7. 5: 10. 1 Tim. 6: 18, 19. Gal. 6: 7, 10, “what a man sows, that shall he also reap; he that follows his carnal appetites, shall reap *φθοράν*, the pious Christian, *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*.”

III. The intermediate state between death and the Judgment.

The restoration of the body (the raising of the dead) will not take place until the end of the world,—the last day of the present constitution of things,—a period which no one knows beforehand; vid. § 151, seq. And then will every one, for the first time, receive the *full measure* of reward or punishment allotted him, according to his conduct in the present life; vid. Luke 10: 12. Rom. 2: 16. 2 Cor. 5: 10.

Before this time shall arrive, the disembodied spirit will be in a certain *intermediate* state. The exact nature of this state, is not indeed particularly described to us; and we are unable even to conceive of it distinctly; but so much the Bible plainly teaches, that immediately after death the soul passes into that state, for which, from the nature of its previous life, it is prepared. Immediately af-

ter death, retribution begins ; the pious are happy, and the wicked miserable, each in exact proportion to his feelings and actions ; vid. Luke 16: 22—25 (the Parable respecting Lazarus). This truth, too, is always placed by Christ himself and his Apostles, in intimate connexion with his own person ; e. g. Luke 23: 43, “ To day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.” Phil. 1: 23, ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι. 2 Cor. 5: 8, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον.

In what the rewards and punishments of this intermediate state will consist, cannot be determined ; nor whether, in addition to those which are natural,—the necessary consequences of action and feeling,—there will also be, even then, those which are positive, and result from the free appointment of God. As to those who are lost, the Bible teaches us only this, that their punishment,—their whole state of misery, will commence immediately after death ; Luke 16: 22, sq. And for this, we have the analogy of what the New Testament teaches respecting the miserable intermediate state of the Evil Spirits, which will last until the day of Judgment, 2 Pet. 2: 4. Jude v. 7 ; vid. § 63. For the fate of lost men is described as one and the same with that of Evil Spirits ; vid. Matt. 25: 41. On the other hand, the happy intermediate state of the pious commences also immediately after death. The texts in proof of this are cited by Morus, p. 289, § 1, not. 2.—Their blessedness is likened to that of the Holy Angels ; hence they are called by Jesus himself ἱσάγγελοι, Luke 20: 36.

Since, now, the destiny of man is decided immediately after death, and since among men such a decision is usually made by a *judgment* and *sentence* ; there is no more proper way of representing this arrangement of God with respect to the future destiny of men, than by comparing it with a Judgment ; since it has the same effect as a formal judgment.—This has given occasion to the division of Judgment into *particular* or *preceding* (*judicium particulare* or *antecedens*), which denotes nothing more than the determining of the fate of men immediately after death ; and *universal* or *subsequent* (*judicium universale* or *consequens*). It is respecting the former that Paul speaks, Heb. 9: 27, “ It is appointed to all men once to die, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο κρίσις,” i. e. then follows the determination of their destiny, whether it shall be happy or miserable ; cf. 2 Cor. 5: 10. The Pharisees also, according to Josephus (Antiq. XVIII. 2),

taught that the soul is immortal, and after death is *judged under the earth*, and rewarded or punished according to its works.

According to the doctrine of the New Testament, therefore, there is no third place, or medium, between heaven and hell, or between being happy and miserable; although there are very different degrees both of the one and of the other. The intermediate condition of which we have spoken, must not be understood to imply any thing like this. Still an opinion like this got footing very early in the Christian church; vid. § 150. And this gave rise to the custom of *praying for the dead*; since men were foolish enough to imagine, that there is room to obtain an alteration in the yet undecided destiny of departed spirits, while in truth, their destiny must depend solely upon their own actions during the present life. This custom had become very general in the fourth century, and was at that time opposed by Aërius, Presbyter of Pontus, as we learn from the testimony of Epiphanius (Hær. 75), who is very indignant against him on this account. It was also opposed by the Spanish Presbyter, Vigilantius, in the fifth century, in reply to whom Hieronymus wrote a violent book. This doctrine was afterwards brought into connexion with that respecting *Purgatory*, vid. 150; and then followed *masses for souls*, as sacrifices for the departed. There are also some traces of *prayers for the dead* even among the Grecian Jews; e. g. 2 Macc. 12: 43—46, ὑπὲρ νεκρῶν προσεύχεσθαι.

Note. From what has now been said, it appears, that death, so far as it is the transition to a higher and more perfect life, and the means of bringing us to the enjoyment of it, ought not to be terrible to us, but should rather be regarded as a benefit. Those only, however, can regard it in this light, who have lived here according to their destination, who have obtained the forgiveness of their sins (δικαιούμενοι), and who go out of the world with pious and godly dispositions; vid. 2 Cor. 5: 6—10. Phil. 1: 21, 23. John 14: 1—4. 1 John 3: 2, 3. 1 Pet. 1: 4, 5; etc.

§ 149. *Historical illustrations of the various opinions which have prevailed in ancient and modern times respecting the continuance of the soul after death; and the proofs drawn from reason in favor of it.*

I. Ideas of rude nations.

The ideas of most rude heathen nations respecting the state of man after death, are indeed dark and obscure, as well as their ideas respecting the nature of the soul itself, which they regard as a kind of aërial substance, resembling the body, though of a finer material; vid. § 51, I. 3. Still it is found, that the greater part of mankind, even of those who are entirely uncultivated, though they may be incapable of the higher, philosophical idea of the immortality of the soul, are yet inclined to believe, that the soul survives the body, and continues either forever, or at least for a long time. Their susceptibility for this faith, and their inclination to it, depend upon the following circumstances; viz.

(1) Upon the *love of life*, which is deeply planted in the human breast, and operates powerfully, and leads to the wish and hope, that life will be continued even beyond the grave.

(2) Besides the traditions in behalf of this faith which uncultivated nations received transmitted from their fathers, they often had *dreams*, in which the dead appeared to them, speaking and acting; and in this way they found their wishes, and the traditions they had received from their fathers, confirmed anew; so that the hope of immortality was always sustained in them, and never extinguished. Thus Homer represents (Il. XXIII. 103, sq.), that Achilles first became convinced, that souls and shadowy forms have a real existence in the kingdom of shades, by the appearance to him of the departed Patroclus in a dream. So too it is represented in the parable of Christ, Luke 16: 27, where the rich man wished that Lazarus might be sent to appear before his living brethren, since if one of the dead should teach them respecting the state and destiny of the dead, they would believe. Moreover, these visions were often regarded as divine,—ὄψας ἐκ Αὐτοῦ ἔσθαι, Il. I. 63.

But we find that many heathen nations, long before they had any philosophy, or enjoyed the light of revelation, or before they endeav-

oured to prove the immortality of the soul by arguments drawn from reason, still possessed a firm belief of the continuance of the soul. So it was with the Egyptians, the Indians, the Thracians, the Celtæ, the ancient Germans, the ancient Greeks and Romans; and so it is with many of the rude heathen nations of our times. Vid. Meiners, *Geschichte aller Religionen*, S. 174, f. Hence we find *necromancy* practised among the most barbarous people of all ages; vid. § 66; and the prevalence of this presupposes of course, a belief in the existence of the soul beyond the grave. Vid. *Scripta Varii Argumenti*, Num. III., "Origo opinionum de immortalitate animorum apud nationes barbaras atque a cultu veri Dei alienas."

II. Ideas of the Jewish nation.

(1) Many have maintained, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is not taught in the Old Testament. This was especially maintained by many Socinian writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Others have gone so far as to construe the supposed silence of the Old Testament writers on this subject, into a formal denial of the doctrine; and have attempted to justify their opinion by some texts in which it seems to be said, that all is over with man at his death; e. g. Eccl. 3: 19, sq. Is. 38: 18. Ps. 6: 6. 30: 10. 88: 11. 115: 17. Job 7: 7—10. 10: 20—22. 14: 7—12. 15: 22. The Fragmentist of Wolfenbüttel attacked the divine authority of the Jewish religion, in the most odious manner, by these objections; cf. the fourth Fragment from Lessing's *Beyträgen zur Geschichte und Literatur aus der wolfentüttel'schen Bibliothek*, Th. 4. S. 484, f. On the other hand, Warburton (*Divine Legation of Moses*) derived one of his main proofs of the divine mission of Moses, from this his supposed silence on the subject of immortality. Moses, he argues, being sustained in his legislation and government by immediate divine authority, had not the same necessity that other teachers have, for making use of threatenings and punishments drawn from the future world, in order to furnish motives to obedience.

(2) But even if it were true, that there is no text either in the books of Moses, or the writings of a subsequent period, in which the immortality of the soul is distinctly mentioned; it would by no means follow, that this idea was at that time wholly unknown among

the Israelites. Even from this supposition, we must draw the contrary conclusion. For, not to mention that the Israelites and their ancestors were in Egypt, where this faith was very ancient ; (according to Herodotus, II. 123, the Egyptians were the first who entertained it;) it is proved that the Jews held this doctrine, (a) From the laws of Moses against *necromancy*, or the invocation of the dead, which was very commonly practised by the Canaanites also, Deut. 18: 9—12, and which, notwithstanding these laws, was for a long time afterwards retained among the Israelites, as appears from 1 Sam. xxviii. and the prophets. (b) From the appropriate ancient Hebrew name for the kingdom of the dead, עֵלְיוֹן (*ēdhēs*), which so often occurs in Moses and the other books of the Old Testament. That Moses did not, in his Laws, hold up the punishments of the future world to the terror of transgressors, is a circumstance which redounds to his praise, and cannot be alledged against him as a matter of reproach, since other legislators have been reproached with being either deluded or themselves impostors for doing this very thing. And Moses did not design to give a system of theology in his Laws.

(3) But from passages in his writings, it may be seen, that this doctrine was not unknown to him. These passages have been collected by different writers with different success. Vid. Michaelis, *Argumenta pro immortalitate animi è Mose collecta*, in Syntagm. Comment. T. I. Göttingen, 1759. Lüderwald, *Untersuchung von der Kenntniss eines künftigen Lebens im Alten Testamente*, Helmstädt, 1781. Semler, *Beantwortung der Fragen des wolffenbüttel'schen Ungenannten*. Seiler, *Obserr. ad psychologiam sacram*, Erlangen, 1779.

The following texts from the writings of Moses may be regarded as indications of the doctrine of immortality : viz. Gen. 5: 22, 24, where it is said respecting Enoch, that because he lived a pious life, *God took him*, so that he was no more among men. This was designed to be the reward and consequence of his pious life, and it points to an invisible life with God, to which he attained without previously suffering death ; vid. § 147, III. 1.—Gen. 37: 35, Jacob says, “I will go down into עֵלְיוֹן unto my son.” We have here distinctly exhibited the idea of a place, where the dead dwell connected together in a society ; vid. § 150. In conformity with this idea we must explain the phrase, *to go to his Fathers*,

Gen. 15: 15; or, *to be gathered to his people* (more correctly, *to enter into their habitation or abode*), Gen. 25: 8. 35: 29. Num. 20: 24, etc. In the same way, many of the tribes of North American savages express their expectation of an immortality beyond the grave, by saying respecting one who is dead, that he will now see his father, grandfather, greatgrandfather, etc.

Paul argues from the text, Gen. 47: 9, and similar passages, where Jacob calls his life a *journey*, that the Patriarchs expected a life after death, Heb. 11: 13—16. Only he says very truly, *πρόϋπαθεν ἰδόντες τὰς ἐπαγγελίας*.—In Matt. 22: 23, Christ refers, in arguing against the Sadducees, to Ex. 3: 6, where Jehovah calls himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (i. e. their protector and the object of their worship) long after their death. It could not be, that their ashes and their dust should worship God; hence, he concludes, that they themselves could not have ceased to exist, but that, as to their souls, they still lived. Cf. Heb. 11: 13—17. And this passage was interpreted in the same way by the Jews after the time of Christ; vid. Wetstein ad h. l.

In the subsequent books of the Old Testament, the texts of this nature are far more numerous. Still more definite descriptions are given of *הַנֶּפֶשׁ*, and the condition of the departed there; e. g. Is. 14: 9, sq., also in the Psalms and in Job; vid. § 150. Even in these texts, however, the doctrine of the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked in the kingdom of the dead is not so clearly developed, as it is in the New Testament; this is true even of the book of Job, vid. § 151. All that we find here, with respect to this point, is only obscure intimation; so that the Pauline *πρόϋπαθεν ἰδόντες* is applicable, in relation to this doctrine, to the other books of the Old Testament, as well as to those of Moses. In the Psalms, there are some plain allusions to the expectation of reward and punishment after death; particularly Ps. 17: 15. 49: 15, 16. 73: 24. There are some passages in the prophets, where a *revivification of the dead* is spoken of, as Is. 26: 19. Dan. 12: 2. Ezek. xxvii. But although these do not teach a *literal* resurrection of the dead, but rather refer to the restoration of the nation and land; still these, and all such figurative representations, presuppose the proper idea, that an invisible part of man survives the body, and will be hereafter united to it.—Very clear is also the passage Eccl. 12: 7, “The body must return to the earth from whence it was taken; but the spirit to God who gave it,” evidently alluding to Gen. 3: 19.

From all this we draw the conclusion, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not unknown to the Jews before the Babylonian Exile. This appears also from the fact, that a general expectation existed of rewards and punishments in the future world; although in comparison with what was afterwards taught on this point, there was at that time very little definitely known respecting it, and the doctrine, therefore, stood by no means in that near relation to religion and morality, into which it was afterwards brought; as we see to be the fact often in other wholly uncultivated nations. Hence this doctrine is not so often used by the prophets as a motive to righteousness, or to deter men from evil, or to console them in the midst of suffering. But on this very account the piety of these ancient saints deserves the more regard and admiration. It was in a high degree unpretending and disinterested. And although the prospect of what lies beyond the grave was very indistinct in their view, and although, as Paul said, they saw the promised blessings only from afar; they yet had pious dispositions and trusted God. They held merely to the general promise, that God, their Father, would cause it to be well with them, even after death. Ps. 73: 26, 28, "When my strength and my heart faileth, God will be the strength of my heart, and my portion forever."

But it was not until after the Babylonian Captivity, that the ideas of the Jews on this subject appear to have become enlarged, and that this doctrine was brought by the prophets, under the divine guidance, into a more immediate connexion with religion. This result becomes very apparent after the reign of the Grecian kings over Syria and Egypt, and their persecutions of the Jews. The prophets and teachers living at that time, (of whose writings, however, nothing has come down to us,) must therefore have given to their nation, time after time, more instruction upon this subject, and must have explained and unfolded the allusions to it in the earlier prophets. And so we find, that after this time, more frequently than before, the Jews sought and found, in this doctrine of immortality and of future retribution, consolation and encouragement under their trials, and a motive to piety. Such discourses were, therefore, frequently put in the mouths of the martyrs in the second Book of Maccabees; e. g. 6: 26. 7: 9, sq. coll. 12: 43—45; cf. also the Book of Wisdom 2: 1, sq. and especially 3: 1, sq., and the other apocryphal books of the Old Testament.

At the time of Christ and afterwards, this doctrine was universally received and taught by the Pharisees, and was indeed the prevailing belief among the Jews; as is well known from the testimony of the New Testament, of Josephus, and also of Philo. Tacitus also notices this firm belief of the Jews in the immortality of the soul. In his history (v. 5) he says, *animas prælio aut suppliciis peremptorum æternas putant*. Cf. an Essay comparing the ideas of the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament on the subjects of immortality, resurrection, judgment, and retribution, with those of the New Testament, written by Frisch, in Eichhorn's *Bibliothek der biblischen Literatur*, B. IV. Ziegler's *Theol. Abhand.* Th. II. No. 4. Flugge, *Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit*, u. s. w. Th. I.—But the Sadducees, and they only, boasting a great attachment to the Old Testament, and especially to the books of Moses, denied this doctrine, and at the same time the existence of the soul, as distinct from the body.

But Christ did more to illustrate and confirm this consoling doctrine, than had been before done among the Jews or any other people; and he first gave to it that high practical interest which it now possesses; vid. § 148, at the beginning.

III. Philosophical arguments.

As soon as they began in heathen nations to philosophize, and to investigate more closely the doctrines relating to God and the nature and destination of man, they saw the importance and great practical interest of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It was found to exist already as a popular belief; but they now endeavoured to give it philosophical proof and demonstration. Here, as in other things, the Greeks distinguished themselves above other nations. They laid the first ground of those philosophical proofs which were afterwards enforced anew by Christian philosophers, and corrected and farther developed. In the varied web of proof in our modern philosophical schools, the chief threads, and as it were the entire material, are of Grecian origin. According to the testimony of Cicero, the first Grecian philosopher who investigated this subject was Pherecydes; but according to Diogenes Laërtius, it was Thales. The followers of Socrates, however, did the most for this doctrine, and especially Plato in his *Phædon*. The Platonic ar-

guments are found collected in the *Tusculan Questions* of Cicero (I. 23), and also briefly stated in his *Treatise, De Senectute*, c. 21, sq. With regard to these proofs, it is difficult for us, with our present ideas, to see how the soul, separated from the body, could maintain its own subsistence or personality, since according to Plato, it is only a part of the soul of the world, to which after death, it will return.

There were, however, some among the Grecians who denied, or at least doubted, the immortality of the soul. Among these was Epicurus. The Stoics contended, indeed, for the continuance of the soul after death, but not for its absolute immortality, with regard to which they were accustomed to speak doubtfully; as, for example, Seneca often does in his *Epistles*. The opinions of Aristotle on this subject are doubtful; many of his disciples have concluded from his principles, that the soul is not immortal; e. g. among his old followers, Dicæarchus; among the later Aristotelians, Averrhoës, in the twelfth century, and Peter Pomponatius, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in his book, "*De animi immortalitate*," edited anew by Prof. Christi. Gottfr. Bardili, Tübingen, 1791, 8vo. He endeavours in this work to show, that according to the principles of the Averrhoistic-Aristotelian philosophy, the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated on natural grounds.

Even among Christians, there have been some who have denied the immortality of the soul. There was, for example, an Arabian teacher, in the third century, against whom Origen wrote, who maintained that the soul dies with the body, but is again raised with it at the last day,—an opinion which was revived in the seventeenth century by William Coward, a London physician. Still more strange is the opinion of H. Dodwell, who in a work published in London, 1706, contended that souls are naturally mortal, but become immortal only by means of Christian Baptism.

The opinions of some of the grosser materialists of modern times are well known; e. g. of Toland, Helvetius, de la Mettrie, and the author of the *Système de la nature*, who were followed in this by many of the so called philosophers who wrote during the French Revolution;—also many of the sceptics, who thought nothing could be determined on this subject; e. g. Hume.

A few words respecting these philosophic arguments themselves. It has been justly remarked by philosophers of modern times, espe-

cially by Wolf, that three things are involved in the immortality of the soul: (*a*) the uninterrupted continuance of the substance of the soul; (*b*) the continuance of its consciousness; and consequently (*c*) the lasting recollection of the soul, that its state after death is a consequence of that which preceded. This is very true; but long before these philosophers wrote, all these points were taught in the Christian doctrine; as we have already seen in § 148; cf. the single passage Luke xvi.

These philosophical proofs are either *metaphysical*, i. e. drawn from the idea which we have of the *nature* and *attributes* of the human soul; or *moral*, i. e. deduced from the relation between God and the human soul, or, which is the same thing, from the attributes and designs of God, and the destination of man, as a moral being, as learned from the attributes of God.—The foundation for all these arguments was laid by the Greeks, and by those who drew immediately from them. In modern times, however, they have been revised and rendered more accurate, and better adapted to the prevailing systems of philosophy.

(1) The *metaphysical* proofs are derived from the *simple* nature of the soul (its immateriality), from its inherent and essential activity, and from the maxim that *simple* things and elementary powers do not perish; vid. Cic. de Senectute, 21, sq. None but God *can* destroy the essential being of the soul; but it cannot be shown, that he either will destroy it, or wishes so to do. But from this argument nothing more than the bare *possibility* of the immortality of the soul could be shown. But this possibility, if it depends merely upon the will of God, is quite as obvious, even if the soul has not that absolutely simple nature which is ascribed to it. In general, a complete metaphysical proof is impossible, because we know so little of the true nature of the soul. The doctrine of the *simplicity* of the human soul, in the strict philosophical sense of this term, is a mere philosophical hypothesis; vid. § 51, I. 3, Note.

(2) The moral proofs are far more conclusive; though still not strong enough wholly to exclude all doubt and solicitude; vid. the introductory remarks to § 148. Some of these moral proofs were urged by Plato and Cicero, in the passages above cited. The supposition of the mortality of the soul contradicts all our ideas of the attributes of God,—his wisdom, goodness, and justice. Is the duration of man limited to the present life, then the destination of man, and

the designs of God with regard to him, are the most inexplicable riddle, and every thing is full of contradictions. But if this life is not the last, decisive state of man, but is to be regarded only as a state of education, trial, purification, and preparation for a future life; then the plan and connexion of things becomes clear and obvious. We are moral beings, and find in our souls capacities for ever increasing moral improvement, and we feel a longing after immortality, in order to make higher advances in that moral and spiritual perfection, in which the attainments of the best during the present life are so imperfect. These capacities and this longing, are to be regarded as promises from the Creator. For were they never to be satisfied, he would not have placed them in the soul, as it could not have been his design to deceive us. If our souls are not immortal, then the beasts, which have merely an animal nature, and no rational and moral part, are far better in their condition, than we, to whom a higher destination has plainly been given; for they can develop their constitutional capacities, and can satisfy the innate propensities of their natures. And shall not we, the nobler creation of God, be able to develop the far more perfect spiritual and moral powers which he has given us, and to satisfy our spiritual wants?

The whole system of the rights and duties of moral beings would appear to be a web of incongruities, if the present life were the only one. And, in fine, the disorder and injustice which are obvious in the destiny of men in their earthly life, almost irresistibly compel us, to admit this doctrine to be true, and to console ourselves in the midst of these disorders by the belief of it. The manifest disorders of the present state occasioned great difficulty to all thinking men of former times, who did not fully and distinctly admit the truth of a future life and future retribution; vid. Job 24: 1, sq. Eccl. 8: 10, 11, 14. 9: 1—3. Vid. § 71, especially No. VI. ad fin. Cf. L. H. Jacob, *Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus dem Begriffe der Pflicht*, Züllichau, 1790, 8vo. This proof is drawn out on the principles of the Kantian philosophy, and was written in answer to the prize-question, proposed by the Stolpic Institute at Leiden, "Whether there are any duties, which, on grounds of reason, a man would feel himself bound to perform, if he did not believe the soul to be immortal?"

Note. The following are some of the principal modern writers on the immortality of the soul: Clark, Sherlock, Addison, Reinbeck, Canz, Reimarus, Vornehmste Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, 10 Abhand. Spalding, Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Jerusalem, Betrachtungen über die Wahrheiten der Religion, Th. 1. 6 Beytr. Næsselt, Vertheidigung der christlichen Religion. Mendelsöhn, Phædon. Villette, Unterredungen über die Glückseligkeit des künftigen Lebens. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, and the work of Jacob above cited.—The history of this doctrine has been given by Oporin, Franz, Cotta, Hennings, and Flugge, with which cf. Struvius, Historia doctr. Græcor et Romanorum philos. de statu animarum post mortem, Alten. 1803, 8vo. Simon, Geschichte des Glaubens an die Fortdauer der Seele nach dem Tode, an Gespenster, u. s. w. Heilbronn, 1804, 8vo. Nie. Aug. Herrich, Sylloge Scriptorum de Spiritibus puris et animabus humanis earumque materialitate, immortalitate, et statu post mortem, deque anima bestiarum, Regensburg, 1790, 80.

[Matth. Claudius, Wandsbecker Bote, Th. 5.—Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 634, ff. and his history of this doctrine, S. 641, ff.—Tr.]

§ 150. *Of some of the most important of the various opinions respecting the place of departed souls, and their condition there.*

I. The place of their abode.

(1) Among many rude nations, and also among some which are cultivated (e. g. in America, Thibet, and Hindostan), the opinion is found to prevail, that the soul passes from one body into another, sometimes another human body, sometimes that of beasts, or even into plants and trees. This was called *μετεμψύχωσις*, by Pliny *transfiguratio*. Originally this transmigration of souls was not regarded as a matter of retribution, or as a means of purification. This turn was not given to the doctrine until a period of higher cultivation. It came to be understood in this light, for example, by Pythagoras and Plato among the Greeks. The belief in this doctrine seems rather to have rested, at first, upon a certain supposed analogy in nature, where one body is observed always to pass into another, and even when it seems to perish, only alters its form, and returns in a different shape. This belief may have also sprung in part from the almost universal idea, that every thing in the whole

creation is animated by a soul, especially every thing possessing an internal life and power of motion, e. g. plants.

This doctrine of the transmigration of souls has also been held in modern times by many of the Jews; vid. Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, Th. II. cap. 61. It cannot however be shown, that this opinion prevailed among the Jews at the time of Christ, particularly among the Pharisees, either by the passages of the New Testament cited in favor of it, or by those from Josephus, *Antiq. XVIII. 2. Bell. Jud. II. 12.*

Among Christians, this notion has met with but little favor; and it has without reason been ascribed to the Gnostics, Manicheans, and even to Origen. The reason of its being ascribed to the latter, was his belief in the preexistence of the soul; vid. § 57, II. 1,—a belief which in some philosophical systems, is intimately connected with the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul.—Since the seventeenth century, this has been again regarded as a probable doctrine, on account of some analogy in the material world, and has been again advocated by Helmont, Edelmann, Lessing (*Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*).

[Note. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls has received new light from the investigations which have been made of late in Eastern literature. A deeply interesting exhibition of this subject is given by Fred. Schlegel in his "*Philosophie der Geschichte*." B. I. S. 147. He there shows, that this is one of the most fundamental doctrines of faith in the Eastern world, that it rests upon a religious basis, and, even in the earliest periods, was connected with the idea of retribution and sanctification. The soul, it is supposed, after having been soiled and corrupted by its contact with the body and the world, must expiate its sins by wandering, for an appointed cycle, through various forms of uncongenial matter. By enduring these penal sufferings for a long time, it becomes purified, and prepared to mingle again in the original, pure fountain from which it proceeded. At the bottom of this whole belief, lies the deep and just feeling, that after man has wandered so far from God, in order to approach him again, he must travel with great labor through a long and dreary way; and also the conviction, that nothing which is imperfect or stained with sin, can enter into the pure world of blessed spirits, or be forever united with God. Tr.]

(2) Far more general was the opinion among the ancient nations, that the abode of departed spirits is *under the earth*; because the dead are laid beneath the ground, and their body returns to the dust. The souls there separated from their bodies, were regarded as a sort of ærial beings, or *shades* (ἑῖδωλα, *umbræ*); vid. § 66, II.

coll. § 59, I. Taken as a whole, the ancient Eastern nations and the Greeks agreed in this point; while still it is not necessary to suppose, that the latter borrowed their ideas from the former.

This place was denominated by the Hebrews הַשְׁמָד, by the Greeks *ᾗδης*,—the word by which the LXX. always translate הַשְׁמָד. The term *ᾗδης* is explained by Plutarch (*De Is. et Osir.*) by *ἀειδὲς, ἀόρατον, dark, where one sees nothing*. It is allegorically explained by Plato in his *Cratylus*, as the invisible world, because the place is unseen.—Neither of these terms is used in the Scriptures, to signify exactly the *grave*, still less the *place of the damned*; nor are they used in this sense by any of the fathers in the three first centuries; vid. § 96, I. The same place is called among the Hebrews תְּהוֹמוֹת עֲרִיצָה, as in Homer *ὑπὸ γαῖαν, ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαῖας*, and the entrance to it is placed by the Greeks in the extreme West. Where the sun goes down, and his light and fire are extinguished, there, it was naturally supposed, is the place where all things perish, and where darkness reigns.

Both the Hebrews and Greeks describe this *Under-world* as a great kingdom, and both use the phrase, *gates of death* or *Hades*; cf. Homer. Here, according to the ideas of men in the *earliest ages*, the shades of the good and the bad dwell together, without any distinction, or any marked separation. Thus it is where הַשְׁמָד is introduced in the Old Testament; e. g. *Is. xiv.*, where there is a kind of distinction of rank, and kings sit upon thrones; but where nothing definite and clear is said, respecting a distinction in the places of the pious and the wicked. Thus in Homer, too, even those who are punished are in the same place with the other shades, *Odys. XI. 575, sq.*

But after a time, these places in the lower world were divided, and the residences of the righteous and the wicked were conceived of as separate. Thus *Tartarus* among the Greeks, which during the time of Homer and Hesiod was regarded merely as the prison of the Titans, became gradually the universal abode of the damned. So it is with Plato and others, who are followed by Virgil, *Æn. VI.* In the same way did the conceptions of the Jews on this subject become more developed in later periods. According to *Luke 16: 23—26*, both the rich man and Lazarus are in *Hades*; but a *wide gulf* (*χάσμα μέγα*), as it is figuratively represented in the parable, separates the fields of the blessed from the place of the damned; no

one may or can pass from the one to the other. The Jews too, in imitation of the Greeks, called the place of punishment, where wicked men and angels are reserved unto the day of judgment, *τάρατος*, vid. Joseph. Bell. Jud. II. 7. 2 Pet. 2: 4, where *ταρταρώω* appears, cf. § 63, II.

From this it appears, that the sacred writers retained the phraseology common among their contemporaries, in order to be more easily understood by them, and to make a stronger impression upon their minds. *They*, however, used all this only in the way of figure and figurative representation, by which they designed to set forth the most important truths with regard to the state of departed spirits; as any one may see from Luke xvi. 2 Pet. ii. etc.

The whole kingdom of the dead is described by the ancients in a threefold method; viz. (a) as a dark, desolate, silent region, the land of forgetfulness, rest, and inactivity; since the dead rest silently in the grave under the earth, and are cut off from all connexion with the living world; cf. the texts cited from the Old Testament, § 149, II. (in init.). This gave rise to the idea respecting the *sleep of the soul* in after times. (b) Again it was described as a kingdom full of motion and activity, and as resembling as nearly as possible the present world; cf. Is. xiv. (c) But in process of time, these two representations were connected together, in a great variety of ways.

Now the sacred writers, and Christ himself, often make use of figurative expressions, borrowed from these ideas, though they also frequently exchange them for others which are more literal. Thus what Christ represents in Luke xxi., under the image of a steep walled grave, he describes elsewhere without a figure; viz. that the states of men in the future world will be very diverse, but exactly apportioned, both as to happiness and misery, according to their conduct in this life, and that it will not depend upon the choice of men to pass from one state to the other; cf. Matt. xxv. The hindrances here are as great and insurmountable, as a deep chasm is, to one who would pass from one place to another; cf. § 148, I.

The ancient languages were still more deficient than those of the present day, in philosophically definite expressions for objects beyond the cognizance of the senses. Indeed, many things could not be so much as conceived of, without a symbolical representation; hence such are often found even in the writings of Plato, and other

Grecian philosophers. According to this method, one could not indeed teach in so exact and definite a manner ; but he would make a stronger impression upon the feelings and desires, and succeed better in awakening religious dispositions among those who were unacquainted with philosophical language. This hint is very important for the religious teacher. If he follows the method of instruction pursued in schools of philosophy, and adopts their phraseology, he will accomplish but little, and often be entirely unintelligible to his hearers. He must follow the example of the Bible, and make use alternately of figurative and literal representations. In fact, the whole representation of the invisible world must be figurative and symbolical, even when we make use of the most literal expressions in our power. It is all a mere comparison of the invisible world, with something like it in the world of sense. For what the Apostle said, "eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard," etc. is literally true in application to this subject.

With regard to Orcus, and the different views entertained on this subject among Christians, cf. Cotta, *De inferno ejusque sede*, Tübingen, 1775. As to the ideas of the Hebrews, cf. the works of Ziegler and Ammon, *Ueber das Todtênreich der Hebræer*, Erlangen, 1792. Cf. also, an excursus of Heyne on the fourth *Æneid*, and other works cited below.

Note. To any unprejudiced observer it cannot but appear a great excellence in the Bible, and especially the New Testament, that it takes no part in the absurd conceptions which have often prevailed on this subject, and from which the greatest philosophers are not altogether free ; e. g. Plato. And on the other hand, the Bible is equally deserving of praise for not exhibiting pure truths in metaphysical language, and making them the object of dry and curious speculation, but, on the contrary, in the highest degree intelligible, so that their practical application is obvious to every one.

(3) But many believed, that departed souls remain in or about the graves or dwellings of the dead, either forever, or for a long time. So many nations of different degrees of cultivation. The opinion was formerly very widely diffused, that departed spirits linger for a long time around the dead body, or at least sometimes return to it from the kingdom of the dead ; and hence in part the belief in spectres, § 66, II. These ideas prevailed to some extent among the Jews and many Christians ; and even at the Concil. Iliberit. in the year 513, it is forbidden, to kindle a light in burying grounds, lest the spirits of the saints should be disturbed.

II. Opinions respecting the state of departed souls.

(1) It is apparent from what has been said, that according to the ideas of the ancients, the employments, the state and life of departed souls resemble the life of men in this upper world,—an idea in which many germs of truth are involved. We find nothing said respecting the sleep of the soul either in the Old or New Testaments, nor in the earliest monuments of other nations; vid. § 148. Quite as foreign from the conceptions of the earliest periods is the idea, that the dead have no recollection of their earthly life, and take no interest in human affairs. The opposite of this is clear from the earliest records, e. g. from Homer (Odys. XI. coll. II. XXII. 389, 390), and from the Holy Scriptures (Is. xiv. Luke xvi). It was for this reason, that so many nations believed, that the dead sometimes return, appear to men, and have personal intercourse with the living. And hence too the error of *invoking the saints*. These superstitious conclusions, however, are not favored by the doctrine of Christ; vid. Luke 16: 27—31.

It was very natural, even for nations having no direct revelation, to come to the thought, that the shades in Hades recognize each other, have mutual intercourse, and perpetuate the friendship begun in the present life. This idea might, indeed, like many others, have been abstracted from the mere *phantoms of a dream*. For in dreams, our departed friends appear to be cognizable, as Patroclus did to Achilles, even as to his eyes, voice, and stature, II. XXIII. 66, sq. 107. This may be justified also by an appeal to Scripture, Luke xvi. Heb. 12: 23, and Revelation. The soul, indeed, is no longer regarded as a fine material substance, as it often was in ancient times; but these delightful views lose nothing on this account, as some have most unphilosophically supposed. For one may be recognized otherwise than by his body, and may be loved too otherwise than corporeally. Why then should not departed souls recognize each other, even when they no longer possess bodies?

(2) In the childhood of nations, the ideas of men have been commonly very vague and indefinite with regard to the *happy* or *miserable* state of departed souls; cf. Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen*, S. 174—178. With regard to what the Israelites in the earliest times knew on this subject, while they yet saw the promises in an

obscure distance, cf. § 149. II.—Many of the heathen nations represented the state of the dead, not indeed as wholly miserable; still they regarded it as not altogether desirable, and often as rather worse, than better, in comparison with their state in this world. Achilles in Hades does not speak of death very favorably; but would rather till the field on earth, as a day-laborer, than to rule all the hosts of the Shades; *Odys. XI. 487*. For the *Elysium* in Homer is not as yet the residence of the departed souls of men, but only the abode of heroes or demigods.

But by degrees they advanced to more enlarged and correct conceptions. The Greeks then supposed, that good men participate hereafter, in the joys of Elysium, and that crimes are punished in Hades. At first, however, only the grosser offences were supposed liable to punishment there; and in Homer, one offence only, *perjury*, II. III. 278. XIX. 259, 260. This indicates the great simplicity, and the very defective ideas on moral subjects, which still prevailed, since only the very grossest crimes were regarded as worthy of punishment. Afterwards, in the greater advance of cultivation, and the higher perfection of moral ideas, the number of crimes punished in Hades was very much increased; and at length it was believed, that every virtue is there rewarded and every vice punished. So it is represented by Plato, and other Grecian philosophers; so also, in imitation of them, by Virgil, *Æneid VI.*; vid. Heyne, *Excurs. 1 and 8*.

A gradual developement of ideas is also noticed among the Israelites. In general, the great multitude among them, as among other people, formed very gross conceptions respecting the joys and pains following death, and regarded them as merely *corporeal*; since they were unable to conceive of any other. Many understood literally the expressions, *to be in Abraham's bosom, to sit down at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*; the more enlightened, however, used them only as figurative expressions, as Christ himself always understood and explained them in his instructions; e. g. *Luke xvi.*

(3) The doctrine respecting an *intermediate state* of departed souls, and respecting *purgatory*; cf. § 148, III., and *Morus, p. 290*. Such a state, in which the fate of men is undecided until the day of Judgment,—a state which is neither heaven nor hell, neither being blessed nor damned, was supposed by many of the Church Fathers, e. g. Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian.

Only some eminent saints and martyrs, it was supposed, come at once into heaven; and only the grossest sinners go at once to Hell. This intermediate state they call, taking the appellation from Luke xvi., *Sinum Abrahami*. To this they referred the text 1 Pet. 3: 19, *τὰ ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύματα*; vid. § 96. Thither Christ went, and rescued from thence the patriarchs and other pious men, who had died before his atonement was made. This place was afterwards called, *limbus* (*superior* or *exterior pars inferni*) *patrum*; and a *limbus infantium* was also supposed (and is still believed by the Romish Church), into which children go, because they are not actually condemned, having committed no *peccata actualia*, while still, in consequence of original sin, they are unable to attain to the blessed vision of God.

The foundation for the doctrine of purgatory is found even in the second and third centuries. Its origin may be traced back to the Pythagorean or Platonic philosophy. Souls, according to Plato, are a part of the divine nature, which, however, are confined in the body, as in a prison; vid. § 74, I. ad finem. Now, even after the soul of man is disembodied, there still cleaves to it much sin and impurity, acquired from its contact with the body, and this impurity is regarded by Plato, as a natural *sickness*. It cannot, therefore, immediately on leaving the body, return again to its original source. With some, the disorder is *incurable*, and these are *the lost*, who go at once to *Tartarus*; with others, it is curable; and these are purged and purified in Hades. This process Plato compared with purification (*καθάρισις*) by water, air, and fire; and represented this state as an intermediate one. Vid. Plato, *Phædon*, c. 62; and Virgil, *Æneid* VI. 735—751, and Heyne, *Excur.* XIII.

This, with many other Platonic doctrines and fables, was early transferred to Christianity. We find traces of it among the Gnostics (according to the testimony of Irenæus, II. 51, sq.), in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, in the second century, and of Origen, in the third. But after the fourth century, it was more widely diffused through the Latin Church. It is found in Hieronymus, Lactantius, Ambrosius, and even Augustine; the latter of whom, however, though he speaks of *ignis purgatorius*, regards the subject as doubtful. In the sixth century, this doctrine was taught by Gregory the Great, in the eighth by Beda, Boniface, and others. It was supposed, that those Christians only who commit no delibe-

rate sin after baptism, are exempt from this punishment ; or such as become martyrs, or who, by assuming the monastic life, have made atonement for their sins.—Gross offenders,—those who, according to Plato, are irrecoverably disordered, pass immediately after death into Hell. Those who have not sinned so grossly (who are recoverable), or whose repentance commences in the present life, but remains imperfect, although they are not eternally condemned, yet do not attain at once to the enjoyment of God. Such persons, it was supposed, need to be purified, and to make expiation for their sins, by the endurance of certain penalties appointed by God, conceived of under the image of purifying by fire. The advocates of this view endeavoured to support it by such texts of Scripture as the following ; viz. 1 Cor. 3: 13 (as by fire), Jude v. 23. Mal. 3: 2. 2 Macc. 12: 39.

This doctrine became connected with many opinions and practices equally unscriptural, especially with offering prayer for the dead, and making satisfaction to relieve them from punishment ; and also with the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, as a sacrifice for the dead,—a doctrine which prevailed during the eleventh and twelfth centuries ; at which time also, masses offered in order to free souls from purgatory, became common. As early as the eleventh century, the feast of *all souls* was appointed by Pope John xviii. This doctrine was now adopted by the schoolmen into their systems, e. g. by Peter of Lombardy, Thomas Aquinas, and others. The most frightful representations were given of purgatory, founded upon stories of the apparition of souls from thence, etc. The theologians, too, contended respecting the place, manner, and duration of this punishment. And the Council at Florence, in 1439, gave this doctrine the authority of a formal article of faith. As such, it still continues in the Romish Church, and was re-established by the Council at Trent.

This doctrine, however, of the Romish Church respecting Purgatory, as it has been gradually developed by the schoolmen, and as it was established by the Council at Florence, differs in two essential points from the old Platonic notion, which was adopted by Origen and other Church Fathers ; viz. (a) According to Origen and the Platonists, all without exception are subjected to this purification, although some need it more, and others less. But according to the opinion of the Romish Church, those only go into

Purgatory, who, though they have been baptized and believe, are not of perfect virtue. (b) According to Origen and the Platonic idea, the whole design of this suffering is to promote the moral improvement and perfection of men; but according to the conception of the Romish Church, it is designed to make atonement and expiation for sin.

Note. Works on this subject. (a) *Historical*: Jac. Windet, *Στροματὲς ἐπιστολικός* de vita functorum statu ex Hebræorum et Græcorum comparatis sentiis concinnatus, Londini, 1663—64.—Système des anciens et des modernes sur l'état des âmes séparées de corps, à Londres, 1757, 2 Tom. 8vo.—Thom. Burnet, De statu mortuorum et resurgentium, London, 1757, against which, and in behalf of the Romish doctrine, there were treatises written by Muratori, Columna, and others.—Baumgarten, Hist. doctrinæ de statu animarum separatarum, Halæ, 1754.—Cotta, Recentiores quædam controversiæ de statu animi post mortem, Tubingen, 1758.—(b) *Philosophical and doctrinal* works.—Wernsdorf, de animarum separatarum statu, earumdemque cum vivis commercio, in his "Collec. Disput." Tom. I. Num. 15.—The best and latest works on the state of the soul after death are collected by Löschner, Dresden, 1735.—Meier, Philosophische Betrachtung vom Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode, Halle, 1769.—J. E. Schubert, Gedanken vom ewigen Leben, und Zustand der Seele nach dem Tode, Jena, 1747.—J. C. Lavater, Aussichten in die Ewigkeit, Zurich, 1773, 3 Th. 8vo. Other works are cited § 160.

§ 151. *What is understood by the RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD; the meaning of the word RESURRECTION; and what is taught respecting it by the Jews.*

I. What is understood by the resurrection of the dead.

By this is meant, the revivification of the human body after it has been forsaken by the soul, or, the reunion of the soul hereafter with the body which it had occupied in the present world. Death was compared with sleep, and the dead body with a sleeping person, שׁוֹכְבִּים, κοιμηθέντες, § 147, I. Hence the terms which literally signify, *to awake, to rise up, to rise out of sleep*, are also used to denote the resurrection of the lifeless body; e. g. in Hebrew the terms, קוּם, הָקִים; and in Hellenistic Greek, ἀνίστημι, ἀνάστασις (with

the Rabbins תחיית, *éγείρω*, and *éγερσις ἐκ νεκρῶν*. Of the *literal* sense of these terms, examples may be found every where; cases of the derived signification occur, where these terms are used with the qualification *ἐκ νεκρῶν*, e. g. where the resurrection of Christ is spoken of, and that of others whose body is to be restored like his; vid. John 5: 21, 28. 1 Cor. 15: 3, 4, 20, 53.

The Jews were also accustomed to speak of the resurrection of the dead under the image of a *new* or *second birth*, to which they were led by the passage Is. 26: 19, "the earth will again bring forth her dead;" vid. Michaelis's Commentary on Heb. 1: 5.—Again, *ἀνίστημι* was used even by the ancient classical Greeks, to denote the returning of the dead to life. So it was in Homer, Il. XXI. 54, sq., where Achilles says, "What a wonder! all the Trojans slain by me shall again arise from the kingdom of the dead (*ἀναστήσονται*);" cf. Il. XXIV. 756. Cicero and Livy designate this idea by the phrase *ab inferis exsistere*. In Aeschylus, the term *ἀνάστασις* is used for the same thing.

But the same terms which signify *arising*, and the *being awakened from sleep*, also denote figuratively, (1) a restoration to a more happy condition, in opposition to a state of *fall* and *prostration*. In this general sense, they are used in two ways; viz. *physically*, e. g. a sick man rising from his bed and recovering his health, is said *ἀνάσκειναι*, Is. 38: 9; and again in a *moral sense*, used with reference to the reformation of a man, who *rises* from his *fall*. And so (2) the terms *resurrection from the dead*, and *being raised from the dead*, denote figuratively (a) external and physical restoration to a happy condition, *death* being the representative of *misery*, and *life* of *happiness*; e. g. Is. 26: 19, 20. Ezek. xxxvii., where the subject is the restoration of the Jews after a long and terrible persecution, and the reward of the virtuous, cf. Dathe, a. l.; (b) a moral restoration or renovation of men; e. g. Eph. 5: 14, *éγρειτε . . . ἀναστα ἐκ νεκρῶν*, coll. 1: 19, 20, and Rom. 8: 10, etc.

II. Doctrine of the Jews respecting the resurrection of the dead.

(1) There are obvious traces of the doctrine, that the soul will survive the body, even in the oldest Jewish writings; vid. § 149, II.; but of the doctrine, that the body will hereafter be raised to life and the whole man be restored, there are no very clear intimations in the

earliest writings. There is nothing in these writings which is inconsistent with such a doctrine, or opposed to it; but neither, on the other hand, was there, in those early ages, any distinct information or revelation communicated on this subject. The passage Job 19: 25, sq. is indeed cited in behalf of this opinion, and such a construction of this passage is strenuously vindicated by Michaelis and Schultens. According to the Vulgate, which Luther for the most part follows, this passage very clearly teaches this doctrine; and many persons, having been accustomed to this rendering from their youth, are startled by any doubts with respect to it. But,

(a) It is remarkable, that neither the ancient Jewish teachers, nor Christ or his apostles, ever appealed to this passage, which appears so plain to us. This explanation, therefore, appears to have been unknown to them; nor can there be found any trace of it in the Septuagint.

(b) It is not in itself probable, that this doctrine should have been at once so clearly revealed in so ancient a writing. This would be contrary to all analogy. For knowledge of this kind has always been gradually developed, and the revelations made to man follow in regular gradation one after another.

(c) If Job had such distinct expectations and hopes, it is hard to account for it, that he did not earlier express them, that he did not oftener console himself with them, and that he constantly recurs to his old complaints and doubts, which would have been entirely set aside and answered by the knowledge of any such doctrine.

(d) Nor can it be accounted for, that his friends should have replied nothing to the statement of such a doctrine as this, since they take up, one by one, all his remarks, his complaints, and his consolations, and refute them. Would they, now, have passed by unnoticed this most important of all his arguments?

(e) From many passages in the book of Job it is clear, that he was indeed acquainted with a life after death (he speaks of חַיַּת אַחֲרַיִם); but there is no satisfactory evidence, that he believed in a state of retribution beyond the grave; vid. ch: 14: 7—12. 7: 6. 9: 25. 17: 11—16. 16: 22, sq.

(f) The common translation of this passage, according to which it is made to teach so plainly the doctrine of the resurrection, does violence to the words of the original, and is contrary to the whole *usus loquendi* of the Bible. This Michaelis perceived. He there-

fore alters the text, and by a comparison with the ancient dialects, makes out an artificial rendering, according to which the passage treats of the resurrection.

The most natural construction of this passage is, to understand it as relating to Job's restoration to health and recovery from sickness, which he so ardently wished and hoped for; vid. Morus, p. 293. This text would then be illustrated by one still more plain in the same book, viz. ch. 42: 5. He refutes the national prejudice, which his friends were continually objecting against him, that sickness and other external calamities are always to be regarded as the consequence of sins committed by the sufferer. He pleads, that even piety and rectitude are not always exempt from these calamities. It is on this account, that he cherishes the hope, which he elsewhere expresses, that God will justify him, in the view of his enemies and accusers, by an entire restoration; and this hope becomes here so strong, that it leads him to look upon his recovery as certain. Cf. Eichhorn's Essay, Hiob's Hoffnungen, in his "Allgemeinen Bibliothek. der biblischen Literatur," B. I. S. 367; also Henke, Narratio Critica de interpretatione loci Job 19: 25, 27, in antiqua ecclesia, Helmst. 1783, 4to. (in his "Opusc.")

According to this view, the text may be translated as follows: "I know that my Redeemer lives. And ere long he, who now lies in the dust, will arise (he who is deeply bowed down by sickness and pain, will recover); although my skin is consumed, I shall yet in this body see God (i. e. have in him a gracious God, be blessed and restored by him); as a *friend* shall I see him, and no more as an adversary. I wait, full of longing desire, for his help. Then shall ye say, when my innocence is clear, why did we persecute this man?"—Ilgen, in his work, "Jobi antiquissimi carminis hebraici natura atque virtutes," p. 161, seq. thus translates: "*Vivit, scio enim, causæ meæ patronus. Qui contemptus in pulvere jacet, victor caput attolet. Hærebo adhuc in cute, dira hac vi contusa: ex hac cuticula videbo Deum. Quem ego mihi videbo propitium, quem hisce oculis cernam animo non alienatum. O quam enecat renes desiderii ardor!*"

There are no distinct intimations of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in the writings of Moses, or in the Psalms; for Ps. 49: 15, does not relate to this subject; still less does Ps. 104: 29, 30, though cited by Theodoret as one of the proof-texts of

this doctrine. Isaiah is the first writer who compares the restoration of the Jewish people and state, with a resurrection from the dead; ch. 26: 19, 20. In this he was followed by Ezekiel at the time of the exile; ch. xxxvii. From these passages, we must conclude, that something respecting this doctrine was known at that time among the Israelites; still they do not seem to have seen it in that clear light, in which it was afterwards revealed; since in that case, the prophets would probably have mentioned it oftener and more distinctly in their writings. But the text, Dan. 12: 2, leads very plainly to this doctrine; for here is something more than a mere civil restoration. "Those who lie sleeping under the earth will awake; some to eternal life, others to everlasting shame and contempt."

Judging then from the writings of the Jews, they appear to have been destitute of any complete knowledge of this doctrine until the exile, and indeed, for a considerable period after. Still, there is nothing in the Old Testament which contradicts this doctrine; it is only not plainly revealed. For where it is said (e. g. Ps. 88: 11), "that the dead shall not rise again and praise God," it is plainly meant, that they will never return to this upper world, and into the society of men living upon the earth;—they can never again, in company with us, and in the circle of the living, praise God. Cf. Ps. 6: 6. 30: 10. Is. 38: 18, coll. v. 20.

(2) It was not, then, until the Babylonian exile, and more especially after this period, that this doctrine was developed and diffused among the Jews. We are not acquainted with the more particular occasion which led to this developement, or what prophets or teachers, after Daniel, were employed in giving this doctrine a wider circulation. For just in this place, there is a great gap in the doctrinal history of the Jews; since no writings of the prophets or teachers of this period have come down to us. So much only is known on this subject from the information which has come down to us: viz.

(a) About the time when the Jews came under the Grecian dominion, the doctrine of a future retribution was more developed among them, than it had before been, and was employed by them in a practical way, as a means of consolation under suffering and persecution; vid. § 149, II.

(b) It is known also, that even at that time, the doctrine of the

resurrection of the body was most intimately connected with the doctrine of retribution. It was then taught, that the perfect and happy condition of man would first commence, when his soul should be hereafter united again to his body. They did not therefore commonly separate these two things in their conceptions; but always connected the thought of the continuance of the soul after death with the idea of its future union with the body; indeed they supposed, that the blessedness of man could not be complete, until his soul should be reunited to his body. Hence they comprehend under the term *ἀνάστασις*, the entire future condition of man. For according to the doctrine of the Jews, with which the Holy Scriptures accord, man is not merely in this life a being compounded of sense and reason; but he will continue the same in the life to come; except only that, in case of the good, there will be none of that preponderance of sense over reason, which has its foundation in our earthly bodies. Cf. the Essay, “De nexu resurrectionis J. C. è mortuis et mortuorum,” in *Scripta Varii Argumenti*, Num. ix.

Thus we find it, for the first time, in the second book of Maccabees, where the martyrs are made to express the hope, by which they were consoled, of a coming resurrection; e. g. 7: 9, εἰς αἰώνιον ἀναβίωσιν ζωῆς ἡμῶν ἀναστήσει, and v. 14, πάλιν ἀναστήσεσθαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ, and ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωὴν, also vs. 23, 29, 36; but especially chap. 12: 43—45, where it is said, it would be foolish to pray for the dead, if they did not rise again. And so we find, both among the later Jewish and earlier Christian writers, that there is no distinction made between immortality and the resurrection, but that both are considered as the same thing; vid. the passages from the Rabbins cited in Schöttgen’s *Hor. Heb. ad Joh. V.*—It is the same frequently in the New Testament; e. g. Matt. 22: 31, where the ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν is argued from the fact, that God calls himself the *God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, even after their death; although, according to our present usage, in which resurrection and immortality are distinguished, this fact would only prove the continuance of the soul after death. Again; 1 Cor. 15: 32, εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, φάγομεν καὶ πίνομεν, κ. τ. λ. But wherever ἀνάστασις σώματος, or σαρκός is spoken of, the resurrection of the body and its connexion with the soul, are alone intended.

The Jews, therefore, would regard the restoration of man as incomplete, unless his body were restored. They believed the latter es-

sential to the entire restitution of man, because in the present life he consists of both soul and body. And as the body here participates in our virtues and vices, and their consequences; so, they supposed, it would hereafter participate in our reward or punishment. Hence they represent the intermediate state, in which the soul exists without the body, as an imperfect state. It is compared by them to *nakedness* (and the same is done by *Plato*), e. g. in the Chaldaic paraphrases, Job 38: 14, etc. So Paul, οὐ γυμνοὶ ἐύοηθησόμεθα, 2 Cor. 5: 2—4.

The greater part of the Jews formed very gross conceptions respecting the rewards and enjoyments of the blessed in the future state, and many of them perverted the doctrine of the resurrection of the body to suit these conceptions. For they were for the most part better acquainted with the grosser corporeal pleasures, than with the higher spiritual joys, for which indeed they had but little taste or capacity. They thus pictured to themselves the future life as entirely resembling the present, except in being exempt from all sufferings and unpleasant sensations. They believed that men would eat and drink, and satisfy their other animal appetites, in the same way there as here. Doctrines like these were taught by many of the most distinguished Rabbins who lived after the time of Christ, and even by Maimonides. It is said in Rev. 2: 7, and 22: 2, 14, that the *tree of life* is placed in Heaven, and its fruit is there eaten, as the means of obtaining immortality. This representation is figurative; but many of the Jews understood such descriptions literally, and believed in a kind of food for angels or gods, like *nectar* and *ambrosia*.—It was against such gross material representations, which have no necessary connexion with this doctrine, but which were often associated with it, that the Sadducees directed their wit; and they made these incongruities ridiculous. This was their object, when they proposed to Jesus the case of the woman, who had several brothers, one after another in succession, for husbands, Matt. 22: 24, sq.

Others, better instructed, separated from their conceptions of the future state, these grosser indulgences, and thus escaped this ridicule. They taught, that we shall hereafter possess a more refined body, which will not be dependent for its nourishment upon food, and which will not propagate the race. This was the opinion of most of the Pharisees at the time of Christ, and the same was afterwards maintained by most of the Jewish teachers. For when

Christ said, that "the risen saints would not marry, but be as the angels of God," the Pharisees entirely assented, Matt. 22: 30, coll. Luke 20: 39, and the texts cited from the Rabbins in Wetstein on Matt. 22: 30.—With regard to the use of food, Paul says expressly, that it will entirely cease in the future world, *θεὸς κοιλίαν καὶ βρώματα καταργήσει*, i. e. he will take them away, and enable us to do without them.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was, therefore, common among the Jews at the time of Christ and the Apostles. Vid. Matt. xxii. Luke xx. Acts 23: 6—8. So, in John 11: 24, the Jewess Martha speaks of the resurrection of the dead, as a thing well known and undoubted. Josephus indeed (Ant. XVIII. 2), expresses himself doubtfully with regard to the Pharisees,—“they believe that the soul is immortal, and can easily return to life (*ἀναβιώσασαι*),” and again (Bell. Jud. II. 7), “they maintain that the souls of the pious pass into other bodies (*μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα*).” Here Josephus, in his usual manner, so represents designedly the Jewish doctrine, that the Greeks and Romans, to whom the resurrection of the body appeared absurd, should suppose the transmigration of souls to be intended, while at the same time the Jews should understand, that the resurrection of the dead was spoken of. But, from the texts cited from the New Testament, it appears that the Pharisees, like the other Jews, believed in a resurrection.

There were some among the Jews of the opinion, that the *wicked* would not receive a body in the future world. Josephus says, in the passage cited, that even the Pharisees believed, that the souls of the wicked would not pass into other bodies (i. e. that the wicked would not rise again), but that they would be eternally punished. It may perhaps be, that this was taught by some at the time of Josephus; but during the first century, it was the more prevailing belief, even among the Pharisees, that both the righteous and the wicked would share in the coming resurrection. For in Acts 24: 15, Paul says expressly, that he agrees with the Pharisees and other Jews (in opposition to the Sadducees), in maintaining the *ἀνάστασιν*, and that not only of the righteous, but also of the wicked (*δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων*). But frequent traces of this opinion are to be found in the Chaldaic Paraphrases, and in the writings of the Rabbins after the time of Christ; although it never became general among the Jews. This opinion came naturally from the idea, that the happi-

ness of the good would be incomplete without the body; and so it was made a part of the wretchedness of the wicked, not to come again into possession of a body. Another cause of this opinion, is the allegorical explanation which they gave to some passages in the Old Testament; e. g. Ps. 1: 5, לֹא-יִקְוֶה רָשָׁעִים, Sept. οὐκ ἀναστήσονται οἱ ἀσεβεῖς. Indeed, many maintained the entire annihilation of the wicked, both as to soul and body. Vid. Theod. Dassovii Dissert. qua Judæor. de resurrectione mortuorum sententia explicatur, c. 4; also Menasse ben Israel, De resur. mort. L. III. Amst. 1636, where many of the Jewish fancies respecting the resurrection of the dead are collected together.—This opinion respecting the non-resurrection of the wicked, has found advocates even among Christian writers, especially of the Socinian party.

Note. The term ἀνάσταναι ἐκ νεκρῶν is used once in the New Testament, to denote the return of a departed soul to the world, and its reappearance in its supposed body of shade, viz. Luke 16: 31, coll. vs. 27, 28, 30; like the sense in which the phrase, *ab inferis exsistere*, is sometimes used.

(3) Since the doctrine of the future resurrection of the *body* was not very plainly taught in the books of Moses, or elsewhere in the Old Testament (as it seems not to have been fully revealed in those earlier ages); it is not to be wondered at, that some of the Jews took occasion or derived a pretext from this, either to deny this doctrine, or to doubt respecting it. This was done, not merely by the Sadducees, who denied in general that the soul of man is of a nature different from his body, and that it can continue after death (vid. Acts 23: 8, sq. and Josephus in the passage before cited), on the ground that this doctrine is not taught in Moses or in all the Old Testament; but also by other Jews, especially those, it seems, who had imbibed the Grecian (the Pythagorean or Platonic) philosophy, or who at any rate entertained ideas respecting the *body* similar to those taught in this philosophy, making it a *prison* for the soul, from which it is freed by death, when it returns to God.

Thus, according to Josephus (Bell. Jud. II. 7), did the Essenes believe. They seem, therefore, not to have maintained the resurrection of the body, although they believed in the immortality of the soul. Even Josephus carefully avoids the words ἀνάστασις and ἀνίστημι, when he describes the doctrines of the Pharisees and Sadducees, and expresses himself ambiguously, in order not to displease

the Greeks and Romans for whom he principally wrote, and to whom the doctrine of the resurrection of the body would appear not only new, but, according to the principles of the philosophy prevailing among them, offensive and absurd. And so Paul was ridiculed at Athens by the Grecian philosophers, when he taught the resurrection of the dead, Acts 17 : 32, coll. 26: 6—8, and vs. 23, 24. At a later period, Lucian and Celsus employed their wit against the same doctrine in Origen and others ; and Pliny says (Hist. Nat. II. 7), that if it is impossible for God to destroy himself, it is equally impossible for him, *mortales æternitate donare, et in vitam revocare defunctos*.—There have always been some among the modern Jews, who have been inclined to the doctrine of the Sadducees, and who have frequently been opposed by the Rabbins ; vid. Wetstein on Matt. xxii.

§ 152. *The Christian doctrine respecting the resurrection of the body.*

- I. What Christ and the Apostles have done for this doctrine, and respecting the doubts of some Christians.

At the time of Christ and the apostles, this doctrine had already become prevalent among the Jews, § 151, II. ; although it was not clearly revealed in their older religious books. Through Christ, it was now for the first time distinctly established anew, and revealed on divine authority. In those very discourses of our Saviour, in which he designs to prove himself divine in the highest sense, he plainly and definitely brings forward this doctrine, as a constituent part of his religious system ; e. g. Matt. xxii. John v. viii. xi. Without this explanation and positive assurance, on his part and that of his disciples, this doctrine would still have been doubtful. But those who regard Christ and his apostles as being what they profess to be, ought not, and cannot be any longer in doubt.

Christ and his Apostles, however, corrected the false notions on this subject, which at that time prevailed among at least a large

portion of the Jews, and made the whole matter more obvious and intelligible. But this doctrine has derived a special interest and demonstration from the fact, that it is placed in the most intimate connexion with the history of the person of Christ, and that he is represented as the one to whom we are indebted for this benefit. It is most intimately connected with his death, his resurrection, and his exalted state in heaven; vid. § 119, ad finem, and § 120, I.—The Apostles rested the doctrine of our resurrection mainly upon that of Christ, cf. 1 Cor. xv. 1 Thess. 4: 14; they preached through Jesus (ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ) the resurrection of the dead, Acts 4: 2; and hence they call him *the first that rose from the dead*, Acts 26: 23. 1 Cor. 15: 20, et alibi. And from this Paul argues, that if it is acknowledged that Christ rose from the dead, there can be no reason to deny or think it impossible, that there should be a general resurrection of all men, 1 Cor. 15: 12, sq. Cf. Mosheim, Diss. “qua docetur Christum resurrectionem mortuorum corporum, qualem Christiani credunt, e tenebris in lucem revocasse et demonstrasse,” in his Dissertations “ad hist. eccl. pertinent.” Vol. II. p. 586. Cf. also the Essay, “De nexu resurrectionis Christi e mortuis et mortuorum,” in “Scripta Varii Argumenti,” Num. IX.

But this doctrine has been doubted or denied by many Christians in modern times.

(1) It appears from 1 Cor. xv. and 2 Tim. 2: 18, that even during the life of the Apostles, there were Christians to whom this doctrine seemed doubtful, if they did not wholly deny it, because it did not accord with their preconceived opinions; although it cannot be shown, that they at the same time denied the immortality of the soul. These may have been either Gentile converts (for this doctrine was peculiarly offensive to the heathen, vid. § 151, ad finem), or converts from Judaism, who had agreed on this point with the Essenes or the Sadducees. To the latter class belong Hymenæus and Philetus, λέγοντες τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἤδη γεγόνεναι. They probably understood the term ἀνάστασις, as used in the Old Testament and by Christ, to signify, *the introduction of a person into a better state, or improvement of life*, vid. § 151, I. This, they supposed, was already accomplished by Christ, and that a resurrection, in the literal sense, is not to be looked for. Hence Paul endeavours, 1 Cor. xv. in part to obviate the objections of the Sadducees and Gentiles, and in part to separate and distinguish the true doctrine from the gross and earthly conceptions of many of the Jews.

Still the opinion, that there will be no restoration of the body, has always found place among some Christians ; especially among the Gnostics, who were led to reject this doctrine by their views respecting matter, and by their method of interpreting Scripture. So thought Manes, in the third century, and his numerous followers in after times ; also the Priscillianists in Spain ; likewise Hierax, at the commencement of the fourth century, who would allow of only a spiritual resurrection, or a resurrection of the soul. And so in all succeeding ages, there have always been those among Christians, who have either secretly doubted, or openly rejected this doctrine. Cf. Dr. Hammer, *Mortuorum in vitam revocatio, sermonibus Christi historicæ interpretationis ope vindicata*, Lips. 1794.

(2) In modern times, many Protestant theologians (e. g. Eckermann, Henke, Ammon, etc.) have endeavoured to explain away from the New Testament the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, notwithstanding the many clear passages by which it is supported. They have maintained, that this dogma is no part of the Christian System. It was, in their view, through mere condescension to the prevailing opinions of the Jews, that Christ and the Apostles employed the common language on this point, which must accordingly be understood in a different sense, viz. a sense agreeing with the philosophical ideas prevailing in the nineteenth century. There is not, however, the remotest hint, in all the words of Christ and the Apostles, that they meant to be understood figuratively ; and if this method of interpretation were adopted, nothing of the Christian System would be left behind. That the words of Christ and the Apostles are to be understood literally on this subject, is plain from this, that it is affirmed of Christ, that he himself now possesses a body in his heavenly state in the kingdom of the blessed, and that we shall hereafter resemble him in this respect, and possess a body which will be like his glorious body ; § 153.

II. Biblical representation.

The principal texts of Scripture which relate to this subject, are John 5: 21—29. 6: 39, 40. Matt. 22: 23, sq. 1 Cor. xv. Acts 24: 14, 15. 1 Thess. 4: 13. Phil. 3: 21. With regard to the principal points taught in these passages, we remark,

(1) The raising of the dead is ascribed expressly to *Christ*,

and it is represented as the last work which will be undertaken by him for the salvation of man. Paul says, 1 Cor. 15: 22, sq., "As through Adam all die, so through Christ shall all be made alive;—through him shall death, the last enemy, be conquered;—and then shall his work as Messiah be completed, and he will lay down his government." Christ himself said, that he had received power for this purpose from the Father, John 5: 21, "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God and live. For as the Father *ζωὴν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ* (i. e. is the original source of all life, and possesses, as Creator, all-quicken power); he hath given to the Son also power, to quicken the dead." And in John 11: 25, where he is about to raise the lifeless body of Lazarus, he says respecting himself, that he is *ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωὴ*, the one who would raise the body, and give life to the dead. Cf. 1 Thess. 4: 14 and Rev. 1: 18, *ἔχει κλεῖς τοῦ ᾗδου καὶ τοῦ θανάτου*.

(2) All the dead will hereafter be raised, without respect to age, rank, or moral character in this world. So the New Testament teaches throughout; especially in opposition to the opinions of some Jews, § 151, II. 2, ad finem, coll. § 120, I. 2, Note. So 1 Cor. 15: 22, *ἐν Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσι*, to which is opposed *ἐν Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιηθήσονται*. Acts 24: 15, *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων*. And Christ himself says, John 5: 28, 29, "All who are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and those who have done well *ἐκπορεύονται εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς* (i. e. *εἰς ζωὴν*), those who have done evil, *εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως*. This was a common mode of speech among the Jews (vid. Macc. 7: 14, coll. 12: 43, *ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωὴν*), which is obviously taken from Dan. 12: 2.

(3) The resurrection of the body, however, will not take place before the end of the world, or the general judgment.—This, too, was the common doctrine of the Jews at the time of Christ; hence Martha says, John 11: 24, "that she knows her brother will rise at the last day, (*ἐν τῇ ἑσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ*). And this opinion is everywhere confirmed by Christ. In John 5: 21, he not only connects the resurrection and judgment most intimately together, but in John 6: 39, 40, he expressly promises his followers, *ἀναστήσω [εἰς ζωὴν] ἐν τῇ ἑσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ*. And so in 1 Cor. 15: 22—28, the resurrection is placed in obvious connexion with the *παρουσία* of Christ, after which the end of the world will immediately come; and in

1 Thess. 4: 15, it is said, that those who survive the *παρουσίαν* of Christ, will not attain either sooner or later to the enjoyment of heavenly blessedness, than *κοιμηθέντες*; but that the dead and living will meet Christ at the same time, that they may be forever with him; cf. Rev. 20: 11, sq. The resurrection of the dead, then, will take place, when the Christian Church on earth shall cease; but this, according to the clear declarations of Christ, shall last until the end of the world.

This cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis of Priestley, who attempts to show, that the resurrection will take place immediately after death. The same hypothesis has been advocated in a work entitled, "Auferstehung der Todten nach der eigentlichen Lehre Jesu Christi," by Joh. Fr. des Cotes, Court preacher at Nassau; and still better in the "Beyträgen zur Beförderung des vernünftigen Denkens in der Religion," 2tes Heft, S. 76, f., and 3tes Heft, S. 39, f. It is indeed true, that the disembodied existence of the soul beyond the grave is comprehended in the writings of the Jews and of the New Testament, under the term *ἀνάστασις*; but this is not all which is comprised in this term; and the *ἀνάστασις* will not be complete and perfect, until the body also is raised; vid. § 151, II. 2.

Again, these Pauline texts are opposed to the opinion of the Chiliasts, that there is a *two-fold* resurrection; an earlier, that of the pious, and a later, that of the wicked, or of the heathen. An *ἀνάστασις πρώτη* is, indeed, mentioned in Rev. 20: 5, 6, but the phrase admits easily of another interpretation.

(4) As to the *manner* in which the resurrection will take place, the New Testament gives us no definite information, by which our curiosity can be wholly satisfied; and this, doubtless, because such information could be neither intelligible to us, nor of any use. The whole matter lies beyond the sphere of our knowledge. In speaking on this subject, Christ and the Apostles sometimes make use of expressions which are figurative (and of such there were many current among the Jews); and sometimes, they content themselves with proving the possibility and intelligibleness of the thing, in opposition to doubters and scoffers, and with making it plain by examples.

(a) Among the more figurative representations and expressions, at least, among those in which there is some intermixture of what is figurative, the representation contained in John v., is commonly reck-

oned ; viz. the representation, that the voice of Christ will penetrate the graves, in order to awaken the dead. The image is here that of a sleeper, who is aroused by a loud call ; and some understand the representation as so entirely figurative, that they exclude any audible or perceptible sound. It cannot, however, be shown that Christ meant to exclude these. For in the resurrection of Lazarus, of the young man at Nain, and the daughter of Jairus, the voice of Christ was heard by them, and was the means of raising them to life. Still the voice, merely as such, is not the efficient cause of the work, but the almighty power accompanying it ; and so it is said of God, when he produces any effect by his creative power, that *he speaks, his voice sounds forth.*

The Jews supposed, that the dead would be awakened by the *sound of a trumpet.* Traces of this opinion are to be found in the Chaldaic paraphrasts. At first this representation belonged only to the figurative phraseology of prophecy ; for the people were commonly assembled by the sound of the trumpet, as was the case in the assembling at Sinai ; and in general, a trumpet was used to give signs and signals, e. g. for an onset in battle, etc. Afterwards, this representation was literally understood, and the size of the trumpet was supposed to be a thousand yards, and that it was blown seven times ; vid. Wetstein and Semler on 1 Cor. 15: 52. In this passage, Paul uses the term *ἐν ἑσχάτῃ σάλπιγγι, (σαλπύσει γάρ,)—νεκροὶ ἐγερθήσονται.* The same poetic phraseology is employed in 1 Thess. 4: 16, “ Christ will come with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and *ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ* (the trump given him by God), *καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται.*”

In this representation, there is much, indeed, which is figurative, and which belongs to the prophetic imagery (as in Matt. xxiv. and in the Apocalypse) ; and we are not now able to determine the meaning of all the particular traits in the picture. But the great thought which we must hold fast, is very obvious, viz. Christ will solemnly and visibly appear in his majesty, and by his divine power raise all the dead. In other passages, this truth is literally expressed, e. g. Phil. 3: 21, where it is said, that Christ will do this by the power, by which he is able to subdue all things to himself, i. e. by his *ἐνέργεια*, his omnipotence, which surmounts all difficulties and hindrances, and brings to pass, what appears to men impossible.

(b) The *possibility* of the resurrection of the dead, is illustrated by Paul in opposition to those who regarded it as impossible or contradictory, 1 Cor. 15: 35, sq. by comparing it with events of common occurrence in the natural world, which seem to us less wonderful only because they are common. "How is it possible," it was asked, "that the dead should be raised?" (πῶς ἐγείρονται νεκροί;) He replies: "The grain of corn cast into the ground, cannot rise (ζωοποιεῖται) until it die" (ἀποθάνῃ, vid. John 12: 24). This appears unintelligible; and we should regard it as impossible, if we did not see it actually accomplished. Why then should not God be able to raise men, and from their present bodies, to produce others? This is a fine comparison to illustrate the possibility of this event.—Again, he shows by the example of Christ, that the dead *can* be raised, vs. 12—14. And so the Apostles always, e. g. Acts 4: 2, καταγγέλλειν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ τὴν ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν. Cf. Morus, Diss. Inaug. ad 1 Cor. 15: 35—55, Lipsiæ, 1782.

Note. Many modern writers also have endeavoured in various other ways, to show the *possibility* of the resurrection, and in this have availed themselves of the observations of naturalists. The common fault with these comparisons, is, that either the alledged facts are untrue and imaginary, or have nothing resembling the resurrection. It must be considered a fault of the first kind, to endeavour, as Fecht, von Frankenau, and others have done, to illustrate the resurrection by the alledged *palingenesia* of plants, or their restoration from their ashes by means of a chemical process, which in fact is nothing more than an exhibition of the image of the plant; vid. Wiegleb, Natürliche Magie. It is a fault of the other class, to apply to this subject the observation, that there is only one mass of matter upon the earth, and that nothing is lost, nothing perishes, but still revives again, only under forms which are ever new. But this revivification is very different from the resurrection of the dead. For in the former case, there is no consciousness of the previous state. The inanimate body of a man may furnish nourishment to a beast of prey or to a vegetable, so that its parts will become incorporated with those of the beast or the plant, and contribute to their nourishment and growth. But is this resurrection? The principal thing in the resurrection, is the reunion of the soul with the body.

But if these attempts have not succeeded, it is equally vain to attempt, by reasons *à priori*, to prove the *impossibility* of the restoration of the body. Respecting the question, whether our souls will remain after death without a body, nothing can be definitely determined by philosophy; but the negative opinion is not only liable to no philosophical objection, but has in its favor this fact, which is universally observed, that the different *species* of beings are not essentially altered, or as it were made anew, through all the changes to which they are subject, but still preserve their peculiar and characteristic fea-

tures ; so that the wonderful gradation in the works of God is preserved unbroken. Thus there are beings *wholly spiritual* (as the angels are described to be in the Scriptures) ; there are beings *composed of reason and sense* (as men, and perhaps many in other worlds) ; and finally, there are animate beings consisting wholly of sense, and having no moral nature (such as the beasts). Since now the latter class subsists by itself, and is so separate from the foregoing, that there is no example of a mere animal becoming a rational being ; it may from this analogy be expected, that it will be the same with man, and that, even in the future world, he will not become a merely spiritual being, but remain, as now, compounded of spirit and matter, and consequently will hereafter become again possessed of a body.

§ 153. *Doctrine of the New Testament respecting the nature of the body which we shall receive at the resurrection ; and the opinions of theologians on this point.*

I. Difference of the future body from the present.

That there is a difference between the two, in respect to their entire constitution and the objects of their existence, we are taught by the New Testament. The body received at the resurrection will be *immortal*, and is designed for an entirely different world from the present. The chief characteristic of the resurrection-body is placed by the New Testament in its *ἀφθαρσία*, and its other excellencies are derived from this ; vid. the texts cited by Morus p. 292, not. 8. It cannot therefore be wholly constituted like our present body, which is designed only for this world.

One of the most important texts on this subject is 1 Cor. 15: 50, *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομεῖν οὐ δύναται*, i. e. man, in the present imperfect state of his body (Theodoret well says, *ἡ θνητὴ φύσις*), is incapable of heavenly bliss. For the mortal body (*φθορά*, i. e. *σῶμα φθαρτόν*), cannot partake of eternal life (*ἀφθαρσία*, immortality). Blood, according to the conception of the whole ancient world, is found only among men and other animals, who are nourished by the food of our earth ; and not among the immortals, who do not taste of this food. The gods, therefore, in the opinion of the ancient Greeks, had no blood (they were *ἀναιμόνες*), and were immortal, because they ate no bread and drank no wine.

In Homer, (Il. V. 341, sq. VI. 142,) men are called, in opposition to the gods, *βροτοί*, *those who eat the fruit of the field*. The body of the gods was regarded by them as a true body and in human form, but only framed more perfectly, and from a finer material; it was by no means that shadowy body ascribed to departed souls; vid. § 150, § 66, II. And so was the body of those raised up at the last day conceived of, as no mere shadowy form, but as a true body, though without flesh and blood.

The Greeks supposed that their gods ate a food peculiar to themselves, *nectar* and *ambrosia*; and so the great multitude of the Jews supposed, that those who are raised to be inhabitants of heaven, partake of a kind of heavenly food; vid. § 151, II. 2, and § 59, II. respecting angels. There have always been Christians who have maintained the same thing; and even in modern times, some have expressed themselves at least doubtfully on this point; e. g. Michaelis. But the passage 1 Cor. 6: 13, (already cited § 151,) teaches exactly the contrary. The gods of the Greeks were supposed to marry, and to indulge in the sexual propensities; and some Jews imagined the same thing with regard to the angels and those raised from the dead; but this idea is rejected by Christ, Matt. 22: 30; cf. the sections before cited.

Here then is a separation between what is true and false in the prevailing popular conceptions, which is worthy of notice. In these conceptions, there is often much which is true, and the germ of truth, which is fully developed. But the learned often mistake in rejecting certain ideas, merely because they are the common conceptions of the people. Not so Christ; he only distinguishes between what is false and true in these conceptions.

Respecting the nature of the heavenly body, and its difference from the earthly, Paul expresses himself very fully in 1 Cor. 15: 35, sq. *ποῖον σώματι ἔρχονται*; sc. *é sepulcris*. (a) He takes a comparison from a grain of wheat, from which an entirely new body is developed, whose form and properties are very different from those of the seed sown. (b) God makes material things in very different forms, and with different constitutions, on account of their different destination. The body of fishes, of birds, and of beasts, is not the same; their nature and attributes are wholly different, vs. 39—41. And so must our heavenly body be organized differently from the earthly, because it has a different end. (c) The heavenly body will

have great preeminence over the earthly. V. 42, sq., *σπείρεται* (i. e. *sepelitur*, sc. *σῶμα*) *ἐν φθορᾷ*, i. e. *φθαρτόν*, *perishable*. The sequel is to be explained in the same way; for *ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ* read *ἀτιμόν*, *deformed*, *disfigured*; *ἀσθενές*, *feeble*, *powerless*; *ψυχικό*, *carnal*, *animal*; because in this life, the animal propensities must be indulged. But when it is raised, it will be a body, *ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ*, i. e. *ἀφθαρτόν*, *immortal*, *indestructible*; *ἐνδοξόν*, *beautified*, *glorious*; *δυνατόν*, *strong* and *mighty*; and *πνευματικόν*, *spiritual*, exempt from every thing which is imperfect in the material body. In short, our earthly body is, like Adam's, *from the earth* (*ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκόν*); the future body will, like that which Christ now possesses, be a *heavenly body* (*ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*).

And here Paul makes the observation, that Christ had not *at first* (*πρῶτον*, while he here lived upon the earth), that more perfect, spiritual body (*πνευματικόν*), but that which was natural (*ψυχικόν*); and *afterwards* (*ἔπειτα*, after his ascent to Heaven) that which was spiritual. Therefore he did not possess it immediately after his resurrection, while he was yet upon the earth, for he then ate and drank, John xxi.; but he first received it, when he passed into the Heavens; cf. § 97, II.

That our body will be like that of Christ, is plainly taught, v. 49; *φορέσομεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου* [*Χριστοῦ*]; and still more plainly, Phil. 3: 21, "Christ will transform (*μετασχηματίσει*) our earthly perishable body (*σῶμα ταπεινώσεως*), into the resemblance of his heavenly body (*σῶμα δόξης*); cf. Rom. 6: 9. This heavenly body is commonly called *glorified*, for so *δεδοξασμένον* is translated. This translation, however, may give occasion to unfounded accessory conceptions with regard to the splendor, etc. of the heavenly body. The simple idea conveyed by this expression is *glorious*, *excellent*, *perfected*, *ennobled*; vid. Morus, p. 292, n. 8.

Those who are alive at the last day, will not indeed *die*, like other men, § 147, II. Still, according to the doctrine of Paul, their bodies must undergo a *change*, like that which it was necessary for the earthly body of Christ to experience, before it entered the heavens; vid. 1 Cor. 15: 51, *πάντες μὲν οὐ* (non *sollicitanda lectio*) *κοιμηθησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα*, i. e. their bodies must be changed, in order that they may be adapted to their future destination and abode, and be no more perishable and destructible. For the mortal body must become immortal, v. 53, coll. 2 Cor. 5: 4.

1 Thess. 4: 15, sq. In Phil. 3: 21, this change is expressed by the word *μετασχηματίζειν*. Some of the Jews also appear to have maintained, that such a change would take place with those alive at the last day; vid. Wetstein on 1 Cor. 15: 54.

Such is the doctrine which we are plainly taught in the New Testament respecting the constitution of our future body. Let not, therefore, the Christian doctrine be charged with all the absurdities and fancies which dreaming heads have suggested respecting the nature, form, size and uses of the spiritual body; nor with the fictions even of some theologians respecting *corpore pellucido, penetrantibus, illocali, invisibili, præfulgido, impalpabili*, etc.—From the texts already cited, as well as from others, it is plain, that the more perfect body which we shall hereafter receive, will contribute very much to our heavenly blessedness, as on the other hand, our present frail body greatly conduces to our present suffering and imperfection. But *how far* our glorified body will affect our future blessedness, cannot be definitely determined from the Holy Scriptures; vid. Morus pp. 299, 300, § 10.

NOTE. The Bible says indeed plainly, that the bodies even of the wicked will be again raised, but it no where informs us particularly what their nature and state will be. The first Christian teachers, however, imagined without doubt, that their state would be such, as to aggravate the sufferings of the wicked; as they supposed, on the other hand, that the body which the righteous would receive, would contribute to the heightening of their joys and blessedness.

II. Identity of the future with the present body.

Notwithstanding the difference between the body which we now have, and that which we shall possess hereafter, it is still taught in the schools of theology, that our future body will be, in substance, the same with the present; vid. Morus p. 291 sq. § 3, not. 6. This, however, is denied by some, who maintain, that the body which believers will receive at the resurrection will be entirely new, of a totally different kind, and not having a particle of the present body belonging to it. So in modern times, have some Socinian theologians taught; also Burnet in his work, *De statu mortuorum et resurgentium*, c. 9; likewise Less, in his “*Praktische Dogmatik*,” and others. They ground their opinion upon the fact, that the parts of our body in the process of time, and in the ordinary course of nature, became incorporated with many thousand other human bodies.

To which, therefore, they ask, of all these thousand, do they appropriately belong? And if every human body should again receive all the parts which ever belonged to it, it would be a monster.

In order to obviate these difficulties, it is justly remarked by others, that there is no reason to suppose, that each and every part of the earthly body will be hereafter raised; but only that its finer elementary materials will be restored. For the grosser parts of the body, which appear to exist only for the filling out of the whole, and for holding it together, (like the stones for filling up, in a building,) are in constant flux, and fall off from the body, while yet it cannot be said, that we have lost our body, or received a new one. In respect to these grosser parts, our body in early childhood was totally different from our present body; and in old age, it will be different from that which we now have. Still we call it, through these different periods, *our* body, and regard it as being the *same*. In common language we say, with *our eyes* we have seen, or with *these hands* we have done, what took place twenty or thirty years ago. In this way, we may speak of *identity* in a more general and popular sense; and understood in this sense, the identity of the body through all the periods of its existence may be spoken of, without impropriety. It is not implied in this, that the body will be hereafter constituted of precisely the same materials which it here possesses; nor that it will again have the same form, limbs, and organs, which it now has; but that, from all the parts of which our present body is composed, the most fit and the most noble will be chosen by God, and of these the heavenly body will be constructed.

What conceptions the first Christian teachers formed as to the *manner* of this, we cannot clearly ascertain; nor is it possible, that while we remain upon the earth, we should be able to understand this matter fully. So much, however, is plain, that the inspired teachers did not believe, that an entirely new body would be hereafter created for us; but that there would be a kind of identity, in the popular sense of the term, between the heavenly and earthly body. Such is the implication of the terms so often employed by them, *to awaken or call forth the dead from their graves*, vid. John 5: 28, 29; also of the representation, that the sea and Sheol should give up their dead, Rev. 20: 13, seq; and especially of the passage, 1 Cor. 15: 35—38. It is here plainly implied, that the present mortal body contains the germ of the heavenly body, in the same way

as the germ of the plant lies in the seed, from which, after it is dissolved and dead in the earth, the plant is developed, and as it were *raised to life*. Hence according to Paul, the future body has at least as much in common with the present, as a plant has with the seed from which it springs. It will be still the same body, which we shall hereafter possess, only beautified and ennobled (*μετασχηματιζόμενον*), Phil. 3: 21. 1 Cor. 15: 42, 52, 53. This is thus expressed by theologians: there will be a *renovation* of one and the same substance, and not the production of a wholly new material; vid. Morus, pp. 291, 292, not. 6 ad § 3.—Some modern writers have endeavoured to illustrate this matter, by the application to it of the whole of Bonnet's theory of developement; but this is not contained in the words of Paul, although his doctrine bears some resemblance to it.

The Church-fathers are not entirely unanimous in their opinions respecting the identity of the body. The earlier fathers gave no very definite opinion on the subject, but contented themselves with saying in general, that we should receive again the same body; so Justin the Martyr, and Athenagoras and Tertullian in their books, *De resurrectione*. They appear, however, to have had rather gross conceptions on this subject. Origen, in the third century, was the first who philosophized with regard to the heavenly body, and undertook to determine accurately respecting its nature. He defended the resurrection of the body, against those who denied it; and taught at the same time, that the substance of the human body,—the essential and characteristic form by which it is to be discerned and distinguished from others, remains unaltered. He also controverted the opinion of some who supposed, that those who are raised will again be invested with the same gross, material body, as before. It was his opinion, that the grosser parts will be separated, and that only the germ or fundamental material for the new body will be furnished by the old. He and others expressed their views by the following formula, viz. we shall hereafter have *σῶμα τοῦτο (idem) μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοιοῦτο (ejusmodi)*, De prin. II. 10.

But such a statement was far from being satisfactory to many at that period, and especially to the gross Chiliasts. They wished to keep alive the hope of having still the same flesh as at present, in order to their eating, drinking, etc. So Nepos, Methodius, Theophilus of Alexandria, and others. With these Hieronymus, in the fourth centu-

ry, agreed, and opposed the opinion of Origen, contending that the same body would be raised, with the same limbs and nerves, and with flesh and blood in the proper sense, and even with distinction of sex, although he did not, indeed, affirm that the animal and sexual appetites would be indulged in the heavenly world. Epiphanius, however, who was a declared opponent of Origen, says expressly, that the bodies of the raised must have teeth, since otherwise they could not eat. What kind of food they would have, he did not pretend to say, but left for God to determine.

The opinion of Origen was adopted, in the fourth century, by Gregory of Nazianzen, Basilus, Chrysostom, and all the opponents of the Chiliasts. Those who maintained the resurrection of the body in its grosser parts were all, with the exception of Hieronymus, Chiliasts. The opponents of Origen, among the Greeks and Latins, began now to insist, that not merely the resurrection of the body (*corporis*) should be taught, but also *carnis* (*crassæ*). The older fathers used *corpus* and *caro* interchangeably (as was also done in the older symbols), and intended by the use of these terms to denote only, that there would be no new creation of a body; since both of these terms, according to the Hebrew *usus loquendi*, are synonymes; as when we speak, in reference to the Lord's Supper, of the *CORPUS* and *CARO Christi*. But since the term *caro* implies, according to the same idiom, the associated idea of *weakness* and *mortality*, it was abandoned by many who wished to use language with more precision, and, instead of it, the phrase *resurrectio corporis* was adopted. It was on this account, that the Chiliasts insisted so much the more urgently upon retaining the terms *σάρξ* and *caro*.

Note. Works on this subject, Cotta, Theses theol. de novissimis, in specie de resurrectione mortuorum, Tub. 1802.—Hermann, Pflug, Beweiss der Möglichkeit und Gewissheit der Auferstehung der Todten, 1738.—On the history of this doctrine, besides the works of Hody and Burnet, cf. Ge. Calixtus, De immortalitate animi et resurrectione carnis, and especially, W. A. Teller, Fidei dogmatis de resurrectione carnis, per quatuor priora saecula enarratio, Halle and Helmstädt, 1766, 8vo, with which however the student should compare the additions and corrections made by Ernesti in his "Neues theol. Bibliothek," B. IX. S. 221—244. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 658, § 152. Neander, All. K. Geschichte, B. I. Abth. III. S. 1038 and especially 1096; also B. II. Abth. III. S. 1404—1410.—Tr.]

§ 154. *Of the last appearing of Christ before the end of the world; the various opinions on this subject; also respecting the Millennial kingdom, and the universal conversion of Jews and Gentiles.*

I. The last appearing of Christ.

Christ often spoke of his future *coming* (*παρουσία*), using this phrase in different senses. It sometimes denotes figuratively the destruction of the Jewish state, and the consequences of this event, particularly the advantages which would result from it to the Christian doctrine and Church; as the spiritual kingdom of Christ could not be truly established in the earth until this event should take place; Matt. xxiv. and 16: 27, 28. Again, it denotes his *visible* appearing to judge the world; Matt. 25: 31, sq. When Jesus spoke of his appearing, his disciples during his life commonly conceived at once of his coming to establish an earthly kingdom. And when he spoke of his coming at the destruction of Jerusalem, they supposed that he would then, with his followers, destroy the hostile Jerusalem, triumph over his opponents, and commence his new earthly kingdom.

The xxiv. of Matt. was for the most part understood in this way by many at that time. With this they then connected the idea, that the *end of the world* was near at hand; because, according to the opinion of the Jews, Jerusalem and the temple would stand until the end of the world; vid. § 98, II. 3. Hence in the passage, Matt. 24: 3, the disciples of Jesus connect the two questions, *when will the temple be destroyed?* and *what are the signs of the end of time?* In what Christ said, Matt. xxiv., he referred to the diffusion of his new religion, the establishment and confirmation of his spiritual and moral kingdom, on which the destruction of Jerusalem would have a favorable influence, vid. Matt. 10: 23. Luke 12: 40. But he said this in part, in the style of prophetic imagery, as in Matt. xvi. xxiv. To these questions Christ replied with great wisdom and forecast; —to the first, in Matt. 24: 4—25, 30; and to the second, Matt. 25: 31—46. He taught them plainly only so much as it was needful for them to know at that time. The rest he taught them in prophetic figures, which were not as yet entirely intelligible to them, and the meaning of which they afterwards learned. Their false ex-

pectations were not therefore cherished and approved, but neither were they prematurely contradicted. Full information on this subject was among those things which they were not then able to bear, and respecting which they were to receive more full information after the ascension of Christ to Heaven ; John 16: 12. And this more full information they actually received. For from that time they abandoned their expectations of a Jewish kingdom, and thenceforward looked for no other coming of Christ, than that at the general Judgment. As to what Christ and his apostles taught respecting the nature and extent of his spiritual and heavenly kingdom, vid. §§ 97—99.

11. The belief of a Millennial kingdom of Christ upon the earth or Chiliasm.

(1) *Origin of this belief.* The Jews supposed, that the Messiah at his coming would reign as king upon the earth, and would reside at Jerusalem, the ancient royal city. The period of his reign, they supposed would be very long, and therefore put it down at a thousand years, which was at first understood only as a round number. Respecting the Jewish ideas of the Messianic kingdom, cf. § 89, and § 118, I. together with Wetstein's selections from Jewish authors on Rev. 20: 2. This period was conceived of by the Jews, as the return of the Golden Age to the earth, and each one formed to himself such a picture of it, as agreed best with his own disposition, and that degree of moral and intellectual culture to which he had attained. Many anticipated nothing more, than merely sensual delights ; others entertained better and more pure conceptions ; etc.

The same remark applies to many of the Judaizing Christians. Although Jesus had not yet appeared as an earthly king, yet these persons were unwilling to abandon an expectation, which to them was so important. They hoped, therefore, for a second coming of Christ, to establish an earthly kingdom, and transferred to this kingdom, every thing which the Jews had expected of the first. The apostles wholly abandoned this opinion after the ascension of Christ, and expected no other coming, than that at the Judgment of the world ; 1 Cor. xv. and elsewhere. The fact, however, that these Jewish ideas had taken deep root in the minds of many Christians in the apostolic age, may be argued from 1 Thess. 4: 13, sq. ch. v. and 2 Thess. II.

Many have endeavoured to find this idea even in the Apocalypse, especially 20: 1—8. But John does not there speak of Christ reigning visibly and bodily on the earth, but of his spiritual dominion, resulting from the influence of Christianity, when it shall at length be universally diffused through the earth,—a kingdom which will last a *thousand years*, used as a round number, to denote many centuries, or a long period.—Thus does it appear, that even during the first century there were many opinions upon this subject among Christians which deviated widely from the doctrine of the Apostles.

[Note. The scriptural ideas upon which the belief in a millenium rested, are more specifically stated by Neander, Kirchengesch. B. I. Abth. III. S. 1089. As the world was made in six days, and according to Ps. 90: 4, a *thousand years* is in the sight of God as *one day*; so it was thought the world would continue in the state in which it had hitherto been, for six thousand years: and as the Sabbath is a day of rest; so will the seventh period of a thousand years consist of *this millennial kingdom*, as the close of the whole earthly state. TR.]

(2) In the second century, the doctrine of the future, earthly kingdom of Christ became more and more widely diffused, and in a large portion of the Christian world, it was finally predominant. Its first zealous advocate was Papias, in the second century; and he was followed by Justin the Martyr, Tertullian, and most of the Montanists. This doctrine was also adopted by some of the heretics, e. g. by Cerinthus. It was not, however, held by all in the same manner. Most taught, that the Church would have to suffer much from Antichrist (the seducer and persecutor); and that Christ would then visibly return, and destroy his power, 2 Thess. 11. Then, it was supposed, all worldly power would cease, the pious be raised from the dead (*πρώτη ἀνάστασις*), assemble in Jerusalem, and standing under Christ, their king, would reign with him a thousand years.

As to the pleasures then to be enjoyed,—the conceptions of some were very gross, those of others more chastened. In forming their pictures of this period, they drew largely from the Apocalypse, which they interpreted in many different ways. Origen, in the third century, was the first who wrote in opposition to this doctrine, and who gave a different interpretation to the texts of Scripture to which appeal was made by the Chiliasts. On this account, this

doctrine fell into disesteem among the learned. In the third century, Dionysius, Bishop at Alexandria, wrote against Chiliasm in opposition to Nepos, Bishop in Egypt; and in his work, denied that John wrote the Apocalypse, because his opponents were accustomed to derive their doctrine principally from this book.

[Note. It was in Phrygia, the seat of the spirit of religious enthusiasm, that Chiliasm chiefly prevailed; and from thence it spread. Here belonged Papias, Irenæus, Justin the Martyr, etc.—Two causes contributed to prevent this doctrine from becoming more universally prevalent in the early Church, viz. opposition to Montanism, and the influence of the school at Alexandria. The visionary conceptions which the Montanists entertained and inculcated, respecting what would take place in the Millenium, brought the whole doctrine into disrepute; and all the opponents of Montanism, opposed these gross Chiliastic conceptions, as belonging essentially to that scheme.—The allegorizing method of interpretation adopted by the teachers of the Alexandrine school, enabled them to avoid the gross conceptions of the Millenium to which those who adopted the literal mode of interpretation were led. By applying this principle to the interpretation of the Apocalypse, they could take away the support which the Chiliasts derived from it, without excluding the book from the sacred canon. TR.]

(3) The seed of the doctrine of gross Chiliasm, has always remained in the Christian Church. This doctrine, however, has shown itself in different forms, and has been taught sometimes in a more visionary manner, and at other times less so. Respecting the time when this Millenial kingdom will commence, there has been no general agreement of opinion. Many suppose it will take place before the resurrection; others, not until afterwards.

At the time of the Reformation, this belief in a millenial, earthly kingdom of Christ was revived and widely spread by the enthusiastic Anabaptists, Thomas Münzer and his adherents. They themselves wished to establish this kingdom of Christ with fire and sword, and to put an end to all worldly power; they encouraged rebellion. Hence Luther and Melancthon set themselves against this doctrine with great zeal and earnestness; vid. Augsb. Conf. Art. XVIII. It showed itself again, however, in the Protestant Church.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Spener was charged with teaching Chiliasm. But he was far removed from this. He only expressed frequently the hope, that the spiritual kingdom of Christ would not only continue in the world, but would be much

more widely diffused than it now is, and hereafter would become absolutely universal. And this expectation (*spes meliorum temporum*), is perfectly accordant with the Holy Scriptures. This is the point to which all the middle part of the Apocalypse refers; viz. from ch. 12: 18 to 20: 10, the victory of Christ over heathenism, and all sin and corruption on the earth, and the general diffusion of Christianity; after which the end of the world and the kingdom of the saints will follow, ch. 20: 11—22: 5. This, one might call (if he wished) *biblical Chiliasm*; in this there is nothing of enthusiasm; and even for those who do not live to see this period, the anticipation of it is consoling and animating.

But Petersen, who came from the school of Spener, at the end of the seventeenth, and commencement of the eighteenth century, inculcated in his writings various enthusiastic ideas on this subject. The same doctrine was taken into favor about the same time by Burnet in England, in his work, “*De statu mort. et resurg.*” At a later period, Bengel in Germany went a great deal too far in many points in his interpretation of the Apocalypse. So, many Theologians of Wurtemberg, Crusius and his disciples, and Lavater in Switzerland.

A good developement of the History of this doctrine is contained in Corrodi’s “*Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus*,” Frankfort und Leipzig, 1781—1783. It was principally occasioned by Lavater’s views on this subject.

[Note. Neander, in his history of this doctrine (B. I. Abth. III. S. 1090), suggests the important caution, that we should not allow ourselves, through disgust at the extravagant visions of enthusiasts about the Millenium, to decide against what we are really justified in hoping and expecting, as to the future extension of the kingdom of Christ. As the Old Testament contains an intimation of the things of the New; so Christianity contains an intimation of a higher order of things hereafter, which it will be the means of introducing; but faith must necessarily come before sight. The divine revelations enable us to see but a little, now and then, of this higher order, and not enough to form a complete picture. As prophecy is always obscure until its fulfillment; so must be also the last predictions of Christ respecting the destiny of his Church, until the entrance of that higher order.

There are three degrees in the manner of holding this doctrine, described as *crassus*, *subtilis*, *subtilissimus*, according to the proportion in which enthusiastic and visionary conceptions are mingled with the scriptural idea of the future kingdom of the Messiah. The lowest kind is characterized by the belief of the *visible* appearance and reign of Christ upon the earth, a resurrection

of the saints before the general Judgment, and their living with Christ in the enjoyment of worldly splendor and luxury, for a thousand years. In this form it was held by many of the ancient Montanists, and by the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century. The more refined and scriptural doctrine of the Millenium, as held by Spener, Vitrunga and others, excludes the idea of the visible appearance of Christ, and does not insist upon the definite period of a thousand years, but only holds to the future universal extension of the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Cf. Haln, Lehrbuch, S. 665.—Tr.]

III. Future conversion of Jews and Gentiles.

The doctrine of the universal conversion of the Gentiles, and especially of the Jews, to be hoped for hereafter, has been for the most part taught by the advocates of the grosser kind of Chiliasm. Still the former doctrine stands in no *necessary* connexion with the latter. And many Protestant theologians, who are far from assenting to any unscriptural views of the Millenium, have adopted this doctrine, e. g. Michaelis, Koppe, and others still more lately. But some theologians connected with both of these doctrines other opinions which do not entirely accord with Scripture, or which at least are not in all parts clearly demonstrable from Scripture; e. g. Burnet, Bengel, Crusius. Hence Ernesti and his whole school were very much opposed to this doctrine, and would not at all allow, that even the remotest hope of the conversion of the Jews is authorized by the New Testament.

It has happened with regard to this subject, as it often does in all the departments of human knowledge, that opinions, in which there has been an intermixture of what is erroneous and incapable of proof, have been on this account entirely rejected, instead of being carefully sifted, in order to separate the true from the false, that which may be proved from that which is incapable of demonstration. The doctrine itself of the future conversion of the Jews involves nothing questionable or enthusiastic, if it be understood only to imply, that the apostles believed and taught, that the Jews would hereafter abandon their prejudices and their hardness of heart, possess a taste and susceptibility for Christianity, and cordially unite themselves with the Christian Church. When this will take place, and by what means it will be brought about, the apostles determine nothing; and with regard to these points, nothing is known. But an expectation of this event is found in their writings.

Two things on this subject are certain; viz. (1) That it was

always a current doctrine among the Jews, that all the gentiles would at last become incorporated in the kingdom of the Messiah; and with reference to this event they explained many passages in their prophets, which, when read impartially, plainly teach this very thing; e. g. Ps. 22: 28. Is. II. XII. XL.—LXVI. Zech. 14: 9, 16, coll. Rev. 15: 4. And this same hope is clearly expressed by Paul, especially in Rom. XI.

(2) The Jews, at the time of the apostles and afterwards, explained many passages in their prophets as referring to the future restoration of their people at the time of the Messiah (Deut. xxx.); and these passages are referred in the New Testament, and by Paul, to the same event; from whence it is clear, that the apostles taught and inculcated the same thing with the ancient prophets; e. g. Is. 10: 21. 59: 20. Jerem. 31: 1, sq. Hos 3: 5. Zech. 14: 6. 9: 10. These passages indeed, have all been differently interpreted in modern times. Cf. Doederlein's work, *Giebt uns die Bible Hoffnung zu einer allgemeinen Judenbekehrung?* But the Jews understood these passages to refer to the restoration of their nation, and the New Testament gives them the same explanation. This is historically certain; and upon this every thing depends, when the question is, *Whether the New Testament teaches this doctrine?* Vid. Schöttgen, in the book, "Jesus, der wahre Messias." Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*; and Koppe on Rom. XI.

We may come now more easily to the examination of the celebrated passage, Rom. 11: 25, sq. Ernesti and others understand the *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται*, thus: all "Israel *can* be delivered;" but this does not accord with v. 31, *ἵνα αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθῶσι*, and v. 32, *τοὺς πάντας, ἐλέησῃ*. We cannot render these clauses: *in order that God can have pity*; no, he will *actually* have mercy upon them. Nor can we see any reason, according to this interpretation, why Paul should adopt such a high and elevated tone with regard to a matter which is self-evident, or how he could call this *μυστήριον*. It is also equally unintelligible, if this were all, what should have induced Paul so solemnly to celebrate and magnify the divine wisdom, vs. 33—36. But every thing is plain and consistent, if Paul is understood here to speak the language of prophecy. He proceeds on the ground of the expectation, universally prevalent among his countrymen, and authorized by the ancient prophets; he rectifies their ideas with regard to their future restoration, dis-

cards their false conceptions, their hopes of earthly good, and then says, with great assurance, that *all* Israel will hereafter be converted to Christ, as all the Gentiles will come to worship him ; although, when he wrote, there was no human probability of either of these events. But in all this, he does not give the least countenance to the enthusiastic conceptions frequently entertained on this subject. He does not fix any definite time. But theologians have often been unwilling to allow, that Paul affirmed the final conversion of the Jews, because enthusiastic ideas have often been connected with this doctrine, or because they have regarded this event as either impossible or improbable, since after the lapse of eighteen centuries, there are no signs of its accomplishment.

The sentiment of this passage is as follows : ‘ I must propose one other important subject for your (i. e. the Gentile converts) consideration,—a subject with which you have been hitherto unacquainted, and which has therefore been disregarded by you, in order that you may not be proud of your advantages over the unbelieving Jews. Namely, some of the Jews will continue unbelieving until all the Gentiles who are chosen by God (πλήρωμα ἐθνῶν) shall have believed in Christ. (This will, therefore, first take place.) But when this is first brought about (καὶ οὕτω for καὶ τότε or ἔπειτα vid. Koppe), i. e. when all the Gentiles have first become believers (now follows the μυστήριον), *then will the nation of the Israelites also experience salvation* (σωθήσεται), by embracing the Christian faith. For, thus it is said in the Scriptures, the Deliverer (Messiah) will come out of Zion (David’s line), and then will I free Jacob from his sins (Is. xlix.).’ Cf. Koppe, on this passage. Paul here quotes the same passages of the Old Testament, from which the Jews had always proved, that an entire restoration of their nation was predicted by the prophets ; though he did not understand them, as they often did, to refer to an external, civil restoration.

§ 155. *Of the general Judgment, and the end of the present constitution of the world.*

I. The general Judgment.

The following texts may be considered as the most important relating to the last Judgment; viz. Matt. 25: 31. John v. 2 Thess. 1: 7—10. 1 Thess. 4: 16, 17. 2 Pet. 3: 7—13. 1 Cor. xv. and Rev. 20: 11.—In illustration of this doctrine, it may be observed,

(1) According to the uniform doctrine of the Scriptures, the Judgment of the world will follow immediately after the general Resurrection; and then will be the *end of the world*, or of its present constitution. Cf. 1 Cor. xv.

(2) This doctrine of a general judgment of the world, was also prevalent among the Jews at the time of Christ and the Apostles; although they frequently associated with it many incorrect notions. This doctrine, as well as that of future retribution and resurrection, was without doubt, more and more developed and illustrated, under the divine guidance and direction, by the prophets and teachers of the Jewish nation, who lived after the Exile; vid. § 149, II. 2. This was done more particularly at the same period of time in which those other doctrines were developed. But there are also passages in Daniel which allude to this event; e. g. ch. xii.

Before the Exile, the doctrine of the Judgment *as a solemn, formal transaction at the end of the world*, was not clearly taught. At that time, the Jews held only the general truth, that God is the righteous Judge of the world, who in his own time would pronounce righteous sentence upon all men, according to their deserts, and bring all their works, even the most secret, to light; vid. Ps. 9: 5—9. Eccl. 9: 9. 12: 13, 14. The doctrine which was afterwards developed among the Jews, and in the form in which it existed among them at the time of Christ, was expressly authorized and confirmed by him as true, and as constituting a part of his religious system; in such a way, however, as to exclude the false additions of the Jewish teachers.

(3) The holding of this judgment, as well as the raising of the dead, is commonly ascribed in the New Testament to Christ, and

represented as a commission or plenipotentary power, which the Father had given to the man Jesus, as Messiah. Thus it is said, Rom. 2: 16, θεὸς (cf. v. 6.) κρινεῖ τὰ κρυπτά ἀνθρώπων διὰ Ἰησοῦ and Christ himself says, John 5: 22, 25, κρίσιν πᾶσαν δέδωκε τῷ υἱῷ. Vid. Matt. 16: 27. Acts 10: 42. 17: 31. Cf. § 98, II. 3, and Morus p. 294, not. 8, and p. 296, not. 3. Christ himself assigns it as the reason, why God had entrusted to him the holding of this Judgment, that he is *a man* (υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου); John 5: 27, coll. Acts 17: 31, ἀνθρώ. God has constituted him the Judge of men, because he is man, and knows, from his own experience, all the sufferings and infirmities to which our nature is exposed, and can therefore be compassionate and indulgent; Heb. 2: 14—17, coll. 1 Tim. 2: 5.

(4) *Names given in the Scriptures to the last Judgment.* The time of this Judgment, and the Judgment itself, are called in the passages already cited, ἡμέρα (יום) κυρίου or Ἰησοῦ, Χριστοῦ, κ. τ. λ.; also ἡμέρα μεγάλη (גדול יום), Jude v. 6; κρίσις (sometimes written κατὰκρίσις), κρίμα, παρουσία Χριστοῦ, 1 Thess. 4: 15. 2 Thess. 2: 1; ἐσχάτη ἡμέρα, John 6: 39, 40, 44. Hence the ecclesiastical name of this transaction, *judicium extremum*, or *novissimum*, *the last Judgment*, because it will take place at the end of the world that now is. The term, *the last Judgment*, is not used, however, in the New Testament. Nor are the phrases ἐσχάτη ἡμέρα and τὸ ἐσχάτον τῶν ἡμέρων used exclusively with reference to the end of the world. They often designate merely *the future, coming days*, e. g. 2 Tim. 3: 1. 2 Pet. 3: 3; like יְהִיָּה הַיָּמִים, Gen. 49: 1. They sometimes also denote *the last period of the world, or the times of the Messiah*; e. g. Heb. 1: 1. 1 Pet. 1: 20, like τέλη αἰώνων, αἰὼν μέλλον, Heb. עולם הבא.

(5) *The time of the Judgment or of the end of the world, and its signs or precursors*; vid. Morus p. 304, § 13.—According to the assurance of the Apostles this time is unknown. Yet many of the Jewish Christians at the times of the Apostles, supposed that it would take place immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Jewish state, because the Jews believed that their temple and city would stand until the end of the world; vid. § 98, II. 3. But the Apostles never affirmed this; they never pretended to the knowledge of a divine revelation respecting the time; but contented themselves with saying, that it would come suddenly and unexpectedly,

like a thief in the night ; 1 Thess. 5: 2. 2 Pet. 3: 10. In the first of these texts, Paul shows that this event was not so near, as some at that time supposed ; and in the second, Peter shows, that the actual coming of this event could not be doubted, merely because it seemed to some to be long delayed. In 2 Cor. 4: 14, Paul considers himself and his contemporaries as being among those, *whom God would raise from the dead through Christ* ; he did not, therefore, expect himself to survive the Judgment of the World, although from other passages it might seem, that he at least wished he might. It is not by chance, that the declaration of the Apostles, that they could not determine the time and the hour of this event, is so clearly preserved to us. Were there any reason to charge them with the opposite, to what contempt would their doctrine be exposed !

As to the signs and precursors of this event, nothing can be very definitely determined from the New Testament ; nothing certainly by which we can draw conclusions with any safety, with regard to the precise time of its occurrence. No indications, pointing definitely to the day and hour, can be expected, especially for this reason, that the coming of this event is always described as sudden and unexpected ; cf. 2 Pet. 3: 10. Even with regard to the far less important revolution among the Jewish people, in the overthrow of their state, it is said, Matt. 13: 32, that the exact time when it would take place, no one but God knew, not even the angels nor the Son of Man, in his humiliation. And yet there have never, at any period, been wanting persons, who have undertaken to determine definitely the time and hour of this event. They have commonly reasoned from some, and often very arbitrary, explanations of the Apocalypse, and from calculations drawn from the same. This ingenious search after the time and hour of the fulfilment of the divine predictions, is not according to the mind and will of Christ, since it usually leads to the neglect of what is more important ; and besides, nothing is gained by it ; vid. Acts 1: 7.

In the earliest age of the Church, many supposed, that the end of the world would follow immediately upon the destruction of Jerusalem. When this event was passed, other calculations were made. In the tenth century the opinion was very prevalent in the Western Church, that the end of the world was near at hand, because, according to Rev. 20: 3, 4, the Millennial kingdom should commence after a thousand years. This belief had the effect, upon the multitudes who

adopted it, to render them inactive ; they squandered and consumed their goods ; they suffered their houses to go to ruin ; and many families were reduced to want. Hence in the eleventh century there was more building and repairing done, than at any other period.

From this we may conclude, that the way to promote the conversion of men, is not as it were to compel them to it, by the fear of the proximity of the last day. Even in modern times many theologians, and those too of some celebrity, have entered into calculations of this kind, drawn chiefly from the Apocalypse ; e. g. Bengel, Crusius, and others.

What we are definitely taught on this subject in the New Testament may be stated as follows : the Christian Church will hereafter be subjected to great temptation from heathen profaneness, from false, delusive doctrine, and extreme moral corruption, and will seem for a time to be ready to perish from these causes ; but then Christ will appear, and according to his promise, triumph over this opposition ; and then, and not till then, will the end of the world come ; Christ will visibly appear, and hold the general Judgment, and conduct the pious into the kingdom of the blessed. This is the distinct doctrine of Paul, 2 Thess. 2: 3—12, and is taught throughout the Apocalypse, 12: 18—22: 5, and this is sufficient for our instruction, warning, and comfort.

(6) As to the *nature* of the general Judgment, and the *manner* in which it will be conducted by Christ, we can state on scriptural authority only the following particulars.

(a) That Christ will pronounce sentence upon *all* men, even on those who have lived in paganism, Rom. 2: 6, sq. Acts 17: 71, vid. § 98, II. 3. Final sentence will then, too, be pronounced upon the Evil Spirits, Jude v. 6. 2 Pet. 2: 4. Matt. 25: 41. For other texts, cf. Morus p. 294, not. 1. and 3.

(b) This sentence will be *righteous* and *impartial*, 2 Tim. 4: 8. Every one will be judged according to the light he has enjoyed, and the use he has made of it. Those who have had the written law, will be judged according to that ; the heathen, according to the light of nature, Rom. 2: 13—10. Those who have had greater knowledge, and more opportunities and powers for doing good than others, and yet have neglected or abused them, will receive a severer sentence ; etc. Matt. 10: 15. 11. 23, 24. 2 Thess. 1: 5. Morus p. 294, not. 4.

(c) This will be the *final* and *irrevocable* sentence, by which rewards will be bestowed upon the righteous, and punishments allotted to the wicked, for their good and evil actions, and the thoughts of the hearts; Matt. 25: 31—46. 2 Cor. 5: 10. 1 Cor. 4: 5. Rom. 2: 6, 16.

Note. It has for a long time been disputed among theologians, whether the Judgment of the World will be an *external, visible, formal* transaction, or whether *the mere decision respecting the destiny of man*, the actual taking effect of retribution, is represented under the image of a judicial proceeding, like what is now common among men? The reasons alledged on both sides of this question, are stated by Gerhard, in his *Loci Theologici*. Cf. Morus p. 295, not. 1. The latter opinion is adopted by many theologians at the present time, e. g. Eckermann, Henke, and others, who contend that this whole representation was intended by Christ and the Apostles to be merely *figurative*, and should be so understood. It is clear, however, from the New Testament, unless its language is arbitrarily interpreted and explained away, that the first Christian teachers every where represent the Judgment of the world, as a solemn, visible transaction, distinct from *retribution*; though its more particular nature cannot be distinctly determined or made plain to us; and is, therefore, described in the New Testament for the most part by figures. This is very well expressed by Morus p. 295, § 6. If the New Testament taught the contrary opinion, its doctrines would not be consistent with each other. For according to the New Testament, man will possess a *body*, even in the future life, and continue to be, as he now is, a being composed both of *sense* and *reason*; and so there, as well as here, he will have the want of something *cognizable by the senses*.

With regard to this subject, as well as many others, the Bible is accustomed to connect figurative and literal phraseology together, and to use these two modes of speech interchangeably, in order to render clear and impressive to our minds many things which could not otherwise be represented plainly and forcibly enough. Thus it is, for example, in the discourses of Christ on this subject, Matt. 16: 27, sq., and ch. xxv. By all which he has there said in a figurative style, the idea should be impressed that Christ will visibly appear, in a majestic manner, pronounce some *innocent* and others *guilty*, and treat them accordingly. In the courts of the ancients it was a custom, to place the former on the *right* hand, the latter on the *left*; and every one who heard this discourse of Christ knew what he meant by this representation. He taught the same truth without a figure, when he declared, that some should be pardoned and made happy, and others pronounced guilty and punished.

II. Scriptural doctrine respecting the End of the World.

(1) Even the ancient Hebrews believed, that as the world had a beginning, it would also have an end; and so their prophets

speak of *the growing old* of the heavens and the earth. They teach, that hereafter the whole material creation will become unfit for its purposes, and useless to its inhabitants, and that God will then lay by the aged heavens, like an old, worn out garment, and create a new heaven, and a new earth. Vid. Ps. 102: 10—12, where this is described, in opposition to the eternity and unchangeableness of God. Cf. Heb. 1: 19—12.

Our seeing the constant fluctuations and changes of all things, the wasting and falling away of the hardest rocks, and other observations of a similar nature, may lead to the same thought, and give it confirmation.

Hence we find, even in the Old Testament, such expressions as the following, *until the heavens are no more, until the sun and the moon are no more*; e. g. Job 14: 12. So in Ps. 72: 5, 7, 17, where a time far removed is expressed by this phraseology; for this period was naturally conceived of as far distant, since changes of this nature are found by experience to require a long time. Moreover in the prophets, such expressions as *the destruction of the Heavens and of the Earth, the growing pale and darkening of the Sun and Moon*, are often used figuratively, to denote great changes in the world,—the calamity and downfall of particular states and countries, etc., e. g. Is. xiii. (respecting Babel); ch. xxxiv. Ezech. xxi. Rev. vi. Matt. 24: 29, sq. On the contrary the phrases *new heavens, new earth, the clear shining sun*, etc., are used to denote the welfare, and returning prosperity of states; e. g. Is. 65: 17. 66: 22. 13: 10, et passim. But these very figurative expressions presuppose the literal idea.

(2) From these more general ideas and expectations respecting great changes hereafter to take place in the Universe, there was developed among the Jews and other nations, the more definite idea of the future destruction of the world, and especially of our earth. Every thing, it was supposed, would be hereafter shattered and destroyed, but not annihilated; since from the ruins of the ancient structure, there would come forth again a renewed and beautified creation. Philo says (De vita Mosis, Tom. II. p. 144, ed. Mangey), *νέα ἀναφαίνεται ἡ γῆ, μετὰ κάθαρσιν, the earth shall appear new again, after its purification*, even as it was after its first creation. He calls this renovation *παλιγγενεσίαν, νεωτερισμὸν τῶν στοιχείων, &c.*; as the Greeks also denominated the same thing *παλιγγενε-*

οίαν τοῖν ὄλων,—an expression used by the Stoics with reference to this subject. This end of the world was not, then, described as its entire destruction or *annihilation*.

Now Christ and the Apostles taught the doctrine of the End of the World very distinctly and plainly, and sanctioned what was previously known on this subject by their own authority; vid. Matt. 5: 18. Luke 21: 33. 2 Pet. III. 1 Cor. xv. Rev. 20: 11, et passim. But among the Jews and some others, the doctrine prevailed, that this change would be effected by a *general conflagration*. This belief in such a conflagration did not at first rest upon any arguments drawn from a profound knowledge of natural philosophy; such, for example, as the supposition of a fire burning in the centre of the earth, or the approximation of a comet, as many modern writers have thought, but they were first led to this belief, and afterwards confirmed in it, by thoughts like the following: *Water and fire* are the two most powerful and efficient elements, by which the most violent changes are produced in the earth, and by which desolations and renovations are effected. Now we find traditions among all nations respecting great floods of water, and the desolations occasioned by them in the earliest times. According to Moses, the water originally covered the whole earth, and the dry land issued from thence, and then followed Noah's flood. It was now the expectation, that hereafter the other still more fearful element, *the fire*, which even now often causes such terrible desolations, would effect a still more amazing and universal revolution, than that effected by the water, and that by this means the earth would be renewed and beautified.

It was by such analogies as these, that this traditionary belief was confirmed and illustrated among the heathen nations where it prevailed. It was afterwards adopted by many philosophers into their systems, and advocated by them on grounds of natural philosophy. Thus, for example, Heraclitus among the Greeks contended for such a conflagration and regeneration of the earth by means of fire; and so after him the Stoics. Cf. Cicero, De nat. Deor. II. 46; and Seneca, Quæst. Nat. II. 28—30.

This doctrine of the perishing of the world by fire, was unquestionably prevalent among the Jews at the time of Christ and the Apostles, although Philo does not accede to it in his book περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου. The arguments which he there brings against it,

are, however, extremely meagre, built partly upon arbitrary metaphysical reasoning, and partly upon a play on the word *κόσμος*.

In one passage of the New Testament, this doctrine is very distinctly stated, 2 Pet. 3: 7—13. It cannot be thought, that what is here said respecting the burning of the world is to be understood figuratively as Wetstein supposes; because the fire is here too directly opposed to the literal water of the flood, to be so understood. It is the object of Peter to refute the boast of scoffers, that all things had remained unchanged from the beginning, and that therefore no day of Judgment and no end of the world could be expected. And so he says, that originally, at the time of the Creation, the whole earth was covered and overflowed with water, Gen. 1., and that from hence the dry land appeared; and the same was true at the time of Noah's flood. But there is yet to come a great *fire-revolution*. The heavens and the earth (the earth with its atmosphere) are reserved, or kept in store, for the fire, until the Day of Judgment, V. 10; at that time the Heavens will pass away (*παρέχθῃ*) with a great noise, the elements will be dissolved by fervent heat, and every thing upon the earth will be burnt up. The same thing is taught in v. 12. But in v. 13, Peter gives the design of this Revolution; it will not be an annihilation, but "*we expect a new heaven, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness*;" i. e. an entirely new, altered, and beautified abode for man, to be built from the ruins of his former dwelling-place, as the future habitation of the pious; cf. Rev. 21: 1, sq. This will be very much in the same way, as a more perfect and an immortal body will be reared from the body which we now possess.—The passage, Rom. 8: 19, sq. also treats of this renovation and beautifying of the world. Vid. Morus, p. 303, not. 5. Cf. with regard to the subjects here discussed, Süsskind's "*Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und Moral*," 10tes St. No. 2, respecting the Jewish ideas of the Messiah as the Governor of the world and the raiser of the dead; and No. 3, the declarations of Jesus in which he ascribes to himself the raising of the dead, the judging of the world, and a kingdom at the end of the world.

§ 156. *Of the punishments of Hell, or eternal condemnation.*

I. Scriptural names and representations of these punishments, and of the place where they will be inflicted.

According to the doctrine of the Jewish nation at the time of Christ,—a doctrine which he himself receives as true, and expressly authorizes and confirms,—the wicked are miserable, and the righteous happy, even immediately after death ; cf. what was said respecting the intermediate state, § 150. Still it is not until after the day of Judgment, that the perfect blessedness of the righteous, or the entire misery of the wicked, will properly commence, and they enter upon the state of full retribution. The former will then go to an abode of joy,—the latter, to a place of sorrow. Vid. Wetstein on Matt. 25: 46. The condition of wicked men and of the fallen Angels before the day of Judgment, is described by the sacred writers, as like that of malefactors while yet in prison, before the final judicial sentence is pronounced upon them.

The place in which they are confined is properly called *Tάρταρος*, and it is a part of Hades,—the invisible world, in which bad angels and ungodly men are reserved until the day of Judgment ; vid. § 150, I. 1. This place is also called *ζόφος*, or *σκότος* in the Epistle of Jude and in the 2 Pet. ii., and *γυλακή* in 1 Pet. 3: 19. Even in this place the wicked are represented as indeed unhappy, but their complete misery will not commence until after judicial sentence has been pronounced upon them.

The place of punishment *after Judgment*, is not revealed in the Scriptures, nor is it known distinctly, whether the Jews conceived of it as *under* the earth, or as entirely beyond the boundaries of our planet. The term *ᾗδης* is not used in the Scriptures to designate specifically *this* place, for *ᾗδης* and *ᾗδης* are the names given to the kingdom of the dead, where the righteous and the wicked both abide after death ; vid. § 150, I. The more appropriate designations of this place are *λίμνη πυρὸς καὶ θείου*, Rev. 20: 10, 15 ; and *γεέννα*, Matt. 10: 28. 5: 22, on which place cf. Wetstein.

The names given to these punishments themselves, both before and after Judgment, are in part figurative ; and many terms which were commonly applied by the Jews to this subject, are retained in

the New Testament. These images are taken from death, capital punishments, tortures, prisons, etc; and it is the design of the sacred writers, in using such figures, to awaken the idea of something terrible and fearful: future punishment, they mean to teach will awaken in men the same feelings of distress, as are produced by the objects employed to represent it.—Some of the more general and literal names of this punishment are, ὅλεθρος αἰώνιος, 2 Thess. 1: 9; ὀργὴ μέλλουσα, Matt. 3: 7; κόλασις αἰώνιος, Matt. 25: 46; βάνισαντοι, Luke 16: 24, 25. The more figurative names are θάνατος, John 8: 51. 11: 26; θάνατος δεύτερος, Rev. 20: 6, etc. vid. § 147, II.; σκότος and ζόφος τοῦ σκότους, Matt. xxv. Jude v. 6, sq.; πῦρ αἰώνιον, γλῶξ πυρός, Matt. 25: 41. 18: 8. 2 Thess. 1: 9; *the worm which dies not*, Mark 9: 44, where the comparison is taken from Is. 66: 24; πορεύεσθαι ἀπὸ θεοῦ, in opposition to *beholding the countenance of God*, Matt. 25: 41; *having no rest day or night*, Rev. 14: 11, etc.

Many of the Jews, and some even of the Church Fathers, took these terms in an entirely literal sense, and supposed there would be literal fire, etc., in Hell. But nothing more can be inferred with certainty from the words of Christ and the apostles, than that they meant by these images, to describe great and unending misery. The name adopted by the schoolmen, *damnatio æterna* is founded upon Heb. 6: 2, where we find κρίμα (i. e. κατὰκριμα) αἰώνιον, cf. 2 Thess. 1: 9.

II. Nature of future Punishments.

It is certain from the plainest declaration of the Holy Scriptures (cf. § 155), and may also be proved on grounds of reason, that the happiness or misery of the future world, stands in most intimate connexion with the present life. The rewards and blessedness of the world to come, are to be regarded as the salutary and happy consequences of the present life and conduct of men; and on the contrary, the punishments there to be endured, and future misery, as the sad and fatal consequences of their character and actions in this world. Our future good or evil estate is dependent upon our present life and character.

The divine punishments are divided into *natural*, and *positive* or *arbitrary*, and both these kinds belong to future punishment. Vid. §§ 31, 86, 87.

(1) Among *natural* punishments we may reckon the following ; viz.

(a) The loss or deprivation of eternal happiness, *poena damni*, Matt. 7: 21—23, ἀποχωρεῖτε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ. Matt 22: 13. 25: 41 ; in all of these texts the representation is figurative. Cf. 2 Thess. 1: 9, δίκην τίσουσιν—ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ κυρίου, i. e. removed from Christ, and from the happiness which he enjoys.

(b) The painful sensations which are the natural consequence of committing sin, and of an inpenitent heart, *poena sensus*. These punishments are inevitable, and connected as closely and inseparably with sin, as any effect with its cause. From the consciousness of being guilty of sin, arise, regret, sorrow, and remorse of conscience, and it is these inward pangs, which are the most grievous and tormenting. The conscience of man is a stern accuser, which cannot be refuted or bribed, and the more its voice is disregarded or suppressed here upon earth, the more loudly will it speak hereafter. For man will then be no longer surrounded, as he is in this world, with external circumstances which distract the mind, and prevent him from seeing the heinousness of sin, and from reflecting on his unhappy situation. He will pass at once from the noise and tumult of the things of sense, into the stillness of the future world, and will there awake to reflection. He will then see, how he has neglected the means of improvement and salvation, and to what irreparable injury he has thus exposed himself.

Add to this, that the propensity to sin, the passions and evil desires, which in this world occupy the human heart, are carried along into the next. For it cannot be supposed, that they will be suddenly eradicated, as by a miracle ; and this is not promised. But these desires and propensities can no longer find satisfaction in the future world, where man will be placed in an entirely different situation, and surrounded by a circle of objects entirely new ; hence they will become the more inflamed. From the very nature of the case it is plain therefore, that the state of such a man hereafter must necessarily be miserable. Shame, regret, remorse, hopelessness, and absolute despair, are the natural, inevitable, and extremely dreadful consequences of the sins committed in this life.

(2) But there are also, according to the most incontrovertible declarations of the Scriptures, *positive* or *arbitrary* punishments, i. e. such as stand in no natural and necessary connexion with sin ;

vid. Morus, p. 297, not. 2. This is, indeed, denied by those who will not allow that God inflicts any arbitrary punishments, vid. § 31, 86, 87. But even if they suppose they can make their opinion appear probable on philosophical grounds, they ought not still to assert, that the doctrine of positive punishments is not taught in the Bible. All the ancient nations, who believed in the punishments of Hell, regarded these punishments, at least the most severe and terrible of them, as *positive* or *arbitrary*, i. e. as depending on the will of the Legislator; as on the other hand, they regarded the rewards of the pious, as not merely natural, but principally arbitrary.

There are, in fact, but few men in such a state, that the merely natural punishments of sin will appear to them terrible enough to deter them from the commission of it. And so for this reason, if for no other, the doctrine of positive punishments should be retained in popular instruction. Experience also shows, that to threaten positive punishment has far more effect, as well upon the cultivated as the uncultivated, in deterring them from crime, than to announce and lead men to expect the merely *natural* consequences of sin, be they ever so terrible. Hence we may see why it is, that the New Testament says little of natural punishments, (although these beyond a question await the wicked,) and makes mention of them in particular far less frequently, than of positive punishments; and why, in those passages which treat of the punishments of Hell, such expressions and images are almost always employed, as suggest and confirm the idea of positive punishments; cf. No. I. of this Section ad finem.

Those, therefore, who consider Jesus to be a teacher of truth, in whose mouth there was no guile, must necessarily believe also his often repeated declarations on this subject. It is very inconsistent in some modern philosophers and theologians to admit of positive *rewards* for the pious, and yet deny positive punishments for the wicked. We are indeed compelled to admit positive rewards, because those which are merely natural are not sufficient to complete the measure of our happiness. If the positive rewards are probable on grounds of reason, how can it be said, that positive punishments are impossible and contradictory? It was, moreover, the prevailing doctrine among the Jews at the time of Christ, that punishments are for the most part positive, and that they affect even the body. Hence the words of Christ, ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, Matt. 10:

28. For since the impenitent will be again clothed with a body at the Resurrection, this body must participate in their punishment, as the body of the righteous will participate in their reward.

As to the question, *In what these positive or corporeal punishments will consist*; no definite answer can be drawn from the Bible; because it is plainly intended, that all the representations made of this subject should be understood figuratively and by way of comparison; i. e. these punishments will consist of pains like those, e. g. arising from fire, or from a gnawing worm. We are so little acquainted with the state in which we shall be hereafter, and with the nature of our future body, that no strictly literal representation of future punishments could be made intelligible to us. Even the place in which the wicked are confined will contribute much to their misery; also the company of other sinners, and of evil spirits, a circumstance, particularly mentioned in Matt. 25: 41.

Note. The efforts of those who have endeavoured to persuade even the common people and the young, that no *positive* divine punishments are to be expected in the world to come, have ever had a most injurious tendency, as the history of all ages will show. For the deep-rooted expectation of such punishments among all nations, has always been a check upon the more gross out-breakings of sin. It was from this expectation that the oath derived its sacredness and inviolableness. It is often said by Cicero and others, that all philosophers, both Greek and Roman, are agreed in this, that the gods do not punish, *deos non nocere*. But as soon as this opinion of the philosophers began to prevail among the people, it produced, according to the testimony of all the Roman writers, the most disastrous consequences, which lasted for centuries. No subsequent efforts could ever succeed in awakening a fear of divine punishments in the minds of the great multitude. Hence resulted the deplorable degeneracy of the Roman Empire. Truth and faith ceased, chastity became contemptible, perjury was practised without shame, and every species of luxurious excess and of cruelty was indulged. To this corruption, no philosopher was able to oppose any effectual resistance; until at length its course was arrested by Christianity.

Among Christians themselves such efforts have always been followed by similar disastrous consequences.

(1) The papal sale of indulgences, which became general during the twelfth, and the succeeding centuries, and especially after the Crusades, had a tendency, in the same way, to diminish the fear of positive divine punishments; because it was supposed one might purchase exemption from them. The result of this delusion was equally deplorable in this case, as in the one before mentioned; the greatest immoralities prevailed throughout Christian lands; until this evil was arrested by the Reformation, and the fear and the love of God were both awakened anew in the hearts of Christians.

(2) A similar result took place in England in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when some rationalist philosophers, during the reign of Charles II., undertook to emancipate the minds of men from the fear of positive divine punishments. The effect of their efforts is well known from history. Frivolity of spirit, immorality, sins of impurity, and all the dreadful consequences of forgetting God, suddenly prevailed.

(3) The principles of these English philosophers were gradually diffused through France, by the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, and others; and after 1740, they were also adopted and disseminated by some even in Germany. The history of our own times shows us sufficiently what has been the result of these principles here.

It is agreeable to the Gospel,—it is, indeed, the very spirit of the Gospel, to represent God as *Love*. It is also right for the evangelical teacher, indeed it is his duty, to preach respecting the infinite love of God, especially as it is manifested in Jesus Christ. In this his whole heart should live. But he must never forget to teach, in what order and on what conditions alone man becomes susceptible of these proofs of the divine favor. The Gospel itself, though at a loss for words sufficiently to magnify the infinite love of God, represents also his penal justice in a light extremely terrifying to all who do not fall in with this prescribed order, and threatens them with the most severe and inevitable punishments in the world to come. Both of these views should, therefore, be connected together. Cf. the small work written by Jacobi, *Was soll ich zur Beruhigung meiner Seele glauben? Was soll ich hoffen bey den mannichfaltigen Meinungen der Gelehrten?* 1790, S. 83—96.

III. The justice and necessity of the punishments of Hell; the sins, which bring condemnation in their train; and the different degrees of punishment.

(1) That there will be punishments in the future state, has been believed by nearly all men who have reflected impartially upon the world, the destiny of man as a moral being, and upon the attributes of God. It is obvious to every one, that the earth is not the theatre of the divine justice, and that the lot of man here below is not justly apportioned to his moral conduct. The greatest criminal often goes unpunished, and lives perhaps in external peace and prosperity; and the pious, good man is often unrewarded, lives in adverse external circumstances, and frequently is severely persecuted. All this now appears to contradict our ideas of the divine justice, goodness, and wisdom, and makes the destination of man an inexplicable riddle.

As soon, therefore, as men came to believe in a future life, and began to reflect upon the disproportion which now exists between the moral character and the happiness of men, the thought would

naturally suggest itself to their minds, that the proper theatre of divine justice will be first opened in the world to come, and that the punishment of the sinner there, may be as confidently expected, as the reward of the righteous; since in this way only can either the justice or goodness of God be vindicated. Vid. the Article on Providence, especially § 71, VI. ad finem. Also Michaelis, Ueber die Lehre von der Sünde, S. 314.—Such accordingly is the uniform representation of the New Testament; vid. 2 Thess. 1: 5, sq. Rom. 2: 6, sq.

(2) *Causes of condemnation.* According to the conceptions of men possessing only a very limited and imperfect knowledge of moral things, it is only a few of the grosser crimes which are punished after death. In proportion as their ideas on moral subjects become enlarged and perfected, the number of offences which they regard as liable to punishment, is increased; and they come at length to the just result, that every sin must be punished; vid. § 150, II. 2. And so, according to the express doctrine of the New Testament, all *irreligiousness* (an ungodly disposition, forgetfulness of God, ἀσέβεια), every transgression of the divine precepts, all kinds of vice and moral corruption, will be inevitably punished in the future world. And this punishment will be inflicted not only upon those who, like Jews and Christians, have the express, written law of God, but also upon the heathen, who have merely the law of Nature; vid. Rom. 2: 6—16. Gal. 4: 8. Matt. 25: 41, sq. 1 Cor. 6: 9. 2 Pet. 2: 1—3.

Especially is ἀπιστία or ἀπειθεία represented as a cause of condemnation. So Mark 16: 16, “he that believeth not, is condemned.” John 3: 18. and v. 36, ὁ ἀπειθῶν νῦν οὐκ ὀψεται ζωήν, ἀλλ’ ἡ ὁργὴ θεοῦ μένει ἐπ’ αὐτόν. By this unbelief is meant, the deliberate rejection of the doctrine of Christ, and disobedience to his precepts, against one’s better conviction. It includes also, apostasy from the Christian doctrine when it has been once received and acknowledged as true; Heb. 10: 26, 39.—Every thing, therefore, which draws after it punishment in the future world, may be comprehended under ἀπιστία and ἀνομία,—a criminal disbelief and transgression of the divine precepts. Whoever, then, is ἄπιστος or ἄνομος, will be unhappy hereafter, however different the degrees of unhappiness may be. On the contrary, πιστός and ἔννομος βίος (εὐσέβεια) will be followed by blessedness, however great

the difference in degree may be.—It will be understood of course, that among the *unbelieving* who will be punished, those are not included, who have no opportunity to become acquainted with the divine will or with the Christian doctrine, or who are naturally incapacitated for this; in short, those who do not believe without any fault of their own; e. g. children and many of the heathen; vid. § 121.

Note. As to the *number* of those who will be saved and lost, the Bible says nothing definitely. When, on a certain occasion, the question was proposed to Christ, *Whether the number of the saved would be small?* he gave an answer, according to Luke 13: 23, sq., of the following import: “Ask not such questions from an idle curiosity; but act as if thou wert alone among many thousands.” There are, indeed, *many* who will be saved, cf. vs. 28, 29, and Rev. 7: 9; but among them there will be many, whose lot it was supposed would be different; and not all of those who account themselves the heirs of salvation, and are so esteemed by others, will be found in this number, vs. 29, 30. It is often distinctly affirmed by Christ, that among those who profess his name there are many, who will not obtain eternal life, although he desires to lead all to salvation. E. g. Matt. 20: 16. 22: 14, “many are called, but few are chosen,” i. e. many who hear me, suffer themselves to be instructed in my doctrine, and become externally professors of my religion (*κλητοί*); but few, however, belong to the number of the chosen saints, the elect, those who are well-pleasing in the sight of God, who do that which is commanded them, who are what they should be. It is the same as to Matt. 7: 13, 14, where Christ shows, that the way in which many teachers lead the people, is not the right way for attaining salvation, i. e. their instruction is not true and salutary, although followed by the majority of men (*latavia*); the right and sure way which he points out, meets with less approbation (it is narrow and forsaken, trodden by few), because it is more difficult and requires many sacrifices. For there were at that time but few who believed on him, and kept his commandments with the whole heart.

(3) As there are future punishments, they must be *different in degree*; vid. Morus, p. 298, § 9. This might be concluded *à priori*, and might be reasonably expected from the justice of God: for there are different degrees in sin, and one is greater than another; vid. § 81, II.; and hence punishments, both natural and positive, must be proportionately varied. Now this is the uniform doctrine of Jesus and the Apostles. The more knowledge of the divine will a man has, the more opportunity and inducement to avoid sin, the greater the incentives to faith and virtue which are held up before him; by so much is his responsibility increased, and the greater will be his punishment, if he does not make a faithful use of his ad-

vantages. "The servant who knows his Lord's will, and does it not, deserves to be beaten with many stripes." "To whom much is given, of him will much be required." Matt. 10: 15. 23: 15. Luke 12: 46. Hence Paul says that the Heathen, who act against the law of nature, will be punished; but that the Jews will be punished more than they, because they had more knowledge, and *more was given to them*.

But we can go no farther than this general rule, that this difference of degree will be apportioned *κατὰ γνώσιν, πίστιν, and ἔργα*. For God alone is able rightly to appoint punishments, and to fix their degree, since he alone is able by his omniscience to determine infallibly the degree of sin and its ill-desert. It may, therefore, be, that many whom we regard as utterly *damnable*, may not, in God's judgment deserve damnation, or not that degree of it which we award them. Others, on the contrary, to whom we might adjudge reward, may appear in the eyes of God, to deserve severe punishment.

§ 157. *Duration of future punishments; reasons for and against their eternal duration.*

I. Reasons in favor of the eternal duration of future punishments, and what is, or may be, objected against these reasons.

(1) *From the Holy Scriptures.* In the New Testament, the punishments of Hell are expressly described as *eternal*. In Matt. 25: 41, 46, we find *πῦρ αἰώνιον*, and *κόλασις αἰώνιος* opposed to *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*; in both of these sentences, therefore, must *αἰώνιος* be taken in the same sense, *per legem disjunctionis*. And so, if in connexion with *ζωή*, it means *unending, eternal*; it must mean the same in connexion with *πῦρ*. In accordance with this, must other texts be explained; as where it is said respecting the fallen angels, that they are bound in *δεσμοὶ αἰῶνιοι*, Jude v. 6, coll. 2 Pet. 2: 4. Rev. 14: 11; *ὁλεθρος αἰώνιος*, 2 Thess. 1: 9. Mark 9: 44, 46. Rev. 20: 10. So in John 3: 36, where it is said respecting unbe-

lievers, μένει ἡ ὀργὴ θεοῦ,—οὐκ ὄψεται ζοήν. In Matt. 26: 24 Christ says, respecting Judas, “that it would have been better for him, never to have been born.”

With regard to these texts we shall here subjoin some observations.

(a) On the texts in which αἰών and αἰώνιος are used. These are regarded by some as not decisive. For עָלְמָא and αἰών are used to denote any long duration, or period of time. Sometimes they refer to the *past*, and denote *ages gone by, ancient days, antiquity*; thus, πύλαι αἰώνια, Ps. 24: 7, 9; ἔτη αἰώνια, *years of antiquity*, Ps. 77: 5; χρόνοι αἰώνιοι, Rom. 16: 25; ἀπ’ αἰώνος, Acts 3: 21. Sometimes they refer to *future* time, and are applied to every thing which lasts long, although in time it may come to an end, or has come to it already. For the Hebrews and other ancient people have no *one* word for expressing the precise idea of *eternity*. Cf. Vol. I. § 20, III. respecting the eternity of God. Thus Paul, 2 Cor. 4: 18, opposes αἰώνιον to πρόσκαιρον. Thus διαθήκη αἰώνιος is used with reference to the Mosaic Institute, although it came to an end, Ex. 31: 16; the same as to ἱερατεία αἰώνιος, Num. 25: 13.

From this, as some suppose, it follows, that κόλασις αἰώνιος, may mean either the pain and condemnation *ordained by God of old* (as Christ says, with regard to the blessedness opposed to it, that it was προητοιμασμένη, Matt. 25: 34, 41); or misery and happiness *long continued, lasting for ages*, without yet designating a duration absolutely endless; or, both of these senses may be comprehended under this expression. In the invisible world, every thing is αἰώνιον and αἰδίων. There,—according to the conceptions of all nations,—time is not measured by years and short human periods, as it is here in the world; but by long periods, by ages.

To this some add the remark, that πῦρ and κόλασις αἰώνιος properly denote the *place*, the kingdom, the residence of the lost,—the state of condemnation; as βασιλεία θεοῦ and ζωὴ αἰώνιος denote the place, the abode of the blessed. This place, they say, may be *eternal*, because it will never be without occupants, or persons who endure punishment on account of sin. There will always be two different kingdoms, one of happiness, the other of misery, the distinction between which will never be removed, and which can never be united. But from this it does not follow, that every person who has once been there, or suffered punishment, will remain there forever.

(b) As to the phrase, *their worm dieth not*, etc. Mark ix., this, it is said, occurs also in Is. 66: 24, with reference to the unhappy fate of the idolatrous Israelites, and is transferred here to the punishments of Hell. Since, however, in the former case it does not denote an absolute eternity of suffering, but only its dreadfulness and long continuance; so it is at least *possible*, it may mean the same here. —And as to the term μένει in John iii., the idea of eternity is still less implied in this. As used by John, it may stand for εἶναι, and denote only the certainty, and inevitableness of future punishments.

(c) In the passage with regard to Judas, Matt. xxvi., the language employed, it is said, may be *proverbial* and *popular*, not admitting of a strict construction. It is as much as to say, “such an one makes himself extremely miserable; well would it be for him, had he never been born!”

But those texts in which there is a clear contrast between ζωὴ αἰώνιος and κόλασις αἰώνιος, cannot be so easily explained away, as some suppose. And if any one considers them impartially, and without attempting to prevent their obvious meaning, he will not fail to derive from them, as Morus justly observes, (p. 300, ad finem), “*idea sempiternitatis, non autem longi temporis.*” For since ζωὴ αἰώνιος in all the other discourses of Jesus, is understood, without contradiction, to denote a blessed life lasting *forever*; there is no reason for understanding it differently here. And if ζωὴ αἰώνιος here means *eternal life*, then *per legem disjunctionis*, must κόλασις αἰώνιος denote *eternal, unending* punishment.—And the other texts relating to this subject, must now be explained in accordance with these.

(2) Other arguments *à priori* have been employed in behalf of the eternity of future punishments.

(a) The guilt (*culpa, reatus*) of sin, it is said, is *infinite*, and its punishment must therefore be the same. The injured majesty of the law-giver is *infinite*, and hence punishment for the injury must be infinite too. This argument was employed by many of the schoolmen, e. g. Thomas Aquinas; and has also been urged by Mosheim, and other modern theologians.

Answer. There is no *infinitus reatus peccatorum*; nor can the object against which sin is committed, be made in every case the measure of its criminality or ill-desert; certainly this cannot be done with regard to God. Vid. § 81, ad finem.

(b) Every sin is followed, to all eternity, by injurious consequences to him who commits it ; as every virtue, or good action, is followed by good consequences. The wicked therefore must be miserable to all eternity, and endure the punishment of their sins.

Answer. This is very true, as far as *natural* punishments, or the *natural* evil consequences of sin, are spoken of. And if these are meant, when the eternity of future punishments is mentioned, then indeed must they be called *eternal* ; since something will always be detracted from the happiness of the sinner for his having sinned, even if he repents, and all positive punishments are removed from him or repealed ; as it cannot be otherwise, than that the *natural* consequences of sin should always remain. Those who have sinned, will always stand proportionably below others, in point of happiness, as there are degrees both of blessedness and misery.

Here, however, two things should be remarked ; viz. *first* ; all the consequences of our actions cannot be imputed to us, and so all the evil consequences of our actions cannot be regarded as *punishment*, especially in case it was impossible for us to foresee these consequences, or when we sinned unintentionally. *Secondly* ; divine Providence has wisely ordered it, that good and useful consequences shall often result even from the sins of men, and these consequences are equally *unending* ; e. g. through the unbelief of the Jews, the heathen are saved, according to Paul, Rom. xi. This now should be taken into consideration, in mitigation of the guilt and punishableness of many sins.

(c) Another argument in behalf of the eternity of future punishments is drawn from the *scientia media Dei* ; vid. § 22, I. With regard to some men, God foresaw, that if they continued here upon the earth, they would sin without cessation. Since now these persons are such, as to their whole constitution and disposition, that they would go on forever to sin ; they are justly punished forever. This argument was employed by Fulgentius, and Gregory the great ; and it has been again used of late by Drexel, Baumgarten, Troschel and others.

Answer. It cannot be reconciled with our ideas of justice, that sins which were never actually committed, should be punished as if they had been committed. If a human ruler should punish an individual for crimes, of which he was never actually guilty, but which he knew with certainty he would perpetrate, if he

had means, time, and opportunity, it would doubtless be pronounced unjust and tyrannical. The fact, too, is very questionable, whether there are any men who would go on to sin without interruption, in every possible situation and under all circumstances in which they might be placed in this world. Nothing like this is taught us in the Christian doctrine. According to this, God punishes only *τὰ ἔργα* or *ἃ ἐπραξεν ἕκαστος*. Rom. 2: 6. 2 Cor. 5: 10.

(d) The eternity of the punishments of Hell is inferred by others from the *bias to sin*, which will continually acquire strength in those who are lost, and finally make repentance impossible. It is often seen, even here upon the earth, how deeply this propensity to sin takes root, when it is long indulged, and how difficult, and indeed impossible, repentance becomes. Besides, the use of the *means of grace* is confined to the present life. Hereafter there will be no preaching of the word of God, and no sacraments and the grace of God will no longer be there given to bring men to repentance.

Answer. In these statements, there is much which is vague and incapable of proof.

First. The state of things in the future world, is very different from the state here. The reason why the bias to sin takes such deep root, and why reformation is so difficult in the present world, often lies in the external circumstances by which man is surrounded, and which make an irresistible impression upon his senses. As soon as these objects can be removed, or the impression which they make upon the senses can be weakened, it is seen that reformation becomes more easy. But now in the future world, the spirits of lost men will no longer be surrounded by these external objects which prove so exciting to the senses. So that, even if the impression before made upon them by these objects should for a while remain, they must still, from the very nature of the human soul, become weaker and weaker, in the absence of these excitements. It would seem, therefore, that sometimes at least, the propensity to sin must gradually decrease in the future world; especially when we consider, that those who are lost, being no longer deceived by external and sensible objects, and being no longer withdrawn from reflection as when upon the earth, will now see and deeply feel the evil consequences of sin.

Secondly. From hence we may conclude, if the use of reason is

not wholly denied to the damned, and if their moral nature is not wholly destroyed, that it is not improbable, that even in hell they *may possibly* conceive an abhorrence of sin, and renounce their love for it, although the word of God is not there preached, nor the sacraments there administered. Morus p. 301. The knowledge which they will carry with them from this life into the next, cannot be entirely obliterated; nor can it be supposed, that God will compel them to sin, or so entirely withhold from them his grace, that they will not be able to come to the knowledge of their sins, and to renounce the prejudice and wickedness cherished during the present life. For God to do this, would be to punish sin with sin, and to be himself the author of new offences. It may be asked, then, whether the end of the divine punishments, to promote the actual reformation of those upon whom they are inflicted, may not be attained even in the case of those who will hereafter be condemned?

Thirdly. But should any one say, that these punishments will be so severe, and will cause so great pain, that they will rather drive those upon whom they are inflicted to despair, distraction, or fury, than promote their repentance; he does not consider, that such a statement can hardly be reconciled with our ideas of the justice and goodness of God. These ideas do not permit us to suppose, that he will punish any one as an offender, from whom he himself has withdrawn all opportunity for repentance, and all freedom of action. He only can be rightly punished, who enjoyed freedom, but would not employ the means and opportunities for reformation which were offered him.

II. Arguments for the finiteness of future punishments, and objections to these arguments.

Besides what is commonly said to invalidate the prevailing opinion of the eternity of future punishments, the following arguments are often employed to support the opinion, that they are finite in duration. These arguments are of very unequal weight.

(1) *Arguments from the New Testament.* (a) The advocates of this opinion appeal to the declaration of Peter, Acts 3: 21, where *χρόνοι ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων* are spoken of, which God had before promised by the prophets. This is understood by many, to denote the future recovery of lost spirits and men to a happy condition, which is on this account called *Restoration*. (b) The finiteness of

future punishments is inferred by others, from the efficacy and universality of the merits of Christ. There is no reason, they say, to limit the salutary consequences of his work merely to the present life. It will continue to be efficacious in the future world, if man is only *willing* to reform. Such is the reasoning of many, and they refer to 1 Cor. 15: 22—28, where *θάνατος* denotes *misery* and the *punishment of sin*; and also other texts.

Answer. From the New Testament, however, no clear argument can be derived in behalf of the finite duration of future punishments. For,

(a) The passage in 1 Cor. xv. treats of *Death* in the literal sense; since *θάνατος* is there opposed to the Resurrection of the dead, and it is there expressly said, that Christ, in raising the dead to life, will conquer this last enemy of the human race. Cf. § 98, ad fin. This is, therefore, described as his last great work for the good of the human race. And so, judging from this passage, one could expect no influence of Christ, or of his work for the good of men, beyond the grave.

(b) That the passage referred to in Acts III. does not relate to this point, is beyond all question. Vid. Ernesti's Programm on this text, in his "Opusc. Theol." p. 477, sq. Cf. § 97, ad finem. The meaning of this passage is as follows: "The heavens have received Christ, or retain him within themselves, *as long as* (*ἄχρις οὗ*) *the happy period of the New Testament continues.*" He will not come again to found an earthly kingdom. In v. 20th, these *χρόνοι ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων* are called *καιροὶ ἀναψύξεως ἀπὸ Κυρίου*, and in Heb. 9: 10, *καιρὸς διορθώσεως*. Thus it is said in Matt. 17: 11, Ἰησὺς (i. e. John) *ἀποκαστήσει πάντα*, where the phrase is taken from the Sept. Version of Mal. 4: 6. *Πάντα* refers to every thing which needs reformation in religious affairs, and to every thing which is predicted by the prophets. Cf. Morus p. 301.

(c) Nor is there in the discourses of Jesus a single passage, which encourages the hope that there will be a termination of future punishments. Cf. e. g. Luke XVI.

(2) *Arguments from reason* for the finite duration of future punishments. The principal of these are drawn from our ideas of the divine attributes, the *goodness*, *wisdom*, and *justice* of God. How can it be reconciled with these attributes, it is asked, that God should make so large a number of his rational creatures forever

miserable? How can God, who is love itself, punish his creatures *eternally*, because they have lived a *few years only* in a thoughtless, wicked, and irrational manner? This seems to be wholly disproportionate. Again it is asked; how could God create beings whose eternal misery he foresaw?

To these questions it may be replied.

(a) That although the views expressed in them are in general true, yet our limited understanding is unable to determine, *in particular cases*, what is to be expected from the divine goodness, wisdom, and justice, and what is accordant with these attributes, and what otherwise. And so, although it may *appear* to us to be agreeable to the goodness, and the other attributes of God, to put a period to the punishments of Hell, still it does not follow, that he must necessarily, or will actually do this. Did we not see it to be a fact, that God has created a world in which there is so much physical and moral evil, we should proceed to argue, on this principle, that it would be inconsistent with his perfections to give such a world existence, and should think that we had reasoned conclusively.

(b) Again; in reply to the above questions it may be said, that God does not look merely at single individuals, but has respect to the whole of his creation, and that he must prefer the welfare of the whole to that of a few. The offender himself may not always be benefited by the divine punishments visited upon him; but his example may yet serve for the warning of others, and thus conduce to their good; cf. Rom. 9: 17, 22. Thus the eternal punishments inflicted upon some, may perhaps serve, through all eternity, to deter from sins many other beings in the boundless empire of God—good angels, and men redeemed, and perhaps still other classes of beings not belonging to this world. By this punishment, therefore, a good may be done for many which will overbalance the evil inflicted on a few. The subject is exhibited by Michaelis in this light in his Work, “Von der Sunde,” S. 325, sq. Plato in his Gorgias, near the end, ascribes a similar thought to Socrates; “he believed, that the irreclaimable part of mankind would be eternally punished as παραδείγματα, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὀρῶντες, φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίνωνται.”—There is much probability in this thought. The force of it, however, some endeavour to invalidate by saying, that it is conceiving of God too narrowly, and too much after the manner of men.

God cannot be wanting in other means, by which this object could be more easily and surely attained. Again; it is very much to be doubted, whether the example of persons condemned to eternal punishment, would have such a powerful effect upon all, and actually deter them from sin. This effect is not certainly produced upon many here in this world, who believe most confidently in the eternity of future punishments. Moreover it is an imperfection belonging to human legislators and rulers, and not therefore to be transferred to the supreme legislator, that the punishments inflicted by them often serve merely for the warning of others, and cannot secure the reformation of those who are punished. Vid. Vol. I. § 31, No. 2, respecting the positive justice of God.

§ 158. *Result drawn from comparing and examining the different arguments for and against the eternal duration of future punishment; and a sketch of the history of this doctrine.*

I. Result of the reasons for and against this doctrine.

(1) There is not a single text in the New Testament, either in the discourses of Christ or in the writings of the Apostles, which clearly authorizes the hope of an entire and universal removal of all future punishments; but exactly the opposite of this sentiment is expressly affirmed in many passages; vid. § 157, I. 1, and II. 1.

(2) The following remarks, drawn partly from Scripture and partly from reason, may serve to illustrate and confirm, what we are taught in the Bible respecting the duration of punishment in the future world. There are two kinds of punishment which the wicked will be made to suffer; viz.

(a) *Natural punishment.* As every action morally good is followed by endless good consequences to him who performs it; so it is with every wrong action. This is founded in the wise constitution of things which God himself has established. When, therefore, *natural* punishments are spoken of, it is obvious to reason, how an eternal duration of them may be affirmed. Indeed, reason cannot con-

ceive it to be otherwise, since there is no promise of God, either in the Holy Scriptures or elsewhere, that the natural evil consequences of sins once committed will ever cease. In order to this there must be some incomprehensible miracle performed; and this God has not promised to do. Hence as far as natural punishments are concerned, their eternal duration may be affirmed, both on grounds of Scripture and reason. Cf. §157, I. 2.

(b) *Positive punishments.* With regard to these we may conceive that they may be removed; indeed, much can be said, on grounds of reason, to render this opinion *probable*. To hope that God would remove the positive punishments of sins, in case the sinner, even in the future life, should come to the knowledge of himself, and truly repent, would seem to be agreeable to the divine goodness and justice. That the repentance of the sinner in the future world is absolutely impossible, is not taught in the Scriptures; vid. 157, I. 4, coll. § 63, II. Note, respecting the fallen angels. And that even these miserable beings are by no means wholly excluded from the active proofs of the goodness and justice of God, is evident from the fact, that the Bible expressly teaches, that the lot of some of the damned will be more light and tolerable, than that of others. vid. Matt. 11: 22, 24. 10: 15. Luke 12: 48. The phrase *κόλασις αἰώνιος* may perhaps relate therefore merely to the *natural* punishments of sin, and not to the positive. Still it cannot be shown, that this phrase does and must refer exclusively to these natural punishments; and it is still possible that both these kinds of punishment may be comprehended in its meaning.—In short, no arguments which are merely *philosophical*, furnish any thing more than a certain degree of probability, on this subject; they cannot enable us to decide any thing definitely with regard to it. We know too little what the positive punishments of the future world will be, to speak decidedly with regard to them. Where the object is unknown to us, we cannot pronounce decidedly, that the predicate of *eternal duration* may not be applied to them. But allowing that positive punishments may be wholly removed from one who may have actually repented; still, the natural evil consequences of sin will not therefore, of necessity come to an end. These may, indeed, become more light and tolerable to one who has repented; but even such an one can never be happy in the same degree as another, who has never sinned. Such an one will always stand on a lower point of happiness than others, and there will always be a great gulf fixed between him and them.

(3) The wisdom which Christ and his apostles always showed in exhibiting this doctrine, should be imitated by all Christian teachers. In our practical instructions, we should never indulge in speculations, or suffer ourselves to enter upon the investigation of learned questions, which the unpractised cannot understand, and will but too easily misconstrue and pervert. Even the distinction between natural and positive punishments cannot be made perfectly plain to the unlearned; and hence it is never insisted upon in the Sacred Scriptures; and that positive punishments will ever wholly cease in the future world, can be shown incontrovertibly neither from the Bible nor any other source. It is moreover impossible to prevent the doctrine of the finite duration of future punishments, let it be stated ever so guardedly, from being perverted in various ways by the great mass of mankind, to their own injury.

Let the teacher, therefore, adhere to the simple doctrine of the Bible; the more so, considering how little we know of the future world, and how liable we are, through our ignorance, to mistake. Had more full disclosures on this subject been necessary or useful for us in the present life, they would have been given to us by God either through nature, or direct revelation, or in both these ways. But since he has not seen fit to do this, let the Christian teacher exhibit faithfully and conscientiously, that only which Christ and the Apostles taught on this subject, without either adding any thing to their testimony, or diminishing aught from it.

Note. Some modern writers, who admit that *eternal* punishments are threatened in the Bible, but who are unable to reconcile this doctrine with their preconceived philosophical or theological principles, have hit upon the thought, that God has merely threatened these eternal punishments, in order to deter men more effectually from sin, and to sustain more firmly the authority of his law; but that it depends upon himself, to what degree he will fulfil his threatenings. In executing the sentence, he can and will, it is said, abate something from the severity of the punishment threatened. So thought Tillotson, in his Sermon on the pains of Hell. And this view has appeared not improbable to many German theologians, e. g. Bushing, Bahrdr (in his "Dogmatik"), Less, and others.

But such a supposition is unworthy of God. Human legislators do, indeed, in consequence of their weakness, sometimes resort to such expedients, in order to sustain the authority of their laws. Still such measures, even among men, are generally followed by injurious consequences, and are rarely adopted except by weak princes. But with regard to God, who is faithful and true,

such a supposition is incongruous. Nor does he need any such expedients, since he cannot want for means to effect this object, without going contrary to his veracity. Besides, the whole strength and efficacy of all the threatenings connected with the divine laws, would be diminished by this supposition. For men are always inclined enough to believe, that they shall not, after all these threatenings, be dealt with so strictly and severely; because they have been accustomed to see some abatement of the penalty annexed to human laws, when it comes to be inflicted. But against so hurtful a mistake, the Holy Scriptures labor with the greatest earnestness, and every where insist upon the doctrine of the divine veracity, and the unfailing fulfilment of the divine threatenings; e. g. Heb. 4: 12, 13.

II. Sketch of the History of this doctrine among Christians.

Cf. Burnet, *De statu mortuorum et resurgentium*; also J. A. Dietelmair, *Hist. antiquior commenti fanatici de ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων*, Altorf, 1769, 8vo; and Cotta, *Historia succincta dogmatis de poenarum infernalium duratione*, Tubing. 1774.

(1) We are not to expect any deeply learned and philosophical investigations and distinctions, with regard to this subject, from the simplicity of the earliest Christian period. The teachers were then contented with the simple doctrine of the apostles which has been already exhibited, and they made use of this, with the most happy success, in their didactic and hortatory discourses. Afterwards, since the second century, when they began to mingle the philosophy of the schools with Christianity, they fell into speculation upon this doctrine. Some undertook to define the idea of αἰώνιος more accurately, and to show, that it does not necessarily imply punishments which are strictly *unending*. Others insisted upon the literal meaning of this term, and would have it taken in its strictest sense. Thus two parties were formed. These might perhaps have found some points of union, or at least of approximation, if they had properly considered the distinction between *natural* and *positive* punishments. But no traces of this distinction can be found in most of the ancients; certainly they did not see it, and all the consequences which can be derived from it, with sufficient distinctness.

(2) The doctrine that the pains of Hell are *finite* in duration, was first clearly taught by some of the Christian teachers of the Alexandrine school, in the second century. They obviously derived their mode of representation from the principles of the Platonic philosophy. Plato regarded punishments merely as *medicinal*, design-

ed to effect the cure of the disorders of men. He supposed that all spirits and souls not wholly irreclaimable, would be morally purified and renovated, by means of punishments, and would in this way attain to happiness; which however would be very different, as to its degree. But still he, as well as Socrates, believed in the unending punishment of the irreclaimable. Cf. § 150.

Even in Clement of Alexandria, we find a clear exhibition of these Platonic ideas; cf. Strom. 4 and 6. But Origen, in the third century, taught still more plainly, ἀποκατάστασιν δαιμονίων καὶ ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων, and πρόσκαιρον εἶναι κόλασιν ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων, and endeavoured to establish this doctrine by many arguments. In the works of his which are still extant, there are passages which are clearly of this import; e. g. in his works “*Contra Celsum*,” V. 15. “*De principiis*,” II. 5. Homil. 19, in Jerem.; and Athanasius, and other ancient writers are agreed, that he taught this doctrine. Some modern writers have undertaken to dispute this, though without sufficient reason.* Origen was followed in this doctrine by many of the learned Grecian fathers, e. g. Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and others of the school of Origen. Even in the Latin Church this opinion was widely disseminated in the fourth century, as we learn from Augustine and Hieronymus.

But in opposition to these, the doctrine of the *eternity* of future punishments was affirmed by other equally distinguished teachers; e. g. Gregory of Nazianzum, Basilus, John of Constantinople, and among the Latins by Hieronymus, Augustine, and others. Even in the fourth century, Origen and his adherents were severely reproached on account of this and other doctrines, which had been already freely circulated. At length the ecclesiastical anathema was pronounced upon this doctrine.—Among the opponents of the school of Origen and of their doctrine on this subject, Theophilus of Alexandria in the fourth and fifth centuries, was especially distinguished. The doctrine of Origen was therefore condemned by the fourth Council at Carthage, in the year 398, and afterwards by many other Councils, and in opposition to it, the doctrine of the

* [Neander, while he concedes that Origen taught this doctrine, thinks it is one of those points respecting which his opinion afterwards changed. Cf. Neander, Allg. Kirch. Gesch. B. I. Abth. III. S. 1098.—Tr.]

eternity of future punishment was established as the faith of the Church.

(3) Still, the doctrine of the limited duration of future punishment has never wanted defenders. Even during the dark ages and among the schoolmen, there were some who took this ground, especially Scotus Erigena in the ninth century, and the Abbot Raynaldus in the twelfth. But the great majority of teachers during this period, held fast to the opposite opinion, and endeavoured to confirm it by new arguments; so e. g. Thomas Aquinas, and others.

But this doctrine of the limited duration of future punishment fell into very ill-repute in the Western Church, on account of its being professed by some of the enthusiastic and revolutionary parties in the sixteenth century, (e. g. by the Anabaptists,) and from its being intimately connected with their expectations and schemes. The mere profession of the doctrine came to be regarded, as implying assent to the other extravagancies of these parties, and as the signal for rebellion. Hence it is rejected in the Symbolical books of the Lutheran Church, as an Anabaptistical doctrine; Augs. Confess. Art. XVII. In the form in which this doctrine was held by these sects, it deserves the most unmingled disapprobation. Again; among the ill-famed Christian free-thinkers, e. g. the Socinians, there were some who professed it. In modern times, it has been the same. This doctrine has been advocated in the Protestant Church both by men who have stood in suspicion of enthusiasm (e. g. Peterson, Lavater, and others); and by some of the free-thinkers in philosophy and theology, although for very different causes, and on very different grounds, by these two classes.

The principal advocates of the common opinion on this subject, in modern times, are Mosheim, in the Appendix to his Sermons; and among the philosophers, Leibnitz, Baumgarten in his *Dogmatik* and *Vindiciæ poenarum æternarum*, Halle, 1742; Schubert, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von der Endlichkeit der Höllenstrafen*, 3te Aufg. Jena, 1750; Heinr. Meine, *Gute Sache der Lehre von der unendlichen Dauer der Höllenstrafen*, Helmstädt, 1748; Schlitte, *Ueberlegung der beiderseitiger Gründe für und wider die unendliche Unglückseligkeit der Verbrecher*, etc. Cf. also Michaelis, *Von der Sünde*, etc.

The principal advocates of the doctrine of the limited duration of future punishments, are Soner, (in an acute philosophical work,

to which Leibnitz replied, vid. Lessing's *Beyträge zur Geschichte und Literatur*, 1r *Beytr.*, Braunschweig, 1773, S. 201); Eberhard, *Apologie des Sokrates*, Th. I. and II.; Gruner, *Theol. Dogm.* p. 636; Basedow, *Philalethie*, S. 539; Steinbart, *System u. s. w.* A work entitled *Ueber die Strafe der Verdammten und deren Dauer*, Leipzig, 1782, is composed with much reflection. The arguments on both sides are examined, and a middle course between them is chosen.—Some have supposed that the wicked, after enduring the punishments of Hell for a season, will be at last annihilated, and have called this *mortem aeternam*; vid. § 151, ad finem. But according to scriptural usage, *θάνατος* or *ὅλεθρος αἰώνιος* or *δένειρος* is not *annihilation*, but *eternal condemnation*.

ON ETERNAL BLESSEDNESS.

§ 159. *Introduction to this doctrine; and explanation of the Scriptural phrasology with regard to it.*

I. Grounds for expecting a happier life hereafter.

That a more happy life is to be expected after death, appears, even on grounds of reason, in a high degree probable, if either the present state of human life is considered, or the attributes of God, his goodness, justice, and wisdom. Cf. the arguments in behalf of the immortality of the soul, § 149. Man and his destination are the most insolvable riddle, if he has received existence merely for the present life. And this riddle can be explained only on the supposition, that the period of man's existence extends beyond the grave, and that there will properly begin the happy state, where the pious will reap the fruits of what they have sown.

The destination of man, as a moral being, is holiness and proportionate happiness. As to holiness or moral perfection, it is and

remains extremely defective during the present life ; and even those who make the greatest advances in moral excellence, still fall very far short of that high standard which is set up before them and which their own inmost feeling tells them they ought to attain. And as to *happiness*, it must be confessed, that no one in the present life is perfectly happy, either as to body or soul, although there is implanted in all by the Creator a disposition to seek for happiness, and an inextinguishable thirst to enjoy it. But how scanty and miserable is the satisfaction of this desire in the present life, even with those who in the judgment of others are enviably happy ! Beautifully and faithfully is this described in Ecclesiastes,—a book which contains the true philosophy of life.

It is true, indeed, that agreeable sensations, both bodily and spiritual, are enhanced in their value and charm, by being connected with unpleasant sensations, if the unpleasant only go before, and the pleasant follow after. Thus to the convalescent man, after he has endured great sufferings in his sickness, the mere cessation of pain, is an exquisite delight, while to those who have felt none of these sufferings, it is no source of pleasure. But an order exactly the reverse is common in the life of men here upon the earth. The most cheerful time is that of youth ; then we have the full power and bloom of life. The older we grow, the more we become entangled in business, burdened with cares, oppressed with griefs and distresses, infirmities of body and mind, perhaps with poverty and disgrace. How sad were the lot of man, if he had no future, and happier life to expect !

How many men are born with intellectual faculties and powers, which they can never fully develope here, either because they die early, or are wholly destitute of the means and opportunities for developement and cultivation. Now if existence ceases with death, this sum of powers is wholly lost. But since our Creator does not give us even our *bodily* powers in vain and for no end, how much less can he have imparted the higher intellectual and especially *moral* faculties without design !

It is no wonder, therefore, that the expectation of a more happy state after the present life, has as it were forced itself so universally upon reflecting men. But equally universal and equally well grounded, is the hope of an *unending continuance* of this future happy state. For if it is not to continue forever, it ceases to be a

truly happy condition. To foresee the end of a state of bliss, would be of itself enough to disturb the happiness which we might for a time possess, and to embitter its enjoyment; and when it should actually come to an end, it would leave us far more miserable, than we were before we had experience of this blessedness. For one who is born and brought up poor and in a state of servitude, will not feel his situation to be so miserable and oppressive, as a rich or great man, who is cast down from his elevation and brought into the same condition, will find it to be.

Great and inestimable, therefore, is the merit of Jesus Christ in giving to this doctrine of an eternal blessedness beyond the grave, that firmness and certainty, which it cannot receive from arguments of reason, by which it can be rendered only probable; and also in referring every thing, as he does, to this future life. Vid. John 20: 28. 1 John 2: 25. Rom. 2: 7, and § 148. Except for Christ we should have no satisfying certainty, to lift us above all doubt. But now this doctrine is placed in the most intimate connexion with the history of his person, since he always represents himself as the one, through whom we attain to the possession of this eternal happiness and in whose society we shall enjoy it. Cf. the Sections above cited, also § 120, II.

II. Nature and names of future blessedness.

On this subject, we have no very clear and definite knowledge, nor can we have in the present life. Men indeed usually conceive the joys of heaven to be the same as, or at least to resemble the pleasures of this world; and each one hopes to obtain with certainty, and to enjoy in full measure, beyond the grave, that good which he holds most dear upon earth,—those favorite employments or particular delights, which he ardently longs for here, but which he can seldom or never enjoy in this world, or in the enjoyment of which he has never been fully satisfied. Hence rude men, living only in the indulgence of their passions and appetites, have always expected to find in Heaven the uninterrupted enjoyment of sensual delights of every kind. The indolent man, or one who is exhausted by severe labor, regards rest and freedom from employment as the highest good, and places the chief blessedness of heaven in this. But one who reflects soberly on this subject will easily see, that the

happiness of Heaven must be a very different thing from earthly happiness. This last is of such a nature as to be soon followed by disgust and satiety. We should be very unhappy, if we should live forever in the richest profusion of the highest earthly delights and joys, even could we continue in perpetual and never-fading youth. For all earthly joys and delights of which we know any thing by experience, are of such a nature that after they have been enjoyed for a short time, they lose their relish, and then follows satiety. Experience daily confirms the truth of what is said by the Preacher, that every thing upon earth *is vanity and vexation of spirit*. If it were appointed to us *in our present condition*, to live *forever* upon the earth, in the full enjoyment of all it can afford to please and charm, our lot were indeed pitiable. Had we tasted all possible earthly pleasures, and were there none now left which could attract us by their novelty, satiated with a joyless life, we should wish ourselves dead, and even this wish, to our sorrow, would remain unsatisfied. Even that rest, or rather indolence and torpidity, which is so highly praised and so ardently longed for by some drones, would, long continued, render us perfectly miserable, and at length become wholly intolerable.

Cicero very justly remarks, that the blessed gods, according to the notion which the Epicureans entertained of them, could not possibly be happy, being without employment, and having nothing to think, through all eternity, except *belle est mihi*. Hence the bliss and joys of the future world must be of an entirely different kind, from what is called earthly joy and happiness, if we are there to be *truly happy forever*.

But since we have no distinct conceptions of those joys, which never have been and never will be experienced by us here in their full extent; we have of course no words in our language to express them, and cannot therefore expect any clear description of them, even in the Holy Scriptures. Cf. Morus p. 298, § 7, ad finem, and p. 299, note 1. Hence the Bible describes this happiness, sometimes in general terms designating its greatness (as Rom. 8: 18—22. 2 Cor. 4: 17, 18); and sometimes by various beautiful images, and figurative modes of speech, borrowed from every thing which we know to be attractive and desirable.

The greater part of these images were already common among the Jewish contemporaries of Christ, but Christ and his apostles em-

ployed them in a purer sense than the great multitude of the Jews. The Orientalists are rich in such figures. They were employed by Mohammed, who carried them, as his manner was, to an extravagant excess, but at the same time said expressly, that they were mere figures; although many of his followers afterwards understood them literally, as has been often done in a similar way by many Christians. If all which is figurative is taken away, the main idea which is left, is that of *great felicity*, which, as it is expressly said, will transcend all our expectations and conceptions. Vid. 1 John 3: 2. Col. 3: 3, *ζωὴ ἡμῶν κέκρυπται*. The passage, 1 Cor. 2: 9, *eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard*, etc. (which is taken from Is. 64: 4) does not properly relate to this subject. Judging from vs. 7, 8, the subject here treated of, is the Christian doctrine, which was before unknown, and which is not the product of human invention. Still the whole passage leads to this, that God made these extraordinary provisions through Christ, in order to bring us to the enjoyment of an unspeakable bliss. Cf. also 1 Cor. 13: 2.

The following are among the principal names of future happiness, both literal and figurative.

(1) *The literal appellations.* Ζωή, ζωὴ αἰώνιος, which, according to Hebrew usage signifies, *a happy life, vita vere vitalis, eternal well-being*. Hence the term ὁργὴ θεοῦ is opposed to it, e. g. John 3: 16, 36; also κατάρκεις, κόλασις, κ. τ. λ.—Δόξα, δόξα θεοῦ, *reward*, Rom. 2: 7. 5: 3.—Ἀφθαρσία, δόξα, τιμὴ καὶ ἀφθαρσία, Rom. 2: 7; and εἰρήνη, v. 10.—Αἰώνιον βᾶρος δόξης, *an eternal reward of full weight*, 2 Cor. 4: 17.—Σωτηρία, σωτηρία αἰώνιος, Heb. 5: 9, etc.

(2) *Figurative representations.* Among these is the name *Heaven*. The abode of the departed saints, is a place which, to us who live upon the earth, and while we remain here, is invisible and inaccessible, beyond the bound of the visible world, and entirely separated from it; there they live in the highest well-being, and in a nearer connexion with God and Christ, than here below. This place and state cannot be designated by any more fit and brief expression, than that which is found in almost every language, viz. *Heaven*; this therefore is frequently employed by the sacred writers. It is there that the highest sanctuary or temple of God is situated, i. e. it is there where the omnipresent God reveals himself most gloriously. That too is the abode of the higher spiritual creation of God.

Thither was Christ translated ; he calls it the *house of his Father*, and says that he has there prepared an abode for his followers, John 14: 2, coll. § 23, II. and § 97, II.

This place was never conceived of in ancient times, as it has been by some modern writers, as a particular *planet*, or *world*, but as the wide expanse of heaven, high above the atmosphere, or starry heaven ; hence it is sometimes called the *third* heaven, as being neither the atmosphere nor starry heaven. Vid. 2 Cor. 12: 2. The remark of Morus is good, p. 297, not. 4, “*Illud in celo esse, magis indicat statum conditionemque hominis, quam locum certum.*”

Another figurative name is *Paradise*, taken from the abode of the first man in his innocence. Vid. Vol. I. § 52, ad finem. From this it is transferred to the abode of the blessed. Luke 23: 43. 2 Cor. 12: 4. Rev. 2: 7. 22: 2.

Again, this place is called *the heavenly Jerusalem* (ἐπουράνιος, καινή, ἡ ἄνω) ; because the earthly Jerusalem was the capital city of the Jews, the place of the royal residence and the seat of the divine worship ; Gal. 4: 26. Heb. 12: 22. Rev. 3: 12.—Βασιλεία οὐρανῶν, or θεοῦ, Matt. 25: 34. James, 2: 5 ; βασιλεία ἐπουράνιος and αἰώνιος, 2 Tim. 4: 18. 2 Pet. 1: 11 ; συμβασιλεύειν τῷ Χριστῷ, 2 Tim. 2: 12, i. e. to be distinguished, honored, and happy as he is,—to enjoy royal felicity. Cicero says, *tum nos regnare videbamus*. The Stoics say, *omnem sapientem regnare*.—Κληρονομία and κληρος, (according the Heb. שָׂרָה and לָקַח, *possidere, to attain to possession*,) the possessing, and fully enjoying happiness, as the ancient Israelites did Palestine. Hence κληρονομία τετηρημένη ἐν οὐρανοῖς, 1 Pet. 1: 4. Heb. 9: 15.—*To sit down at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, i. e. to share with the pious of antiquity in the joys of salvation ; *to be in Abraham's bosom*, i. e. to sit next to Abraham, Luke 16: 22. Matt. 8: 11. Vid. Wetstein ad h. l.—Σαββατισμός or ἀνάπανσις, ἄνεσις, Heb. 4: 10: 11, where it denotes the happiness of pious Christians both in this life, and that to come.—Στέφανος δικαιοσύνης, the reward of piety, 2 Tim. 4: 8. Phil. 3: 14.

(3) As to the abode of perfected and happy men *after the Judgment*, when their souls will be again united with their bodies, the opinions of men have been very different. It is of chief importance to notice, that it is always described in the New Testament as a very delightful and happy place. Moreover the Apostles teach dis-

tinctly, that this earth, after the present state of things is ended, will be renewed, and fitted for the ordinary residence of those whose souls will be again united with their bodies, in short, of the saints who will be raised; vid. 2 Pet. 3: 13, where he speaks of a *new heavens* and a *new earth*. Hence it is said in the Apocalypse, that the New Jerusalem in heaven (i. e. the abode of the departed souls of the pious) will, after the resurrection (when their souls will be again united with the body), be let down (*καταβαίνειν*) to the earth (now renewed and beautified). Rev. 21: 1, sq. coll. Rom. 8: 18, sq.

§ 160. *What do reason and Scripture teach, and lead us to expect, in a general view, as to the real nature of future blessedness?*

The sum of what we are taught by reason and Scripture on this point, may be comprehended under the three following particulars; (a) We shall hereafter be entirely freed from the sufferings of this life; (b) Our future blessedness will be a continuation of the happiness of this life; (c) But it will also be increased by the addition of many new joys, which stand in no natural or necessary connexion with our preceding condition in this life.

I. Entire freedom from the sufferings and adversities of this present earthly life.

This is often expressed in the Bible by words which denote *rest*, *repose*, *refreshment* after performing labor and suffering affliction, e. g. *ἀνεσις*, *ἀνάπαυσις*, *σαββατισμός* (not *inactivity*, entire freedom from employment, or indolence, vid. § 159); vid. 2 Thess. 1: 7, "God will give to you, who are troubled, *ἀνεσιν*." Heb. 4: 9, 11. Rev. 14: 13, "they rest from their labors," where *λόποι*, like *labores*, signifies *molestiæ*, *afflictions*, and not *employments*; cf. Morus, p. 299, n. 1. Cf. also Rev. 7: 17, God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes."

This exemption from the evils of the present life, includes, according to the New Testament,

(1) Deliverance from the earthly body, the seat of the lower

principles of our nature and of our sinful corruption, and the cause of so many evils and sufferings, 2 Cor. 5: 1, 2. 1 Cor. xv. Vid. § 153.

(2) Entire separation from the society of wicked and evil disposed persons, who in various ways injure the righteous man, and embitter his life on earth; 2 Tim. 4. 18, *ῥύσεται με ἀπὸ παντός ἔργου πονηροῦ* (i.e. men who do evil). It is hence accounted as making a part of the felicity of Christ in Heaven, that he is there separated from sinners (*κεχωρισμένος*), Heb. 7: 26.

(3) Every thing here upon the earth is inconstant, and subject to perpetual change; and incapable of satisfying our expectations and desires. Every thing is vanity. Even the pleasures and joys of this life are of such a nature, that they lead to satiety and disgust, when they are long continued; vid. § 159. But in the world to come, it will be different. The bliss of the saints will continue, without interruption or change, without fear of termination, and without satiety;—*στρέφανος ἀφθαρτος, ἀμύαντος, ἀμάραντος, a crown ever new and beautiful*, in opposition to the fading crowns of earthly victors; 1 Pet. 1: 4. 5: 10. 2 Cor. 4: 16, 18. Luke 20: 36. 1 John 3: 2, et passim.—From hence, it is also manifest, that the joys of the pious in the future world will be capable of a constant increase, an ever progressive enlargement. For every thing uniform and stationary produces satiety and disgust. In the heavenly world, then, there will be no sameness and stagnant uniformity of joy.

Note. The question is here asked, whether the pious, in the future world, will be entirely delivered from natural depravity or the preponderance of sense over reason? Whether their obedience to God, and their virtue, will be so entirely confirmed, that they will be forever free from all danger of sinning? If we would agree with the Holy Scriptures, we must answer this question in the affirmative. The whole analogy of Christian doctrine implies that this will be so; and so clearly, that it does not need any farther proof. That the state of the saint in the future world, will be one of secure and confirmed holiness, may also be deduced incontrovertibly from the doctrine of the perfectionment and ennobling of the body. The seat of carnal appetite and of sin, is in the earthly and mortal body; and from this we shall then be freed, and shall possess, like Christ, a heavenly body, § 77, and § 153. According to 1 Cor. xv. our body will no more then be *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, but *πνευματικόν*. There is no need therefore of resorting to Purgatory, to explain how man may be hereafter purged from hereditary depravity. The possibility of sinning will, however, still remain, as it was with man in his original innocence, and as it is with the Holy angels. But the blessed saints in heaven will not *wish* to sin.

For the preponderance of sense will then be entirely removed; nor will they any longer meet with those external hindrances—those allurements to sin which obstructed their piety here upon the earth. On the contrary they will there have the strongest attractions and motives to piety,—more enlarged views, good examples, etc. And these means are sufficient to confirm the saints in goodness.

II. Continuance of the happiness of the present life.

When the soul leaves the body, it will retain the consciousness of whatever passed within it, while here upon the earth. It carries along with it, into the future world, the ideas, the knowledge, the habits, which it possessed here. And so it takes also good and evil from this life into the next, as its own property, and there receives the fruit of it. It is therefore certain, that a part of the heavenly blessedness will consist in the consciousness and recollection of the good enjoyed and performed in the foregoing life, and in that cheerfulness and peace of mind, which will proceed from the thought of this. As to the wicked, the case will be reversed. This, now, is one of the *natural* good consequences or rewards of virtue and piety; and the opposite, is one of the natural evil consequences or punishments of sin. Vid. §§ 156, 157.

From what has now been said, it follows of course, that there will be a *difference of degree* (*diversitas graduum*) in the happiness of saints in heaven. The happiness of all will be equally eternal, but not equally intense. The more good actions, such as are acceptable in the sight of God, one has performed, the nobler his virtues were, the greater the difficulties and hindrances which he had to overcome; the greater will be his reward. That this should be otherwise, neither the goodness nor justice of God permit us to believe. Thus, for example, two men, one of whom had devoted his whole life to virtue and piety, while the other had put off reflection to a late period, and then first renounced his former sins, could not possibly be equal to each other in reward. Vid. § 127, II. In short, the happiness of each individual will be exactly apportioned to his susceptibility of happiness. Great and various as may be his capacity or susceptibility for the enjoyment of happiness; just so great and various will his happiness certainly be hereafter. The very different talents, powers, and knowledge of men, and the use they have made of them, also make a great difference, as to the capacity for happiness.

All this is perfectly accordant with the Christian doctrine. Cf. the parables, Matt. 25: 14, sq. and Luke 19: 16—19; also 2 Cor. 9: 6, “he who soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly; and he who soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully;” coll. Gal. 6: 7; 1 Cor. 3: 8, “every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor” (κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόπον); Rom. 2: 10, “to him who worketh good, glory, honor, and peace, will be given, Ἰουδαίῳ προῖον (since from his greater knowledge he could do more good), καὶ Ἕλληνι,” in opposition to the punishment spoken of v. 9.

This sentiment is not contrary to the declaration of Christ, *the last shall be first*, etc.; Matt. 19: 30. 20: 1—16, the parable of the laborers in the vineyard. For all which Christ there says has respect to the mercenary question of Peter, *What shall we receive in return?* In opposition to this, Christ teaches, that men must not undertake to prescribe to God, when and how he shall bestow rewards: in their dealings with him they must not insist upon recompense; for men have deserved no reward at the hand of God, which they can claim as a right. They ought rather, conscious of their own unworthiness, to expect this reward, with humility and submission, only because God, of his mere good mercy, has promised it. Cf. Cotta, *De diversis gradibus gloriae beatorum*, Tub. 1773.

Note 1. The Christian doctrine requires of every one who desires to partake of eternal happiness, that he should possess a humble and unpretending spirit, and should be deeply convinced that he *deserves* nothing by his good deeds, and has not so merited the rewards of the world to come that he can claim them as his right. This disposition is finely represented in Matt. 25: 37, sq., where Christ says, that the pious will be hereafter surprised to find themselves so rewarded, as they will not be conscious of having done any thing to deserve such rewards. On the contrary, the wicked, v. 44, suppose they have done much good, but are notwithstanding sent away into the place of torment. Vid. especially Luke 13: 26, sq.

Note 2. According to the Christian doctrine, such actions only as flow from grateful love to God and Christ, can be consistently rewarded; for these virtues only are recognized by Scripture as having any good desert. Hence in Matt. 25: 35, 36, Christ himself specifies such deeds as are active proofs of faith in him, and of grateful love to him. Vid. §§ 124, 125, respecting good works. One who does good from impure motives, has, as Christ says, already received his reward.

III. Positive rewards in the future world.

Besides being exempt from all earthly trials, and having a continuance of that happiness which we had begun to enjoy even here, we have good reason to expect hereafter, other rewards and joys, which stand in no natural or necessary connexion with the present life. For our entire felicity would be extremely defective and scanty, should it be confined merely to that which we carry with us from the present world, to that peace and joy of soul which result from reflecting on what we may have done which is good and pleasing in the sight of God; since even the best man will always discover great imperfections in all that he has done. Our felicity would also be incomplete were we compelled to stop short with that meagre and elementary knowledge which we take with us from this world,—that knowledge so broken up into fragments, and yielding so little fruit, and which, poor as it is, many good men, from lack of opportunity and without any fault on their part, never here acquire. Besides the natural rewards of goodness, there must, therefore, be others which are *positive* and depending on the will of the supreme Legislator.

On this point almost all philosophers are for the above reasons agreed, even those who will admit of no *positive punishments* in the world to come. But for want of accurate knowledge of the state of things in the future world, we can say nothing definite and certain as to the nature of these positive rewards. Vid. § 159, I. In the doctrine of the New Testament, however, positive rewards are considered most obviously as belonging to our future felicity, and as constituting a principal part of it. For it always represents the joys of heaven, as resulting strictly from the *favor of God*, and as being *undeserved* by those to whom they are given. Hence there must be something more added to the natural good consequences of our actions, something which cannot be considered as the necessary and natural consequences of the good actions we may have before performed. But on this subject, we know nothing more in general than this, that God will so appoint and order our circumstances, and make such arrangements, that the principal faculties of our souls, reason and affection, will be heightened and developed, so that we shall continually obtain more pure and distinct knowledge of the truth, and make continual advances in holiness.

The following particular remarks may be of some use in illustrating this subject.

(1) In this life, God has very wisely allotted various capacities, powers, and talents, in different ways and degrees, to different men, according to the various ends for which he designs them, and the business in which he employs them. Now there is not the least reason to suppose, that God will abolish this variety in the future world; it will rather continue there, in all its extent. We must suppose, then, that there will be, even in the heavenly world, a diversity of tastes, of labors and employments, and that to one person this, to another that, field in the boundless kingdom of truth and of useful occupation, will be assigned for his cultivation, according to his peculiar powers, qualifications, and tastes.

A presentiment of this truth is contained in the idea, which was widely diffused throughout the ancient world, viz. that the Manes will still prosecute, in the future life, the employments to which they had been here accustomed. At least, such arrangements will doubtless be made by God in the future life, that each individual will there develop more and more, the germs implanted within him by the hand of the Creator; and will be able more fully than he even could here, to satisfy the wants of his intellectual nature, and thus to make continual progress in the knowledge of every thing worthy of being known, of which he could learn only the simplest elements in this world; and he will be able to do this in such a way, that the increase of knowledge will not be detrimental to piety, as it often proves on earth, but rather promotive of it. To the sincere and ardent searcher after truth, it is a rejoicing and consoling thought, that he will be able hereafter to perfect that knowledge, which here has so many deficiencies; vid. 1 Cor. 13: 9, sq.

But there is danger here of going too far, and of falling into those strange conceptions, of which we find so many examples in the writings of Lavater. Various as the tastes and wants of men in the future world will doubtless be, they will still be in many respects different from what they are here; because the whole sphere of action, and the objects by which we shall there be surrounded, will be different. We shall there have a changed and more perfect body, and by this single circumstance shall be freed at once from many of the wants and inclinations, which have their seat in the earthly body. And this will also contribute much to rectify, en-

large, and perfect our knowledge. Many things which seem to us very important and essential during this our state of infancy upon earth, will hereafter doubtless appear in a different light; we shall look upon them as trifles and children's play, and employ ourselves in more important occupations, the utility and interest of which we may have never before thought of.

Some theologians have supposed, that the saints in heaven may be taught by *immediate divine revelations* (*lumen gloriæ*); especially those who may enter the abodes of the blessed, without knowledge or with only a small measure of it; e. g. children, and others who have died in an ignorance for which they themselves were not to blame. On this subject nothing is definitely taught in the Scriptures; but both Scripture and reason warrant us in believing, that provision will be made for all such persons in the future world; vid. § 126, II.

Note. In the popular exhibition of the whole doctrine of future blessedness, much prudence and caution are requisite; and the teacher must pay careful attention to the difference of education and intellectual culture among his hearers. This is particularly necessary with regard to the point introduced in the foregoing paragraph. The importance which the learned and educated man attaches to the culture of his *intellectual* powers, and to the increase of knowledge, may easily lead him into the mistake of insisting, even in his religious discourses, too much on the importance of this *for every one*, and of representing it as constituting a chief part of the employments and joys of the future life. But the great mass of mankind have but little taste for this intellectual culture. They even associate with it the idea of severe labor and toil, because thinking and learning are so difficult to them. It is the same as to the expectation of *increased activity* hereafter. This has no charm for the great mass of mankind, because their bodily labors are so oppressive. They find more satisfactions in the idea of *rest and refreshment*, with regard to which, however, they should be taught, that the rest of Heaven is not a state of entire inactivity; vid. § 159. They prefer to hear of the cessation of all their pains, and the drying of all their tears; cf. Rev. 7: 17, etc.—It is therefore very necessary, in presenting this subject before popular assemblies, to have regard to the different wants, conceptions, and dispositions of men, and thus to imitate the example of Christ and the Apostles.

(2) A principle part of our future happiness will consist, according to the Christian doctrine, in the enlargement and correcting of our knowledge respecting God, his nature, attributes, and works, and in the salutary application of this knowledge to our own moral benefit, to the increase of our faith, love, and obedience. There has been some controversy among theologians with regard to the *Vision of God*, (*visio Dei intuitiva* or *sensitiva*, or *beatifica*, or *comprehensiva*). The question is, Whether the Saints will hereafter behold God with the eyes of the glorified body, or only with the eyes

of the mind, i. e. merely know him with the understanding. On this point, there was dispute even in the ancient Oriental Church among the Nestorians, some of whom advocated the bodily vision of God, and were on this account blamed by others. Even in the Latin Church, too, there was controversy on this point among the schoolmen, and the different theological schools of the Romish Church. And this was transmitted to the Protestant Church of the seventeenth century; since Musæus, and other theologians of Jena, rejected the doctrine of the bodily vision of God; which was, on the other hand, advocated by the theologians of Wittemberg.

But in the Scriptures, God is always represented as a being *invisible by the bodily eye* (ἀόρατον), as indeed every spirit is; vid. § 19. The texts of Scripture which speak of *seeing God*, have been misunderstood; they signify sometimes, *the more distinct knowledge of God*, as we speak of knowing by seeing, of seeing with the eyes of the mind; so John 1: 18. 3: 2. 4: 12, coll. v. 20. 1 Tim. 6: 16; and Paul uses βλέπειν and γινώσκειν as synonymous, 1 Cor. 13: 12, 13, coll. v. 10.—Again, they express the idea of *felicity*, the enjoyment of God's favor, the being thought worthy of his friendship, etc. Still more frequently are both of these meanings comprehended under the phrase *to see God*. The image is taken from oriental princes, to see whose faces and to be in whose presence, was esteemed a great favor. Cf. Matt. 5: 8. Heb. 12 14, “without holiness οὐδεις ὄψεται τὸν κύριον.” The opposite of this is, to be removed from God and from his face.

But Christ is always represented as one, who will be *personally visible* by us, and whose personal, familiar intercourse and guidance we shall enjoy. And herein Christ himself places a chief part of the joy of the saints, John xiv. xvii. etc. And so the Apostles often describe the blessedness of the pious, by the phrase *being with Christ*. To his guidance has God entrusted the human race, in heaven, and on earth. And Paul says, 2 Cor. 4: 6, we see “the brightness of the divine glory in the face of Christ,”—he is “the visible representative of the invisible God,” Col. 1: 15. Vid. § 120, respecting the office of Christ.

(3) According to the representation contained in the Holy Scriptures, the saints will dwell together in the future world, and form, as it were, a kingdom or state of God; cf. Luke xvi. 20: 38. Rom. 8: 10. Rev. 7: 9. Heb. 12: 23. They will there partake of

a common felicity. Their enjoyment will doubtless be very much heightened by friendship, and by their confiding intercourse with each other. We must however separate all earthly imperfection from our conceptions of this heavenly society. But, that we shall there recognize our former friends, and shall be again associated with them, was uniformly believed by all antiquity; vid. § 150, II. 2. This idea was admitted as altogether rational, and as a consoling thought, by the most distinguished ancient philosophers; cf. the speech of the dying Socrates, recorded by Plato, and translated by Cicero in his *Tusculan Questions*, I. 41. This too was the opinion of Cicero, as may be seen from his treatise, *De Senectute*, c. 23, and *De Amicitia*, c. 3, 4.

And yet there have been Christians, and even teachers, calling themselves *Christian* teachers, who have blamed, and even ridiculed, other Christians for comforting themselves under the loss of those who were dear to them, by cherishing the joyful hope of seeing them again, and renewing after death the friendship here formed. Even reason regards this as in a high degree probable; but to one who believes the Holy Scriptures, it cannot be a matter of doubt or conjecture. For,

(a) The Scriptures assure us, that we shall hereafter see Christ, and shall enjoy his personal intercourse and friendship. So John 14: 3, "I will take you to myself; where I am, there shall ye be also;" cf. 1 Pet. 1: 8. According to John 17: 24, we shall be eye-witnesses and participators of his glory.

(b) Paul says expressly, 1 Thess. 4: 17, that we shall be with Christ, *in company with our friends who died before us* (ἅμα σὺν ἀν-
τοῖς). And this presupposes, that we shall recognize them, and have intercourse with them, as with Christ himself. Paul advises that Christians should comfort themselves, under the loss of their friends, by considering that they are at home with the Lord, and that they shall be again united together.

The objections made against this opinion are of no weight. It is said, for example, that the body of the saints will be entirely changed, and cannot therefore be recognized. But it would need to be proved, that this change is of such a nature as to make it impossible to recognize a person to be the same whom we before knew. And even were this allowed, it is not merely through the body that we can recognize each other. Even friends here upon the earth,

who have never seen each other's faces, disclose themselves by conversation and agreement of soul. Indeed we can, even upon earth, through the instrumentality of others, become again acquainted with old friends whom we had forgotten. And why may not this be the case in the world to come ?

Again, it is objected that Christ himself says, Matt. 22: 30, that the relation of persons connected by marriage will cease in the heavenly world. It is said, moreover, that the love which exists between husband and wife, and also between parent and child, is rather of a bodily, than a spiritual nature, and therefore will wholly cease, when this gross earthly body is thrown off.

Answer. It is true indeed, that this connexion and love, so far as it is founded in the distinction of sexes and in blood-relationship, will cease ; there will be no wedlock, no sexual propensities, and no gross material bodies in the heavenly world. But friendship, in virtuous and pious minds, does not depend upon these circumstances, but rather upon conformity of intellectual tastes and dispositions. Whatever, therefore, is merely sensual and corporeal in love and friendship here upon the earth, will there fall away ; but whatever is *spiritual*, which is the essential and nobler part of friendship, will remain, and constitute a great part of the bliss of heaven. Cf. Less, *De beatorum in cœlis Consortio*, in his *Opusc. Theol.* P. II. p. 329, sq. ; also Ribbeck's *Sermons* on this subject ; and Engel's little Work, "*Wir werden uns wiedersehen.*" Villaume, in his *Inquiries on some psychological Questions*, denies, in his second Essay (whether, in the future life, we shall remember the present), that we shall hereafter have any recollection of our lives on earth ; because he regards memory as a *bodily* faculty, affected and often destroyed by bodily injuries. But here he mistakes the exercise of a power, for the existence of the power itself. He also denies, that friends will recognize each other in the life to come.

Note. The question is asked, whether the pleasures pertaining to the body, and bodily employments, will continue in the life to come ? There can be no hesitation, if we follow the Scriptures, in answering both these questions in the affirmative. For what purpose will saints in the life to come have a body again, if it is not to be still the organ through which they will feel and act ? It is therefore justly concluded, that the pleasures and employments of Heaven are not merely spiritual, but also *bodily*. Paul too says, according to the most natural interpretation of the passage, Rom. 8: 18, sq. that all nature will be ennobled and beautified, for the residence of the friends of God ; and that they will dwell in a world which will minister pleasure to the refined senses of the spiritual body.

But in what these corporeal pleasures and employments will consist, can-

not now be understood by us, because we know nothing of the nature of the future body, of its organs, or of the objects by which we shall then be surrounded. So much is certain, however, that these will be different from corporeal pleasures and employments here upon the earth. This is clearly taught in the New Testament. E. g. Christ says, Matt. 22: 20, that the saints, at the resurrection, will be like the *angels of God* (as we justly conceive of them); "they will not marry, nor be given in marriage," because the end of marriage, the propagation of the race, will no longer exist. Nor will the glorified body be nourished and sustained by eating and drinking; vid. 1 Cor. 16: 13; cf. § 153. Hence it is obvious, that Christ employed the phrase, *to sit down* (at table) *with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, which was common among his contemporaries, in a figurative sense.

The following are some of the most important or most celebrated works on the Life Eternal, and the joys of the blessed above: viz. On the History of this doctrine, Burnet, also Cotta, in his "*Historia dogmatis de vita æterna*;" vid. § 149, ad finem. This subject is treated doctrinally and philosophically in Cotta's "*Theses Theol. de vita æterna*," Tubing. 1758. A poetical delineation of this doctrine may be seen in Lavater's "*Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*." In this work, while we find many very beautiful and happy thoughts, and fine observations, we feel the want of just interpretation of Scripture, and calm and unimpassioned investigation. He gives himself entirely to the wing of his bold imagination, and treats the subject rather as a poet than a philosopher. A more strictly philosophical and theological investigation of this subject is found in the work of C. L. de Villette, *Unterredungen über die Glückseligkeit des zukünftigen Lebens*, translated from the French into the German, and accompanied with a Preface, by Spalding, Berlin, 1766, 8vo. Cf. also Carl Wilhelm Goldhammer's *Betrachtungen über das zukünftige Leben*, u. s. w. 2 Thl. Leipzig, 1791,—a work written with warmth of feeling and in a popular manner. The scriptural grounds of this doctrine are briefly and thoroughly investigated by Storr, in his *Comment. de beata Vita post Mortem*, p. 75, Tom. II. of his *Opusc. Academica*.

